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Abstract
For most of West Germany's history, the FDP has been the smallest 
party in the German system. However, in relation to their numerical 
weakness, the Liberals have exerted a disproportionally large influence 
on German foreign policy, especially in the field of Ostpolitik/German 
policy. With a special emphasis on the years 1974-1990 and on Hans- 
Dietrich Genscher's role as Foreign Minister, this dissertation examines 
the question how the FDP, at times barely making it into the Bundestag, 
could come to have such a strong impact on German Ostpolitik. Equally, 
this study is concerned with the constraints on the Free Democrats' 
freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy.
The following parameters are investigated to explain and define the 
FDP's capacities for action in foreign policy: (1) the impact of 
international relations, (2) the domestic context, and (3) the historical- 
ideological aspects of liberal foreign policy. Since the Free Democrats 
were in government with two different partners during the time period in 
question, the impact of these three parameters is examined during the 
Social-Liberal coalition (1974-82) and the Christian-Liberal coalition 
(1982-1990) respectively.
Three main and related conclusions emerge from this study. First, 
that the international climate, while setting a tight framework for the 
Free Democrats' foreign policy, simultaneously allowed a number of 
specific FDP (Genscher) initiatives to have some impact on East-West 
relations, much more so during the 1980s than during the 1970s. Second, 
that the domestic context had nearly opposite effects on the FDP's foreign 
policy before and after 1982: during their coalition with the SPD, the 
domestic factors constrained the Free Democrats' capacities for action, 
while during the Christian-Liberal coalition, the FDP was able to exploit 
the domestic-political constellations to its advantage. And third, that 
contrary to what the literature on the Free Democrats posits, liberal 
ideology and personalities not only substantially influenced the FDP's 
Ostpolitik between 1974 and 1990, but provided a crucial element of 
continuity, consistency and indeed identity for the party.
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Chapter I. Introduction
9
Introduction to the research problem
Germany’s geopolitical position in the middle of Europe has 
compelled every German statesman since Bismarck to pursue some kind 
of Eastern policy. The question of Eastern policy has naturally been tied 
up with Germany's whole foreign policy concept and thus played a very 
important role: if Germany decided to pursue favourable relations with 
the East, it was bound to alienate its Western neighbours, and if it 
concluded agreements with the West, it surely troubled the East. In 
addition, there was the constant danger that East and West would ally 
themselves against Germany which made alliances towards one side or the 
other absolutely compulsory.
The importance of Eastern policy for German foreign policy and 
for Germany as a whole increased even more after World War II. East- 
West polarisation now occupied the whole world in form of the Cold 
War, and Germany as divided country - with one half forming part of the 
Eastern bloc and the other half siding with the West - became the symbol 
of East-West conflict pure and simple. One would thus expect that 
interest and influence on a matter of such importance would mostly be 
reserved for two very influential factors in Germany's political system: 
the two big parties, CDU/CSU and SPD. And it is true that both of them 
have been responsible for important initiatives in Ostpolitik, the Social 
Democrats with their innovative approach much more so than the Union.
Considering the fact, however, that for most of the Federal 
Republic's history, the FDP has been the smallest party in the German 
system, in relation to their numerical weakness, Liberals have played a 
disproportionally large role in German foreign policy, especially in the 
field of Ostpolitik/German policy. With a special emphasis on the years 
1974-1990 and on Hans-Dietrich Genscher's role as Foreign Minister, 
this dissertation examines the question of how the FDP, at times barely 
making it into the Bundestag, could come to have such a strong effect on 
German Ostpolitik. Equally, this study is concerned with the constraints 
on the Free Democrats' freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy.
'Ostpolitik,' a term at the core of this dissertation, will be used as 
follows: Ostpolitik, translated literally, means 'Eastern policies,' a policy 
of conducting relations with the Eastern European states, including the 
Soviet Union. However, from the late 1960s onwards, Ostpolitik has 
come to mean a policy of detente with the Eastern European countries,
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based on acceptance of Europe's post-war division. Since this study is 
predominantly concerned with German Ostpolitik in the 1970s and 1980s, 
Ostpolitik will refer to a policy of rapprochement with Eastern Europe. 
Frequently, Ostpolitik has been inseparably linked with other foreign 
policy matters, such as German policy, defence and economic 
cooperation. Whenever this has been the case, the definition of Ostpolitik 
will be extended to cover the overlap. However, sometimes 
'Deutschlandpolitik' will also be used as an independent term, referring 
to policies exclusively concerning the two Germanies.
While the thesis focuses on the Free Democratic Party as a whole, 
special consideration will be given to Hans-Dietrich Genscher who, for 
most of the time period in question, held the triple function of Vice 
Chancellor (1974-92), Foreign Minister (1974-92) and Party Chairman 
(1974-85). Although in practice, the position of Vice Chancellor has been 
a honorific one, it nevertheless highlighted Genscher's personal 
importance in German politics and the FDP's strong position as coalition 
partner. Furthermore, Genscher's occupation of the post of Foreign 
Minister for eighteen years not only rendered him the longest-serving 
Foreign Minister in the Western world, but also had obvious implications 
for his impact on German foreign policy, i.e. in terms of knowing the 
diplomatic scene both at home and abroad. Genscher's say in Liberal 
politics was further enhanced by his function as FDP Chairman from 
1974 until 1985, which meant that - in addition to foreign policy - he also 
influenced the FDP's policy in all other areas, continuously aiming at 
ensuring the party's survival in power.
In trying to find some explanation for this apparent inconsistency, 
that is the contrast between the FDP's size and its impact, the following 
parameters are investigated to define the Free Democrats' room for 
manoeuvre in foreign policy: (1) the impact of international relations, (2) 
the domestic context, and (3) the historical-ideological aspects of liberal 
foreign policy. Let us take each point in turn and first take a closer look 
at the impact of international relations on the FDP's foreign policy.
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International relations and German foreign policy
In an age of increasing interdependence, it is impossible to examine 
any country’s foreign policy without taking its international environment 
into account. Due to the special circumstances of the Federal Republic's 
creation and its geopolitical position as divided country and Cold War 
mirror in the middle of Europe, West Germany has depended on 
international circumstances even more than other countries. In attempting 
to find an answer to the seeming paradox between the FDP's smallness 
and its strong presence in foreign policy, this study will consequently 
look at (1) how Germany's external constraints have affected the Free 
Democrats' foreign policy-making and (2) whether the Liberals 
themselves have somewhat contributed to international relations between 
1974 and 1990.
Before turning to the external impact on German foreign policy, it 
should be stressed that international relations of course usually affected 
West Germany as a whole and not only individual parties. Hence, there 
will only be special reference to the Free Democratic Party when 
international developments specifically influenced it, or when the FDP's 
Ostpolitik in return affected international relations. Even though there 
may not always be an immediate link between Germany's external 
environment and the Free Democrats, an examination of Bonn's 
international framework nevertheless forms an integral part of this study. 
Given Germany's intense dependence on the wider context of East-West 
relations, the Free Democrats' room for manoeuvre in foreign policy 
cannot be comprehensively defined without taking the external 
environment into account.
External constraints on German foreign policy-making
Due to Germany's enormous dependence upon external factors 
from the very beginning of its existence, the concept of "compatibility" 
has played a significant role in the Federal Republic. "Compatibility," as 
defined by Wolfram Hanrieder, is "intended to assess the degrees of 
feasibility of foreign policy goals, given the structures and opportunities 
of the international system."1 This dissertation will analyse the
1 Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy, p.7
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compatibility of Liberal Ostpolitik with the following structures and 
opportunities of Germany's external environment: the superpower 
climate, inner-German relations and alliance politics.
Superpower climate
A central question will be how far the Federal Republic's efforts 
for constructive relations with the Communist bloc have been compatible 
with the climate between the superpowers and with the domestic and 
foreign-political aspirations of the respective US and Soviet leadership. 
Have bad relations between the superpowers automatically limited West 
Germany's room for manoeuvre in Ostpolitik, and likewise, has a 
relaxation of Cold War tension or superpower leadership in return 
increased the FDP's chances for an active conduct of Ostpolitik? In this 
context, the link between Ostpolitik and arms control/demilitarisation will 
also be examined. The question is to what degree the Federal Republic's 
room for manoeuvre towards Eastern Europe has been determined by the 
success or failure of superpower summitry dealing with defence and arms 
control.
Inner-German relations
In addition, this study will investigate how Bonn's Ostpolitik has 
been affected by the two German states' membership in antagonistic 
alliances. How did the Free Democrats cope with the need to consider 
East Germany's importance for Soviet politics and security calculations 
whenever striving for progress in inner-German relations? Furthermore, 
the question is whether the two Germanies succeeded in their attempt to 
shield inner-German cooperation from the ups and downs in US-Soviet 
relations.
Alliance politics - linkage and bargaining
This thesis will furthermore seek to analyse how Germany's 
dependence on NATO, and particularly the US security guarantee, has 
constrained West German foreign policy makers. In other words, the use 
of 'linkage' in the Atlantic Alliance will be examined, based on the 
following definition by William Wallace:
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"Linkage between unrelated or only loosely-related issues in 
order to gain increased leverage in negotiation is an ancient and 
accepted aspect of diplomacy - a means of widening the threats 
or rewards at stake in international bargaining, with the hoped- 
for pay-off of increasing the incentive to accede to a 
government's demands."2
All German governments since the Second World War have been aware 
of the 'linkage' between Washington's commitment of troops to 
Germany's defence and the Federal Republic's firm and visible 
commitment to NATO and the West. Bonn's dependence on the Western 
Allies for a solution to the German national question and to the Berlin 
controversies must also be considered here. The question is how the 
federal government, and the FDP in particular, tried to make sure that 
the German division would not become subject to any bilateral or 
multilateral agreement concluded between 1974 and 1989, and how Bonn 
strove for the Western Allies' support for progress on the Berlin issue.
The F D P ’s contributions to international relations
While external constraints have led Germany to certain foreign 
policy actions, its foreign policy actions and reactions have in return 
influenced the international environment. According to Philip Windsor, 
Germany has been important for international relations because in some 
ways, it has "...held the key to the future of the Cold War, or to the 
detente which might follow it."3 Given this study's focus on Liberal 
Ostpolitik between 1974 and 1990, the main question will be whether the 
Free Democrats have to an extent contributed to the development of East- 
West relations during the time period in question.
Economic leverage
To begin with, the thesis will investigate how the Federal Republic, 
once termed an "economic giant but a political dwarf" by Willy Brandt, 
tried to circumvent its political weakness by using its economic strength
^Wallace, Atlantic Relations, p. 164
^Windsor, p.239
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as a lever for exerting influence in other areas. More specifically, the 
question will be how West German politicians (with a special focus on the 
Free Democrats), have utilized 'positive economic leverage,' defined by 
Angela Stent as "...the use of positive economic means in the pursuit of 
political goals..." in the attempt to elicit certain humanitarian concessions 
from Eastern Europe.4 It will also be examined whether the Liberals 
employed 'negative economic leverage' during the 1970s and 1980s by 
withdrawing economic assistance to the Warsaw Pact in order to retaliate 
for Communist measures harming detente.
The FDP's agenda
In attempting to analyse West Germany's impact on its external 
environment, this dissertation will also look at the issues most actively 
promoted by the Free Democratic Party. It will investigate how the Free 
Democrats tried to increase their room for manoeuvre in foreign policy 
precisely by stressing Germany's firm commitment to democratic 
alliances like NATO and the European Communities. How successful 
were the Liberals in their attempt to utilize European Political 
Cooperation as a framework for gaining a greater say in international 
negotiations and organizations, and how did the Free Democrats try to 
translate their specific interest in more human rights and reunification 
into an international agenda? Lastly, the question will be considered 
whether through the judicious seizing of opportunities, a statesman like 
Genscher could occasionally influence external developments as much as 
he was influenced by them.
The domestic context
In addition to analysing the impact of international relations, any 
examination of the German Liberal Party's role in foreign policy 
inevitably also requires a consideration of the domestic context in which 
the Free Democrats have operated. Hence, this section will turn to the 
question of how far the FDP's domestic environment - the German 
constitution, public opinion and the structure of the party system - help to
^Stent, p. 10
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explain the Liberals' strong presence in Ostpolitik between 1974 and 
1990.
C o n s ti tu tio n a l f ra m e w o rk  o f  f o r  e ig n -p o lic y -m a k in g  in 
G erm any
Officially, the Federal Chancellor is the principal decision-maker 
in foreign policy, entitled by Article 65 of the Basic Law to 
"...determine, and be responsible for, the general policy guidelines."5 In 
practice, however, the conduct of foreign policy in Germany has not been 
the Chancellor's monopoly, (1) because foreign policy has been initiated 
by the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister and agreed upon by the 
Cabinet, and (2) because each Chancellor has to make sure that he enjoys 
both his party's and his coalition partner's support in the Bundestag. This 
dependency of foreign policy-making on a functioning party system has 
provided the Free Democrats with much leverage in the process.
Let us therefore next take a look at the role of political parties in 
Germany. The Basic Law is unique in assigning parties a key role in 
German political life - according to Article 21, their task is to 
"...participate in the formation of the political will of the people." Parties 
are the strongest non-governmental factors in the formulation of foreign 
policy and are supposed to act as responsible agents of the electorate in 
the conduct of government. Without doubt, the FDP, for example, has 
played the significant role of translating attitudinal changes in the 
German public into political changes at the government level and vice 
versa.6 In other words, the Free Democrats have been both 'followers' 
and 'leaders' of public opinion.
There are a number of other elements in the German constitution 
assigned some influence on foreign policy: the Federal President 
represents Germany according to the Law of Nations and concludes 
treaties with foreign states on behalf of the Federation. Furthermore, in a 
parliamentary democracy like Germany, Parliament naturally also exerts 
some influence over foreign policy-making. Treaties that regulate the 
political relations of the Federation can only become law with the consent
5This and the following translated excerpts of the Basic Law are taken from Ulrich 
Karpen, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, pp.223-308
6Schweigler, p.82
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of the Bundestag. The stronger the Chancellor is supported, the less he 
needs to rely on convincing Parliament to pass foreign policy decrees. 
Overall, however, the Bundestag is powerless to initiate foreign policy 
and can only react to it. Officially, the Lander of the Federal Republic, 
represented in the Upper Chamber of Parliament, the Bundesrat, are 
constitutionally barred from concluding foreign policy agreements. 
Unofficially, however, they do exercise some influence, since their 
administrations provide channels through which regional interests make 
themselves felt. The government needs a two-thirds majority in the 
Bundesrat for constitutional amendments.
Since the Basic Law does not clearly define the limits of foreign 
affairs entrusted to the federal government, the Federal Constitutional 
Court is supposed to fill this gap. Both the Social Democrats and the 
Union have - respectively during their time in opposition - challenged the 
government's foreign policy actions on the grounds that they were not 
compatible with the German Constitution. Both Chambers of Parliament 
may challenge the government's actions in foreign policy before the 
Constitutional Court.
In Germany, domestic and foreign policy have been most clearly 
linked in the sense that imperatives for Germany's foreign policy have 
been anchored in the Basic Law: for reunification and international 
cooperation. Article 23 of the Basic Law made it a constitutional 
requirement for the Federal Republic to complete the unity and liberty of 
Germany in free self-determination. In other words, there has been a 
"constitutional taboo on the renunciation of reunification."7 The Basic 
Law did not state the means of reaching national unity, however, which 
resulted in relative freedom for West Germany's policy makers in 
designing policies geared towards reunification. Furthermore, the 
Federal Republic has been constitutionally obliged to seek international 
cooperation. Article 25 provides that the general rules of international 
law should form part of the Federal Law and that they should take 
precedence over local laws. West German foreign policy has thus from 
the beginning been built around legal or quasi-legal doctrine, and any 
foreign policy actor has had to take these constitutional imperatives into 
account.
7Tilford, p. 16
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Necessity o f  domestic consensus as indicator o f  feasibility  in 
foreign policy actions
Apart from the impact of Germany's constitutional framework on 
the FDP's foreign policy, this dissertation will also examine the link 
between the Free Democrats' Ostpolitik and their need to maintain 
enough domestic consensus and popular support to stay in power. 
According to Wolfram Hanrieder, consensus "...assesses the measure of 
agreement of the ends and means of foreign policy on the domestic 
political scene."8 The need for domestic consensus is thus a standard of 
feasibility: only to a limited degree can the FDP pursue foreign policy 
that does not correspond to popular will or to its coalition partner's 
desires before it risks loss of popular support or fragmentation of the 
party system.
Domestic pressure and the need for coalition consensus can thus both 
positively and negatively influence the FDP's foreign policy-making. 
Positively, if the Liberals respond to domestic pressure by incorporating 
the public's will into their political programmes and actions, or if they 
use the success of their politics - such as after the first Ostpolitik Treaties 
- to gain electoral advantages. Domestic pressure can also negatively 
influence foreign policy-making, however, in the sense that public 
disagreement can result in election losses. Besides domestic pressure, the 
Free Democrats have to guard their coalition partner's plans and goals, at 
least enough to ensure survival of the coalition.9 Consequently, a question 
relevant to this dissertation is how far the need to maintain both enough 
popular and coalition partner support to stay in power has influenced the 
FDP's Ostpolitik.
Structure o f  the party  system and the F D P ’s coalition  
behaviour
In attempting to define the Free Democrats' room for manoeuvre 
in foreign policy with the help of domestic politics, the FDP's function in
^Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy, p.8
^Of course, there are exceptions to this rule, such as in 1974 and 1982 when 
respectively a Social-Liberal coalition broke down. It is nevertheless interesting to note 
that in both cases the FDP continued to stay in power.
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the German system must also be considered. Due to the Liberals' situation 
as smallest party in the Federal Republic (until the arrival of the Green 
Party in 1983), their behaviour has been geared towards guaranteeing 
their survival, and it seems as though Ostpolitik has aided the FDP in this 
attempt in several ways: (1) the combination of Germany's electoral 
system and the FDP's strong profile in Ostpolitik has provided the 
Liberals with much leverage in their choice of coalition partner, (2) the 
Free Democrats have employed Ostpolitik to distinguish themselves in the 
German party system and (3) to stress their function as 'third force' 
between the SPD and the Union. (4), the FDP has used Ostpolitik to 
divert attention from inner-party friction through a 'personalization 
effect' in foreign policy. Let us take each point in turn and first consider
The favourable interaction between Germany's electoral system and the 
FDP's strong profile in Ostpolitik
Frequently, the German electoral system has worked to the Free 
Democrats' advantage because of the possibility of 'vote-splitting.' In the 
Federal Republic, each voter has two votes, one for electing a candidate 
in his constituency (Land) and a second one, the Zweitstimme, which 
forms the basis for determining proportional representation in the 
Bundestag and hence is the decisive vote.10 While a majority of the 
electorate give both their first and second vote to the same party, the Free 
Democrats have frequently survived at the federal level because of the 
possibility of vote-splitting. Often, voters will give the SPD or CDU/CSU 
candidate in their constituencies their first vote, and their second vote to 
the FDP, leaving the Free Democrats as main beneficiaries because of the 
decisive nature of the Zweitstimme for determining the governing 
coalition at the federal level.
Furthermore, the Free Democrats have profited from the Federal 
Republic's electoral system because the system of proportional 
representation in the Bundestag has rendered it very difficult for either 
of the two big parties to win an absolute majority (only exception: the 
Union's absolute majority of 50.2% in 1957). As a consequence, the FDP 
plays a pivotal role in its function as coalition partner, enabling the 
formation of a government. The Liberals have also benefited from the
i OSmith, Democracy in Western Germany, pp. 136-139
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fact that both the Social- and the Christian Democrats prefer the FDP as 
coalition partner to each other: (1) ideologically, the Free Democrats are 
in the middle between the two big parties since, for most of the time, the 
CDU's and SPD's programmes have varied too much to be co-ordinated, 
and (2) the FDP is "only" a junior partner, meaning that it is a weaker 
coalition partner than either of the big parties and needs to be granted 
fewer concessions.11
In the Free Democrats' strong position as majority enabler, their 
foreign policy profile has often played a role because the Liberals have 
used foreign policy criteria for the choice of their coalition partner. For 
example, in 1949, the CDU was seen as the only logical coalition option 
for the Free Democrats, largely on the basis of foreign policy 
considerations, and when the Christian Democrats started their campaign 
against Social-Liberal Ostpolitik from the late 1960s onwards, the 
Liberals could only see themselves in a coalition with the Social 
Democrats. Given the FDP's powerful position as final arbitrator of the 
government's composition, this dissertation will investigate how 
Ostpolitik has played a role in the Liberals' choice of coalition partner.
The FDP's use of Ostpolitik for distinguishing itself in the German party 
system
The Free Democrats have gone about this in two ways: firstly, 
since 1948, the Liberals have tried to distinguish themselves from the 
Social Democrats and the Union with the help of innovative Ostpolitik 
programmes and actions. For example, in 1952, with the Pfleiderer Plan, 
the FDP as first party introduced the idea of combining West-integration 
with detente towards the East (a thought which later became the basis of 
Social-Liberal Ostpolitik), and in 1969, the FDP was the first party to 
renounce the reunification idea which turned out to be another key 
element of Ostpolitik. Secondly, the FDP has attempted to shape its
1 lln March 1983, the Greens entered the Bundestag as fourth party and thus put a 
theoretical end to the FDP's position as only possible junior coalition partner. In 
practice, however, the Greens have not concluded a coalition agreement on the federal 
level so far, and therefore the Free Democrats have continued to be needed as majority 
makers by their coalition partners. The Greens furthermore face the strategic 
disadvantage of occupying a position quite on the left of the German political spectrum, 
which leaves them with only one coalition option, the SPD, instead of enjoying 
flexibility towards both major parties like the Free Democrats.
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profile in the respective coalitions through regularly advancing a claim to 
the post of Foreign Minister, most successfully from 1969 onwards, since 
when the Free Democrats have continuously occupied the Foreign 
Ministry. This study will examine whether the FDP's attempts to 
strengthen its position in the German party system with the help of 
innovative party programmes and functional claims could provide some 
further explanation for the Liberals' focus on foreign policy/Ostpolitik.
The FDP's position as 'third force' between the Union and the SPD
Part of the FDP's function in the German party system is also its 
role as 'third force' between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, although the 
Free Democrats only fully developed the concept in the early 1970s. By 
then, the Free Democrats' previous definition of their role as 'liberal 
corrective' to the CDU/CSU had caused major problems, since the FDP's 
emphasis on its corrective task made it difficult for the Liberals to 
develop an independent policy profile. One result of this was that the 
media primarily referred to the FDP in terms of its relations with other 
parties instead of on its own merit.12
While the Free Democrats continued to keep the SPD's foreign 
policy in check in the Social-Liberal coalition, under Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher's leadership, the FDP made a concerted effort to move away 
from its image as reactive force without a clear ideological identity of its 
own. Instead, the Free Democrats began to emphasize their role as 'third 
force' and distinct representative of liberal principles between the 
CDU/CSU and the SPD. As Heino Kaack has pointed out, the primary 
purpose of this 'strategy of self-sufficiency' was to persuade other people 
to stop thinking of the party on the basis of its coalition position and to 
start viewing the FDP as representative of liberal principles.13 The FDP's 
role as 'third force' in the German party system thus could provide some 
insight into the Liberals' special interest in foreign policy: how have the 
Free Democrats used their liberal foreign policy stance to legitimise their 
existence in the German party system?
12 Kaack, The FDP in the German party system, p.78
13 Kaack, The FDP in the German party system, p.79
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The 'personalization' effect
For a small party such as the FDP, too many individualistic members 
pulling in opposite directions can pose major risks to its coherence, 
efficiency and survival. To prevent especially the last danger, collapse 
due to internal friction, the Free Democrats have periodically tried to 
shape their image with the help of one or two leading personalities whose 
task it has not only been to restore some internal party coherence but also 
to gain votes and recognition. The 'personalization' effect could thus also 
shed some light onto the question how the Free Democrats have employed 
foreign policy to survive in the German party system despite their 
smallness. In this context, this study will mostly be concerned with Hans- 
Dietrich Genscher's role in the Free Democratic Party.
Overall, its favourable position between the two major parties has 
allowed the FDP to adapt towards both political ends and thus to exert a 
disproportionally large influence in German politics. On the other hand, 
as Emil Kirchner has pointed out, the Free Democrats have had problems 
in establishing a unique 'liberal' identity for themselves as a result of this 
functional position:
"...The FDP's problems in establishing an identity for itself 
based on 'liberal' ideas have been accentuated by the party's 
enforced role within the post Second World War German party 
system as a 'corrective' or 'pivot' between the two major 
parties..."14
Consequently, this study will now turn to the question whether the Free 
Democrats' strong functional position in the German party system has 
been compatible with their efforts for a distinct 'liberal' foreign policy 
identity.
14Kirchner, Liberal Parties in Western Europe, p.62 Despite the FDP's (and for that 
matter, many Western European liberal parties') tendency to pay more attention to 
coalition prospects than to ideological principle, Kirchner has also argued that "...it 
would be inappropriate to characterise liberal parties as opportunistic in policy aims." 
Kirchner, p.484
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The historical-ideological aspects of liberal foreign policy
There are two reasons why it is necessary to look at the FDP's 
foreign policy ideology. First, it is necessary to examine whether a party 
which arguably has become a prisoner of its own electoral success has 
also to some degree been guided by liberal principles in foreign policy. 
More specifically, the question is whether a 'liberal' foreign policy 
ideology exists in the first place, and if so, whether the roots of liberal 
foreign policy in the past can help to account for the FDP's strong 
presence in foreign policy and for its concentration on the national 
question and Ostpolitik.
Second, it is necessary to look at the FDP's foreign policy ideology 
because in analysing foreign policy decisions, one has to consider the 
decision-makers' motives, values, and ideology. Psychology helps to 
explain why one decision is preferred to another. As Christopher Hill 
has said:
"With a knowledge of ideology...it should be possible to make 
broad but definite predictions about, for instance, which 
policies will be pursued with special resolve, and which will be 
sacrificed if it needs be....Ideally, a concern for attitudes, 
perceptions and values should be part of the texture of any 
analysis of policy, at whatever level of generality."15
An interesting - if hypothetical - question in this context will be whether 
the fact that the Federal Republic has had the same Foreign Minister for 
eighteen years has resulted in more steady foreign policy perceptions and 
consequently foreign policy actions than might have been the case if the 
Foreign Ministry had been occupied by different people.
Since the FDP sees itself as representative of today's Liberalism, 
most of its party programmes naturally claim adherence to past liberal 
ideology. This section will consequently next look at the various elements 
of a liberal foreign policy ideology.
l 5Hill, A theoretical introduction, pp. 16-17
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The link between freedom and law
German liberalism has its roots in the movement of the 
enlightenment which slowly caught on in Germany after the French 
Revolution. The main characteristic of this movement, reason, has been 
the leverage for all German liberal domestic and foreign policy. For 
example, while individual freedom (and consequently rejection of 
authoritarianism) has always been a main pillar of liberalism, reason has 
led Liberals to accept the need for some kind of authority to guarantee 
this individual freedom. Thus, liberalism has developed the concept of 'as 
little state power as possible and as much state power as necessary to 
reach liberal goals.' The best way to guarantee individual freedom in a 
state seemed to be with the help of law - hence the liberal belief in being 
able to tame human beings by law while simultaneously granting them 
maximum individual freedom. According to the neo-liberal Friedrich 
August von Hayek,
"The conception of freedom under the law rests on the 
contention that when we obey laws, in the sense of general 
abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to 
us, we are not subject to another man's will and therefore
free. "16
The question then arises whether there is such a thing as freedom in 
foreign policy. Since history has proved that - even in terms of relations 
between democratic states - human beings are not naturally peaceable, 
liberals have relied and still rely today on Immanuel Kant's concept of 
foreign policy, as stated in his work 'Perpetual Peace': "A state of peace 
among men living together is not the same as the state of nature, which is 
rather a state of war."17 Consequently, individual freedom cannot be 
endless, neither in domestic policy nor in foreign policy, because human 
beings are not naturally peaceable.
In foreign policy, it also has become more and more necessary to 
tie up national freedom of action in laws. For example, the fact that the 
Basic Law (created with the help of some Liberals) has set the framework
l^Hayek cited in Zundel, p.75 
l^Reiss, p.98
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for German foreign policy-making shows the liberal belief that a proper 
foreign policy will result from a proper domestic constitution. Besides 
the belief that foreign policy can be anchored constitutionally, liberals 
hold that the nation ought to direct its efforts towards the establishment 
of a rational peace order to be secured by institutions and firm principles. 
Just like the individual in the state would give up some of his personal 
freedom in order to have it secured by the state, the nation in the 
international scene would out of voluntary self-interest give up some of 
its national independence in order to guarantee its survival with the help 
of a peace order, a thought much reflected in the FDP's party 
programmes demanding a pan-European peace order.
An early example of the liberal belief that law can be realised in 
foreign policy was the organisation of the League of Nations. Today, the 
modern Liberal would probably desire a little more security of 
regulations according to the Law of Nations, not because he believes it is 
possible to break the laws of power but hoping to domesticate power a 
little by laws. No matter how little efficient and far from perfect they 
may seem, the United Nations, International Courts of Justice, 
disarmament conferences and treaties are institutions which demonstrate 
liberal thinking. They reflect the ambitious but necessary attempt to tame 
human beings with reason.
Defence
The liberal principle of as much state power as necessary and as 
little as possible extends into the realm of defence. A reason-oriented 
foreign policy also means that military policy has to be subordinated to 
foreign policy and must be a reasonable defence policy. Too high a level 
of German defence equipment would be just as provocative as a level of 
minimalist one for neither would guarantee peace. Liberal ideology here 
positions itself between the conservatives who have traditionally 
promoted a strong army and the political left-wing which has 
traditionally been more sceptical about the need to maintain an army 
strong enough for defence than the liberals. Liberal rational pacifism 
considers the use of force for reasons other than defence a fatal 
contradiction of the concept of law and a factor through which power 
degenerates into an end in itself.
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Progress and reform
Another liberal heritage from the enlightenment is the belief in 
progress and reform. While Liberals share this heritage with the 
Socialists, they nevertheless differ from them in the degree of radicalism 
with regard to reform. Liberals reject radical progress as well as radical 
reform on the grounds that change in itself does not equal progress. 
Liberals also contrast their desire for rationally justified reforms with the 
Conservatives' status quo thinking in foreign policy. Walter Scheel once 
portrayed this liberal position between the left and right wing as follows:
"Liberals are not dreamers...To face realities, understand 
politics as the art to change what can be changed and not to 
despair over what has to be accepted as given distinguishes the 
liberal politician from the illusionary visionary as well as from 
the one who wants to leave everything as it is."18
Negotiations and compromise
The need to face realities is another guiding principle in liberal 
foreign policy. Again, reason is the driving force behind this: the 
recognition that one can really best pursue one's interests by recognition 
of the facts. In terms of international relations, Liberals believe in 
negotiation, compromise and understanding. In order to progress in 
international relations, it is vital to consider one's partner's and 
opponents' interests as well as one's own. Liberalism claims a sense of 
realism, tolerance and readiness for compromise to be part of its foreign 
policy ideology, which has been reflected in many FDP party 
programmes.
Liberalism and nationalism/Ostpolitik
The combination of liberalism and nationalism in Germany 
emerged when the German liberals tried to implement the democratic 
values inherited from the enlightenment, and found that there existed no 
unified German state to realise them. How the desire for national 
unification could come completely to overtake other 'liberal' goals, such
18Scheel cited in Reif p. 10
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as the objective of a democratic constitution, will be examined in Chapter 
Two. For now, it should be stressed (1) that the Free Democrats have 
inherited the liberal tradition of fighting for national unity, if in a 
modified version, and (2) that due to Germany's post-World War II 
situation as a divided country and Cold War mirror in Europe, the desire 
for reunification and Ostpolitik have been inseparably intertwined. With 
East Germany being a satellite state of the Soviet Union, West Germany 
could make no move towards the other half of the German nation without 
somehow taking Moscow's presence into account, in other words, without 
conducting some form of Ostpolitik.
This thesis sets out to investigate whether the Free Democrats have 
been able to develop a 'liberal' foreign policy identity despite their strong 
functional position in the German party system. It also examines how far 
factors such as history, ideology and past experience help to explain why 
certain issues became more highlighted than others in Liberal Ost- and 
Deutschlandpolitik during the 1970s and 1980s. The question whether 
great Liberals of the past, i.e. Immanuel Kant or more recently Gustav 
Stresemann, still served as role models for the FDP in any way will also 
be considered. Lastly, we shall pay attention to the issue of 'Genscherism' 
and to the question whether and how far Genscherism is something 
distinctive from general liberal values and ideology.
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Research Gap
In addition to the attempt at explaining the FDP's disproportionally 
large influence in foreign policy, especially Ostpolitik, this dissertation 
tries to fill a research gap. The existing literature on the FDP's foreign 
policy can be divided into two main categories: on the one hand, the 
literature which specifically deals with the FDP's Ostpolitik is dominated 
by historical accounts and does not cover Liberal Ostpolitik beyond 1974. 
On the other hand, the literature which does address the Free Democratic 
Party in the 1970s and 1980s is not specifically concerned with the FDP's 
foreign policy, let alone its Ostpolitik. Consequently, this thesis attempts 
to provide the first systematic study of the FDP's Ostpolitik between 1974 
and 1990.
In terms of historical accounts of the FDP's Ostpolitik, Sebastian 
Glatzeder's book Die Deutschlandpolitik der FDP in der Ara Adenauer 
covers Liberal Ostpolitik between 1949 and 1963. While Glatzeder 
provides a thorough account of the FDP's programmes and actions under 
Adenauer, his analysis focuses on the domestic and international 
parameters, omitting any reference to liberal ideology. Liberal Ostpolitik 
in the 1960s and early 1970s has been examined both by Clemens 
Heitmann in his book FDP und neue Ostpolitik and by Amulf Baring in 
Machtwechsel. Die Ara Brandt - Scheel. Heitmann's book demonstrates 
the FDP's pacesetter role as first German party to promote a more 
realistic assessment of the East during its time in opposition and lays out 
the importance of the Free Democrats' concepts for later German 
Ostpolitik. However, since Heitmann's book is a Master's thesis, it is 
almost exclusively based on secondary sources. Baring's Machtwechsel. in 
contrast, offers a much more comprehensive analysis of Social-Liberal 
Ostpolitik during the whole period of the Brandt and Scheel government 
(1969-74) and is largely based on primary sources. Ting-Fu Hung's book 
Die Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der Regierung Kohl/Genscher in den 
Jahren 1984-85 is the only account of Liberal Ostpolitik in the 1980s so 
far, if limited to the study of two years. Hung's analysis is based on 
comparing and contrasting the government's theoretical attitude with its 
concrete actions, while placing special emphasis on the importance of 
Germany's international environment.
Concerning the more recent literature on German politics, a 
number of studies dealing with international politics in the 1970s and
28
1980s also touch upon the FDP's foreign policy. While Avril Pittman's 
book From Ostpolitik to Reunification predominantly focuses on 
Chancellor Schmidt's (and the SPD's) politics and barely mentions the 
FDP at all, Michael Sodaro's Moscow. Germany and the West from 
Khrushchev to Gorbachev contains occasional references to the FDP's 
positions. There is much more literature on the process of German 
unification. Stephen Szabo's book The diplomacy of German unification. 
Elisabeth Pond's study Beyond the Wall, and Karl Kaiser's article on 
'Germany's unification,' all give some consideration to the FDP's role in 
the process of German unification. Timothy Garton Ash's book In 
Europe's Name, is a most comprehensive and insightful analysis of 
German Ostpolitik from 1945 until unification. However, Garton Ash's 
main focus is on West German politics as a whole and not so much on the 
differences between the various parties and personalities.
While there is no shortage of literature about the FDP's domestic 
function in the German party system, little thereof specifically relates to 
the Free Democrats' foreign policy.19 The literature on the FDP's 
historical-ideological heritage is much less plentiful, but Rolf Zundel's 
Die Erben des Liberalismus and Hans Reif, Friedrich Henning and 
Werner Stephan's Geschichte des deutschen Liberalismus. provide 
valuable insights. Emil Kirchner's (ed.) book Liberal Parties in Western 
Europe discusses the FDP within an international context by analysing 
and comparing the domestic context/strategies and ideological heritage of 
fourteen Western European liberal parties.
While Garton Ash touches upon the issue of 'Genscherism,' the 
only academic work specifically attempting to define the term is Emil 
Kirchner's 1990 article 'Genscher and what lies behind Genscherism.' 
Kirchner's article examines Genscherism in light of Germany's 
opposition to the modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear missiles 
in 1989, and consequently bases its conclusions on this particular case
l^For the FDP's domestic strategies, see for instance Jurgen Dittbemer, FDP - Partei 
der zweiten Wahl: Heino Kaack, 'The FDP in the German party system,' in 
K.H.Cerny (ed.), Germany at the Polls. The Bundestag election of 1976: Emil 
Kirchner and David Broughton, 'The FDP in the Federal Republic of Germany: the 
requirements of survival and success,' in Liberal Parties in Western Europe: Yves 
Meny, Government and Politics in Western Europe: Britain. France. Italy. Germany: 
Geoffrey Pridham, Coalitional behaviour in theory and practice: an inducive model for 
Western Europe: Christian Soe, 'The Free Democratic Party', in H.G.Peter 
Wallach/George K. Romoser, West German Politics in the Mid-Eighties: Rudiger 
Ziilch, Von der FDP zur FDP. Die dritte Kraft im deutschen Parteiensvstem.
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study. While this dissertation has tended to confirm most of Kirchner's 
findings, the much greater time span examined (1974-1990) has also led 
to some additional conclusions.
This study tries both to cover the research gap on the FDP's 
Ostpolitik between 1974 and 1990 and, in doing that, to provide a slightly 
more comprehensive account than previous authors of not only how but 
why the Free Democrats with Genscher as Foreign Minister have 
conducted Ostpolitik the way they did.
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Methodology
With the help of above's hypotheses, this dissertation examines the 
FDP's Ostpolitik between 1974 and 1990 by systematically scanning both 
primary government and FDP documents. In terms of government 
documents, the proceedings of the Deutsche Bundestag (obtained at the 
Bibliothek des Deutschen Bundestags in Bonn) proved valuable as they 
provided the FDP's and the other parties' views on foreign policy. 
Moreover, this study relies heavily on speeches by Free Democrats, most 
notably Hans-Dietrich Genscher, that were not given before the 
Bundestag and printed in the government's Bulletin. Copies of these 
speeches were found at the Presse- und Informationsamt der 
Bundesregierung in Bonn.
Concerning FDP documents, numerous sources in the Archiv des 
Deutschen Liberalismus in Gummersbach provided valuable information. 
The evolution of the FDP's programmatic positions on Ostpolitik between 
1974 and 1990 has been traced by systematically scanning (1) the party's 
programmes, (2) the speeches and debates at all FDP party congresses, 
(3) the parliamentary fraction's and the FDP's official press releases 
(fdk). Furthermore, I consulted a number of FDP party officials who 
were active during the time period in question, which was useful in 
confirming the validity of information available in the open literature.
In addition, broadcast and television interviews with leading Free 
Democrats were a most useful primary source, as they provided the 
politicians' immediate reaction to nearly all international and domestic 
events during the time period in question. Copies of these interviews 
were obtained at the Bundestag Press Archives in Bonn, along with 
another central source of this thesis, that is innumerous national and 
international press accounts on German foreign policy/Ostpolitik between 
1974 and 1990. All translations of quotations from the documents named 
above are my own.
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Chapter Structure
Since the Free Democrats were in government with two different 
partners from 1974 until 1990, the impact of the three parameters 
(international impact, domestic context, ideology) is examined during the 
Social-Liberal coalition (1974-82) and the Christian-Liberal coalition 
(1982-90) respectively.
Only regarding the ideological parameter is there a slight deviation 
from this pattern, (1) because the FDP's reliance on 'liberal' foreign 
policy values cannot be demonstrated without investigating the historical- 
ideological development of Liberalism. Chapter Two thus looks at the 
history of German Liberalism in order to answer which past experiences 
have either positively or negatively influenced the FDP's approach to 
foreign policy today. Second (2), the ideological parameter differs from 
international relations and domestic politics since by its very definition, 
ideology is a relatively static factor and hence unlikely to change 
dramatically over two decades. Consequently, Chapter Five analyses the 
influence of 'liberal' values on the FDP's Ostpolitik during the whole 
period from 1974 to 1990.
Concerning the parameters of international relations and domestic 
politics, in contrast, it is vital to investigate their impact during the 
Social-Liberal and Christian-Liberal coalitions respectively, in order to 
analyse how they both increased and constrained the FDP's room for 
manoeuvre in foreign policy. Chapter Three traces the influence of 
Germany's external framework on Liberal Ostpolitik from 1974 until 
1982, while Chapter Six analyses the impact of the changes in 
international relations on the Free Democrats between 1982 and 1990. 
Similarly, Chapters Four and Seven examine how the FDP's different 
domestic constellations during the 1970s and 1980s, that is its respective 
coalitions with the SPD and the Union, both positively and negatively 
affected the Liberals' capacities for action in foreign policy.
Chapter Eight investigates to what extent the evidence presented in 
this study confirms the hypotheses that were forwarded in the 
introduction, and what lessons can be drawn about the FDP's special 
relationship with foreign policy by an international comparison with 
other liberal parties, both in terms of its function in the party system and 
its ideology.
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Chapter II. The FDP s historical legacy - 
liberal foreign policy before 1974
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Since this study proceeds from the assumption that the FDP’s 
foreign policy can at least partly be explained by its liberal heritage, this 
chapter will attempt to trace the origins and the evolution of liberal 
foreign policy before 1974. The central question is how and why the 
German Liberals' historical-ideological development helps to account for 
the FDP's strong presence in foreign policy in the first place and, more 
specifically, for its concentration on the national question and Ostpolitik. 
This chapter will focus on the following four themes in trying to answer 
the above question: (1) the evolution of the link between liberalism and 
nationalism in Germany, (2) the relationship between domestic and 
foreign policy in liberal ideology, (3) the emergence of two distinct 
strands of liberalism (and its consequences), and (4) the liberals' changing 
attitude towards power over time. What follows is an attempt to trace the 
impact of these four themes on the evolution of German liberalism and its 
foreign policy from the nineteenth century to contemporary politics.
The link between liberalism and nationalism
Emergence of the link between liberalism and nationalism
Ironically, even though Napoleon introduced the values of the 
enlightenment to Germany, it was precisely these values which were to 
put an end to his control over Germany. From Napoleon's perspective, 
French troops had certainly taught the Germans too much by spreading 
the thoughts of liberty, equality and fraternity. The phase during which 
the German liberals remained content with just absorbing the values of 
the French enlightenment did not last very long. While initially there had 
been little resistance of the German population against Napoleon, soon the 
Germans wanted to use the tools of liberty, equality and fraternity for 
themselves. French foreign rule was a hindrance to their growing 
determination to control Germany's future alone. Napoleon's occupation 
and German impotence in face of his war measures led to an increase in 
national feeling and to the emergence of the political link between 
national feeling and liberal demands.
Besides foreign occupation, there was a second way in which 
Napoleon contributed to the rise of nationalism in Germany. One of the 
positive effects of his regime was that he deprived many small worldly 
and ecclesiastical potentates of their power which reinforced liberalism in
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its fight against absolute authorities. Most liberals assumed that the 
freedom of the German Volk at home was inseparable from the freedom 
of the German Volk to define itself as a nation.1 In other words, from the 
beginning, liberals have seen an automatic link between domestic and 
foreign policy. The subjected society of absolutist states should be turned 
into an independent nation, the authoritative state into a national 
constitutional state. As Friedrich Henning has said:
"It was of deep and fateful significance that liberalism - 
resistance by the German bourgeoisie against the absolutism of 
the 18th century and its demands for political, legal and 
economic freedom - woke up and became audible in Germany 
when the Germans were just being threatened by Napoleon's 
foreign rule, divided and split into many small states, and that 
the beginnings of liberalism were connected with the fight for 
national freedom."2
It was at this time directly after the Wars of Liberation when nationalism 
had a predominantly 'instrumental' character and was mostly seen as a 
means of reaching other liberal goals. In line with this view, the Southern 
German liberals welcomed the creation of constitutions after 1815 as an 
act of nation-building.
However, this subordination of the national element to the goal of 
creating a liberal constitution for all German states did not prove very 
durable. From disappointment within the individual states about the 
growing hesitance of the states to proceed with their constitutional 
promises - or else like in Prussia to realize their promises at all - grew 
the conviction that only the nation state would be able to break up the 
encrusted political and social structures in the individual states. In this 
situation, it was almost unavoidable that the original pragmatic concept of 
the nation state as means for liberalization and democratization began to 
change, and national unity became a goal in itself.3
The liberals first announced their new dual demand for freedom 
and national unity at the Hambach Festival in May 1832. However, soon 
after, they were confronted with the divisive effects of their new concept.
1 Sheehan, p.274
2Henning, Liberalismus und Nationalismus. p. 13
^Gall, Liberalismus und Nationalstaat. pp.290-291
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Now that nationalism was no longer only a means of liberalism but had 
developed into an objective of its own, the balance between national and 
liberal demands slowly began to be replaced by priority for one or the 
other. While the supporters of the liberal Carl von Rotteck advocated 
"...rather liberty without unity than unity without liberty...," the group 
around Paul Achatius Pfizer considered the realization of liberal values to 
be impossible without a united German state and therefore made national 
unity a priority over freedom in a constitutional state.4 The emergence of 
Pfizer's followers demonstrates that in Germany the appeal of 
nationalism started to work against other liberal ideas. These tensions had 
the consequence of fragmenting the previously united liberal party, 
thereby laying the groundstone for a century of liberal disunity.
The positive and negative legacy of the 1848/49 Revolution
The 1848/49 Revolution has affected the FDP's foreign policy in 
positive and negative ways, both of which will be considered in this 
section. On the positive account, the attempted Revolution marked the 
first pan-German success of political Liberalism. The liberals succeeded 
in taking over government in most German states, and for the first time, 
the bourgeoisie governed Germany. However, the Revolution's most 
important achievement was the creation of a liberal constitution, 
including a catalogue of Basic Laws. Basic rights had always been a 
liberal priority and can indeed be regarded as an especially characteristic 
document of liberal constitutional thinking then and today. As Paul 
Rothmund has said:
"The catalogue of the Germans' basic rights, first codified in 
Frankfurt in 1848, taken over by Weimar and now anchored 
in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, is 
besides the political parties the only heritage from the first 
German national Parliament."5
Eventually, however, the liberal dream of 1848/49 had to give way 
to the resurge of reactionism because of two fundamental liberal 
weaknesses: disunity and lack of organization. The national assembly in
4Sell, pp. 124-125; Federici, p.XXI
5Rothmund, p.53
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the Paulskirche disagreed so strongly that the liberals split into two 
branches. The left-wing (progressive) liberals wanted people's 
sovereignty and a democratic constitution now and, if necessary, were 
willing to use force. The right-wing (national) liberals, in contrast, 
primarily aimed at unifying all German states, be it at the cost of a 
democratic parliamentary system, and only planned to act if times were 
favourable. The development of two distinct strands of German 
liberalism can thus be dated back to the time of the failed 1848 
Revolution.6 Besides internal disunity, the liberals also suffered from a 
lack of organization in 1848/49. Initially, both Vienna and Berlin had 
promoted the creation of a pan-German constitution and a German nation 
state, but when the liberals failed to seize this chance by quickly devising 
a constitution, the opponents of parliamentarism got the upper hand 
again.
The liberals lost the Revolution but did not give up their thoughts. 
As this chapter and Chapter Five will seek to show, in the twentieth 
century, the Free Democrats were to take up both the positive and 
negative (in the sense of trying to avoid past mistakes) heritage from the 
Paulskirche Revolution. During the second half of the nineteenth and the 
early twentieth century, however, the opposite was to happen: not only 
did nationalism increasingly stifle all other 'liberal' values, but the ditch 
between the two strands of liberalism also grew deeper, eventually 
resulting in the complete collapse of German liberalism.
The rise of nationalism and the decline of liberalism during the Bismarck 
era
Considering that, by its very definition, German liberalism had 
from the outset aimed at fighting conservatism and authoritarianism, the 
fact that part of the liberals agreed to form an alliance with Bismarck 
after the failed Revolution of 1848/49 deserves some explanation. To 
begin with, since the liberals had achieved neither unity nor freedom 
during the Paulskirche events, they now faced a situation in which only 
one state was interested in one of the concepts - Prussia in unity without 
freedom. While the left-wing liberals still claimed that freedom was the 
precondition for German unity, the right-wing liberals held that in order
^Kirchner, Liberal Parties in Western Europe, p.64
37
to reach unity at last, they had no choice but to seek Prussia's assistance.7 
Apart from the practical reason of Prussia being the only state interested 
in one of liberalism's goals, German right-wing liberals also allied 
themselves with conservative Bismarck for more ideological reasons. The 
right-wing liberals believed that through their subservience towards 
Bismarck, they could at least have some impact on the domestic 
construction of the Reich, and they also hoped to exert a taming influence 
on Prussia's foreign policy.
However, as events were to show, the liberals were incapable of 
realizing the goals that had made them make a pact with Bismarck. Their 
belief that they would be able to infiltrate the Prussian constitution with 
their values turned out to be an unrealistic assessment of Prussian power 
politics. Far from realizing the liberal conviction that national unification 
and domestic progress would be inseparably linked, the first pan-German 
constitution after 1871 proved the opposite: because of his foreign policy 
success, Bismarck had gained the right to reactionary measures 
domestically, and the German constitution contained no basic laws and 
very few other democratic rights.
The right-wing liberals' assessment of Bismarck's military politics 
proved to be equally unrealistic. Instead of Prussia ceasing to be an 
authoritarian state, the liberals themselves were to stop being 'liberal' by 
giving up most their previous foreign policy principles. In face of the 
Prussian army's dramatic victories in 1866 and 1870, the liberals 
dropped their traditional postulation that the use of military force be 
limited to the purpose of defence ('as much defence as necessary and as 
little as possible') and their previous suspicion of standing armies. The 
national liberals now readily accepted the fact that German unification 
was based on military victory instead of on the joint efforts for a 
democratic constitution. At the same time, the achievement of nationhood 
helped to produce a shift in emphasis from the liberal principle of 
national self-determination to the defence of national self-interest, which 
reflected the ever-increasing influence of conservative views on 
liberalism. Although the right-wing liberals had counted on Bismarck's
7Gall, Liberalismus und Nationalstaat. p.294 Note that the left-wing liberals now 
pleaded for a 'groBdeutsch' solution, whereby Germany would become part of the 
Austrian Empire, while the right-wing liberals called for Germany to join Prussia 
('kleindeutsch' solution).
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use of force to achieve national unity, they had not expected that 
nationalism would overtake the importance of liberal values so much.8
A look at the left-wing liberals at the time of the Reichs foundation 
shows that, in contrast to the national liberals, they consistently refused to 
sacrifice liberal constitutional values for German unity. In 1861, part of 
the left-wing liberals founded the Progressive Party, which quickly 
suceeded in creating a political reservoir for almost all political 
liberalism in the country. Domestically, the Progressives demanded 
further development of the parliamentary legal and constitutional state, 
and in terms of foreign policy, they opposed Prussian militarism and 
colonial adventures. Even though the Progressive liberals thus nobly 
stuck to their principles, they did not have any power to exert them.
When Bismarck was dismissed by William II in 1890, he left the 
German liberals in a more or less crushed condition. Not only had the 
national liberals given up most of their previous ideology, but liberalism 
had also never been as disunited and consequently as weak as at the end of 
the Bismarck era. The next section will show that neither the progressive 
liberals' return to power nor greater foreign policy agreement between 
the two liberal wings was able to prevent the complete collapse of 
liberalism by 1914.
The Wilhelmine Age 1890-1914
After Bismarck's dismissal, initially the situation did not improve 
very much for the liberals until 1907, when the left-wing liberals entered 
a governing coalition with the national liberals and the conservatives for 
the first time in their history. However, even the joint participation of 
both liberal strands in power did not enhance their impact on German 
politics. Although the liberals held a two-thirds majority in the coalition, 
the conservatives had much more influence through their social ties with 
the military, the Court and government officers.9 The highly 
undemocratic way in which Germany decided to enter the First World
^Sell, p.235; Gall, Liberalismus und auswartige Politik. p.39; Ullrich, p.378 In 
contrast to Germany, Italy - which was the other European country to complete its 
nation state very late - had managed to combine the creation of a nation state with a 
remarkably advanced constitution for the Europe of 1861.
9Sell, p.330 The Bulov coalition between the conservatives and the two liberal 
wings lasted from 1907 until 1909.
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War best demonstrates the German liberals' failure to create a true 
parliamentary democracy before 1914. Despite a left-wing majority in 
the Reichstag since 1912, the Emperor and the right-wing started World 
War I without extensive consultation of Parliament's opinions and 
without any major objections on its behalf.
The two liberal wings' growing agreement on foreign policy after 
Bismarck's departure did not foster the liberal cause either. By the turn 
of the century, nationalism had become such a dominant element of the 
'Zeitgeist' that not only right-wing but also left-wing liberalism had 
caught on to it. Given the right-wing liberals' affiliation with the goals of 
military preparedness and colonial expansion since Bismarck's time, it 
was not much of a surprise that the national liberals now promoted 
imperialism, annexations and national grandeur. More significantly, 
however, imperialism had also won over left-wing liberalism by the 
1900s. After a generational change in leadership, the progressive liberals 
caught on to the 'mood of the time' and started to follow the widespread 
opinions of the bourgeoisie in favour of power politics and Germany's 
world importance. Since liberal ideology - apart from the national aspect 
- was largely incompatible with imperialism, many values had been 
sacrificed on the altar of nationalism, such as the principle of self- 
determination for all peoples and the traditional liberal aversion against 
expansionism.
In this situation, almost all liberals initially supported the outbreak 
of World War I. They saw it as a possibility to assert Germany's 
powerful international position and were as convinced as the 
conservatives that the cause of the war lay in the aggression of the Czar 
regime controlled by pan-Slavism, in England's envy of German 
economic strength and in the unjustified French claims to Alsace- 
Lorraine.10 As has been shown, liberalism's alliance with nationalism had 
meant the end for most of liberal ideology. Instead of proving a factor in 
Germany's increasing political liberalization, nationalism had only 
brought about greater conservatism, both at home and abroad, and 
eventually, the vast majority of liberals had been captured by the 
'Zeitgeist' of militarism and expansionism. Thus, while disagreement 
over nationalism had split the German liberals since the 1848/49 
Revolution, even when both wings of liberalism promoted nationalistic
lOStephan, p.97
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objectives at the turn of the century, nationalism did not prove a good 
guide to political action.
Four years of war experience helped to produce certain shifts in 
liberal foreign policy values back towards more original convictions, 
however. The 1917 parliamentary alliance of Progressive Liberals, the 
Centre Party and the Social Democrats in the Reichstag provided the 
institutional foundation for such a value reorientation. In July 1917, their 
coalition formulated a Peace Resolution which emphasized the readiness 
for peace and renunciation of annexationism. Even though the Peace 
Resolution's concrete impact was very limited, its significance lies in the - 
be it still purely theoretical - resurge of liberal foreign policy ideology 
after the First World War.
Nationalism and the collapse of the Weimar Republic
Much of liberal foreign policy during the Weimar Republic roots 
in liberal ideological traditions but there was some reweighting of policy 
priorities, reflecting both positive and negative past experiences. As 
overall trend, the liberals' rather fervent nationalism of the last forty or 
so years now took on a slightly more moderate character in favour of 
other liberal foreign policy principles, such as the belief that foreign 
policy could best be conducted on the basis of negotiations, compromise 
and acknowledging one's opponents' interests.
For some time after World War I, it looked as though the liberals 
were for once able to combine their two main goals of national unity and 
internal freedom. Due to their negative experience with nationalism in 
the past, many liberals now wanted to "...make up for that which had 
been missed in 1848..." and create a parliamentary democracy.11 As an 
important first step, they re-founded the Progressive liberal party, which 
had traditionally strongly promoted a democratic constitution, under the 
name of German Democratic Party (DDP). Most architects of the 
constitution were members of the DDP, and as a result, the Weimar 
constitution of August 1919 contained Basic Rights and finally removed 
the Prussian three-class voting system in favour of general, equal and 
secret elections.
DDehler, p.223
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While the liberals now attached more importance to the values of 
parliamentary democracy than in the nineteenth century, they still did not 
manage to cope with their past problem of internal disunity. Tragically, 
in 1918, the liberals again failed to create one strong united party and in 
this way effectively to implement their ideas. Instead, as mentioned 
above, the left-liberals founded the DDP, and the national liberals now 
formed the German People's Party (DVP). Despite such continued 
organizational disunity, the liberals benefited from the fact that three 
Foreign Ministers during the Weimar Republic were liberals. Each of 
these three Foreign Ministers - Walther Rathenau (DDP), Gustav 
Stresemann (DVP) and Julius Curtius (DVP) - roughly represented one 
of the three liberal approaches to foreign policy after World War I. How 
this manifested itself and how it affected German foreign policy during 
the Weimar Republic will be examined next.
Walther Rathenau, Foreign Minister from February - June 1922, 
represented the DDP's dual heritage of the 1848 tradition on the one hand 
and the moderate annexationism of the Progressive Party on the other 
hand. In terms of concrete politics and in comparison with the DVP, this 
manifested itself in a relatively weaker nationalistic orientation and a 
relatively greater conviction that a policy of fulfilment was the 
appropriate reaction to the Versailles Treaty. For instance, Rathenau 
firmly advocated a policy of fulfilment concerning Germany's 
reparations. Of all liberal strands during the Weimar Republic, the 
DDP's left-wing most strongly believed in pacifism and internationalism 
for reasons of principle and was convinced that a policy of fulfilment was 
appropriate on moral grounds.
Nevertheless, the DDP also demonstrated liberalism's traditionally 
ambiguous attitude towards the issues of nationhood and self- 
determination. On the one hand, the German Democratic Party claimed 
that self-determination was a general liberal principle, and used this claim 
to justify its plea for Austria's annexation (1848 tradition) and for 
promoting German interests in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the 
DDP showed no desire to extend the right of self-determination to other 
parts of the world, and also failed to consider that an alliance between 
Germany and Austria might lead to German hegemony in Europe and 
would therefore not be acceptable to other European powers.12
l^Frye, p. 133
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At any rate, the majority of liberals during the Weimar Republic 
adhered not to Rathenau's but to Gustav Stresemann's (Foreign Minister 
between 1923 and 1929) foreign policy concept. While Stresemann 
employed the same liberal means as the group around Rathenau - a policy 
of fulfilment in reality he pursued the much more nationalistic goals of 
revising the Versailles treaty and restoring Germany's previous power 
position. Stresemann always remained convinced, however, that his 
objectives could better be reached by cooperation with the Allies than by 
openly challenging them.
Under Stresemann, the policy of fulfilment consequently became 
'national Realpolitik.' Most of Stresemann's actions, such as ending the 
passive Ruhr resistance (thereby ensuring the Ruhr area would remain 
part of Germany), his support for the 1923 Dawes Plan and the 1929 
Young Plan (which regulated the issue of Germany's reparations to the 
Allies), the Locarno Treaty of 1925 (which, based on mutual 
renunciation of force, served French security interests and started a 
decade of European cooperation) and Germany's entry into the League of 
Nations in 1926 should be viewed as a combination of 'liberal' politics 
and 'realpolitical' objectives. When the Foreign Minister died in 1929, 
Germany's international standing had improved greatly compared to 
1918, mostly thanks to his negotiation tactics.
While Stresemann enjoyed strong support from both liberal wings, 
one faction of his own party also strictly opposed his policy of fulfilment 
on the grounds that Stresemann was selling out Germany's interests. 
Germany's last liberal Foreign Minister from 1929 to 1931, Julius 
Curtius, represented this right wing of the DVP which pursued almost 
purely national goals and strongly resisted a policy of rapprochement 
with the Allies. When Julius Curtius took over the Foreign Ministry in 
1929, the DVP gained much more control over German foreign policy, 
which contributed to liberalism's slow erosion in the face of National 
Socialism.
Thus, in order to explain why only fifteen years after the end of 
World War I, Germany found itself governed by a totalitarian National 
Socialist government despite liberalism's promising start at the outset of 
the Weimar Republic - with a liberal constitution and three liberal 
Foreign Ministers in office - it is important to recall that in the end, two 
problematic characteristics of liberalism had reasserted themselves. The 
liberals' ongoing organizational disunity rendered them unable effectively
43
to resist National Socialism, and in terms of the traditional link between 
liberalism and nationalism, the latter had once more proved the stronger 
force. As Theodor Heuss has explained this true calamity of the Weimar 
Republic:
"...The development ... of democracy was accompanied by the 
atmosphere of nationalistic romanticism...These aspects were 
much more decisive for the functioning of the Weimar 
Constitution than...its legal paragraphs."13
From about 1929 onwards, many supporters of the two liberal 
parties thus defected to more right-wing and conservative groupings. By 
the time of the last free elections in March 1933, the situation had 
deteriorated so much that all the remaining five liberal members of the 
Reichstag voted for Hitler's Enabling Act even though two of them, 
Theodor Heuss and Hermann Dietrich, held reservations. With the 
Enabling Act, the last bits of democracy and parliamentarism were 
removed legally, and the new regime's definition of nationalism, i.e. 
extending the German 'Lebensraum' to the East, also drastically differed 
from the Liberals' national concept. Liberalism was banished by the 
Nazis, although in contrast to Marxism and Clericalism, Hitler did not 
perceive the Liberal movement as dangerous.14 The Liberals' only room 
for manoeuvre during the Third Reich was to meet secretly in small 
circles or to emigrate. Needless to say, the Liberals were in no position to 
prevent the outbreak of World War II in 1939.
Heritage reconsidered - liberal foreign policy after World 
War II
Organizational disunity finally overcome
This section will examine how liberal traditions have positively and 
negatively influenced the FDP's foreign policy after World War II by 
first taking a look at how Liberalism re-emerged in 1945 despite its
l 3Heuss cited in Bracher, p. 14
1 ^ Stephan, pp. 126-127
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miserable condition before the war. One characteristic of post-World 
War II Liberalism was the continuity of personnel from the Weimar 
Republic, with Theodor Heuss, Reinhold Maier and Wilhelm Kiilz all 
having formerly worked for the DDP.15 A second factor of continuity 
was Liberalism's re-emergence along the lines of varying regional 
traditions, a development which was reinforced by the new fact of 
Germany's division into four occupation zones.
While Heuss and Maier continued the DDP's left-wing liberal 
traditions in the German Southwest (US and French occupation zones), 
national liberalism was resurgent in the DVP's tradition in the traditional 
strongholds, Hesse and North-Rhine-Westphalia (now the British 
occupation zone). The new national right consciously contrasted itself 
with Socialism and located itself to the right of the Christian Democrats. 
In the Soviet occupation zone, Wilhelm Kiilz founded the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD).
For a short time, the Liberals even succeeded in uniting all regional 
strands in a pan-German liberal party (Democratic Party of Germany), 
which was created in 1947 in Rothenburg and chaired by Theodor Heuss 
and Wilhelm Kiilz. Only one year later, however, after the East German 
Liberals' participation in the Communist party congress, the Western 
liberals decided that the LDPD's attitudes on freedom and democracy 
were too different. As a consequence, the pan-German Liberal Party 
broke down in all four zones, and a number of LDPD members changed 
over to the West German Liberals. This has been to the FDP's advantage, 
since these East German liberals - above all Hans-Dietrich Genscher - 
have cared about reunification especially strongly.16
In December 1948, the Free Democratic Party was founded in 
Heppenheim with the motto "unity in freedom."17 Even though regional 
differences persisted within the FDP, the main historical importance of 
Heppenheim lies in the fact that exactly one hundred years after the 
splintering of German Liberalism in 1848, the two competing liberal
15 Kiilz had become Minister of the Interior in 1926, and Heuss had been a DDP 
Reichstag deputy.
l^Stephan, p. 137
1 7 Heppenheim was chosen as location for refounding the liberal party because 
already a hundred years ago, in 1847, a prerevolutionary meeting of liberal and 
democratic personalities had taken place there. Theodor Heuss became the first FDP 
Chairman.
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wings were again united in one party, the FDP. Such organizational 
discontinuities did not imply discontinuity of liberal foreign policy 
ideology, however, as we shall see next.
Link between domestic and foreign policy continues
Just as after World War I, in 1945, many Liberals initially believed 
that they could achieve both a democratic constitution and national unity 
for Germany. However, by 1947/48, most Liberals had realized that the 
growing East-West tension and Germany's impotence no longer allowed 
them to pursue democracy, freedom and unity simultaneously. In this 
situation, the vast majority of Liberals broke with the national-liberal 
tradition and decided that domestic freedom mattered more than national 
unity. During the summer of 1948, five Liberals were voted into the 
Parliamentary Council, whose task it was to create a Basic Law for all 
Germans. These Liberals, including Thomas Dehler, Theodor Heuss and 
Helmut Schafer, decisively contributed to the construction of the Basic 
Law which was passed on 8 April 1949.18
It would be wrong, however, to assume that the Free Democrats 
saw the creation of a West German state and a German constitution as an 
end to the option of reunification. Instead, most Liberals kept 
emphasizing the Federal Republic's provisional character and considered 
West Germany as vicarious state for an "indivisible Germany."19 How the 
national thought continued to affect liberal foreign policy after the end of 
World War II will be examined in the next section.
Link between nationalism and liberal foreign policy continues
Even after the total perversion of national thinking by National 
Socialism, the nation remained a decisive factor in the Liberals' political 
thinking because nationalism during the Third Reich had nothing to do
l^Kaack, Die FDP. Grundrifi und Materialien. pp. 13-14 Overall, the Parliamentary 
Council had sixty-five members. The Free Democrats played a mediating role in the 
Parliamentary Council, foreshadowing their later role as 'third force' in the German 
party system. The distribution of mandates in the Council, with the FDP holding 5 and 
the CDU/SPD 27 mandates each, meant that in case of controversy, both the SPD and 
the CDU had to try to win the FDP over to their side.
190 tt, p. 103; Padtberg, p.31
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with their concept of liberal nationalism.' Typically, Heuss, Maier and 
Dehler thought it necessary for the German people to acknowledge their 
guilt of Hitler's regime and to devote much attention to "...the most 
difficult task which we all face to build a new national feeling which 
foregoes cheap language and (will) lead to the real values."20 In addition 
to their efforts morally to restore the German nation, most Liberals also 
attempted to prevent Germany's division by avoiding to opt for either the 
West or the East immediately after World War II. Only by 1947/48, 
when Germany's division had virtually become a reality after the United 
States' and Great Britain's fusion of their two occupation zones in a 
clearly anti-Soviet move, did the Liberals change their attitude and 
adjourned the pan-German option.
Nevertheless, the continued liberal interest in national issues clearly 
manifested itself during the first West German government, a coalition 
between the Christian Democrats under Konrad Adenauer and the Free 
Democrats. Although the Liberals and the Conservatives were united in 
their fear of Communism and in their desire to promote both West- 
integration and reunification, in two important ways, the Free Democrats 
pursued a distinctive approach: (1) on several occasions, the FDP asserted 
its views on the national question against the Christian Democrats, and (2) 
a few Free Democrats developed progressive theories about Ostpolitik 
that were later to determine liberal foreign policy. In a pattern that was 
to repeat itself several times between 1949 and 1974, most Free 
Democrats initially rejected their avantgarde members' suggestions, but 
eventually incorporated them into Liberal programmes and actions.
Although the CDU and the FDP agreed on the need to promote 
both West-integration and reunification, they differed on the order of 
priority for their objectives. For Adenauer's CDU, West-integration was 
the number one priority, followed by reunification, while the Free 
Democrats - in line with their liberal heritage - were mostly concerned 
with the prospects for reunification.21 At the root of these different 
priorities lay the parties' different perceptions of Germany's position on 
the continent of Europe: Adenauer regarded Germany as part of the
^Theodor Heuss in a speech before the Free University of Berlin, in Casdorff, 
p.196
2lNote that the FDP even initially opposed the Federal Republic's entry into the 
EEC, partly on the grounds that such an integrationist move would harm the prospects 
for German reunification. See Zundel, p.54, pp.60-61
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Western world, while the Free Democrats saw Germany's position as that 
of a Middle European power, a view which was also represented by 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher in later years.
In terms of concrete politics, the Free Democrats' preoccupation 
with reunification manifested itself firstly in their concern with Berlin as 
the future capital of a reunified Germany. Hans Reif, the FDP's 
Bundestag deputy from Berlin, constantly strove for consolidating the ties 
between West Berlin and Bonn and actually achieved West Berlin's 
integration into the Federal Republic's financial system. Secondly, the 
Free Democrats asserted their national values during the Saar conflict in 
1955, which arose over Adenauer's plan to integrate the Saarland into 
Western Europe.22 The Free Democrats blocked Adenauer's plans and 
instead called for a referendum in the Saar area, which proved that the 
majority of the population wanted to remain part of Germany. Thirdly, 
the FDP achieved the removal of the so-called 'linking-clause' from the 
German Treaty which provided for a an automatic link of a reunified 
Germany with the Western European alliances. According to the 
Liberals, the Federal Republic was only a provisional government and 
must not decide for all of Germany before reunification had even taken 
place.23
Furthermore, although during the early years of the Federal 
Republic, most Free Democrats shared the CDU's view that the Soviet 
Union needed to be contained by a policy of strength, in 1952, the 
Liberal Karl Pfleiderer introduced an avantgarde plan that was soon to 
become the basis of the FDP's foreign policy. Instead of the need to 
counter and eliminate the Soviet threat in order to end Germany's 
division, Pfleiderer argued that only if the West took Moscow's economic 
and military interests into account would there eventually be a chance for 
reunification.24 Similarly, instead of making progress on reunification 
into a prerequisite for East-West rapprochement, Pfleiderer urgently 
pleaded for an active German Ostpolitik (i.e. assumption of negotiations 
with the Communist states) on the grounds that detente was a prerequisite
22Dittbemer, p.36
23zundel, p.55 Note that - in contrast to their earlier position, during the actual 
process of unification in 1989-90, the Free Democrats strongly emphasized that united 
Germany would remain firmly committed to the Western alliances.
24Zundel, p.57; Glatzeder, pp.64-65
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for reunification. In contrast to the Hallstein Doctrine, Pfleiderer also 
called for the assumption of human contacts between the two Germanies 
as a basis for reunification.25
Although the FDP's initial reaction to Pfleiderer's suggestions had 
been reluctant, during their time in opposition from 1956 until 1961, the 
Liberals embarked on a process of re-orientation and increasingly united 
behind Pfleiderer's suggestions. While the FDP's Berlin programme of 
1957 still postulated reunification as an overriding priority, the Free 
Democrats now also argued that Germany's relations with Eastern 
Europe should be regulated "...in a peaceful manner," and in their 1961 
election programme four years later, the Liberals argued that the West 
German government should "...serve detente between East and West by 
assuming diplomatic relations with the Eastern bloc..."26 Furthermore, 
the FDP concreticized its previous call for human contacts with East 
Germany and began to advocate a 'policy of small steps,' geared towards 
the slow improvement of inner-German relations.
Despite the Free Democrats' return to government in 1961, the 
construction of the Berlin wall in August 1961 proved the failure of both 
the CDU's and the FDP's Ostpolitik and started another process of 
rethinking within the Free Democratic Party. Once again, the FDP's re­
orientation in Ostpolitik was based on suggestions by an innovative party 
member. In face of the escalating Cold War, Wolfgang Schollwer, 
adviser for pan-German questions, had already argued in 1962 that the 
Federal Republic should postpone the goal of reunification and for the 
time being focus on the improvement of East-West relations. This should 
be done by preliminarily respecting East Germany's sovereignty, 
dropping the Hallstein Doctrine and acknowledging the Eastern European 
borders.27 In 1967, Schollwer expanded his earlier suggestions and 
argued that the FDP should replace its traditional top foreign policy 
priority of reunification by striving for a permanent pan-European peace
25The Hallstein Doctrine of 1955 stated that West Germany would break diplomatic 
relations with any third state (except for the Soviet Union) that recognized the German 
Democratic Republic.
26Juling, Programmatische Entwicklung der FDP. pp. 153-154, p. 163
27Glatzeder, p. 104
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order, which would be the only way of "overcoming Europe's and with it 
Germany's division..."28
Similarly to the Pfleiderer Plan, most Liberals only seriously 
considered Schollwer's concepts during another period in opposition, that 
is between 1966 and 1969, when the Federal Republic was governed by a 
grand coalition of Christian- and Social Democrats. While the national 
liberals (most notably Erich Mende, at that time FDP Chairman) 
continued to regard reunification as a first priority, the progressive wing 
in the FDP - represented by Walter Scheel, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 
Wolfgang Mischnick and Hildegard Hamm-Briicher - now began to 
advocate an Ostpolitik based on acceptance of the status quo. The 
progressive liberals' say in foreign policy greatly increased after Scheel's 
election as the new FDP Chairman in 1968, and at their party congress in 
Niirnberg in June 1969, the Free Democrats officially dropped the 
Hallstein Doctrine and incorporated their new efforts for a pan-European 
peace order, based on the mutual renunciation of force and preliminary 
recognition of the status quo, into their election programme.29
Although the Free Democrats ultimately continued to opt for 
reunification, the FDP's election programme of 1969 nevertheless 
marked an important change, firstly because it replaced the FDP's 
previous main priority of reunification with the goal of a pan-European 
peace order, and secondly because it introduced the notion that 
Germany's division could and should only be overcome together with 
Europe's division. As we shall see, this 'Europeanization' of the German 
question has remained a central element in the FDP's foreign-policy 
making ever since. However, it was also of immediate importance in 
1969, as it paved the path for the first Social-Liberal coalition in the 
Federal Republic's history.
In 1969, the Social-Liberal coalition with Willy Brandt as 
Chancellor and Walter Scheel as Foreign Minister was formed and 
immediately began to implement the new Ostpolitik. Based on the
28schollwer in Benz, pp.208ff. Note that in the same year Hans-Dieter Jaene, FDP 
deputy from Berlin, drafted a General Treaty for the regulation of inner-German 
relations which was based on full recognition of the German Democratic Republic as 
normal negotiation partner. Baring, p.227
29The FDP's 1969 programme postulated: "..The divisions in Europe must be 
overcome by a European peace order, in which both East and West participate. Such a 
European peace order must not fail due...to territorial questions." Juling, 
Programmatische Entwicklung der FDP. p.208
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principles which had evolved during the previous decade, (1) 
renunciation of force and (2) de facto (but not de iure) recognition of the 
status quo and the borders in Eastern Europe, the Brandt/Scheel 
government now 'normalized' relations with Eastern Europe in a series 
of treaties. Since the Federal Republic realized that the Soviet Union was 
the key to relations with Eastern Europe and to an improvement of the 
inner-German climate, Bonn first signed a 'normalization' treaty with 
Moscow in August 1970, followed by the Quadripartite Agreement on 
Berlin in September 1971 and the Basic Treaty on inner-German 
relations in December 1972.30
While the Brandt/Scheel government theoretically held on to 
reunification as a long-term objective, in terms of practical politics, the 
Social-Liberal coalition focused on a policy of small steps in order to ease 
the human problems resulting from division and to keep the way open for 
German reunification in a future European peace settlement. In line with 
the FDP's traditional focus on the national question, Foreign Minister 
Scheel attached great priority to keeping the option of reunification open 
in the Ostpolitik treaties. In tedious negotiations with the Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrej Gromyko, Scheel achieved that on the same day as 
signing the Moscow Treaty, the federal government sent a 'Letter 
regarding German Unification' to the Soviet Union. The letter stated that 
the Moscow Treaty did not conflict with Bonn's "political objective" to 
work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation could 
regain its unity in "free self-determination."31
Overall, the Brandt/Scheel period had been dramatic and fast- 
moving, and together with the Social Democrats, the Liberals - and most 
notably their first Foreign Minister Walter Scheel - , had been able to 
implement most of the new concepts which the Free Democrats had 
developed during the 1950s and 1960s.
^Treaties normalizing relations with Poland (December 1970), Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria and Hungary (December 1973) were also signed under the Brandt/Scheel 
government.
^ B a rk /G re ss , p. 183; Baring, pp.339-344 Note, however, that the letter was not 
legally binding.
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Conclusion
In sum, this chapter has found that certain characteristics of and 
dilemmas inherent in German liberalism have greatly affected the 
German Liberals throughout their history and the Free Democrats since 
1948. On the one hand, a look at the Liberals' contribution to the German 
constitutions in 1848/49 (Paulskirche), 1919 (Weimar) and 1948/49 
(Basic Law) has shown the strong impact of the historical liberal 
conviction that a state's internal and external freedom are inseparably 
linked, in other words that only a democratic state can conduct a 'liberal' 
foreign policy.
On the other hand, we have also seen that in practice, the Liberals' 
dual objectives of a democratic constitution and national unification have 
not been complementary, but mutually exclusive instead. This 
incompatibility has in return forced the Liberals to attach priority to one 
or the other goal all throughout their history, with most of them 
concentrating on national liberalism. Such a need to set priorities had two 
equally weakening effects on Liberalism: firstly, it resulted in a chronic 
disunity of the liberal movement which rendered it incapable of making 
any strong impact on German politics. Furthermore, the Liberals - 
independently of whether they chose national liberal or democratic 
liberal values as priority - ended up sacrificing some liberal principles in 
any case and thus rendered the liberal movement fairly implausible.
This chapter has also traced Liberalism's traditionally ambiguous 
attitude towards power: for one thing, the Liberals have inherently 
mistrusted authoritarianism which resulted in their organizational 
weakness and in their failure determinedly to use certain situations to 
implement their goals, such as the 1848/49 Revolution or the 1907-1909 
Conservative-Liberal coalition. For another thing, while the Liberals 
were aware that on their own they were too weak to effect anything and 
thus had to ally themselves with more influential forces, they tended to 
choose Conservative powers, which both under Bismarck and towards the 
end of the Weimar Republic eventually resulted in a complete collapse of 
Liberalism.
Most importantly, this chapter has sought to show how these 
historic liberal dilemmas have significantly affected the FDP's foreign 
policy making since 1948. Like their precedessors, FDP members have 
not only simultaneously aimed at internal freedom and national unity, but
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have also been confronted with the need to choose between democracy 
and nation. However, in contrast to their liberal fathers, the Free 
Democrats have clearly favoured a free democratic Germany over a 
united, yet undemocratic country (at least until their options changed in 
1989). Furthermore, from the 1960s onwards, the FDP increasingly 
recalled Stresemann's concept of embedding Germany’s national interest 
in a wider European context, thereby 'internationalizing' the German 
question.
On the one hand, the Free Democrats have thus continued their 
predecessors' focus on democratic values and national unification, if in a 
substantially modified manner. On the other hand, the FDP has made 
concerted efforts to discontinue other aspects of its liberal heritage: (1) a 
look at the FDP's record of government participation since 1949 clearly 
demonstrates that the Liberals have overcome their traditionally 
ambiguous attitude towards power and (2), since the end of World War 
II, the Free Democrats have successfully avoided the Liberals' historical 
division into two strands, albeit at times at the cost of programmatic 
distinctiveness.
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Chapter III. The Social-Liberal coalition 1974-82: 
the international framework
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Compared to the rapid progress in Ostpolitik during the era 
Brandt/Scheel, the international situation which Chancellor Schmidt and 
Foreign Minister Genscher faced upon their assumption of power in May 
1974 was much less conducive to the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik.1 Since 
relations with Eastern Europe had already been 'normalized' with the 
help of the Ostpolitik treaties, the new Schmidt/Genscher government's 
task was to apply and consolidate the treaties of the era before. However, 
by 1974, it had become apparent that this task would not be an easy one, 
given the growing controversies over the implementation of the 
Ostpolitik treaties and the process of disillusionment in detente on the 
American and Soviet sides which had by then started to emerge. 
Furthermore, Bonn's chances for progress in Ostpolitik were constrained 
by the world economic crisis, which urgently required the federal 
government's attention.2
In the face of such intense external constraints on German foreign 
policy makers, this study's analysis of the FDP's room for manoeuvre in 
foreign policy between 1974 and 1982 will first focus on the international 
framework within which the Liberals' Ostpolitik was formulated and 
implemented during the Social-Liberal coalition. It should be stressed, 
however, that since international circumstances tended to affect West 
Germany as a whole and not only individual parties, there will only be 
special reference to the Free Democratic Party when international 
developments specifically affected it, or when the FDP's Ostpolitik in 
return had an impact on the development of international relations.
Firstly, this chapter will examine to what degree the Free 
Democrats' room for manoeuvre in foreign policy between 1974 and 
1982 was determined by the overall condition of superpower relations 
and by the respective aspirations of the leadership in the Kremlin and the 
White House. It will also investigate how far Bonn's efforts for progress 
in inner-German relations were compatible with Soviet security interests 
and the overall East-West climate. Furthermore, we shall examine the 
effect on the FDP's Ostpolitik of West Germany's dependence on (1) the 
NATO security guarantee and on (2) the Western Allies' and Moscow's
1 During the Brandt/Scheel government, Helmut Schmidt had successively held the 
posts of Minister of Defence, Economics and Finance, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher had 
been Minister of the Interior.
2Pittman, p. 11
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cooperation for a solution to the German national question and the Berlin 
controversies.
Apart from the constraints on the FDP's Ostpolitik, this chapter 
will also address the question whether the Free Democrats themselves 
were able to exert some influence on East-West relations during the 
1970s and early 1980s. In the course of this chapter, the impact of the 
above factors will be investigated by looking at the central areas of 
Germany's relations with Eastern Europe between 1974 and 1982: 
economic relations, Berlin controversies, national and humanitarian 
issues and the INF debate.
Economic relations
German-Soviet trade
After the Brandt/Scheel era, when normalization of East-West 
relations had been reached, the only field where both the Communist 
states and West Germany truly wanted to progress was economic 
cooperation, although for very different motives. The Eastern European 
states mostly cared about the economic advantages of trade with the 
Federal Republic since they needed Western economic help to overcome 
their backwardness in economy and technology. While during the 1960s 
and early 1970s, Bonn had also still seen the main benefit in trading with 
Moscow in the economic realm, and even though West Germany 
continued economically to benefit from Osthandel after 1974, over the 
years, Bonn's emphasis shifted to using German economic power to elicit 
Soviet political concessions, in other words to the use of 'positive 
economic leverage.'3
Although positive economic leverage was not exclusively employed 
by the Free Democrats, it will be considered here because it was a central 
aspect of German Ostpolitik during the Social-Liberal coalition. As this 
section will show, the Federal Republic's reliance on economic levers for 
its 'linkage' strategy towards Moscow was rather successful because it 
complemented well with the Soviets' use of positive political leverage in 
order to gain economic concessions from Bonn. Both sides approved of
3Stent, p.215
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the 'material foundation’ of Ostpolitik and benefited from the fact that the 
structures of the Eastern European and the German economies were 
complementary.4
The first big economic project between the Kremlin and the 
Federal Republic, concluded during Schmidt's and Genscher's visit to 
Moscow from 28-31 October 1974, had already demonstrated the 
negotiating partners' contrary priorities concerning economic 
cooperation. The project provided for the Germans to build a nuclear 
power plant at Kaliningrad from which the Soviet Union was to supply 
West Germany and West Berlin with electrical current. Moscow strongly 
supported the deal, not only because Kaliningrad would be the largest 
power plant to be built in the USSR ever, but also because the Kremlin 
would get the most modem technical know-how. German industry, on the 
other hand, hoped for a diversification of raw material and energy 
provision and for an increase in the employment rate. Apart from such 
economic interests, Bonn attached greatest importance to the political 
prospect that West Berlin would be included in the agreement. As 
Schmidt said: "...it would downright be a matter of political sex-appeal if 
we could this way combine the Soviet and the West-European systems via 
Berlin."5
From the very beginning, the project ran into several problems, 
however, demonstrating the limits of economic freedom in East-West 
trade due to political constraints. To begin with, the Free Democrats had 
to contend with some domestic political opposition to the Kaliningrad 
project, fearing the prospect of West German dependence on Moscow and 
East Berlin for energy provision and a possible sell-out of German know­
how to the Soviet Union.6 In addition to such domestic reservations, there 
were some potential international hindrances to the project. The United 
States and Great Britain were delaying the necessary unanimous 'yes' vote 
in the Cocom export control of strategically important goods, giving a
4\Vhile West Germany exported finished manufactured goods such as machinery and 
chemical products, the Soviet Union exported raw material and semi-finished goods.
^Soviet television, 26.10.74, Interview with H.Schmidt, translation in Bull. 126, 
29.10.74
6Die Zeit, 14.3.75 The federal government tried to soothe such domestic-political 
reservations by pointing out that only 3% of German energy provision would stem 
from Kaliningrad, and that by the early 1980s, when the project was expected to be 
finished, the exported technology would no longer be so up-to date.
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number of factual reasons but in reality objecting to such a big German- 
Soviet deal. Even though in the end a negative Cocom vote was not really 
expected, the FDP nevertheless had to deal with its Allies' opposition to 
an important economic agreement.
The Kaliningrad project was furthermore bound for stagnation 
because East Germany tried to change the part of the agreement that 
Bonn most strongly cared about. Instead of directly linking West Berlin 
and the Federal Republic by energy tracks that would allow West 
Germany to solve West Berlin's energy problems in case of an 
emergency, East Berlin wanted to provide West Berlin's energy from an 
East German plant, thereby depriving Bonn of any control over the 
situation while benefiting from the transfer of technical know-how. In the 
end, Moscow decided that the loss of the power plant was less harmful 
than incurring East Germany's anger over the political implications of 
the project for West Berlin.7 Consequently, the Kaliningrad negotiations 
were adjourned by 1976.
By the time of Brezhnev's visit to Bonn from 4-7 May 1978, the 
Schmidt/Genscher government's priorities in Ostpolitik (Osthandel) had 
shifted even more to the political aspects of economic cooperation than 
previously. Despite little progress in other areas, Soviet press 
expectations about some positive economic progress during Brezhnev's 
stay were fulfilled on 6 May 1978 when West Germany and the Soviet 
Union concluded a long-term agreement on economic and industrial 
cooperation.8 Although the accord had little direct economic benefit, it 
was praised by the German politicians precisely for its political benefits, 
reflecting a change of government reasoning. Bonn now argued that even 
if the agreements were not very beneficial economically, their positive 
political effects clearly outweighed the economic disadvantages of 
German-Soviet trade.
When Brezhnev next visited Bonn from 22-25 November 1981, 
detente policy had entered into a severe crisis and the federal
7Stent, p.230 Stent has pointed out that the USSR here refrained from simply 
imposing its will on the GDR because it had alternative sources of energy, and that, in 
the Kremlin's calculation of assets and liabilities, the potential economic gains from the 
Kaliningrad project were less important than preventing a confrontation with East 
Germany.
^The agreement, meant to run for the unusually long period of 25 years, provided for 
intensification of economic cooperation between Bonn and Moscow, such as joint 
development and production, and included West Berlin.
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government's approach to Ostpolitik (Osthandel) into a third phase. 
Despite the difficult international situation, the Free Democrats still 
considered trade with the Soviet Union an important element of stability 
and detente in Europe and did not want current international tensions to 
affect Bonn's bilateral relations with the Communist states. By the time of 
this third phase of Osthandel, its economic strength had become such an 
important part of the Federal Republic's foreign policy that Bonn 
concluded a gas-pipeline deal with Moscow during Brezhnev's 1981 visit, 
even though the United States had just announced an embargo on high 
technology exports to the Communist bloc. Bonn's aversion to utilizing 
negative economic leverage against the Soviet Union clearly demonstrated 
that by the end of the Social-Liberal coalition, the Federal Republic had 
developed its own trade policy towards Eastern Europe and no longer 
accepted US definitions of what was permissible in this area.9
Economic relations with Moscow's satellites
Although German-Soviet trade grew considerably in the 1970s and 
Bonn became Moscow's most important Western trading partner, the 
Schmidt/Genscher government also tried to develop its economic 
relations with the other Communist countries. Following Brandt/Scheel's 
agreement on economic, industrial and technical cooperation with 
Rumania in 1973, Schmidt and Genscher signed similar bilateral 
agreements with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria between 
November 1974 and May 1975. An additional factor in West Germany's 
economic cooperation with the Eastern European states was the constant 
competition between Moscow and its Warsaw Pact satellites for the better 
economic relations with Bonn. Considering purely economic factors, the 
federal government most successfully cooperated with Budapest due to 
Hungary's liberal laws for foreign capital shareholds, and more than half 
of all German industrial cooperation agreements with the Communist 
bloc were realized in Hungary.10
However, taking political factors into account as well, Poland, not 
Hungary, became Bonn's second most important Eastern European 
trading partner during the Social-Liberal coalition. Naturally, Poland
9Stent, p.238
^Link, p.306
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also had to contend with its Communist partners for economic relations 
with Germany but this did not stop the Polish Head of State Edward 
Gierek and Chancellor Schmidt from concluding several German-Polish 
accords in 1975. These agreements provided for the biggest West 
German credit ever given to an Eastern bloc country in return for 
Warsaw's commitment to let 125.000 ethnic Germans emigrate from 
Poland. The Federal Republic's increasingly independent use of positive 
economic leverage was once again apparent during the summer of 1980, 
when Bonn gave a credit of DM 1.2 billion to Poland despite the 
Afghanistan crisis and US economic sanctions against the Warsaw Pact 
states.
Inner-German trade
In a parallel manner to Bonn's overall economic relations with the 
Eastern bloc, the FDP's chances for progress in inner-German trade were 
affected by the contrasting East- and West German motives. The German 
Democratic Republic's main interest in inner-German trade lay in the 
acquisition of Western technology and production goods, and as with all 
other Warsaw Pact states, inner-German trade affected the GDR's 
economy more strongly than the Federal Republic's in terms of its 
relative commercial importance. While West Germany was also 
concerned with the economic aspects of inner-German trade, i.e. the 
opportunities it provided for the export industry, the Free Democrats 
attached at least equally great importance to increasing the contact 
between West- and East German citizens.
After entering into office, Schmidt and Genscher soon 
demonstrated that the political implications of inner-German economic 
cooperation greatly mattered to Bonn by stating two preconditions for 
resuming inner-German trade that were much more political than 
economic. Firstly, the federal government demanded that the German 
Democratic Republic reverse its November 1973 doubling of the 
compulsory currency exchange requirement for West Germans and West 
Berliners travelling into East Germany, which had resulted in a rapid 
decrease of inner-German traffic.11 Since East Berlin was also interested
USchmidt, DB, 135th sess., 11.12.74, government declaration; Plock, The Basic 
Treaty, p. 113
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in continuing good economic relations with West Germany, it announced 
in October 1974 that the exchange rate increase of 1973 would be 
reduced by two-thirds, and a couple of months later, the GDR fulfilled 
Bonn's second precondition for resuming inner-German trade by 
officially exempting pensioners from the compulsory exchange rate.
Although East Germany had not completely restored the 'status quo 
ante' in terms of the minimum compulsory exchange rate, the measure's 
entry into force in November 1974 preceded agreement on a number of 
issues between Bonn and East Berlin. In a process of 'do ut des,' the two 
German states tied up a package of agreements. While Bonn now 
extended the so-called swing credit (an interest-free West German credit 
to East Germany which was due to expire by the end of 1975) until 1981 
at a fixed level, East Berlin reciprocated by signalling its readiness to 
take up negotiations about the transit routes to West Berlin.
Both in December 1975 and in November 1978, Bonn and East 
Berlin concluded a major traffic accord, which was based on a mutual 
strategy of 'linkage.1 While West Germany benefited from the extension 
of the transit facilities to and from West Berlin, East Germany profited 
from Bonn's economic concessions, i.e. the Federal Republic's 
commitment to finance transit routes which would ultimately be East 
German infrastructure. Despite such considerable monetary obligations, 
Bonn argued "..that the agreed improvements and their political 
importance make the financial expense worthwhile."12
Significantly, the process of linkage between West- and East 
Germany continued in the late 1970s and early 1980s in spite of the 
general crisis of detente. Both in October 1979 and in April 1980, Bonn 
and East Berlin concluded agreements further facilitating travel between 
the two Germanies, which led Foreign Minister Genscher to express his 
hope that these inner German settlements would serve as an 'element of 
confidence-building in East-West relations' in a difficult international 
situation.13 However, for the remaining seventeen months of the Social- 
Liberal coalition, progress in inner-German transit questions was 
increasingly impeded by the international crisis.
12B u11.134, 17.11.78 In addition, West Germany had pushed through that the new 
transit ways would be fully included in the privileged traffic regulations of the Four- 
Power accord.
l 3fdk 124, 26.4.80, Genscher's speech at the FDP's state party congress in Bavaria
on 26.4.80 in Munich
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Although cooperation on inner-German issues had lost some of its 
momentum by the end of the Social-Liberal coalition, overall this section 
has shown that positive economic leverage was an important and 
successful aspect of the Schmidt/Genscher government's Ostpolitik even 
after the onset of the Second Cold War in the late 1970s. Next, we shall 
look at those areas of East-West cooperation where the Free Democrats 
could not rely on the concept of linkage for progress, such as the national 
question or the issue of West Berlin's status.
Berlin controversies
During the Social-Liberal coalition, the question of West Berlin's 
status emerged as one of the main controversies in Bonn's relations with 
the Eastern bloc. These disagreements particularly affected the FDP as 
the German party which for historical and ideological reasons strongly 
cared about West Berlin's role as yardstick of detente and as the place 
from which Europe's and Germany's division could potentially be 
overcome.
Controversies about West Berlin mainly arose from the different 
Eastern and Western interpretations of the Four-Power accord of 1971, 
in return reflecting different goals concerning West Berlin's status. The 
Soviet Union and East Germany relied on the part of the Four-Power 
agreement stating that West Berlin was not a "constituent part of the 
Federal Republic of Germany," hence certain state representatives (such 
as the Bundestag or other state organs) had no right to settle in West 
Berlin. Moscow and East Berlin most frequently cited this part since they 
aimed at turning West Berlin into a separate entity while simultaneously 
transforming East Berlin into an integral part of the German Democratic 
Republic. In reality, East Berlin was as little a constituent part of East 
Germany as West Berlin was one of West Germany.
Another part of the Four-Power Agreement said that the existing 
links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic should be maintained 
and developed. Here, the Soviet Union and West Germany decisively 
differed in their interpretation of "links." The Kremlin claimed that the 
Four-Power Agreement meant "loose ties" (Verbindungen) and on 
principle refused to include West Berlin in any agreements with Bonn.14
14Griffith, p.297
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Moscow and East Berlin saw Berlin’s Western orientation as a security 
challenge to the East German state and united in objecting to any specific 
ties with the Federal Republic. Bonn, and most notably the Free 
Democrats, in contrast, interpreted the Four-Power Agreement as 
allowing for "close links" (Bindungen) between the Federal Republic and 
West Berlin, reflecting the fact that the FDP was promoting close official 
government links with West Berlin.
In terms of concrete progress on West Berlin, the Free Democrats 
thus had to consider Soviet and East-German interpretations of the Four- 
Power Agreement and to defend maintenance of the status quo in West 
Berlin against Eastern attempts to deconstruct it. Furthermore, the 
federal government was well aware that Berlin's independence rested on 
American, French and English security guarantees and persistently urged 
the Three Western Powers to reconfirm their commitment to all of 
Berlin, both regularly at NATO encounters and spontaneously in the 
context of crises over Berlin. On the eve before the annual NATO 
conferences, the American, English, French and German Chiefs of State 
or Foreign Ministers would traditionally meet beyond the 'Berlin group' 
to discuss issues concerning Germany and Berlin. During the first NATO 
conference in Ottawa after Schmidt's and Genscher's entry into office, 
the four Foreign Ministers had already agreed on "the essential link 
between detente in Europe and the situation in Berlin."15 It was 
something completely new that the Allies should tie their detente policy to 
the German situation and the Berlin question, and Genscher had all 
reason to be very pleased with the outcome of the conference.
Despite their dependence on international factors for progress in 
the Berlin question, the Free Democrats nevertheless in various ways 
pursued their goal of intensifying the links between West Berlin and the 
Federal Republic. West Germany first attempted to extend Bonn's federal 
presence in West Berlin with its decision of June 1974 to establish a 
Federal Agency of Environmental Protection in West Berlin. This project 
had already been proposed under Chancellor Brandt and was one of the 
first issues with which Schmidt and Genscher were confronted upon 
formation of their government in 1974. While Foreign Minister 
Genscher was strongly in favour of the project, Chancellor Schmidt had
15Genscher, DB, 139th session, 19.12.74, government declaration on the NATO 
Council
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misgivings, but for internal reasons eventually had to go along with the 
proposal.16
Initially, the Western powers objected to the federal government's 
decision, arguing that even though Bonn's action was not illegal, it risked 
renewed East-West complications. While West Germany did go ahead 
with the establishment of the Federal Agency, Genscher - aware of the 
importance of Allied support on the Berlin question - travelled to the 
United States the day after the decision: "On Thursday, the law will enter 
into force, on Friday I will be with the US President. That's perfect."17 
During this trip, Genscher managed to get reassurance of US support for 
Bonn's political and legal standpoint on West Berlin. The Kremlin, in 
contrast, claimed that the Federal Republic's extensive interpretation of 
the Four Power Agreement was illegal and authorized East Berlin to 
disturb access to West Berlin a few days after the law about the Federal 
Agency had entered into force. These traffic hindrances were stopped in 
August 1974, however, and eventually the Soviet Union and East 
Germany began tacitly to accept the Federal Agency's location in West 
Berlin.
As already mentioned in the context of the Kaliningrad 
negotiations, the FDP's Berlin policy furthermore rested on the 
assumption that West Berlin could be included in all of the Federal 
Republic's international agreements according to the law of nations if this 
were mentioned explicitly in each case. Hans-Gunter Hoppe, vice- 
President of the FDP's parliamentary fraction, typically explained the 
government's reasoning:
"...We expect the Soviet Union no longer to deny West 
Germany the right to include Berlin in all international treaties, 
after the Soviet Union as a signatory power (of the Four-Power 
accords) has granted precisely this right to the federal 
government."18
l^Pittman, pp.50-51; The Times, 6.8.74 In his previous function as Minister of the 
Interior, Genscher had stated that locating the Federal Agency of Environmental 
Protection in West Berlin was intended as a political act, which seemed too provocative 
to Schmidt. See also Chapters Four and Five.
17Genscher cited in Der Spiegel, 29.7.74
18Hoppe, DB, 30.1.75, debate on German policy
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Given this conviction, Genscher had already before his and Schmidt's 
visit to Moscow in October 1974 expressed the hope that the Kremlin 
would agree to West Berlin's inclusion in the three outstanding German- 
Soviet agreements on scientific-technological cooperation, legal assistance 
and cultural exchange which were otherwise ready for signing. However, 
Moscow was not ready to grant such an extensive interpretation of the 
Four-Power accord to Bonn, and thus the treaties remained unsigned all 
throughout the Social-Liberal coalition.
During the negotiations about the Conference of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, culminating in the Final Act of Helsinki on 1 
August 1975, the Free Democrats were more successful with their 
request that West Berlin be included in the final document. This time, all 
nine EC Chiefs of Government agreed with Genscher's argument that 
there must be "no white spots on the map of detente" and jointly declared 
in May 1975 that the results of the conference had to apply everywhere in 
Europe.19 The Schmidt/Genscher government was similarly successful 
with its 1976 suggestion that deputies from West Berlin be sent to the 
European Parliament. When the European Summit decided in July 1976 
to move towards direct elections to the European Parliament, it also 
provided for deputies from West Berlin to take their seats in the EP after 
1979. Both the Three Powers and Genscher refuted Moscow's objections 
to the new regulations on the grounds that the West Berlin deputies would 
not be elected directly, but through the Berlin chamber of deputies.
Overall, Moscow and East Berlin were rather suspicious of the new 
West German Foreign Minister, as they realized that Genscher preferred 
to take a tougher line on the issue of West Berlin than his predecessor and 
the Social Democrats. By 1976, the Kremlin and the SED tended to attack 
Genscher when complaining about the Federal Republic's Berlin policy, 
and it seemed as though Genscher occasionally served the Warsaw Pact 
states as a suitable justification for blocking further cooperation with 
Bonn. The Soviet Union consciously emphasized the differences between 
Chancellor Schmidt and the Foreign Minister on the Berlin issue and 
indirectly appealed to Schmidt to use his overall competence in this area. 
However, Moscow's and East Berlin's attacks against the West German
19Genscher, DB, 183rd session, 25.7.75, debate on the CSCE Foreign Minister 
Genscher also demonstrated his conviction that West Berlin was part of the Federal 
Republic by demonstrably accompanying visitors from the United States, Great Britain 
or France to West Berlin.
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government neither resulted in driving a wedge into the coalition nor in a 
significant reversal of Bonn's Ostpolitik.
Between 1974 and 1982, the FDP's attempts to extend West 
Germany's links with West Berlin were also constrained by the Warsaw 
Pact states' objective of turning West Berlin into a separate entity and of 
transforming East Berlin into an integral part of East Germany. The 
Soviet-East German Friendship Treaty of October 1975, for instance, 
tried to create the impression that West Berlin's ties with Bonn were not 
any closer than West Berlin's ties with any other state, for example the 
German Democratic Republic. Furthermore, in January 1977, East 
Germany abolished the military control points between East Berlin and 
adjacent parts of the GDR, which was a clear attempt to invalidate the 
Four Power status for the city and meant that East German laws now also 
automatically applied to East Berlin. Along similar lines, East Germany 
changed its electoral law in July 1979 so that in the future East Berlin's 
citizens could directly elect deputies to the People's Chamber.20
Although on all these occasions, the Western powers immediately 
objected to East Germany's actions and increased their patrols in East 
Berlin, none of the Western protests really changed the Soviet Union's or 
East Germany's Berlin policy. Thus, with both sides' determination to 
assert their interpretation of the Four-Power accord, the FDP's chances 
for real advancement on Berlin issues during the Social-Liberal coalition 
on the whole were quite limited.
National issues/reunification
In a parallel manner to questions concerning West Berlin's status, 
the Free Democrats' striving for progress on the issues of national 
sovereignty and German state citizenship was also impeded by Bonn's and 
East Berlin's disagreement over the interpretation of the existing treaty 
basis. The problem here arose from the German Constitutional Court's 
ambiguous ruling of 1973 which on the one hand had confirmed the Basic 
Treaty's acknowledgement of the GDR as an independent state within the
20Up to that point, deputies from East Berlin had been sent by the borough council 
of East Berlin instead of being elected directly.
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meaning of international law and on the other hand had denied the 
existence of a separate East German citizenship.21
Just as with the Four-Power accord, Bonn and East Berlin relied on 
the part of the Basic Treaty/Karlsruhe Court verdict that suited them best 
for their national policy. The Federal Republic argued that the existence 
of a second German state did not mean a real solution to the German 
problem since the main characteristic of a nation state were the shared 
cultural values ('Kultumation'). Schmidt and Genscher thus concentrated 
on maintaining the German people's right for self-determination, hoping 
this would one day result in reunification. The federal government also 
strictly relied on the Karlsruhe ruling that there was only one German 
citizenship. East Germany in contrast persistently dismissed the notion of 
a still open 'German question' on the grounds that two German states 
already existed ('Staatsnationen'). In contrast to Bonn, the SED leadership 
geared its efforts towards acknowledgement of the German Democratic 
Republic as independent state with independent East German citizens.
However, such inner-German disagreements about the issues of 
citizenship and nationhood mostly took place on a theoretical level and 
hence did not majorly impede practical inner-German cooperation. Only 
in the area of legal assistance to East Germans in third countries did the 
citizenship question emerge as a practical problem in inner-German 
relations. In this context, Foreign Minister Genscher's active opposition 
to the Austrian-East German consular treaty of January 1975 
(recognizing an East German citizenship) should be mentioned. On the 
German Democratic Republic's behalf, this treaty clearly was an attempt 
to gain international recognition of an East German citizenship via 
consular treaties with third states. Bonn immediately protested, arguing 
that the Karlsruhe Court had charged the Federal Republic, not East 
Germany, with taking consular care of all Germans in third states. 
Genscher's attempts to prevent the signing of the Austrian-East German 
treaty failed, but for the rest of the Social-Liberal coalition, the West 
European states upheld Bonn's right to represent East Germans in all 
capitals.22
21Plock, The Basic Treaty, p.94 The Karlsruhe Court has asserted that the two 
German states were to be understood as parts of a still existing pan-German state with 
one Staatsvolk.
22piock, The Basic Treaty, p. 192 The Western states in fact recognized an East 
German citizenship, but without a GDR monopoly on the representation of its citizens 
when the latter sought the assistance of the Federal Republic in third states.
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In addition to its insistence on only one German state citizenship, 
the FDP's Deutschlandpolitik between 1974 and 1982 was characterized 
by its struggle to keep the option of reunification open. This concern was 
most apparent during the negotiations of the Conference of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, culminating in the Final Act of Helsinki on 1 
August 1975. Since one of the CSCE's main objectives was to fix the 
status quo of borders in Europe, Bonn feared that Germany's division 
would become subject to a multilateral agreement. During the CSCE 
negotiations in Geneva, Genscher consequently had his negotiator Klaus 
Blech fight for the inclusion of a clause on the possibility of peaceful 
border change in the Final Act of Helsinki, thereby maintaining the 
German people's right to strive for reunification in free self- 
determination.23
Of course, the Schmidt/Genscher government was also aware of the 
importance of Allied support for its objectives and hence attempted to 
ensure Allied backing during the NATO conference from 18-19 June 
1974 in Ottawa. While the United States had previously shown little 
interest in allowing for a time-consuming quarrel with the Soviet Union 
about the so-called 'German question' and had instead pressed for a quick 
finish to the Geneva talks, in Ottawa, the German government managed 
to secure Allied support for the inclusion of the principles of peaceful 
border change, renunciation of force and self-determination in the Final 
Act.24
During the actual Helsinki negotiations, Bonn could also count on 
EC and US support because not only the option of German reunification 
but also the possibility of European integration needed to be kept open. 
After the Final Act had been signed, Genscher thanked West Germany's 
Allies for supporting Bonn so "...emphatically in realizing the necessary 
formulations in the conference documents..."25 Bonn noted contentedly 
that for the first time not only the Western but also the Warsaw Pact 
states had committed themselves to the possibility of peaceful border 
change. Despite Germany's unambiguous pursuit of its priorities during
23 Ambassador Blech in the foreign policy committee of the German Bundestag on 
15.1.75, Link, p.298; Genscher, DB, 146th session, 30.1.75, debate on German 
policy
24Genscher, DB, 110th session, 20.6.74, debate on the Ottawa Declaration
25ZDF, 27.7.75, Interview with H.D.Genscher
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the CSCE negotiations, it should also be stressed that the Federal Republic 
was careful to avoid making the CSCE into a conference about German 
problems.
While the Schmidt/Genscher government’s national policy overall 
aimed at keeping the German question open and at maintaining the claim 
that there was only one German citizenship, the Free Democrats also had 
to contend with the fact that the German Democratic Republic pursued 
quite the opposite goals. To demonstrate its complete autonomy, East 
Germany undertook a constitutional change in September 1974 which 
replaced the formula of 'Socialist state of German nation' by the term 
'Socialist state of workers and farmers,' stamping any joint cultural 
heritage with West Germany irrelevant. The Federal Republic's protests 
that German unity had its roots in history and could not simply be 
destroyed by changes in East Germany's constitution did not help. All 
throughout the Social-Liberal coalition, East Germany continued its 
emphasis on national independence, which was for instance apparent in 
the SED's omission of the traditional aim of German reunification from 
its May 1976 party programme and in the subsequent removal of any 
reunification passages from East Berlin's Friendship Treaties with other 
Warsaw Pact states.
Regarding the Federal Republic's Deutschlandpolitik between 1974 
and 1982, we have thus seen that during the Social-Liberal coalition, the 
Free Democrats did not achieve their objective of removing the 
traditional postwar irreconcilability of East and West German positions 
on the issues of national unity and citizenship. It has also been shown, 
however, that these issues were not a major factor of conflict in the daily 
inner-German relations but were mostly disputed at a theoretical level.
Humanitarian matters
The area of humanitarian issues resembled the questions of 
nationality and Berlin's status in the sense that the completely different 
Eastern and Western ideological positions and the Eastern bloc's security 
interests theoretically prevented the FDP's desire for rapprochement. 
Nevertheless, there was quite substantial progress in the field during the 
Social-Liberal coalition, partly because the West skilfully managed to 
maintain a process of 'do ut des,' whereby the Kremlin agreed to certain
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concessions in the humanitarian field in return for Western 
acknowledgement of Soviet foreign policy interests.
The Final Act of Helsinki
The single most important progress in the field of humanitarian 
questions between 1974 and 1982 was achieved during the negotiations 
resulting in the Final Act of Helsinki on 1 August 1975. Apart from its 
objective of keeping the German question open, the FDP's main priority 
in Helsinki was the inclusion of humanitarian principles in the Final Act, 
firstly because of the Federal Republic's national duty to care for the 
Germans on the other side, and secondly because of its desire to create 
instances of appeal for bilateral relations.26 During the actual CSCE 
negotiations, the German policymakers' (and in particular the FDP's) 
emphasis on the issue of human contacts was of course modified by the 
views and priorities of its negotiating partners. However, West 
Germany's accent on the humanitarian aspects remained distinctive, and 
Bonn not only phrased the first drafts of all EC members in this area but 
also carried the main burden of the negotiations.
For a successful conclusion of the Helsinki negotiations, the Free 
Democrats inevitably also needed to consider Washington's and Moscow's 
interests. On the one hand, the Federal Republic had to contend with the 
United States' lack of enthusiasm about the very concept of a Conference 
of Security and Cooperation in Europe, given (1) US Foreign Minister 
Henry Kissinger's preference for bilateral negotiations with the 
Communist states to a multilateral forum and (2) the United States' 
preoccupation with the military rather than the political determinants of 
East-West rivalry, which resulted in a low US profile during most of the 
Helsinki negotiations until 1975.27 On the other hand, the 
Schmidt/Genscher government had to take account of Moscow's
26By 1973, the head of the Foreign Ministry planning staff and leader of the German 
delegation to the Helsinki preparatory talks, Guido Brunner (FDP), had already written 
about Bonn's priorities in its approach to the CSCE: "We intend to establish contact 
between people, contacts between professional groups, contacts from society to 
society, as autonomous factors in the process of detente." Brunner in Europa-Archiv 
13, 1973, cited in Garton Ash, p.263
27Hanrieder, Germany. America. Europe, p.204
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preoccupation with the static rather than the dynamic elements of the 
Final Act.
In a process of ’do ut des,' both the Kremlin's interest in fixing the 
status quo of the borders in Europe (thereby acknowledging the Soviet 
Union's status as superpower) and the West's interest in creating 
possibilities for humanitarian improvements was incorporated into the 
final document. The Free Democrats here benefited from the fact that 
despite Kissinger's initial lack of interest in humanitarian matters, in the 
end, the US Foreign Minister used his personal influence with Andrej 
Gromyko to lay the groundwork for the Final Act in bilateral 
negotiations. These negotiations eventually resulted in a Soviet 
commitment to the freer flow of people and ideas in the Soviet Union 
(Basket III) in exchange for the Western recognition of the borders of 
Eastern Europe (Basket I).28
In his concluding speech to the Conference of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, Brezhnev said there were "no victors and 
defeated, no winners and losers."29 Despite the package deal technique, it 
initially seemed as though the Soviet Union had gained most from the 
Final Act of Helsinki, and the Western powers were accused of having 
ratified Europe's post-war boundaries for nothing in return. Schmidt and 
Genscher, for their part, were content that through the inclusion of 
Basket III in the Final Act, there now was an official pan-European 
commitment to the goals that Social-Liberal Ostpolitik had placed in the 
forefront and partially achieved bilaterally. However, no less than the 
other Western CSCE participants did Bonn at first underestimate the 
impact of Basket III on the Eastern signatory states and on international 
relations in general. As Vojtech Mastny has expressed it:
"The notion that sovereign states be held accountable for the
treatment of their own citizens to other sovereign states and
28Andren/Bimbaum, p.4 Moscow's commitment to Basket El became even more 
relevant for the West when all Helsinki principles were declared interdependent instead 
of being applied independently (as requested by the Kremlin). The regulation suggested 
by the Soviet Union would for instance have permitted Moscow to neglect the 
obligations anchored in Basket IE while simultaneously insisting on Western adherence 
to the Baskets I and E.
29Der Spiegel, 18.8.75
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their citizens amounted to nothing short of a revolutionary 
innovation in the conduct of international relations."30
The next section will consequently examine the effect of Basket III on 
Eastern Europe and, as a result, on the Social-Liberal coalition's room 
for manoeuvre in Ostpolitik.
Emergence of the dissident movements
Although the Final Act of Helsinki had not committed the Eastern 
European leaders to any humanitarian concessions, issues like greater 
freedom of ideas and movement had now been "de-tabooed." In the two 
years after the Final Act, dissident voices in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe started to make demands in accordance with Basket III, and 
several dissident movements formed. In May 1976, Juri Orlov (a Soviet 
physician) founded the so-called 'Helsinki group,' which aimed at 
watching over the proper implementation of human rights in the Soviet 
Union.
For fear of similar developments in its own country, Poland had 
initially not even included Basket III in its obligatory publications of the 
Final Act. However, this could not prevent the emergence of a powerful 
Polish Workers' Committee by 1976 which legally assisted demonstrating 
workers and formed an alliance with the dissident intellectuals. In 
Czechoslovakia, the so-called 'Charter IT  came into being to fight for 
realization of the human rights that the CSSR had recognized by signing 
the Final Act. While most of the Eastern European dissidents thus focused 
on the need for democratic reforms, Basket III probably had the 
strongest effect on the German Democratic Republic, which was apparent 
in the drastic increase of East German applications for emigration to 
West Germany (more than 100.000 by 1976) and the exodus of writers 
and other intellectuals.
Overall, the Final Act of Helsinki had started a process of political 
change with unexpected and undesired consequences for the Eastern 
European states, and by 1977, the dissident movements in the Warsaw
30Mastny, Helsinki. Human Rights and European Security, p. 12 In connection with 
the Federal Republic's efforts to create instances of international appeal for human 
rights, Foreign Minister Genscher's suggestion of 1976 to create an International 
Human Rights Court of the United Nations should also be mentioned.
72
Pact states had long transcended the beginning stage. How, then, did the 
Communist states cope with the increased internal resistance against their 
regimes, and how did this affect the FDP’s Ostpolitik? In addition to 
rather futile objections to the Western strategy of ’’peaceful infiltration," 
Moscow and East Berlin hoped to set an example of deterrence by 
expelling some of their own dissident citizens. Beginning in mid- 
December 1976, it was reported that East Germans who had visited West 
Germany were denied re-entry into the German Democratic Republic, a 
step which coincided with an increased East German campaign against 
dissidents. The most spectacular case of expatriation was song-maker 
Wolf Biermann's expulsion from the German Democratic Republic on 7 
November 1976, while he was on a concert tour to West Germany. 
Although East Germany had expelled Biermann to quell the domestic 
opposition, the opposite happened: about one hundred intellectuals heavily 
criticized East Berlin's decision, and a large number of famous writers 
left the German Democratic Republic under protest.
The Communist states furthermore defended themselves against 
'Western ideological infiltration' after the Final Act of Helsinki by 
banishing many Western correspondents from their states who - in line 
with Basket Ill's requirement for more exchange of information - now 
reported more freely about the conditions in Eastern Europe. In 
December 1975, the German Democratic Republic expelled Jorg-Rainer 
Mettke, correspondent of the magazine Der Spiegel in East Berlin, since 
he had - rightly - claimed that the Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
enforced adoption of children whose parents had fled to the West by 
SED-loyal parents. Almost exactly one year later, the ARD's (First 
German television) correspondent in East Berlin, Lothar Loewe, had to 
leave because of spreading the news that the GDR killed human beings at 
its borders 'like rabbits,' an almost ironic accusation as the East German 
guns actually did contain ammunition normally used for rabbits.31 In 
January 1978, the German Democratic Republic again proved its 
apprehension about more journalistic freedom, when it completely closed 
the office of Der Spiegel in East Berlin, because the magazine had 
published a manifesto that was so precise in its criticism of the East
3 lDie Zeit, 31.12.76 Loewe had said: "Here in the GDR every child knows that the 
border troops are strictly requested to shoot at human beings like at rabbits."
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German regime that only somebody with inside knowledge of the 
governmental system could have written it.32
Apart from the GDR's expatriation of dissident citizens and 
expulsion of 'dangerous' Western journalists, the Schmidt/Genscher 
government's desire to continue detente with Eastern Europe was also 
constrained by the Communist regimes' practice of denying potential 
Western troublemakers, especially journalists and politicians, access to 
their countries. In March 1976, East Germany for instance prevented 
three West-German journalists from admission to the Leipzig Fair. The 
West German Minister of Economics, Hans Friderichs (FDP) ended his 
visit under protest, arguing that it was time for Bonn to demonstrate how 
seriously it took such offences. Thus, the first official visit of a West 
German Minister of Economics to East Germany, meant to be a sign of 
normalization, instead turned out to be the sign of a new phase of 
confrontation. Similarly, in January 1978, East Germany prevented 
Helmut Kohl, leader of the opposition in the Bundestag, from entry, 
arguing that his intended activities in West Berlin clashed with the Four- 
Power agreement. As Der Spiegel aptly commented, the German 
Democratic Republic behaved as though the CSCE had been a 
"Conference for Security and Confrontation.."33
President Carter’s human rights campaign
From January 1977 onwards, the FDP's chances for progress in 
Ostpolitik were further limited by the new US President Jimmy Carter's 
human rights policy, which was significantly to affect the overall 
development of detente. While the previous US governments had been 
fairly uninterested in the negotiations on human rights and had been 
unwilling to interfere with the internal problems of the Eastern bloc, 
Carter felt an almost religious obligation to restore the 'moral authority' 
of US foreign policy and suddenly discovered the Final Act as a weapon 
in the new campaign for human rights.34
32In July 1978, the real author of the manifesto, Rudolf Bahro, who had worked in 
the ranks of the SED leadership, was arrested.
^3Der Spiegel, 22.3.76
34Andren/Birnbaum, p.27; Die Zeit, 25.2.77 However, Carter also said that there 
would be no link between human rights and arms control.
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To Bonn's and the FDP's dismay, Carter's campaign already 
severely harmed relations with the Soviet Union during his first months 
in office. The Kremlin reacted to such "undue American interference" by 
stepping up its confrontation against the West on several levels, thereby 
decisively worsening the overall climate of detente. Moscow now arrested 
many of its leading dissidents (e.g. Orlov and Ginsburg), demonstrating 
to the West that it would not allow the United States to dictate the Soviet 
Union's behaviour towards its own citizens. Furthermore, the Kremlin 
tried to circumvent Western accusations by introducing the distinction 
between two kinds of human rights: 'bourgeois' human rights, as applied 
in the West, which were purely geared towards the imposition of 
Capitalism, and 'real' human rights, which could only be realized in 
Socialism and entirely fell within the Communist states' internal 
competences.35
The first CSCE Follow-up conference in Belgrade
Although by the time of the first CSCE follow-up conference in 
Belgrade (4 October 1977 - 9 April 1978), both the Soviet and the 
American positions on human rights had been somewhat modified, the 
Schmidt/Genscher government's striving for a successful outcome of the 
conference was constrained by the remaining strong differences between 
the superpowers. On the one hand, the Kremlin had signalled its readiness 
for compromise by supplementing the Soviet constitution with ten 
principles from the Final Act (i.e. the freedom of the press, speech and 
demonstration) as of October 1977. On the other hand, the fact that the 
new rights were restricted to "preserving the interests of the Soviet state 
and for the purpose of strengthening the Socialist system" proved these 
changes to be largely symbolic.36 Apart from its skilfully timed 
constitutional change, the Soviet Union pursued a strategy of damage 
limitation in Belgrade and was firmly determined to avoid any obliging 
obligations or further institutionalization of the CSCE process.37
35Die Zeit, 18.3.77
36Die Zeit, 10.6.77
37Andren/Bimbaum, p.32 Most Eastern European countries were unhappy about the 
Soviet Union's behaviour in Belgrade. At Helsinki, it had seemed as though their 
national independence had been emphasized but by the time of the Belgrade conference,
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Similarly to the Soviet Union's constitutional change in time for the 
Belgrade conference, Washington had also signalled some readiness for 
cooperation by June 1977. By then, Carter's understanding for the 
complications of the process of interfering in Eastern Europe seemed to 
have grown, and his public engagement on behalf of Soviet dissidents had 
noticeably decreased. Nevertheless, of the two main Western concerns in 
Belgrade, (1) controlling the application of the Helsinki principles and (2) 
checking the possibilities for a further extension of detente, the United 
States was clearly preoccupied with the former. Arthur Goldberg, who 
was appointed head of the US delegation in Belgrade, was fully
committed to a full and frank review of the participating states'
implementation of the Final Act of Helsinki, which implied some 
unavoidable confrontation with the Eastern bloc.
Washington's preoccupation with human rights also meant that the 
US delegation soon found itself ahead of its European Allies in Belgrade, 
most notably the Federal Republic of Germany. While the Free 
Democrats acknowledged that for the United States, human rights was a 
matter of high principle, the West Germans were particularly worried 
about their delicate contacts with the Eastern European states, which 
called for a much more pragmatic and less confrontational Ostpolitik. As 
Schmidt said in an interview with Die Zeit in 1978:
"...As regards human rights, the accents on this side of the
Atlantic are overall more reticent than on the other side of the
Atlantic - and that includes my government."38
The Germans and most other Western Europeans believed that it would 
be counterproductive to criticize the Communist states too harshly on the 
implementation of Basket III and instead concentrated on preserving and 
extending the concrete achievements of detente in Belgrade.
Concerning the outcome of the CSCE follow-up conference in 
Belgrade, not only the aggressiveness of the United States but also the 
vulnerability of the Warsaw Pact states stood in the way of the FDP's 
desire for progress. Although the Western powers succeeded in 
committing the conference participants to a firm date for the next CSCE
the Soviet Union had stepped up bloc discipline due to the growing number of strikes 
and dissident movements since 1975.
38Die Zeit, Interview with H.Schmidt, 21.7.78
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conference in Madrid, and even though the Belgrade conference ended 
with a final communique (contrary to Soviet desires), this communique 
contained little but very vague statements and did not even address the 
question of human rights. The Soviet Union had thus reached its goal of 
getting through Belgrade without making any substantial commitments.
Overall, this section has shown that the FDP's success in the area of 
human rights during the early years of the Social-Liberal coalition 
contrasted markedly with the constraints which Schmidt and Genscher 
faced from about 1977 onwards. Despite the Free Democrats' successful 
striving for the inclusion of Basket III in the Final Act of Helsinki, and 
despite the latter's unexpectedly strong impact on Eastern Europe, by the 
late 1970s, the Communist states had greatly stepped up their demarcation 
against 'Western ideological infiltration,' which resulted in a setback for 
detente.
By the time of the second CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid, 
the prospects for success had declined even further. Due to substantial 
disagreement among the participants, this second conference lasted almost 
three years (November 1980 to September 1983) instead of the originally 
planned three months, and instead of human rights, one of the main topics 
in Madrid was the French proposal for a European disarmament 
conference, taken up by the states of the Warsaw Pact. This different 
focus reflected the fact that by the turn of the decade, the security aspects 
of detente had begun to overshadow the humanitarian aspects. Why the 
international environment had changed, and how Bonn and the Free 
Democrats reacted to the altered character of detente will be examined in 
the next section.
Managing the crisis of detente
Before discussing the link between detente and defence during the 
Social-Liberal coalition, it should be stressed (1) that similarly to the area 
of economic relations, the issue of global security tended to affect West 
German politics as a whole and not only the Free Democratic Party 
specifically, and (2) that in contrast to other areas of West German 
foreign policy, security matters were much more dominated by 
Chancellor Schmidt than by Foreign Minister Genscher, both due to 
Schmidt's constitutional position as Federal Chancellor and to his
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personal interests. Although the Free Democrats thus played a limited 
role in the Federal Republic's security policy, a discussion of the shifts in 
global security after 1976 is nevertheless essential for defining the FDP's 
room for manoeuvre in Ostpolitik, given the central role of military 
questions in determining the overall climate of East-West relations.
From about 1976 onwards, the Soviet Union had drastically 
increased its level of arms in the area not covered by SALT I by 
modernizing its intermediate-range nuclear forces aimed at Western 
Europe. This shifted the global balance of power in Moscow's favour 
and meant that by 1976/77, the Schmidt/Genscher government's efforts to 
preserve detente were no longer in full accord with the superpower 
developments. The Atlantic alliance undertook its first attempt to remove 
the growing military imbalance between East and West by debating the 
production of the so-called neutron bomb. In July 1977, President Carter 
declared his readiness in principle to construct this new system, but soon 
afterwards he faced intense domestic opposition against the neutron 
bomb, largely on the grounds that a weapon which would destroy all 
living beings while leaving material goods untouched was immoral. 
Carter thus tried to avoid a final decision about the neutron bomb by 
making it dependent on West Germany's commitment to stationing the 
bomb on its territory before the final decision to produce it had even 
been taken.
Since the Federal Republic refused to fulfil this precondition, and 
since the domestic discussion about the neutron bomb had not left the US 
President untouched, Carter infinitely deferred the decision about the 
production of the neutron bomb in April 1978. The Europeans, and 
especially Chancellor Schmidt and the Free Democrats, were taken by 
surprise and let down by the US President's decision after they had tried 
to get the neutron bomb accepted at home. What remained was doubt on 
both sides of the Atlantic: in the Federal Republic of Germany about the 
leadership qualities of the US President, and in the United States about 
Bonn's readiness to contribute to the joint defence.39 Even though Bonn 
tried to keep up the impression of intra-alliance agreement towards 
outside by pointing out that the final decision depended on the future 
behaviour of the Soviet Union, the result was clear: the entry into arms
39Haftendom, p. 138
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control via the neutron bomb had not been successful, and instead the 
disagreement between Bonn and Washington had grown.
After the attempt to remove the imbalance between the Warsaw 
Pact and NATO with the help of the neutron bomb had failed, Carter, 
Giscard, Callaghan and Schmidt met at Guadeloupe in January 1979 to 
discuss NATO's next steps. In Guadeloupe, President Carter's 
announcement that in the near future, the United States was prepared to 
station Pershing-II and cruise missiles in Europe was quickly accepted by 
all participants, if on the basis of rather vague information. After the 
Guadeloupe summit, Chancellor Schmidt succeeded in getting the missile 
deployment debate 'doubled' with arms control negotiations, which 
allowed the whole package to be rationalized as another step forward in 
NATO's Harmel Report policy of combining defence with detente.40
Overall, the Schmidt/Genscher government here faced the 
traditional German problem of having to balance West- and Ostpolitik. 
On the one hand, by supporting Carter's military plans, Bonn took 
account of the 'linkage' between Washington's commitment of troops to 
Germany's defence and the Federal Republic's firm and visible 
commitment to NATO and the West. After all, the Allies' lingering 
doubts about Bonn's loyalty to the alliance had been apparent during the 
negotiations about the neutron bomb, when Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
President Carter's national security adviser, had started referring to the 
concept of West Germany's 'self-finlandization.' On the other hand, 
towards the East, the Federal Chancellor tried to avoid the impression 
that Bonn was the pacesetter in the Western alliance for the 
modernization of Western missiles. Lastly, at home, Schmidt aimed at 
retaining his party's support by claiming that he was exercising a decisive 
influence on the Americans in keeping the arms control process alive and 
guiding them towards negotiations with the Soviet Union.41
On 12 December 1979, NATO officially approved the 'dual-track 
decision' in Brussels, providing for the alliance to produce and deploy
40johnstone, pp.45-47
41 The domestic debate about the NATO dual-track decision centered on the facts that 
(1) while US cruise missiles would be deployed in Germany, Great Britain, France and 
Italy, the Pershing II missiles would be exclusively deployed on German soil. (2), 
whereas the cruise missiles would take two hours to reach the Soviet Union, the 
Pershing II missiles would only take fifteen minutes, which increased both German and 
Soviet anxieties. Die Zeit, 8.9.78; Pittman, p. 112
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intermediate-range nuclear missiles from 1983 onwards, unless the 
Kremlin had both destroyed its existing SS 20s and stopped any further 
production by 1983, in which case NATO would entirely forego the 
modernization of Western forces ('zero option'). Overall, the 'carrot and 
stick' approach underlying the NATO dual-track decision corresponded 
to the Federal Republic's own plans, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
remarked contentedly:
"...It must not be underestimated that the dual-track decision 
introduced a new peace-securing element into the international 
demilitarization discussion...Its decline of the arms race should 
set a precedent..."42
The main question now was whether the Soviet Union would be 
ready to cooperate concerning the dual-track decision. During NATO's 
decision-making process, Moscow had already started an intensive 
propaganda campaign with the aim of preventing or at least delaying the 
decision. In a speech that he held in October 1979 in East Berlin, 
Brezhnev announced that the Soviet Union would withdraw 20.000 Soviet 
troops and 1.000 tanks from the German Democratic Republic if NATO 
renounced the modernization of its forces. After 12 December 1979, the 
Kremlin further intensified its propaganda campaign, and in particular 
warned that the introduction of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in 
Europe would negatively affect German-Soviet relations.
By the end of 1979, Moscow's rearmament and NATO's response 
in the form of the dual-track decision had already severely strained East- 
West detente. When in December 1979, the Soviet Union intervened in 
Afghanistan, it became clear that detente was indeed undergoing a major 
crisis, and that the rapid deterioration of superpower relations was bound 
to affect the framework of Bonn's Ost-and Deutschlandpolitik. West 
Germany and the Free Democrats reacted to the changed international 
situation in four ways: firstly, the Schmidt/Genscher government firmly 
sided with the Atlantic alliance and clearly disapproved of Moscow's 
actions. Equally importantly, however, the Social-Liberal coalition 
reacted to the overall deterioration of East-West relations by attempting 
to save as much of detente as possible, both together with its European 
partners, and by trying its hand at the role of an 'interpreter' between the
42Bull.23, 10.3.81
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two superpowers. Fourthly, Bonn and the FDP attempted to shield at least 
inner-German relations from the crisis of detente and conducted a policy 
of 'damage limitation' towards the German Democratic Republic.
Bonn sides with the Atlantic alliance
On the one hand, the Free Democrats decided on clear solidarity 
with NATO in this difficult situation because the Germans were only too 
aware of their dependence on the Western alliance for achieving their 
goals in Eastern Europe and containing Soviet expansionism. As Foreign 
Minister Genscher remarked, Europe was not siding with Washington 
"...as a present to the United States but in order to realize (its)..own 
European interests."43 In concrete terms, West Germany's solidarity with 
the United States after Afghanistan manifested itself in Bonn's eventual 
support for the American boycott of the 1980 Olympic games in 
Moscow. Along with most other EC countries, the federal government 
had initially been slightly more hesitant than Washington about 
boycotting the Olympic games because it feared for the further progress 
of detente. Nevertheless, in March 1980, Chancellor Schmidt advised the 
National Olympic Committee that West Germany not participate in the 
Olympic games unless the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from 
Afghanistan. Wolfgang Mischnick, head of the FDP's parliamentary 
fraction, typically noted:
"I do not conceal that for many of my colleagues in the FDP's 
parliamentary fraction, solidarity with the United States was a 
decisive factor in their agreement not to participate (in the 
Olympic games in Moscow)..."44
Bonn furthermore demonstrated its commitment to the Atlantic alliance 
by approving a 3 percent increase of its expenditure on defence and
4'3DFS, 13.3.80, Interview with H.D.Genscher
44Mischnick, 213th sess., 23.4.80, debate about the Olympic boycott Note (1) that 
the Federal Republic was the only major nation other than the United States to boycott 
the Olympic Games and (2) that although no West German athletes went to Moscow, 
German companies played an important role in providing much of the equipment of the 
games, for instance a new airport. Stent, pp.238-239
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sending four German naval units on a demonstrative passage through the 
Indian Ocean.45
On the other hand, the Afghanistan crisis revealed that by the end 
of the 1970s, Washington's relations had changed not only with the 
Warsaw Pact states but also with Western Europe. Whereas at the 
beginning of the decade, the Western alliance had agreed on a policy of 
detente as the best approach towards the Eastern bloc, by the turn of the 
decade, Bonn's and the FDP's continued desire for detente clashed with 
the growing superpower tensions. In face of the deteriorating US-Soviet 
climate, Washington now returned to a strategy of traditional 
containment and attached greatest priority to a strong defence, both in 
order to remove the military imbalance between East and West and for 
exerting political control over Soviet expansionist behaviour in any part 
of the world.46
West German attempts to save detente with the help of EPC
Thus, although Bonn paid tribute to 'linkage' in the Atlantic 
Alliance by supporting the Olympic boycott and increasing its defence 
spending, the Schmidt/Genscher government also attempted to preserve 
the gains of Ostpolitik together with its Western European allies. This for 
instance manifested itself in the EC's comparatively mild reaction to the 
Soviet intervention in Afganistan. While Washington was not prepared to 
negotiate with Moscow before the Soviet Union had completely 
withdrawn its troops, in February 1980, the European Foreign Ministers 
suggested a concept for Afghanistan's independence which provided for a 
step-by-step withdrawal of Soviet troops and parallel measures for 
restoration of an independent non-aligned Afghanistan under 
international control. Although the EPC's initiative failed due to 
Moscow's objections to a neutral status for Afghanistan, it was 
undoubtedly a signal that Western Europe would continue its interest in 
close cooperation with the Eastern bloc 47
45fdk 85, 15.5.82; Pittman, p.119
46Haftendom, p.256
47Nuttall, p. 158
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Europeans and Americans furthermore somewhat disagreed over 
the question of whether a policy of 'carrots' (further economic and 
political cooperation with the Eastern bloc) or 'stick' (economic 
sanctions) would be the most appropriate reaction to Moscow's 
intervention in Afghanistan. Washington, for its part, decided to boycott 
all grain export to the Soviet Union in excess of the eight million tons 
negotiated by Kissinger in a long-term agreement and also put an 
embargo on electronic and oil-producing equipment. Bonn and the FDP, 
in contrast, hesitated to support Washington's policy of sanctions, (1) 
because the federal government feared that negative economic leverage 
would jeopardize the achievements of detente and (2) because for the 
Federal Republic, trade with the Soviet Union was of much greater 
economic importance than to Washington.48
Bonn as mediator between East and West?
Apart from Bonn's efforts for retaining the benefits of detente 
through cooperation with its European allies, Schmidt and Genscher also 
tried to combat the danger that Washington and Moscow would entirely 
break off their lines of communication by acting as an 'interpreter' 
between East and West. Foreign Minister Genscher typically expressed 
the Social-Liberal coalition's determination to preserve the gains of 
Ostpolitik as follows:
"We do not want to give up anything, absolutely anything of 
what has become possible for Berlin, its security, the Berliners' 
mobility, travel opportunities to the German Democratic 
Republic and possibilities for Germans to emigrate from 
Eastern Europe. On the contrary, all this must be defended 
with 'teeth and claws'."49
From about 1980 onwards, the Free Democrats thus attempted to save 
detente by making sure that the White House would remain committed to 
a policy of arms control. However, as will be shown next, such West
48Pittman, p.l 19; Stent, p.236 Of the Western European states, only Great Britain 
was ready to support the United States' policy of sanctions fully.
49fdk 124, 26.4.80, Genscher's speech at the FDP's state party congress in Bavaria 
on 26.4.80 in Munich; See also Bull. 131, 11.12.80
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German mediating efforts proved to be rather futile because Bonn did not 
sit at the bargaining table and was consequently limited to urging the 
United States and the Soviet Union to develop a more constructive policy.
While Chancellor Schmidt's March 1980 trip to Washington was 
indeed a success, as the United States expressed its continued readiness to 
assume arms control negotiations with Moscow, the US-German 
controversies before and during the G-7 summit in Venice only three 
months later clearly demonstrated how restricted the Federal Republic's 
room for manoeuvre in the alliance really was. Under pressure from his 
party, Schmidt had suggested in April 1980 that both sides should 
renounce the production of intermediate-range nuclear missiles for a 
certain number of years and use this period for negotiations. Typically 
for Western suspicions about Germany's loyalty towards the Atlantic 
alliance, in mid-August 1980, President Carter wrote a letter to Schmidt, 
in which he expressed his fear that the Chancellor might slide out of his 
commitment to both parts of the NATO dual-track decision.
Schmidt was extremely offended over the letter and brought the 
matter up with Carter in Venice before the start of the G-7 summit on 23 
and 24 June 1980. On the one hand, Carter's and Schmidt's talks in 
Venice illustrated the value of multilateral summits in providing the 
occasion for bilateral contacts between the leaders, as the air was cleared 
and the US President assured the press that he had confidence in 
Schmidt.50 On the other hand, the Venice talks highlighted the constraints 
on the Federal Republic's freedom of action in foreign policy, since 
Carter declined Schmidt's April proposal on the grounds that such a 
moratorium would freeze the present military imbalance between the two 
superpowers and would unnecessarily delay the United States' 
modernization of its missiles. After some unusually harsh confrontations 
during the summit, Schmidt finally accepted Washington's view as the 
joint Western negotiation position.
During Schmidt's and Genscher's trip to the Soviet Union from 30 
June - 1 July 1980, Bonn again tried its hand at the role of a mediator 
between the two superpowers and achieved that after the visit, Moscow 
no longer made the ratification of SALT II and the suspension of the
50putnam/Bayne, pp. 122-124 Venice was also a political success for other reasons, 
in that the allies now ended their earlier disarray over the Afghanistan crisis by issuing 
a joint a statement, which condemned the Soviet occupation as unacceptable and 
undermining peace in the world at large.
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NATO dual-track decision into a precondition for starting arms control 
negotiations with Washington.51 Although the arms control negotiations 
between Washington and Moscow indeed started in October 1980 in 
Geneva, they only lasted for one month, because both the change of 
power in the United States and the reconfirmation of the Social-Liberal 
government in Bonn affected their further progress. On 4 November 
1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States which 
immediately influenced East-West relations since the new US 
administration took a much stronger rhetorical line towards the 
Communist states, talking much more than its predecessor about military 
strength and even military superiority. In contrast to the Reagan 
administration's increased emphasis on the rearmament aspect of the 
NATO dual-track decision, the reconfirmation of the Social-Liberal 
coalition in Bonn on 5 October 1980 strengthened the SPD's focus on the 
need for arms control.
Thus, while throughout 1980, the West German government had 
largely geared its mediating efforts towards securing Moscow's readiness 
to negotiate, in 1981, Schmidt and Genscher had to strive equally hard to 
ensure Washington's willingness for a resumption of the INF talks. The 
potential problem was President Reagan's belief that in order to negotiate 
with the Russians from a position of strength, the United States needed to 
increase its military strength first. Under these circumstances, the 
German government welcomed the news from Genscher's and Schmidt's 
trips to the United States (in March and May 1981) that Washington 
would hold on to both parts of the NATO dual-track decision and was 
ready to negotiate with Moscow.52
At the end of 1981, the two superpowers actually resumed the 
arms control negotiations in Geneva. The federal government was trying 
to influence Washington to work towards the previously mentioned 'zero 
option,' by which NATO guaranteed completely to renounce any 
modernization of its intermediate-range nuclear forces if the Soviet
51 Schmidt, DB, 229th sess., 3.7.80, government declaration about Schmidt's and 
Genscher's visit to Moscow from 30.6.-1.7.80
52Bull.24, 13.3.81 As the time of the Western modernization of its nuclear forces 
was approaching, the Soviet Union also tried to influence the internal NATO 
negotiations. During his visit to Bonn in November 1981, Brezhnev suggested that if 
both sides adjourned the further production of nuclear missiles during the arms control 
negotiations, Moscow would be ready to withdraw a certain number of its missiles 
from the European part of the USSR, a concept which Reagan of course declined.
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Union both destroyed its existing superiority in this field and reliably 
stopped any further production. Although it is somewhat difficult to 
believe that at this point of time, any government could still seriously 
expect Moscow to agree to this suggestion, the United States declared the 
zero option to be its official objective.53 As expected, the Soviet Union 
rejected the zero option, claiming that approximate parity in Soviet and 
US intermediate-range nuclear missiles already existed, and that 
Washington was merely attempting to shift the military balance in 
NATO's favour. Given the multitude of pressures on both sides, the arms 
control negotiations did not yield any concrete results and were finally 
broken off by Moscow in November 1983.
The Polish crisis of 1981/1982
The Polish crisis in the winter of 1981/82, which had started with 
the workers' revolts in August 1980, again brought to the fore (1) the 
differences between Washington's and Bonn's approach to the Eastern 
bloc and (2) the growing importance of EPC in West Germany's foreign 
policy. The White House, for its part, reacted to the imposition of martial 
law in Poland with a policy of sanctions. By December 1981, Reagan had 
imposed restrictions on high-technology exports to Poland, banned new 
export licences for high technology and equipment (such as used on the 
trans-Siberian gas pipeline) to the Soviet Union and suspended both 
Polish and Soviet flights to the United States.
Washington's European allies, in contrast, reacted to the events in 
Poland in a much more measured way. Most Western Europeans, and 
especially the Germans, were eager to continue cooperation with the 
Communist countries, yet did not want to risk open disagreement with 
Washington. The Twelve thus decided to take a middle road by politically 
condemning the Polish military regime while continuing limited 
economic cooperation. On the one hand, the EC issued a political 
statement which called for the end of martial law and the restoration of a 
genuine dialogue with the Church and Solidarity in Poland.54 On the
53Link, p.339 Interestingly, the US hardliners (’hawks') were more in favour of the 
zero option than the softliners (’doves'). Many doves opposed the zero option on the 
grounds that it was too much of a maximum position and that it would - justifiably so - 
be evaluated as propaganda trick by Reagan and weaken his credibility.
5 4 N u t t a l l ,  p.202; fdk, 27.3.81 The Twelve also warned the Soviet Union not to 
interfere with the political developments in Poland.
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other hand, Western Europe continued its economic aid to Poland in 
order to buy time for the Poles to create the basis for economic 
stabilization and reform.
During the World Economic Summit in Versailles in June 1982, 
the issue of East-West trade featured prominently, as the allies worked 
out a compromise in three hours of bargaining. However, the FDP's 
hopes that the fragile compromise would work quickly collapsed in face 
of the conflicting national press statements, which only fuelled the 
determination of hard-liners in the United States to step up pressure on its 
European allies, especially as no sign of real improvement emerged from 
Poland.55 Two weeks after the Versailles economic summit, President 
Reagan, far from relaxing the US pipeline sanctions as the Europeans had 
hoped, announced that they were being extended to cover US subsidiaries 
and licencees abroad.
Thereby, the United States tried to prevent European subsidiaries 
of US firms from fulfilling signed contracts with Moscow, which entailed 
the delivery of Western European equipment for a Trans-Siberian 
pipeline in exchange for later Soviet deliveries of gas to Western 
Europe.56 The European Community condemned Reagan's actions as 
'contrary to the principles of international law,' and with support from 
their governments, most European companies ignored the restrictions by 
Washington. Only after protracted negotiations between the United States 
and the Europeans, partly in the EPC and partly in the Bonn Group (the 
FRG and the three Western Allies) did Washington lift the sanctions in 
November 1982, while the Europeans agreed to exercise greater restraint 
in trading with the East.57
Overall, however, Schmidt's and Genscher's efforts to revive 
detente via a joint European policy towards Poland did not prove any 
more successful than West Germany's attempts at the role of an 
'interpreter' between East and West. The Soviet Union's intervention in 
Afghanistan and the proclamation of martial law in Poland in December
55Putnam/Bayne, p. 137
56Note (1) that this infringement on European sovereignty annoyed even the English 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and (2) that the potential damage to Western Europe 
was quite substantial, considering that the Federal Republic, for instance, expected its 
import of gas from the Soviet Union to rise from 16 percent in 1980 to 28 percent by
1990. Stent, p.213
57Pittman, p. 132
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1981 had made clear that detente could not be separated from the 
worldwide developments, and that developments in Europe in many ways 
were intertwined with global East-West relations. Whether the Social- 
Liberal coalition's efforts to shield at least inner-German relations from 
the deterioration of detente were any more promising will be investigated 
in the next section.
The politics of damage limitation in inner-German relations
Concerning inner-German relations, the Free Democrats also 
initially tried to protect the gains of detente from the impact of the 
international crisis. Although the federal government was fully aware 
that the two Germanies could only move within the overall framework of 
East-West relations, the Social-Liberal coalition now argued that the two 
German states should contribute to an improvement of the international 
climate by keeping up their dialogue at the highest political level, thereby 
limiting mutual distrust between the two blocs.58 Initially, the two 
German states were quite successful with this attempt, and despite the 
deterioration of the overall international situation, both inner-German 
economic relations and the treaty negotiations continued to progress well 
for some time after Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan.
Despite a short delay in the effects of the superpower crisis on the 
two German states, Schmidt's and Genscher's desire to shield inner- 
German relations was ultimately constrained by the general decline of 
detente. Due to the unstable situation in neighbouring Poland from 1980 
onwards and the general worsening of the East-West climate, East 
Germany now tried to contain the danger that these events would affect 
its domestic stability with a dual strategy of physical and ideological 
demarcation. In terms of physical demarcation, East Berlin limited the 
free movement of West-German journalists in the German Democratic 
Republic in April 1979 since the Western media had become too much a 
focal point for internal opposition in East Germany. Furthermore, the 
German Democratic Republic again raised the minimum exchange 
requirement for citizens from the Federal Republic and Berlin in October
^^Hoppe, DB, 222nd sess., 17.6.80, debate about 17 June 1953
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1980, thereby greatly complicating travel between East and West 
Germany.
Simultaneously, in his speech in Gera four days later (13 October 
1980), Honecker outlined the principles of East Germany's future course 
towards the Federal Republic. This speech amounted to a clear 
ideological demarcation against West Germany since Honecker declared 
any further progress in inner-German relations dependent on Bonn's 
fulfilment of East Germany's maximum demands. The GDR for instance 
requested Bonn's recognition of a separate East German citizenship and 
transformation of the permanent representations into embassies. Since the 
German Democratic Republic knew very well that these points were 
completely unacceptable for Bonn both politically and constitutionally, 
the Schmidt/Genscher government evaluated the Gera speech as a signal 
that the German-German phase of detente was over.59 By October 1980, 
East Germany was also under growing pressure from Moscow to threaten 
serious damage to inner-German relations, unless the Federal Republic 
withdrew its support for the stationing of US missiles on its soil after 
1983.
However, neither the increase in the minimum exchange rate, nor 
the Gera speech, nor East Germany's pressure on Bonn to stop 
supporting the NATO dual-track decision, subsequently proved to be the 
break in inner-German relations it appeared to signal. On the contrary, 
East Berlin gradually dropped its position that inner-German relations 
could only progress if Bonn fulfilled East Germany's maximum demands, 
and Honecker even declared that difficult East-West politics must not 
affect inner-German relations.60 Shortly before the outbreak of the Polish 
crisis, from 11-13 December 1981, Chancellor Schmidt even met Erich 
Honecker at the Werbellin lake near Berlin, which was the first German- 
German encounter on German soil since Brandt and Stoph had met in 
Erfurt and Kassel more than a decade ago.
The question arises, of course, why the Schmidt-Honecker meeting, 
which had been planned for a long time and had previously been 
cancelled several times by both sides, took place precisely at this moment 
of international crisis. To begin with, whereas East Germany's earlier 
cancellations of the meeting had most likely been due to Soviet
5^Link, p.375
60Pittinan, p.89
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reservations about close inner-German cooperation, during his visit to 
Bonn in November 1981, Brezhnev explicitly welcomed Schmidt's 
intention of meeting Honecker in December.61 East Germany, for its 
part, was interested in the encounter, both because it provided an 
opportunity to demonstrate East Berlin's independent room for 
manoeuvre in international politics, and because the German Democratic 
Republic had a strong economic interest in preserving inner-German 
cooperation. Chancellor Schmidt, for his part, felt that despite the many 
uncertainties of the international situation, the time was right for an 
intensive inner-German dialogue.
The main purpose of the visit was to discuss the potential for 
progress in inner-German relations as well as the effects of the 
international situation on the two German states. The Federal Republic's 
attempt to use positive economic leverage by renewing the 'swing' credit 
in order to achieve East Berlin's reversal of its 1980 increase of the 
minimum compulsory exchange rate did not produce the desired effect, 
although by 1982, East Germany conceded slight improvements in the 
minimum exchange rate in return for the swing agreement.62 
Nevertheless, this extension of the swing was the only concrete outcome 
of the summit, and overall, the Schmidt-Honecker summit mostly 
demonstrated the increasing 'internationalization' of inner-German 
relations. By the final day of Schmidt's visit, martial law had been 
imposed in Poland, and this further deterioration of East-West relations 
also overshadowed intra-German relations for some time.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown (1) that the Federal Republic's external 
environment in many ways constrained the FDP's room for manoeuvre in 
foreign policy between 1974 and 1982, as the goals of Social-Liberal 
Ostpolitik were 'incompatible' with the structures and opportunities of
61 Pittman, p.90; p. 139 Note (1) that Brezhnev's visit to Bonn was a remarkable 
achievement in itself, as it was the Soviet General Secretary's only trip to the West after 
Afghanistan, and (2) that by the time of Brezhnev's visit, East Germany had dropped 
its previous objections to the German-Soviet gas-pipeline deal and now permitted the 
delivery of natural gas from the Soviet Union to West Berlin.
62Bu11.63, 23.6.82
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the international system, and (2) that despite such significant external 
constraints, the West Germans, and occasionally even the Free Democrats 
specifically, were able to exert some influence on East-West relations in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Concerning the limitations on Bonn's 
capacities for action in foreign policy, it should first be stressed that after 
the real advances in Ostpolitik during the Brandt/Scheel era, when the 
major Ostpolitik treaties were signed, the period 1974-1982 was 
inevitably one of consolidation and stalemate. The task faced by the new 
federal government under Schmidt and Genscher, namely putting the 
Ostpolitik treaties into practice, was bound to be slower and more 
difficult by definition.
As shown on the preceding pages, the FDP's room for manoeuvre 
in Ostpolitik during the Social-Liberal coalition was to a high degree 
determined by the compatibility of its foreign policy goals with the 
aspirations of the respective US and Soviet leadership and the overall 
superpower climate. This was for instance apparent in 1974 and 1975, 
when the Free Democrats' strong interest in a successful conclusion of the 
CSCE negotiations in Helsinki clashed with the Nixon/Ford 
administrations' lack of enthusiasm about the very concept of a 
Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, given Washington's 
preoccupation with the military rather than the political determinants of 
East-West rivalry. Even the shift in US priorities to the humanitarian 
aspects of East-West relations upon Jimmy Carter's assumption of the 
Presidency in January 1977 did not make the FDP's striving for 
constructive relations with Eastern Europe more compatible with 
Washington's goals. On the contrary, Carter's human rights campaign 
severely harmed relations with the Soviet Union and merely left West 
Germany with the possibility of pleading for a less confrontational 
American attitude towards Moscow.
In addition to the changing priorities in Washington, the effect of 
the changes in Soviet foreign policy on the FDP's room for manoeuvre 
has been demonstrated. From about 1976 onwards, Moscow's 
modernization of its intermediate-range nuclear forces aimed at Western 
Europe shifted the global balance of power in the Soviet Union's favour, 
which not only increased the tension between the superpowers, but also 
underlined the Federal Republic's dependence on the overall East-West 
climate. Given the newly elected President Reagan's focus on containing 
the Soviet aggressor with the help of US military strength and the
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Kremlin's lack of readiness for cooperation, the Schmidt/Genscher 
government's attempts to act as a mediator between East and West in 
1980 and 1981 proved rather ineffective.
Apart from the FDP's dependence on the aspirations of the 
respective superpower leadership, a second major constraint on Social- 
Liberal Ostpolitik was the ultimate dependence of inner-German relations 
on the overall East-West climate. On the one hand, in 1979 and 1980, 
inner-German relations were surprisingly unaffected by the NATO dual­
track decision and the Afghanistan crisis, since East Germany shared 
Bonn's interest in continued inner-German cooperation. On the other 
hand, the escalation of the Polish crisis in 1981 and its negative effect on 
inner-German dialogue clearly demonstrated the futility of Bonn's 
attempt to shield inner-German cooperation from a superpower crisis.
Furthermore, the FDP's capacities for action in Ostpolitik between 
1974 and 1982 were limited by the politics of 'linkage' in the Atlantic 
alliance, in other words the trade-off between Western military and 
political support for the Federal Republic on the one hand and Germany's 
firm commitment to NATO on the other hand. As shown in the sections 
on Berlin and the national issue, the Free Democrats directly depended on 
Western backing for their attempt to extend the ties between the Federal 
Republic and West Berlin in the 1970s and were similarly aware of the 
need for their allies' support for progress on the national question during 
the negotiations in Helsinki. On the other hand, Bonn demonstrated its 
loyalty towards the alliance by joining the 1980 US boycott of the 
Olympic games in Moscow and by approving of the 1983 deployment of 
US Pershing missiles on German soil.
However, this chapter has also shown that despite the tight 
international framework for Social-Liberal Ostpolitik, the West Germans 
(occasionally even the Free Democrats specifically) were nevertheless 
able to exert some influence on East-West relations between 1974 and 
1982. Firstly, there is the Federal Republic's use of economic leverage 
for fostering its relations with Eastern Europe, which is interesting for 
two reasons. On the one hand, an analysis of the Schmidt/Genscher 
government's economic relations with Eastern Europe has demonstrated 
that, although the Federal Republic could theoretically have applied both 
'positive' and 'negative' economic leverage, Bonn only utilized positive
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levers between 1974 and 1982, as this approach seemed more likely to 
secure the desired concessions.63
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the Federal Republic's use 
of positive economic leverage underwent three phases during the Social- 
Liberal coalition. Phase one roughly lasted from 1974 until 1978 and 
marked the transition from Bonn's earlier exclusive focus on the 
economic benefits of trade with Moscow to the use of German economic 
power for eliciting both economic and political concessions from Eastern 
Europe, which was for instance apparent in the German-Polish accords of 
1976 and in East Germany's loosening of travel restrictions in return for 
West German credits. During the second phase of German-Soviet 
economic relations, from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, Bonn grew 
even more comfortable with the use of 'positive economic leverage' and 
finally dropped any hesitation of praising economic agreements with the 
Soviet Union solely for their political benefit. By the time of phase three, 
from about 1982 onwards, the Federal Republic's economic relations 
with Eastern Europe had become such an important and successful aspect 
of its foreign policy that Bonn increasingly refused to succumb to outside 
pressure in this realm.
In addition to West Germany's economic strength, the Federal 
Republic, and most notably the Free Democrats, also somewhat 
influenced East-West relations between 1974 and 1982 with the help of 
EPC. Since President Reagan's confrontational approach in the early 
1980s did not match Western Europe's (and especially Bonn's) interest in 
continued good relations with the Eastern bloc, European political 
cooperation enabled the member states to take a more moderate position, 
reflecting their specific interests during the crises in Afghanistan, Poland 
and the ensuing quarrel about Washington's sanctions against the Soviet 
Union. The Free Democrats especially appreciated and contributed to the 
growing importance of EPC, (1) because, given its lack of full 
sovereignty, EPC was instrumental in the Federal Republic's striving for 
legitimizing and realizing its foreign policy objectives, particularly in the 
field of Ostpolitik, and (2) because EPC was especially important for the 
Free Democratic Party, since it provided an excellent way for Foreign 
Minister Genscher to increase his influence both at the European and at 
the domestic level.
63stent, p.240
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It should also be stressed that despite Bonn's dependencies on the 
international system and the general deterioration of detente, in a number 
of ways, the Social-Liberal government managed quite well to opt for the 
continuation of Ostpolitik. On the one hand, for much of the period from 
1974 to 1982, Bonn successfully convinced the Kremlin that it was safe to 
let inner-German cooperation evolve more intensively than before, even 
after the Afghanistan crisis in 1980. On the other hand, during their visit 
to Moscow in June 1980, Schmidt and Genscher persuaded the Soviet 
Union to go to the negotiation table in Geneva, and after Afghanistan, 
when relations between the superpowers were at their lowest, the Federal 
Republic was the only Western country to exchange visits with the Soviet 
Union at the highest level.
Lastly, the Free Democrats were able to contribute to international 
relations between 1974 and 1982 through their concentration on the issue 
of human rights and their striving for the inclusion of Basket III in the 
Final Act of Helsinki. Apart from the FDP's special contribution, this 
achievement is interesting because the fact that all participating states had 
voluntarily committed themselves to the humanitarian principles in 
Basket III and thereby internationalized the issue of human rights, 
provided the Free Democrats with a powerful argument in the debate 
about the place of human rights in international relations. Generally, the 
growing tendency after 1974 to deal with detente in multilateral (as 
opposed to bilateral) contacts such as the CSCE was of advantage for 
Bonn since, similarly to EPC, these multilateral forums helped the 
Federal Republic both to legitimize and achieve its foreign policy 
objectives.
Basket III is lastly interesting because its effect on the internal 
stability of the Communist regimes was much stronger than either the 
East or the West had expected. The two years after the Final Act saw the 
rise of a number of dissident movements in Eastern Europe, and although 
such liberalizing effects were increasingly stifled by the Communist 
regimes from about 1977 onwards, the increase in domestic resistance 
against the Communist regimes nevertheless demonstrated that the FDP's 
Ostpolitik had some influence on international relations between 1974 and 
1982.
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Chapter IV. The Social-Liberal coalition 1974-82: 
the domestic context
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While Chapter Three has examined the impact of international 
developments on the FDP’s foreign policy between 1974 and 1982, this 
chapter sets out to discuss the influence of domestic politics on the Free 
Democratic Party's Ostpolitik in an attempt to define and explain the 
FDP’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy during the Social-Liberal 
coalition. An examination of the domestic context requires a look at the 
following three general aspects of domestic politics: (1), the constitutional 
framework as anchored in the Basic Law, which raises the question how 
the distribution of power among the various policymakers affected the 
FDP's Ostpolitik in the 1970s and early 1980s, (2) the role of public 
opinion and of intra-coalition consensus for the FDP's foreign policy 
during the Social-Liberal coalition and (3) the structure of the German 
party system, which leads to the question of how the FDP's functional 
role as smallest party in the German system influenced its Ostpolitik 
between 1974 and 1982.
More specifically, the following steps will be taken in the course of 
this chapter. Firstly, it will mean examining how the FDP relied on 
Ostpolitik for distinguishing itself both from the SPD and from the 
Union, thereby increasing the likelihood of its survival in the German 
party system. Secondly, we shall investigate whether the CDU/CSU's role 
as parliamentary opposition had the effect of increasing or constraining 
the FDP's room for manoeuvre in foreign policy during the Social- 
Liberal coalition. Thirdly, this chapter will study how the Free 
Democrats utilized Ostpolitik during the 1976 and 1980 election 
campaigns both for securing their re-election and in their function as 
majority enabler after the elections. Fourthly, it will investigate how the 
distribution of power between the Chancellor's Office and the Foreign 
Office influenced the FDP's capacities for action in foreign policy during 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Lastly, this chapter will take account of the 
importance of public opinion and intra-coalition consensus for the FDP's 
Ostpolitik and for the survival of the Social-Liberal coalition between 
1974 and 1982.
The FDP's foreign policy profile
Although Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher were 
clearly committed to the continuation of their predecessors' Ostpolitik,
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the new government's priorities were slightly different, as both Schmidt 
and Genscher favoured a more pragmatic and business-like approach to 
Eastern Europe, based on economic incentives rather than on substantive 
concessions to the East. Nevertheless, the new Chancellor and Foreign 
Minister were far from breaking with Brandt's and Scheel's Ostpolitik in 
substance. In his Government Declaration on 17 May 1974, Chancellor 
Schmidt stated that two factors, "continuity and concentration", would be 
the 'Leitmotiv' of the Social-Liberal coalition during the next four years, 
not least with regard to Ostpolitik.1 'Continuity' implied that the federal 
government did not intend to change its foreign policy course and would 
carry on its efforts towards peace. 'Concentration,' on the other hand, 
meant that the government wanted to focus on an active Ost- and 
Deutschlandpolitik, but within the framework of the world-wide detente 
process.
Considering the high degree to which not only the Chancellor and 
the Foreign Minister, but also their parties, agreed on the best approach 
towards the Eastern bloc, it was not easy for the Free Democrats to 
develop a specifically 'liberal' profile in this coalition. Nevertheless, this 
section will (1) examine the areas where the FDP's position was slightly 
different from that of the Social Democrats, and (2) investigate how the 
Free Democrats used such different nuances for distinguishing themselves 
in the German party system.
Chapter Three has already indicated the Social-Liberal coalition's 
frequent internal disagreement over the issue of West Berlin's status. 
From the beginning of the Social-Liberal coalition, Foreign Minister 
Genscher portrayed himself and his party as the promoter of Berlin's 
interests by taking a tougher line with the Soviets on Berlin issues, and 
the 1974 decision to establish the Federal Agency of Environmental 
Protection in West Berlin was only the first in a row of FDP projects 
trying to extend the ties between Bonn and West Berlin. Although the 
project had already been proposed under the Brandt/Scheel government 
and Chancellor Schmidt had duly addressed the thought in his 1974 
Government declaration, after a talk with the Soviet ambassador in Bonn, 
Schmidt had reneged on this decision because he and most of the SPD 
thought it would provoke the Soviet Union and East Germany 
unnecessarily. Foreign Minister Genscher, in contrast, was not willing to
IBuII. 60, 18.5.74
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make any concessions on the matter so that, pushed by Genscher, Werner 
Maihofer and the governing Berlin mayor Klaus Schiitz (SPD), Schmidt 
eventually gave in and decided to let the law pass.2
The effect of Genscher's decision to go ahead with the 
establishment of the Federal Agency of Environmental Protection in West 
Berlin certainly was to shape the FDP's profile against the SPD as the 
'tough-liner Berlin party.' German newpapers reacted accordingly, and 
the FAZ, for instance, argued that it was clumsy of Genscher to make a 
conscious political demonstration out of the foundation of the Federal 
Agency of Environmental Protection. Despite the rather cool reception of 
Genscher's Berlin initiative by the press, in a poll of July 1974, 54% of 
the population tended to have a good opinion of Genscher.3
To Schmidt's dismay, Genscher unambiguously stated before their 
joint visit to the Soviet Union from 28-31 October 1974 that if Moscow 
did not agree to West Berlin's inclusion in the outstanding German-Soviet 
agreements on scientific-technological cooperation, legal assistance and 
cultural exchange, he wanted "...rather no agreements than ones that 
weaken Berlin's position."4 Although Chancellor Schmidt had made 
equally clear before their departure that he was much more interested in 
economic cooperation with the Kremlin than in controversies about West 
Berlin's status, it is noteworthy (1) that, due to Soviet opposition, the 
treaties remained unsigned all through the Social-Liberal coalition 
anyway, and (2) that, for the sake of coalition unity, Schmidt and 
Genscher strongly emphasized their cooperation during the trip in the 
ensuing report before the Bundestag.5
During the first month of 1975, Genscher demonstrated again that 
he would not make any concessions on Berlin issues: on 20 January 1975, 
a European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training
^Der Spiegel, 24.6.74 Many Social Democrats tried to delay the parliamentary 
process, especially since Chancellor Schmidt did not show much interest in the 
enterprise either.
3FAZ, 7.8.74; Noelle-Neumann, The Germans. Public opinion polls 1967-1980. 
p.185
4Genscher cited in Stuttgarter Zeitung, 23.12.74; Soviet television, 26.10.74, 
Interview with H. Schmidt, printed in Bull. 126, 29.10.74
^See for example Schmidt, DB, 127th session, 6.11.74, government declaration on 
Schmidt's and Genscher's visit to the Soviet Union; Ronneburger, DB, 127th session, 
6.11.74; Martin Bangemann in fdk 212, 31.10.74
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(CEDEFOP) was established in West Berlin, which was strongly 
supported by the FDP on the grounds that there were already other 
centres in a similar field with which the new centre could cooperate. 
However, both Chancellor Schmidt and much of the German press again 
reacted quite negatively to the FDP's demonstrative support for West 
Berlin. Several newspapers claimed that, since in terms of purpose and 
geography, it did not make sense to establish the EC Centre in West 
Berlin, the explanation was Genscher's ever-lasting readiness to improve 
his profile in foreign policy and to portray the FDP as the Berlin party.6
In addition to their strong position on Berlin issues, the Free 
Democrats also pursued a distinct line on questions concerning 
Germany's division and human rights during the Social-Liberal coalition. 
As shown in Chapter Three, this was most apparent during the 
negotiations leading up to the Final Act of Helsinki on 1 August 1975, 
when the FDP was not only very concerned with the inclusion of a clause 
about the possibility of peaceful border change and free self- 
determination in the Final Act, but also fervently strove for the 
incorporation of humanitarian measures.
As tactician and leader of the FDP, Genscher's approach to Helsinki 
was certainly somewhat coloured by his awareness of the importance of 
public support for Social-Liberal Ostpolitik. Typically, the Foreign 
Minister stated in an interview in 1975 that "...in the end, detente policy 
will only fully be accepted by the public in all states if the citizens 
themselves get something tangible as result of detente..."7 However, in the 
autumn of 1975, the population's belief that it would live to see the 
opening of the East was very low. In an October 1975 public opinion 
poll, 63% of the population did not think they would see the day when 
they would be able to travel to East Germany just as easily as to Austria 
or to Switzerland, compared with only 20% who thought they would. 
The FDP's position in Helsinki can also partly be explained with its hope 
that the inclusion of a clause on peaceful border change "...might make it 
easier for the opposition to support the government's politics..."8 This 
last point leads to the question which will be examined in the next section,
6Der Tagesanzeiger (Zurich), 10.2.75
7DLF, Interview with H.D.Genscher, 27.3.75
^Noelle-Neumann, The Germans. Public opinion polls 1967-1980. p. 123; Genscher 
cited in Die Welt, 29.3.75
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namely how the interaction between the parliamentary opposition and 
government influenced the FDP's Ostpolitik between 1974 and 1982.
Parliamentary opposition and foreign policy
Apart from the fairly difficult task of distinguishing themselves 
from their coalition partner, during much of the 1970s, the Free 
Democrats also faced a parliamentary opposition which vehemently 
rejected any Social-Liberal attempts to advance Ostpolitik. In order to 
shed some light on the issue of consensus and dissensus between 
government and opposition after 1974, this section will rely on Gordon 
Smith's cyclical model. This model examines the development of the West 
German parties' position on national issues in terms of cycles, and argues 
that these cycles have proceeded through similar stages: initially, there 
has tended to be foreign-political consensus between government and 
opposition, followed by a phase of strong polarization, lastly leading to 
subsequent realignment.9
Based on Smith's model, the evolution of consensus and dissensus 
on German foreign policy can be divided up into three cycles. Cycle one 
refers to the inner-German debate about Westpolitik, which finally ceased 
by 1960 when the Social Democrats had come to identify themselves with 
the government's policies. Cycle two covers the evolution of inner- 
German acceptance of Ostpolitik and traces the Christian Democrats' 
original support for the concept during the time of the Grand Coalition as 
well as their later all-out attack on Social-Liberal Ostpolitik after 1969. 
As will be shown in this chapter, the Union's opposition to Ostpolitik 
eventually ebbed from the late 1970s onwards.10 Since this section is 
concerned with the impact of the interaction between government and 
opposition on West German foreign policy during the Social-Liberal 
coalition, it will first concentrate on the second phase of cycle two - the 
Union's opposition against Ostpolitik - which still determined Bonn's 
politics after 1974.
9Smith, Democracy in Western Germany, p. 181
10The third cycle refers to the evolution of inner-German consensus and dissensus 
on security questions, which was most prominent during the 1980s, and will be 
discussed in Chapter Seven.
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Typically, the CDU/CSU opposed the Final Act of Helsinki on the 
grounds that the national question was not kept open enough in 
accordance with the verdict of the Constitutional Court. The Free 
Democrats tried to overcome the Union's objections by arguing that, 
since reunification as demanded by the Basic Law was presently not 
possible, it was best to pursue a step-by-step policy, which, though far 
from perfect, served the reunification imperative and human rights better 
than no policy at all. According to Gunter Hoppe, vice-President of the 
FDP's parliamentary fraction, the CDU/CSU would have to support 
Social-Liberal Ostpolitik if they really cared about reunification:
"Only since we have been trying to achieve concrete measures 
for the human beings in both German states, are we really 
taking the constitutional imperative seriously that everybody 
talks about, especially usually the opposition."11
As it turned out, the FDP's strategy of appealing to the Union's political 
responsibility did not work, and the CDU/CSU (as only Western 
European parliamentary party) still asked the government not to sign the 
Final Act in the Bundestag debate about the CSCE. Shortly afterwards, 
the dissensus between government and opposition was to affect the FDP's 
room for manoeuvre in foreign policy even more strongly, as will be 
shown next.
On 9 and 10 October 1975, Genscher was in Warsaw where he 
signed the German-Polish Agreements which Schmidt and Gierek had 
negotiated in Helsinki. These treaties offered a real chance to patch up 
Bonn's relations with Warsaw, which for historical reasons had been 
more delicate than those with other Eastern bloc countries over recent 
years. The agreements also were a renewed attempt to commit Warsaw to 
the emigration of ethnic Germans, an obligation which Poland had 
already assumed in the Warsaw Treaty of 1970 but never adhered to.12 
Now Poland agreed to allow 125.000 ethnic Germans to emigrate in 
exchange for (1) a German trade credit of DM 1 billion on favourable
1 iHoppe, DB, 240th session, 11.5.76, debate on domestic issues and foreign policy
12Note that the Warsaw Treaty was not binding according to the law of nations. 
Instead of facilitating emigration for ethnic Germans who wanted it, Poland had 
actually restricted exit visas and disputed International Red Cross estimates of the 
number who wanted to leave.
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terms and (2) DM 1.3 billion to be granted as a lump-sum to the Polish 
government for Polish war participants who had paid into the German 
social security system during the war without receiving pensions. The 
Polish Treaties thus provided a real chance for progress in German- 
Polish relations. Before they could be ratified, however, domestic 
developments manoeuvred the Free Democratic Party into a substantial 
dilemma.
Since one of the Polish Treaties, the pension agreement, directly 
affected state finances, the Bundesrat automatically had to vote on it. 
Thus, although the Bundesrat officially has no foreign policy competence, 
in this case, it nevertheless had a say in the ratification of a treaty in 
which foreign policy issues played a role.13 Until early 1976, this did not 
seem to pose a problem since the Bundesrat had previously behaved in a 
fairly disciplined way concerning foreign policy issues and had not 
abused its opportunities of opposing the federal government. The 
situation changed dramatically with the state elections in Lower Saxony 
on 14 January 1976, however, when three anonymous SPD or FDP 
deputies left the Social-Liberal coalition in Lower Saxony and 
surprisingly put Ernst Albrecht, a young CDU politician, into power. 
This election result shifted the power distribution in the Bundesrat, 
suddenly providing the CDU/CSU with a 26:15 majority in their favour. 
This new situation provided the Union with the theoretical possibility that 
they could block ratification of the Polish agreements in the Bundesrat.
Genscher thus faced an enormous dilemma: on the one hand, the 
German-Polish agreements were of utmost importance to him. At his 
first address as FDP Chairman, he had already said that in the near 
future, special attention in the field of Ostpolitik would have to be paid to 
German-Polish relations and to solving the problems inherent in this 
relationship.14 If he ignored the new power distribution, one of his 
favourite foreign policy actions - the treaty with Poland - threatened to 
fail due to the CDU/CSU's veto in the Bundesrat. On the other hand, it 
was Genscher's frequently declared coalition strategy that the Free 
Democrats should commit themselves to a coalition before the elections,
i^This blurring of boundaries between domestic and foreign policy, thus enabling 
Parliament to take a role in the latter, is part of a general trend. See C.Carstairs and 
R.Ware, Parliament and International Relations. (Milton Keynes: Open University 
Press, 1991)
^Genscher's speech at the FDP's Party Congress in Hamburg, 30.9.-2.10.1974
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which they had also done in Lower Saxony. Genscher feared that a 
Christian-Liberal coalition in Lower Saxony would damage the FDP's 
carefully constructed reputation as a loyal coalition partner.
The Free Democrats reacted to this dilemma by pursuing a double 
strategy for winning the Union's assent to the Polish Treaties both on the 
domestic and the foreign policy level. Domestically, the FDP on the one 
hand allowed no doubt that it would neither leave the Social-Liberal 
coalition at the federal level nor form a coalition with the CDU in Lower 
Saxony. Genscher explained this decision as follows:
"I think nobody will expect that the Free Democrats who made 
a coalition statement before the election..., who support the 
government in office, would here now switch sides because of 
the behaviour of a deputy whose name we do not even 
know..."15
Genscher's decision to adhere to the FDP's previous coalition 
commitments, thereby preventing the party's losing face as a disloyal 
coalition partner, was certainly not facilitated by Albrecht's indirect 
pledge to the FDP that he would pass the Polish Treaties if the Free 
Democrats formed a coalition with the CDU in Lower Saxony. 
Genscher's decision to reject this offer as a 'horse trading' which the FDP 
had never considered did not remain uncontested among the Liberals.16 
On the other hand, the FDP signalled that while it was not ready to enter 
a coalition with the CDU in Lower Saxony, it was nevertheless ready to 
tolerate a CDU minority government in the same state - a diplomatic 
distinction indeed.17
15DFS, 16.1.76 Note that only eight months later, on 19 January 1977, the FDP did 
indeed enter a coalition with the CDU in Lower Saxony on the grounds that it wanted 
to defuse the confrontation in the Bundesrat.
16fdk 25, 12.2.76 For example, Martin Bangemann, Josef Ertl (right-wing FDP 
Chairman in Bavaria), Horst-Ludwig Riemer (right-wing FDP Chairman from North- 
Rhine Palatinate) and William Borm (left-wing liberal from Berlin) would have 
preferred a FDP-CDU coalition in Lower Saxony. Der Spiegel, 16.2.76
l 7In addition, the Party Chairman came up with the so-called 'loosening-up 
strategy,' by which he meant the need for the FDP slowly to open up towards the 
possibility of a coalition with the Union in the states while strictly adhering to its 
coalition commitment with the SPD on the federal level. Naturally, the Social 
Democrats thought much less highly of Genscher's 'loosening up' strategy and of the 
FDP's readiness to make concessions towards the Union on the Polish Treaties to get 
them passed by the Bundesrat.
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In foreign policy terms, the FDP also pursued a double strategy: on 
the one hand, it criticized the Union for their resistance against the Polish 
Treaties and refuted the CDU/CSU's arguments, on the other hand, it 
tried to win them over to voting ’yes.’ The Union's major criticism was 
directed against the fact that the emigration protocol lacked the binding 
nature of the credit- and pension agreements and only covered half of the 
estimated 280.000 ethnic-Germans who had applied for exit visas. In 
addition, the Union accused the Social-Liberal coalition of paying DM 2.3 
billion for humanitarian concessions that had already been arranged in 
the 1970 Treaty with Warsaw, in other words, of paying twice for the 
same thing.
The FDP refuted all of this criticism from the Union, partly even 
attacking it for irresponsible political behaviour. Genscher rejected the 
CDU/CSU's argument that the Polish Treaties were not binding. He 
claimed that, on the contrary, all three agreements were completely equal 
in their validity according to the law of nations, and that, after all, the 
German government was not really in a position to doubt Poland's 
adherence to a protocol which had been signed by both Foreign 
Ministers. Furthermore, Genscher argued that a 'no' to the Polish 
Treaties would do so much harm to the interests of human beings that it 
was by no means justified: "Everybody will have to take a decision as 
though it solely depended on him whether the 125.000 Germans can now 
emigrate or not."18 Since the FDP refused to enter a Christian-Liberal 
coalition in Lower Saxony, and since it rejected the Union's arguments 
against the Polish Treaties, the Union voted more or less unanimously 
'no' on the Polish Treaties in the Bundestag on 19 February 1976. This of 
course fuelled FDP fears that the CDU/CSU would vote down the Polish 
Agreements in the Bundesrat, where in this case they really had a decisive 
say.
However, Lower Saxony's Minister president Albrecht opened a 
door for ratification by indicating that the Union would not demand 
renegotiation of the treaties if the clause on the possibility of further 
emigration from Poland (after the 125.000 had left) were to be be 
changed from "can emigrate" to "will emigrate." Franz-Josef Roder, 
CDU Minister president of the Saarland, also said that he would very
1 ^ Genscher, DB, 19.2.76, debate on ratification of the Polish Treaties
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much welcome it if "a sign from Warsaw came once more.'49 Although 
the Free Democrats had fiercely criticized the Union's stance on the 
Polish Treaties, they nevertheless eagerly took up this hint of a 
concession, to the SPD's utter dismay.
Genscher called up the Polish Vice Foreign Minister, Jozef Czyrek, 
who said that Poland would change the clause if Albrecht were then 
reliably to vote 'yes.' After Genscher had reconfirmed this with 
Albrecht, the Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski wrote a guarantee 
to Genscher in which Poland took on Bonn's official interpretation of the 
Polish agreements. As Genscher had stated from the outset, this sign from 
Warsaw did not change the treaties in substance. The letter did say, 
however, that emigration applications after four years (exceeding the 
number 125.000) were not only acceptable but would be accepted and 
thus provided the Union with "that degree of binding security that the 
federal government already ha(d)."20 Olszowski's letter meant an 
enormous victory for Genscher because he had satisfied Kohl and 
Albrecht's demands. On 12 March 1976, the Polish-German package was 
passed in the Bundesrat without dissent. Thus, twelve hours before the 
Bundesrat debate, the Polish Treaties had been saved. Genscher thanked 
Olszowski profoundly in his reply.
Overall, the inner-German debate over the Polish Treaties had 
shown that the Free Democrats, in contrast to the SPD, succeeded in 
advancing Ostpolitik with the opposition's assent and that the Liberals, 
positioned 'between' the two major parties, were playing an important 
role as corrective and stabilizer in Ostpolitik. Although some German 
newspapers argued that the Social Democrats were unhappy about the fact 
that "the ratification of the Polish Treaties had become an all-party 
enterprise under Genscher's management," the Social-Liberal coalition 
had generally managed to preserve its internal consensus. Chancellor 
Schmidt was even quite relaxed concerning the FDP's high profile after 
the Polish Treaties: "Let the FDP do so. That's their dramaturgy. If we 
were in their shoes, we would not act differently."21 Lastly, Genscher was 
content that he had proved his personal importance for the FDP's
19Die Welt, 23.2.76
2^Genscher cited in Frankfurter Rundschau, 6.3.76
21Schmidt cited in Die Welt, 24.3.76; Die Zeit, 19.3.76; Der Spiegel, 5.4.76
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Ostpolitik and was riding high in popularity polls: in May 1976, 60% of 
the German population approved of Genscher as Foreign Minister.22
The Bundestag elections of 1976
As the Bundestag elections on 3 October 1976 were approaching, 
the Free Democrats initially had little time to concentrate on Ostpolitik as 
a campaign issue since their position in the German party system was 
immediately threatened. The CDU/CSU decided to run the election 
campaign on the slogan: "Freedom instead of/or Socialism," naturally 
causing immense dismay on the FDP's behalf since the Union not only 
claimed the concept of freedom for itself but also insinuated that there 
were only two alternatives in the German party system. The Free 
Democrats reacted by stressing that no German party could really claim 
the monopoly of freedom for itself since the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP 
were all democratic parties and that, even if others had now discovered 
the attraction of the term freedom, "unconditional promotion of 
individual freedom in state and society (wa)s and remain(ed) a hallmark 
of the Liberal Party in Germany."23
Despite the importance of the freedom/socialism debate, this section 
will investigate how the FDP utilized Ostpolitik in the 1976 election 
campaign in order to secure its re-election. To begin with, when (in line 
with Genscher's general strategy of committing the FDP to a coalition 
partner before the elections), the Free Democrats announced at their 
1976 party congress that they wanted to continue the Social-Liberal 
coalition after the Bundestag elections, Ostpolitik played a role in their 
choice of coalition partner. According to Genscher, it was the FDP's 
responsibility to ensure the continuation of Social-Liberal Ostpolitik 
which had provided West Germany with a unique advantage, despite the 
CDU/CSU's resistance. Some newspapers commented favourably that the 
Free Democrats had not been so united on a coalition statement in the last 
twenty years. Besides pointing out his party's importance for Ostpolitik, 
Genscher also emphasized his own personal importance for Bonn's
2^NoeHe-Neumann, The Germans. Public opinion polls 1967-1980. p. 185
2^Gemcher, DB, 240th session, 11.5.76, debate on domestic issues and foreign 
policy; Genscher's speech at the FDP's Party Congress in Freiburg, 30.-31.5.1976
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foreign policy: "... I also ask you to vote for me so that I can continue my 
foreign policy."24
Apart from being a factor in the FDP's coalition commitment, 
Ostpolitik played a role in this election campaign in various other ways. 
To begin with, although the Free Democrats as usual tried to portray the 
CDU/CSU's Ostpolitik as completely unrealistic, the fact was that, in 
contrast to 1972, conservative Ostpolitik no longer differed from the 
Social-Liberal position as much as it had done previously. By passing the 
Polish agreements, the Union had entered into phase three of cycle two, 
that is inner-German realignment over Ostpolitik, and become much 
more serious competitors for the Social-Liberal coalition than before. 
Furthermore, the CDU/CSU's call for a more realistic approach to the 
Eastern bloc corresponded closely to the public mood which was 
disappointed about the progress of Ostpolitik so far.25
Even though in 1972, the German electorate had completely 
supported Ostpolitik, by the 1976 elections, such support had declined. 
More importantly, the issue areas where the FDP's profile was strongest - 
reunification and Berlin - had suffered most from a loss of public 
support. While in 1963, still 31% of the population had considered 
reunification to be the most important question with which the Federal 
Republic should occupy itself at present and 11% had said the same about 
Berlin, by 1976, only around 1% of the population considered these 
issues to be most urgent. As a matter of fact, in 1976, only 13% of the 
total population believed that East and West Germany would ever be 
reunited, and 65% thought it would never happen. In contrast, public 
support for 'Schmidt' issues such as economic problems was as high as 
74% in 1976, compared to 21% in 1963.26
Before the 1976 Bundestag elections, the Free Democrats thus 
faced declining public enthusiasm for Ostpolitik, the Union as more
24Genscher cited in Kolnische Rundschau, 25.9.76; Genscher's speech at the FDP's 
Party Congress in Freiburg, 30.-31.5.1976; SZ, 31.5.76 Martin Bangemann and 
Walter Scheel were among the few FDP politicians who challenged Genscher's 
strategy of committing the FDP to a coalition before an election. They argued that 
voters should decide about programmatic positions instead of about coalitions, and that 
coalitions were alliances which must eventually be terminated by natural developments. 
See Die Welt, 29.10.75, Interview with M. Bangemann and Der Spiegel, 8.3.76
2^Clemens, Reluctant Realists, p. 166
2^Noelle-Neumann.The Germans. Public opinion polls 1967-1980. p. 127
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serious Ostpolitik competitor and the need to distinguish themselves at 
least somewhat from the Social Democrats. In terms of foreign policy 
profile, the FDP truly conducted this election campaign as 'third force' 
by approaching the SPD on some issues and the CDU on others, while 
overall maintaining their independent liberal foreign policy stance. For 
example, the Free Democrats once again assumed a distinct position on 
the Berlin question. Before the October 1976 elections, Egon Bahr, the 
SPD's party director, had travelled to West Berlin where he met 
Brezhnev's personal secretaries. When Genscher heard of this initiative, 
he not only unfavourably remembered Bahr's special mission to the 
Soviet Union in March 1974, during which Bahr and Moscow had agreed 
on regulations for Berlin that the FDP considered unacceptable, but the 
Foreign Minister also disapproved of a strong SPD line on Berlin so 
shortly before the elections.
Promptly, in October 1976, Gunther van Well, a member of the 
Foreign Office, published an article in which he argued for a tough 
approach on Berlin, based on strict legal adherence to the Four-Power 
accord.27 Genscher had his press spokesman declare that the content of 
the article fully corresponded with his own opinion. In this way, 
Genscher had not given any ground to the Union for their attack on an 
amateurish Social-Liberal Ostpolitik and had demonstrated that the 
Liberals continued their strong support for West Berlin. Not 
surprisingly, the Social Democrats did not approve of van Well's article 
and criticized their coalition partner for provoking the Soviet Union and 
East Germany with legalistic interpretations of the Four-Power 
Agreement.
Another Ostpolitik matter occupying the Germans before the 1976 
elections was the question of how to deal with East Berlin's border 
behaviour. During the tense summer of 1976, several West Germans 
were seized or shot at the inner-German border, which resulted in 
German-German relations suddenly dropping to their lowest point since 
the Basic Treaty. While the Social-Liberal coalition argued for a cautious 
reaction, many Union members called for retaliation. On this issue, the 
FDP sided with the Social Democrats and outright rejected the 
opposition's demand that West Germany employ economic sanctions 
against the GDR. Genscher argued that if Bonn imposed economic
27Europa-Archiv, October 1976
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sanctions, it would do damage to its international image, give up valuable 
export markets and endanger roughly 350.000 jobs. During the 1976 
election campaign, the Social-Liberal government thus for the first time 
utilized trade with Moscow for its own domestic political purposes by 
emphasizing how many jobs depended on trade with the Soviet Union.28
The incidents at the inner-German border so shortly before the 
elections were causing domestic-political problems for the federal 
government since it had to react to them without endangering detente. 
While the FDP agreed with the Social Democrats in refusing drastic 
measures such as economic sanctions, it nevertheless proved more of an 
Ostpolitik hardliner and closer to the Union than the SPD when Genscher 
suggested in 1976 establishing an International Court of Human Rights 
before the United Nations. Genscher argued that East Germany's border 
violations were a "classical case" for such a United Nations Court. With 
this call, the Free Democrats (1) accommodated the opposition's demand 
that Bonn file a protest with the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission, (2) distinguished themselves from the Social Democrats 
who had repeatedly warned of taking issues such as East Berlin's border 
behaviour before the United Nations and (3) shaped their profile as the 
human rights party shortly before the elections. Typically, the 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung concluded:
"It seems as though it was not the Foreign Minister but the 
election campaigner Genscher who after the deadly shots at the 
inner-German border spontaneously announced that he would 
bring the German problem before the United Nations."29
While Ostpolitik had become a campaign topic with the incidents at 
the inner-German border, it hardly played a decisive role in the election's 
outcome. To the Social-Liberal coalition's disappointment, the Union 
scored the second best result of its history with 48.6%. The Free 
Democrats with 7.9% had clearly expected a higher result, as Genscher 
admitted in his speech at the Liberals' post-election party congress, but he 
also emphasized that the result had consolidated the FDP's position. The 
SPD's 42.6% proved just enough to form a Social-Liberal coalition
28fdk 229, 17.9.76; Stent, p.218
29SZ, 17.9.76; see also Die Zeit, 1.10.76; WAZ, 29.9.76; Der Spiegel, 27.9.76
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which, as Genscher pointed out, meant that the government would 
continue its foreign policy.30
Distribution of competences between the Chancellor’s Office 
and the Foreign Office
Although the FDP and SPD had thus succeeded in winning a 
majority, the take-off for the Social-Liberal coalition did not prove easy 
this time. Immediately after the elections, the controversy about the 
distribution of competences between the Chancellor's Office and the 
Auswartiges Amt reemerged which Schmidt had initiated earlier in 1976 
by talking about uniting the competences for Deutschland- and Ostpolitik 
in the hands of one new state secretary, Hans-Jiirgen Wischnewski. 
Wischnewski at that time was a state secretary in the Foreign Office and 
had good relations with Genscher. Nevertheless, Genscher at once 
strongly objected to the Chancellor's plan because he feared interference 
with his foreign policy competences. This resistance payed off when 
Schmidt announced shortly after the elections that there would be no shift 
in ministerial competences. Instead, Wischnewski became a new Minister 
of State with the task of coordinating policies between the Foreign Office 
and the Chancellor's Office. Even though the SPD had not strengthened 
its voice in German policy and Ostpolitik as dramatically as initially 
planned, the existence of the new Minister of State, Wischnewski, 
nevertheless had increased the Chancellor Office's say in both areas.31
This controversy provides a good opportunity to look at the 
general distribution of competences and cooperation between Schmidt and 
Genscher during the Social-Liberal coalition. As mentioned before, the 
Foreign Office was not officially responsible for German policy, 
according to the government's theory that the two German states were 
not foreign to each other. After the Guillaume affair in 1974, Schmidt 
acted accordingly for some time and wanted to make German policy 
absolutely into a 'matter for the Chancellor,' until some foundation of
^Genscher's speech at the FDP's Party Congress in Frankfurt, 19.-20.11.1976; Die 
Welt, 9.10.76
31Die Zeit, 14.1.77; FAZ, 24.1.77
110
Deutschlandpolitik had been reestablished. Thus, he initiated a secret 
exchange of letters with Erich Honecker in the autumn of 1974.
Although German policy officially was a matter of the Chancellor's 
Office and despite Schmidt's initial attempts to act accordingly, the 
overall reality in the Social-Liberal coalition was quite different. Due to 
the international crises that urgently required the Chancellor's attention 
and because of Schmidt's personal inclination for dealing with global 
economic and military issues rather than with the minute details of 
everyday inner-German relations, the management of intra-German 
detente had generally devolved on Foreign Minister Genscher.32 
Genscher was much too careful ever publicly to admit this, however. On 
the contrary, whenever he publicly dealt with German policy, he made a 
point of reconfirming:
"...the federal government has decided for good reasons that 
not the Foreign Minister but the Chancellor's Office is 
responsible for relations with the GDR. This is more than just a 
ministerial decision, behind this is the federal government's 
political concept of its relations with East Germany."33
For example, Genscher waited for two whole years before he 
officially met Michael Kohl, East Berlin's representative in Bonn, for the 
first time and explained this late encounter by the fact that the impression 
had to be avoided that de facto the Foreign Office was assuming 
competence over German policy. After his annual meetings with East 
Germany's Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer at the United Nations, 
Genscher usually hurried to confirm that the two German Foreign 
Ministers had only discussed international questions and not the inner- 
German relationship. Overall, Genscher's and Schmidt's cooperation was 
based on mutual trust and respect, if not on friendship. Both liked to 
stress that they agreed on all principal questions of foreign policy but 
nevertheless did not leave any doubts that the responsibilities between 
them were "unambiguously and clearly split" and that neither considered 
interfering with the other's affairs.34
32Hanrieder, Germany. America. Europe, p.210
33WDRII, 28.8.76, Interview with H.D.Genscher
34d FS, 28.7.75, Interview with H.D.Genscher; Die Welt, 14.8.74, Interview with 
H.Schmidt
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The conflict about the distribution of power between the 
Chancellor's and the Foreign Office was not the only reason why the 
coalition negotiations after the 1976 elections proved more difficult than 
in 1974. Controversies further arose from the different way in which the 
SPD and the FDP viewed the role of foreign policy in this coalition. 
Many Social Democrats, especially Herbert Wehner, wanted to use 
foreign policy as the only unifying bond against the CDU/CSU and shape 
the Social-Liberal profile against the Union in this area. While Genscher 
concurred on the need to continue a Social-Liberal foreign policy, the 
FDP also wanted to keep its doors open towards the Union, for both 
strategic and ideological reasons. Naturally, this different view provided 
quite some potential for conflict, and the impact of the Social-Liberal 
coalition's growing disagreement over Ostpolitik will be examined in the 
next section.
Crumbling intra-coalition consensus over Ostpolitik
Initially, the government had little time to concentrate on the 
divisive elements of Social-Liberal foreign policy, however. In the winter 
of 1977/78, the coalition partners faced severe domestic problems such as 
the threat of terrorism, a high level of unemployment and bad prospects 
for German-German relations. Precisely because of this domestic 
political trouble, Genscher and Schmidt set their hopes on relief via an 
assertive Ostpolitik which meant that the two parties had to act together 
and not against each other. The SPD and the FDP thus appeared fairly 
united at the CSCE follow-up conference in Belgrade which lasted from 4 
October 1977 until 9 March 1978. The government's ideal goal was to 
have some foreign-political success to show in time for the state elections 
that were coming up in 1978.
Over Belgrade, the FDP and SPD faced a Union that, encouraged 
by Jimmy Carter's plan to make Belgrade into a centre for human rights, 
wanted to provide a document stating all the human rights violations 
committed by East Germany. This plan also reflected a slight 
reorientation in the Union's approach to Ostpolitik, since by the time of 
Belgrade, the CDU/CSU were a little less focused on legal positions and 
had instead stepped up their pressure on the Social-Liberal coalition to 
make human rights into an issue of German policy. However, the
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Schmidt/Genscher government rejected the Union's planned initiative on 
the grounds that a rigorous human rights campaign would endanger the 
progress of detente.
The Union's planned human rights paper entailed additional 
problems for the Free Democrats who had tried to portray themselves as 
the human rights party for some time, for instance with their 1976 
United Nations Human Rights Court initiative. The Liberals thus 
attempted to play down the Union's efforts as not credible by stressing 
that those who had most objected to the CSCE only two years ago were 
now the strongest advocates of implementing the Helsinki principles. As 
Genscher said:
"It is the uncontestable merit of the federal government, of 
which we form a part, that through active influence on the 
Helsinki conference human relief, exchange of information, and 
cooperation have become a legitimate matter of discussion in 
Belgrade....Neither the Belgrade Conference nor the Final Act 
of Helsinki would exist if we had followed the CDU/CSU's 
advice not to sign Helsinki."35
Due to a lack of international agreement, the final communique from 
Belgrade did not meet the expectations which the German parties and 
German public opinion had harboured. But at least the two governing 
parties had managed to put up a united front against the Union's attempt 
to portray itself as the human rights party at Belgrade, thereby avoiding 
further destabilization of the domestic situation.
Despite the coalition's united position in Belgrade, from about 1977 
onwards, the coalition partners started to disagree over Ostpolitik more 
frequently than ever before. Considering the traditional importance of 
Ostpolitik as unifying bond for the Social-Liberal coalition (the first 
federal Social-Liberal coalition in West Germany's history had been 
formed in 1969, largely due to agreement on the best approach towards 
the Eastern bloc), this development was quite striking. Even though in the 
late 1970s, Ostpolitik still had more the effect of holding the government 
together than of dissolving it, compared to the beginning of the Social- 
Liberal coalition, this unifying effect had become very modest by the end
35Genscher's speech at the FDP's Party Congress in Kiel, 6.-8.11.1977
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of the decade. The reasons for such growing Social-Liberal disagreement 
between 1977 and 1979 will be examined next.
As shown in Chapter Three, in face of Moscow's drastic increase of 
its intermediate-range nuclear missiles aimed at Western Europe from 
about 1976 onwards, the progress of detente became increasingly tied up 
with security-political questions. While the coalition continued to agree 
on the aim of preserving and promoting detente, there was increasing 
intra-coalition disagreement over the best means of achieving this 
objective. For ideological reasons, both the SPD's and the FDP's left- 
wing believed that the continuation of favourable East-West relations 
could best be guaranteed if the West attached the highest priority to arms 
control as a reaction to the Soviet Union's rearmament. Schmidt, 
Genscher and the right wings of their parties in contrast believed that 
Bonn had simultaneously to pursue arms control and an appropriate 
Western rearmament if detente were to be preserved. Further major 
Ostpolitik initiatives had to be approached with caution, particularly if 
they were incompatible with Bonn's Westpolitik.
The divisive line was thus not only between the SPD and the Free 
Democrats but also within each of the SPD and FDP. As a result of the 
different reactions to the growing link between detente and defence 
within the government, the SPD's left wing increasingly disagreed with 
the Chancellor. This forced Schmidt, who was obliged to his party, to 
make some concessions towards this Social-Democratic faction, which in 
return strained the coalition's unity. Furthermore, Schmidt himself 
assumed a slightly more left-wing position on a number of issues than the 
Free Democrats which led to further pressure on the coalition. Lastly, the 
FDP's former unity on foreign policy questions, which Genscher had so 
far skilfully managed to maintain, also started to crumble, and the FDP's 
left wing now voiced its disagreement with the Party Chairman more 
strongly than ever before in the Social-Liberal coalition.
In terms of concrete politics, such growing intra-coalition 
disagreement was for instance apparent at the beginning of 1979, when 
Herbert Wehner, head of the SPD's parliamentary fraction, requested that 
the federal government should provide the MBFR negotiations in Vienna 
with a new impetus through one-sided troop reductions. At the same 
time, Wehner accused the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Office of 
acting like a brake on these negotiations. Genscher reacted, (1) by 
publicly repeating Bonn's official position that West Germany could only
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reduce its level of arms under the principles of 'parity and collectivity,' 
and (2) by pointing out that such SPD requests were not covered by the 
government declaration.36 For the sake of governmental unity, Wehner 
wrote a letter of excuse to Genscher in which he played down the factual 
differences as "methodical differences." While the controversy had thus 
apparently been removed, Wehner had given a signal that Schmidt could 
not overlook.
The SPD's left wing also pressed for a more active detente 
concerning the implementation of both parts of the NATO dual-track 
decision. Although the Social Democrats had agreed to this decision in 
December 1979, soon afterwards, several factions of the party started 
questioning the necessity and urgency of rearmament. Schmidt tried to 
make concessions to his party and suggested in April 1980 that if Moscow 
did not agree to stopping the production of further intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles, it should at least agree to stopping their deployment to 
enable the start of arms control negotiations.37 While the FDP agreed that 
strong efforts for disarmament negotiations were vital, Genscher refuted 
any suggestions for a moratorium on NATO's modernization on the 
grounds that further concessions towards the Soviet Union would only 
destabilize the balance of forces in the negotiations:
"One thing is for sure: we cannot count on Moscow's readiness 
for realistic arms control- and demilitarization negotiations as 
long as those who offer Western concessions support the Soviet 
Union's hopes that it can reach agreement at a better price for 
itself."38
When the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in December 
1979, Social-Liberal disagreement over the appropriate reaction further 
drove the coalition partners apart. The majority of the FDP argued that 
Moscow's invasion was not only a conflict with the Third World but 
affected East-West relations as well since detente was indivisible. West 
Germany should now show absolute solidarity with the United States to
36Link, p.303 The principle of 'parity' provided for equal troop reduction on both 
sides, while 'collectivity' meant that the Western alliance could only jointly decide to 
take on disarmament obligations.
37FAZ, 16.4.80
^Bonner Rundschau, 3.5.80, Interview with H.D.Genscher
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improve the situation. In contrast, many Social Democrats, regarding 
detente as geographically divisible, were much less concerned with the 
Kremlin's blow against detente than with what they perceived as 
Washington's 'overreaction' to Afghanistan.39 In addition to the SPD's 
disagreement with his politics, Genscher this time also had to contend 
with some inner-FDP opposition. William Borm, member of the FDP's 
Board, argued that detente had always been divisible for good reasons 
and that it was now time for an encompassing arms control initiative.
When President Carter decided to boycott the Olympic games in 
Moscow in 1980, the SPD rejected this step as unnecessarily provocative 
and argued that such a boycott would not get a single Russian soldier out 
of Afghanistan. Although eight Bundestag deputies refused to support the 
government's recommendation that athletes from the Western states not 
participate in the Olympic games, the National Olympic committee 
narrowly voted to stay at home. Genscher, who had already fairly early 
on indicated his and the FDP's support of the Olympic boycott, 
disapproved of the government's lack of agreement over this issue.40
A last factor of pressure on the Social-Liberal coalition was the 
Union's growing rapprochement with Social-Liberal Ostpolitik. As the 
SPD left grew increasingly disenchanted with Schmidt's and Genscher's 
pragmatism, the Union became tacitly reconciled to it. Between 1977 and 
1980, Kohl was attempting to promote a more flexible, constructive 
Union stance on dealing with the East. The Union was not ready, 
however, to admit that its acceptance of Ostpolitik would be a revision of 
its foreign policy, just as the SPD had accepted the Christian-Liberal 
coalition's Westpolitik with its Godesberg decrees of 1959.41 Kohl's open 
effort to set the Union on a new course thus never gained real 
momentum. Nevertheless, during the years 1977-79, the Union did 
indicate increasing acceptance of Social-Liberal policy. On the whole, in 
trying to show that Union orthodoxy was compatible with continuation of
39Many Social Democrats unequivocally opposed Washington's economic sanctions 
against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in contrast to Genscher's call for solidarity 
with Washington, Willy Brandt suggested that West Germany should now make use of 
its position between the superpowers and attach the highest priority to agreement with 
its European partners, especially France.
40Der Spiegel, 28.4.80; Genscher cited in Bonner Generalanzeiger, 25.4.80
41ciemens, Reluctant Realists, p. 174
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the Eastern dialogue, the Union was moving slowly towards the 
government's position on Ostpolitik.
The Bundestag elections of 1980
As the Bundestag elections on 5 October 1980 were approaching, 
various factors seemed to indicate that the existing governmental 
structure might change after the elections. To begin with, the growing 
estrangement over the best approach to Ostpolitik between the SPD and 
FDP seemed reason to question the coalition's longevity. There were also 
indications that Genscher was preparing his party for a change of 
coalition partner. In 1976, he had already called for a strategy of 
'loosening up' the Free Democrats' commitment to Social-Liberal 
coalitions on the state level. Soon after the federal elections of 1976, the 
FDP had indeed entered into two coalitions with the Union in Lower 
Saxony and Saarland. When Alois Mertes suggested in the late 1970s that 
Genscher might well remain Foreign Minister in a Christian-Liberal 
coalition, there were also first indicators of a rapprochement between the 
Free Democratic Party and the Union.42
A change of the existing governmental structure furthermore 
seemed quite plausible because a number of factors threatened the Free 
Democratic Party's very existence in the German party system. For one 
thing, the local and state elections of 1978 and 1979 had revealed an 
unmistakable loss of support for the Free Democrats, causing substantial 
concern among the party. The FDP's survival also seemed threatened by 
the emergence of a fourth party, the 'Greens' who were mainly 
concerned with environmental issues. Although in public statements, FDP 
representatives tried to play down the potential threat of the Greens, at 
their party congress in June 1979, the Liberals acknowledged that the 
Greens could threaten the FDP's parliamentary existence.43 The Free 
Democrats were also worried about the Union's decision of the summer 
of 1979 to run Franz-Josef StrauB for Chancellor candidate. This way, 
the FDP's nightmare of an electoral polarization, an election campaign
42Clemens. Reluctant Realists, p. 185
43Genscher's and Verheugen's speech at the FDP's Party Congress in Bremen, 15.- 
17.6.1979
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dominated by the two Chancellor candidates StrauB and Schmidt, 
whereby the Liberals would be forgotten, threatened to become reality.
Nevertheless, as this section will show, during the 1980 election 
campaign, the Free Democrats were once again able to utilize foreign 
policy for ensuring their re-election in a Social-Liberal coalition. 
Ironically, the Liberals benefited from the Union's choice of Chancellor 
candidate since they decided to turn the potential threat of StrauB' 
candidature into an advantage for themselves. Hoping to avoid the danger 
that the FDP would be ground down in the election campaign between the 
two big parties, the Free Democrats decided to concentrate on Foreign 
Minister Genscher's personality instead of presenting four cabinet 
members as a 'Liberal team' in the manner of the 1976 election.44 Hans- 
Dietrich Genscher was well known after his four years as Foreign 
Minister, and he had a relatively high and consistent popularity ranking. 
During his four years in office, Genscher had managed well to combine 
official duties of high publicity value, such as trips to Washington and 
Moscow, with a very heavy speaking schedule and thus seemed perfect 
for presenting a less refined and more popular image of the FDP than in 
1976.45
In addition to running a personalized election campaign, the Free 
Democrats now removed any speculations about the Liberals' readiness to 
drop the SPD after the 1980 elections by overwhelmingly approving of 
the continuation of the Social-Liberal coalition at their party congress in 
Freiburg. The FDP had regarded StrauB as its political enemy ever since 
the Der Spiegel affair of 1962, and StrauB in turn made no secret of his 
contempt for the Liberals. In face of the CSU Minister's candidature, the 
old coalition partners SPD and FDP thus united once again.
The Free Democrats also benefited from StrauB1 candidature since 
they could now run the election campaign on the functional component of 
their self-image as coalition 'corrective' instead of on substantive issue 
positions. The Liberals exploited the StrauB factor as "a challenge to all 
liberal forces" but also presented themselves as alternative to left-wing 
radicalism in their election platform for 1980: "Without the FDP, the 
SPD's left and the CDU/CSU's right wing would gain harmful influence
44Soe, The Free Democratic Party; Two Victories and a Political Realignment, p. 121
4^Noelle-Neumann, The Germans. Public opinion polls 1967-1980. pp. 185, 205; 
The Economist, 8.2.82
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over practical politics."46 Wherever he spoke, Genscher stressed the need 
for maintaining the Liberals as the guarantor of moderation and stability 
in Bonn. Genscher even suggested that Schmidt needed 'help' against the 
SPD's left wing which had started criticizing the Chancellor on many 
issues where Schmidt agreed with the FDP 47
In terms of foreign policy, the FDP's strategy largely corresponded 
with its overall strategy for the 1980 campaign: on the one hand, the Free 
Democrats clearly signalled that they wanted to continue the Social- 
Liberal coalition, also for foreign policy reasons, but on the other hand, 
the Liberals portrayed themselves as necessary foreign policy 'corrective' 
for both the SPD and the CDU/CSU. The Free Democrats skilfully used 
the polarization between the two big parties, with the SPD accusing 
StrauB of lacking the true will for peace and the Union attacking the 
Social Democrats as the 'Moscow fraction,' for presenting themselves as 
indispensable foreign policy balancer in the German system. Typically, 
Jurgen Mollemann, the FDP's security expert, claimed that only the FDP 
could grant the much-discussed balance between detente and defence:
"...it is very clear from this discussion that of all parties 
represented in the Bundestag, only the FDP grants a balanced 
relationship of the two pillars of security policy - namely 
detente and defence. The CDU exaggerates the aspect of 
defence, the SPD somewhat neglects it compared with its detente 
considerations."48
Despite such moderate demarcation against its coalition partner, the 
Free Democrats in the 1980 election campaign again supported Social- 
Liberal Ostpolitik more strongly than they had done in the previous two 
years. Apart from the threat of StrauB' candidature, the Liberals now 
also reconfirmed their commitment to a Social-Liberal policy of detente 
because of the ongoing public support for Ostpolitik. Although in January 
1980, 61% of the population had stated that their opinion of Russia had 
deteriorated in the last two years (in February 1977, only 25% said the
46f d P's election programme 1980 in Friedrich-Naumann Stiftung, Das Programm 
der Liberalen. pp. 13-14
47in an interview with Stuttgarter Zeitung on 21.8.80, H.D.Genscher said: "...I do 
not want to expose the Federal Chancellor to the SPD's autocracy."
4^Mollemann in fdk 119, 24.4.79
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same), 74% of the population had declared themselves for continuing 
detente in the same month.49 Overall, however, the FDP's attempts at 
programmatic distinction could barely conceal the fact that substantive 
issues did not play a major role in these elections.
The last Social-Liberal cabinet - breakdown of the coalition
The results of the 1980 election campaign were very favourable for 
the Free Democrats who pushed up their share of the vote by almost one 
third (10.6%), while the Social Democrats remained nearly stationary 
(42.9%). Although this gave the coalition a large enough majority to stay 
in power, the fact remained that not the SPD but the FDP had reaped the 
'Schmidt bonus,' and that the Social Democrats were very disappointed 
about the unbalanced gains from the elections. Instead of consolidating 
the coalition's strength, the 1980 election campaign had thus increased the 
potential for conflict within the coalition.50 This section will examine 
how the ongoing erosion of intra-coalition consensus over Ostpolitik and 
security policy eventually resulted in the breakdown of the Social-Liberal 
coalition by 1982.
Soon after the elections, the government's problems were enhanced 
by the growing controversies within the Social Democratic Party. While 
hitherto, Willy Brandt, Party Chairman, had officially supported 
Schmidt's foreign policy, after the 1980 elections, the SPD's 
disagreement over security policy began to extend even to the party 
leadership. This was most apparent when Brandt travelled to Moscow in 
May 1981 in an attempt to save as much of detente as possible. In contrast 
to Genscher, who welcomed Brandt's efforts for an improvement of the 
climate, this trip finally destroyed any confidence between the Chairman 
and Chancellor Schmidt, especially when Brandt claimed afterwards that 
his talks with Brezhnev had undoubtedly shown the Soviet readiness to 
negotiate and suggested that the blame for the failed negotiations should 
perhaps much rather be sought in Washington.51
49Noelle-Neumann.The Germans. Public opinion polls 1967-1980. pp.430,466
50jager, Republik im Wandel. p. 171; Clemens, Reluctant Realists, p.205 Compared
to their electoral success in 1976, the CDU/CSU had scored relatively low at 44,5% 
this time.
SlFilmer/Schwan, p.231
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In addition to the crisis in the SPD's leadership, Schmidt could no 
longer fully count on his party's support for his security policy. Most 
members of the SPD now claimed that they had only approved of the 
NATO dual-track decision under the condition that the demilitarization 
talks had a 'political priority' over NATO's modernization of 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles.52 Since there had not yet been any 
serious negotiations between Washington and Moscow by early 1981, 
large parts of the SPD no longer felt committed to their 'yes' to the 
rearmament part of the NATO dual-track decision. More than 10.000 
SPD members signed the so-called 'Krefeld appeal,' requesting West 
Germany's withdrawal from the NATO dual-track decision.
With his primary intention still being to hold on to the Social- 
Liberal coalition at this point of time, Schmidt now thought it necessary 
formally to be assured of his party's support for his security policy. 
Before his trip to the United States in May 1981, Schmidt thus threatened 
to resign if the Social Democrats withdrew from the NATO dual-track 
decision. About half a year later, the Chancellor even resorted to the 
strongest disciplining means at his disposal according to the Basic Law, 
when he asked both his party and his coalition partner for a vote of no 
confidence. On 5 February 1982, the Bundestag voted on Schmidt's 
petition, which resulted in the coalition's unanimous 'yes' vote for the 
C hancellor.53 Although the vote of no confidence resulted in a 
confirmation of the coalition's support of Schmidt, the fact that such a 
vote had to take place in the first place was the best sign that the coalition 
was crumbling.
Apart from the growing disagreement over detente and security 
policy within the SPD, the Social-Liberal coalition was facing increasing 
pressure due to internal controversies within the Free Democratic Party. 
The FDP's May 1981 party congress in Cologne, dominated by a 
security-political discussion, clearly demonstrated the left- and right wing 
rift within the party. Similarly to Schmidt's struggle in the SPD,
S^Der Spiegel, 5.1.81
53Note (1) that with 269 votes, Schmidt even gained three more votes than in the 
secret Bundestag elections in 1980, and (2) that this procedure was a novelty in 
German politics, as the only other vote of no confidence that had been held in the 
Federal Republic's history had resulted in a 'no' and led to the end of the Brandt- 
Scheel government in 1972. This time, the vote of no confidence was meant to and did 
confirm the confidence in the Chancellor.
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Genscher had to fight for support of the NATO dual-track decision in the 
FDP. While it used to be Genscher's strength that he knew how to 
reconcile the two wings in the FDP, by now, the Party Chairman was 
seen as belonging to the FDP's right wing around Count Lambsdorff, 
characterized by its loyalty towards NATO. In Cologne, William Borm 
sharply attacked Genscher's security policy and requested more distance 
from Washington. Parts of the FDP now also promoted security-political 
goals which clearly contrasted with the Liberals' election programme of 
1980.54
Since Genscher at this point of time still primarily aimed at 
prolonging the Social-Liberal coalition's survival until 1984, the Foreign 
Minister resorted to similar means as Chancellor Schmidt to ensure the 
FDP's support for the rearmament decision: he threatened to withdraw 
from office if the FDP party congress questioned his position. In addition 
to Genscher's desire to give Chancellor Schmidt a sign of his reliability 
and to demonstrate the importance he and his party attached to security 
policy, the Foreign Minister also feared for a loss of confidence with his 
NATO partners if his party no longer backed the government's security 
policy. While Genscher managed to ensure the support of a majority of 
the FDP in Cologne, one third of the delegates still openly refused to 
support the NATO dual-track decision.
The climate within the FDP deteriorated further when William 
Borm published an article in the magazine Der Spiegel in which he 
attacked Hans-Dietrich Genscher for his "unchecked rejection of Soviet 
demilitarization offers."55 Borm argued that the Foreign Office under 
Genscher attached conditions to disarmament that made progress 
practically impossible and that the Federal Republic was both 
underestimating its own and exaggerating the Soviet Union's military 
strength. The controversies between Borm and Genscher again erupted 
openly when part of the FDP was planning to participate in peace 
demonstrations in Bonn on 10 October 1981. Borm wrote an open letter 
to numerous members of the government in which he claimed that this 
powerful peace movement was the result of the government's failure to 
undertake certain efforts for peace. Genscher this time officially put 
Borm in his place: "..While (Borm) of course has the right to speak for
54d FS, 5.3.82, Interview with H.D.Genscher
S^Der Spiegel, 24.8.81
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himself, he does not have the right to speak for the Free Democratic 
Party. Where are we, after all?..."56 Genscher did not want any FDP 
members to participate in the demonstrations because the goals of the 
demonstrators clashed with the government's security policy.
While both the SPD's and the FDP's internal conflicts over 
Ostpolitik were increasing, the Union's rapprochement with Ostpolitik 
continued to evolve. In contrast to its rather vague reconciliation with 
Social-Liberal foreign policy before the 1980 elections, the CDU/CSU 
now approached the government much more concretely. At its Hamburg 
party congress in November 1981, the CDU eased the path for a 
Christian-Liberal coalition by its official acceptance of Ostpolitik. During 
early 1982, an equally evident softening occured in the Union's position 
on German-German relations. The CDU/CSU now less and less tied 
negotiations to preconditions of any sort, and discreetly, if not secretly, 
the party in 1982 held an increasing number of talks with East German 
officials to discuss how a new Union government would approach inner- 
German relations.57
In face of the growing intra- and inter-coalition disagreement over 
Ostpolitik and the opposition's increasing rapprochement, both the Social 
Democrats and the FDP slowly grew more and more aware that their 
coalition might not last until 1984. From the summer of 1981 onwards, 
both coalition partners thus readjusted their previous strategies of holding 
on to the government with all means. Instead, the FDP and SPD became 
more reticent about their mutual commitment to the Social-Liberal 
coalition. The two parties now tried to portray each other as deviator 
from previous Social-Liberal positions in an act of pre-emption since 
they were equally determined to refuse any responsibility for a possible 
collapse of the coalition.
The Free Democrats indicated their growing doubts about the 
longevity of the Social-Liberal coalition by making concerted efforts at 
clarifying their liberal (as opposed to Social-Democratic) positions on 
economic and security-political issues. In a public letter of 20 August 
1981 to leading party members, the so-called 'Wende' letter, Genscher
56WDR/NDR, 3.10.81, Interview with H.D.Genscher 
57Clemens, Reluctant Realists, pp.222, 226
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clearly stated the FDP's position on economic and social questions.58 
While Genscher's letter caused much speculation, it hardly points to the 
fact that the Party Chairman wanted the coalition to break down over 
domestic issues. Similarly, Genscher pleaded for a clear liberal stance on 
foreign policy. The Foreign Minister repeatedly emphasized that the FDP 
was sticking to the government programme of 1980 with its clear 
commitment to both parts of the NATO dual-track decision: "It will not 
be due to the FDP whether this coalition will survive for four years or 
not."59
In addition to clarifying the FDP's substantive positions, by mid- 
1982, Genscher also more strongly than previously praised the Union for 
moving towards the government's policy. Genscher commented very 
favourably on the Union's official acceptance of Ostpolitik, and when 
asked whether it would be difficult to conduct Ostpolitik with the Union 
in the future, Genscher replied: "No, if the Union continues to follow this 
tendency."60 The impression of a Christian-Liberal rapprochement was 
further intensified in June 1982, when during a meeting in Bonn, leading 
CDU/CSU politicians argued that the central elements of Genscher's 
foreign policy were identical with the Union's concepts.
Despite such FDP efforts to gain some distance from its coalition 
partner, observers did note Genscher's ambivalence. The Foreign 
Minister was neither aggressively distinguishing the FDP from the SPD 
nor did he seem entirely convinced that Union fundamentalists were in 
fact ready to live with continuity in German foreign policy. Genscher's 
actual strategy in this difficult situation was to wait until 1984 and 
prepare the FDP for a change of coalition partner by then. Partly, this 
decision was based on Schmidt's continuing popularity. If the Free 
Democrats openly left him, they could not only seem illoyal and suffer 
electoral penalty, but the FDP could also split so much over this move 
that it would threaten its existence. The Liberals thus hoped that the SPD 
would betray Schmidt, which put them in a waiting and passive position. 
Apart from their determination to avoid the blame in case the coalition
58In the 'Wende' letter, Genscher spoke of the need for a turnaround (Wende) in the 
country's policies in order to revive private enterprise, curb runaway social 
programmes and remove obstacles to productive effort.
59DFS, 15.4.82, Interview with H.D .Genscher
60SZ, 15.3.82; Die Welt, 16.6.82
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broke down, the FDP also could not become more active because it was 
split into two wings itself. The Free Democrats could not use security 
policy for coalition conflicts because on the issue of the NATO dual-track 
decision, they were split the most.
Certainly, the FDP also decided to wait and see because the Free 
Democrats somewhat benefited from the growing polarization of the 
German party system. The magazine Der Spiegel argued in March 1981 
that, due to the coalition's conflicts, Genscher had long since been the 
strongest figure at the top of the government in Bonn and that the 
Foreign Minister had in fact become the 'secret Chancellor' without 
changing the coalition. At the beginning of 1981, Genscher also for the 
first time surpassed Schmidt in popularity: on a plus-minus scale from 
plus 5 to minus 5, Schmidt had sunk from a popularity of 2.7 (summer 
1980) to 2.1, whereas Genscher had stayed at the level of 2.2.61
While the FDP thus decided to focus on substantive positions to 
avoid any possible blame for the end of the coalition and generally 
assumed a waiting position, the Social Democrats were equally busy with 
the question of how they could best portray the FDP as deviator from 
Social-Liberal politics at their party congress in March 1982. Faced with 
Schmidt's repeated threat of resignation and with the Chancellor's 
suggestion that the final decision about the deployment of intermediate- 
range nuclear missiles in Germany would only be taken in the fall of 
1983 and "in light of the results of the negotiations in Geneva," the Social 
Democrats approved of this suggestion with a great majority.62 Such 
comparatively strong SPD support of Schmidt in the NATO dual-track 
issue made some Liberals who otherwise wanted to leave the coalition 
more hesitant. In the long run, however, the Chancellor's demonstration 
of his party's support could not cover up the fact that many SPD 
members felt highly uncomfortable with their decisions in Munich.
In addition to the growing doubts within the coalition about this 
Social-Liberal partnership's duration until 1984, several external factors 
now also indicated the crumbling of the governing coalition. After the 
Bundestag elections of 1980, more and more Social-Liberal coalitions on 
the state level lost their majority, which increased both the SPD's and the 
FDP's fear about the government's stability at the federal level. In
6lDer Spiegel, 23.3.81; Die Zeit, 13.1.81
62Filmer/Schwan, p.216; Jager, Republik im Wandel. p.218
125
January 1981, the Social-Liberal coalition in Berlin lost its majority, 
which was of symbolic importance since the very first Social-Liberal 
coalition in the Federal Republic's history had been formed in Berlin in 
1963 (it had been the forerunner of the Social-Liberal coalition at the 
federal level from 1969 onwards). Equally significantly, after some 
initial resistance, the local FDP decided to tolerate a CDU minority 
government under Richard von Weizsacker in Berlin.
In the end, it was Schmidt who decided to change his strategy from 
passive waiting to an active working towards the end of the coalition. The 
Chancellor returned from his August 1982 holidays probably determined 
to end the Social-Liberal coalition by putting the blame on the FDP and 
Genscher.63 It was not in Schmidt's interest to delay what now appeared 
to have become an inevitable divorce. In the urgent domestic 
negotiations, Schmidt had much more in common with the Liberals than 
with his own party, and the SPD felt betrayed by Schmidt's concessions 
towards the FDP in this area. At the same time, Schmidt realized that 
there would be no US-Soviet rapprochement concerning arms control 
which made the stationing of intermediate range nuclear missiles from 
autumn 1983 onwards all the more likely. Schmidt had severe doubts 
about governing with a SPD that had moved so far away from his own 
political positions.
By charging the Liberals with disloyalty, he could hope to revive 
his own party and draw sympathy votes in the upcoming state elections in 
Hesse and elsewhere. Being aware of his party's eroding support for the 
government's security policy, Schmidt's plan was to construct a domestic 
political position that would inevitably lead to a break with the Liberals 
and allow him to blame the coalition's failure on the FDP. The 
Chancellor was greatly aided in his plan by Count Lambsdorff s growing 
determination to confront the SPD more harshly on economic issues. In 
the cabinet session of 1 September 1982, Schmidt asked the Minister of 
Economics to work out his economic goals. Initially, the FDP leadership 
did not know about this Lambsdorff paper, and when Genscher and 
Mischnick saw it shortly before Count Lambsdorff passed it on to the
63Filmer/Schwan, p.248
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Chancellor a few days later, both urgently, but unsuccessfully, asked the 
Minister of Economics not to give it to Schmidt.64
As Genscher and Mischnick had feared, Schmidt now indeed used 
Lambsdorff s far-raching proposals to justify the breakdown of the 
coalition. In this situation where the Chancellor felt he had to decide 
between the Social-Liberal coalition and his party, Schmidt chose the SPD 
and returned to emotional solidarity with his party. On 9 September 
1982, the Chancellor addressed the FDP’s political ambivalence in a 
Bundestag speech and asked opposition leader Helmut Kohl for a 
constructive vote of no confidence on the grounds that the Social-Liberal 
coalition's course had moved away too much from Social-Democratic 
principles. His speech was brilliant because it created the impression that 
it had been the Liberals who had deviated from Social-Liberal politics.65
In his defence during the Bundestag debates of 15 and 16 
September 1982, Genscher essentially stuck to the FDP's previous 
strategies of vagueness and praising the Liberals' reliability in foreign 
policy. In his speeches, Genscher presented himself and the FDP as true 
guarantors of foreign political continuity and urged the SPD to support 
unambiguously his concept of West German foreign and security 
policy.66 Essentially, Genscher thus did not give up his vague stance on 
the coalition issue even now and still pursued his strategy of blaming the 
SPD for a possible breakdown of the coalition:
"Indeed, this was one of the problems in the coalition between 
Free and Social Democrats because our citizens have been able 
to observe how more and more SPD members have stopped 
supporting the government's foreign and security policy since 
the federal elections in 1980, and how foreign and security 
policy became an instrument of war within the Social 
Democratic party against Chancellor Helmut Schmidt...These
64Die Zeit, 10.9.82; DLF, 16.9.88, Interview with W. Mischnick (fdk, 16.9.88) 
Note that Schmidt himself identified with many positions in the paper but this did not 
play a role now.
^Soe, The Free Democratic Party: Two Victories and a Political Realignment, p. 129 
Schmidt pointed out that the FDP had only achieved such excellent election results in 
1980 because of his own popularity and directly blamed Genscher for the breakdown 
of the coalition: "Since August last year, the FDP-Chairman has very systematically 
and step-by-step moved away from all previous declarations." Schmidt, DB, 118th 
sess., 9.9.-1.10.82, government declaration
^^Genscher, DB, 118th sess., 15.-16.9.82, government declaration
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internal Social-Democratic rifts have certainly contributed to 
the government's increasing problems."67
In the morning of 17 September 1982, Schmidt received Genscher 
and Mischnick and asked the FDP ministers to resign. The four liberal 
ministers turned in their resignations immediately. Genscher reported to 
the FDP's parliamentary party later in the day where he received an 
almost two-thirds' approval for immediate coalition negotiations with the 
Christian Democrats. Several left-wing Liberals tried to fight the decision 
but failed since Genscher did have a majority of the FDP, albeit a very 
small one, behind him. Many of these left-wing Liberals were at any rate 
less concerned with the actual change of coalition partner than with the 
'putsch from above,' the manner in which the FDP's leadership had 
enforced the change on the party.68 Overall, despite many defections, a 
party split was avoided, and 1 October 1982 was set as the date for the 
vote of no confidence. On that date, Chancellor Schmidt was defeated in 
the Bundestag by a seven-vote majority and replaced by Helmut Kohl.69 
Kohl's government declaration indicated how far the Union had adopted 
to the existing foreign policy.
Although the approval of a Christian-Liberal coalition by the 
Bundestag and the FDP's success at maintaining the Liberals' unity 
seemed to signal that the Free Democrats were coping with the change of 
coalition partner quite well, the FDP's public image had suffered 
tremendously from the events during the past months. Schmidt's thesis of 
the FDP's and Genscher's betrayal of the Social-Liberal coalition started 
to take its course and was intensified when the former Chancellor 
justified his procedure by reference to alleged secret agreements between 
Kohl and Genscher to form a coalition. This created the impression that 
Kohl and Genscher had already agreed on the questions of personnel in a 
new Christian-Liberal coalition while the Social-Liberal coalition was 
still going on.
Genscher was now the 'ugly boy' of the nation and had to deal with 
a lot of bad and hostile press coverage of the Wende, blaming him. In
67DLF, 3.10.82, Interview with H.D.Genscher
68Soe, The Free Democratic Party: Two Victories and a Political Realignment, p. 129
69256 deputies voted for the constructive vote of no confidence, 235 against it, and 
there were 4 abstentions. A handful of FDP dissidents had voted against Kohl.
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reality, there had been no such agreement between Kohl and Genscher 
whose last encounter had taken place in May 1982. Nevertheless, the 
majority of the German citizens interpreted the FDP’s change of coalition 
partner as 'treason.'70 Since Genscher had never explicitly talked about 
his intentions in 1982, many members of the German government but 
also large parts of the German public had grown quite suspicious of him. 
As the Foreign Minister admitted in an interview with The Guardian later 
in the same year, he had erred in handling the switch of coalition partner 
by "acting too late."71
Conclusion
Looked at overall, this chapter has shown that while to a certain 
extent, the domestic factors enabled the FDP to exert a disproportionally 
big influence over foreign policy between 1974 and 1982, in many ways, 
the domestic-political constellations during the Social-Liberal coalition 
were not very favourable for the Free Democratic Party. On the one 
hand, concerning the distribution of power between the Chancellor's 
Office and the Foreign Office, the FDP benefited from Chancellor 
Schmidt's personal preference for global matters rather than the minute 
details of inner-German relations. As a result, Schmidt left much of Ost- 
and Deutschlandpolitik to Foreign Minister Genscher who dominated 
Bonn's German policy in this coalition, although for constitutional 
reasons, he could not admit so in public. During the Social-Liberal 
coalition, the FDP furthermore profited from its successful resistance 
against Schmidt's 1976 attempt to unite the competences for Ostpolitik 
and German policy in the hands of one new state secretary, Hans-Jurgen 
Wischnewski. On the other hand, we have also seen that precisely 
Chancellor Schmidt's expertise in matters of economics and foreign 
policy and the high level of agreement between the Chancellor and the 
Foreign Minister over the best approach towards Eastern Europe 
generally rendered it difficult for the FDP to develop an independent 
profile.
70jager, Republik im Wandel. p.261; Filmer/Schwan, pp.263, 265
7lThe Guardian, 6.11.82
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In terms of favourable domestic constellations, the Free Democrats 
also benefited from Hans-Dietrich Genscher's double function as Foreign 
Minister and Party Chairman between 1974 and 1982. Genscher very 
well knew to how hide the FDP's weaknesses, such as its frequently fickle 
role when it came to the choice of a coalition partner and the party's lack 
of clearly liberal programmatic positions. With his strategy of 
committing the FDP to a coalition partner before the elections and with 
his consequent and exclusive emphasis on the Free Democrats' positive 
aspects, Genscher at least managed to save the FDP from a complete loss 
of power in 1982, be it at the cost of renewed suspicion about the Free 
Democrats' opportunistic traits. In general, Genscher, who himself 
termed the FDP a 'party of Ministers,' seemed to see nothing wrong with 
his strong leadership role, being well aware of his own importance for 
the Liberals during elections.
Regarding the issue of parliamentary opposition in the Bundestag 
and Bundesrat, however, the domestic situation was complicated for the 
Free Democrats for most of the 1970s. The Conservatives' fierce 
resistance to Social-Liberal Ostpolitik not only resulted in heated 
parliamentary debates about the Final Act of Helsinki, but also nearly led 
the Union to block passage of the 1976 Polish Accords in the Bundesrat. 
Nevertheless, it has also been demonstrated that the Union's growing 
acceptance of Social-Liberal Ostpolitik from the late 1970s onwards (1) 
finally put an end to the inner-German dissensus over Ostpolitik (phase 
three of cycle two) and (2) paved the path towards the Christian-Liberal 
coalition at the federal level from 1982 onwards.
This chapter has also shown that the Free Democrats were not very 
successful in seizing public opinion for themselves between 1974 and 
1982, firstly because of the high level of agreement in Social-Liberal 
foreign policy for most of the period, and secondly because when the 
FDP and the SPD began to disagree more strongly about Ostpolitik from 
about 1978 onwards, public opinion and the growing peace movement 
were much more in tune with the Social Democrats and the emerging 
Green Party than with the Free Democrats, least of all the wing around 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher. For most of the Social-Liberal coalition, the 
Free Democrats should thus be classified as 'followers' rather than 
'leaders' of public opinion. Similarly, while the high level of intra­
coalition agreement over Ostpolitik for most of the 1970s made it 
difficult for the FDP to develop a clear liberal foreign policy profile, the
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growing erosion of such consensus after 1978 proved no more 
advantageous, as it eventually led to the collapse of the Social-Liberal 
coalition in September 1982.
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Chapter V. The impact of liberal ideology, 1974-90
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Chapter Four has shown that Genscher used certain methods to 
shape the FDP's profile in the party system, thereby ensuring its survival 
and guaranteeing the broadest possible support for his policies. For 
example, the FDP strongly strove for an independent profile in the areas 
of reunification and Berlin, and the Liberals also tried hard to portray 
themselves as the party of 'human rights' and the 'United Nations.' 
Furthermore, the Free Democrats continuously claimed that of all West 
German parties, they offered the best balanced approach to the issues of 
detente and defence. While it seems fairly logical that a small party such 
as the FDP should employ strategic means to provide itself with an 
influential stance in the German party system, the question remains open 
as to why the FDP chose precisely the issue areas named above to 
distinguish itself.
This chapter sets out to investigate why certain issues became more 
highlighted than others in liberal Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik during the 
1970s and 1980s. Since by its very definition, ideology is a static factor 
and hence unlikely to change dramatically over two decades, this chapter 
analyses the influence of 'liberal' values on the FDP's Ostpolitik both 
during the Social-Liberal and during the Christian-Liberal coalition. The 
question is how far factors such as history, ideology or past experience 
help to explain the Liberals' focus on the issues named above. 
Furthermore, it will be investigated whether great Liberals of the past, 
such as Immanuel Kant or more recently, Gustav Stresemann, still served 
as role models for the FDP in any way. Lastly, we shall pay attention to 
the issue of 'Genscherism' and to the question whether and how far 
Genscherism is something distinctive from general liberal values and 
ideology.
National unification and the principle of self-determination
Throughout the whole period from 1974 to 1990, the Free 
Democrats distinguished themselves with their emphasis on striving for 
national unification. In order to explain this focus, Chapter Two has 
already traced (1) the historical development of the link between German 
Liberalism and nationalism and (2) the FDP's continued striving for 
'freedom and unity' after 1949. This section seeks to investigate other 
historical and ideological factors which have contributed to the Free
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Democrats' concentration on national issues during the Social-Liberal and 
Christian-Liberal coalition.
Remembering Stresemann's appeal that Germany should attempt to 
realize its goals in cooperation with its alliance partners instead of against 
them also helps to explain the Free Democrats' approach to reunification. 
Apart from the principal liberal belief in solidarity beyond the nation 
state, the FDP was very aware that its only chance ever to achieve 
reunification lay within the larger framework of European peace­
building: "The more European German politics is, the more national it 
is..."1 Thus, Genscher made no bones about including the most difficult 
and burning problem of German foreign policy, the country's division, in 
the FDP's overall policy of detente and self-determination: "We as 
Germans must say: only if we fight for the right of self-determination 
everywhere, we can also credibly demand it for us Germans..."2
Another factor in the Liberals' concentration on reunification 
certainly also has been their fundamental belief in law as the regulator of 
international relations. Liberals have historically believed that a proper 
foreign policy could only result from the laws anchored in a democratic 
constitution. The FDP has thus tended to pay much attention to the Basic 
Law (created with the help of some Liberals) as the framework for 
German foreign policy-making and especially to the constitutional 
imperative for achieving reunification. In Roger Tilford's words, 
German foreign policy makers, particularly members of the FDP and the 
Christian Democrats, have demonstrated a kind of "legalistic mentality."3
In addition, the FDP's special focus on reunification has been 
reinforced by former LDPD members who changed over to the West 
German Liberals after the LDPD in the Soviet zone was dissolved into 
the SED bloc. Those 'East German' Liberals, for example Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, Martin Bangemann, Wolfgang Mischnick and Hermann Oxfort 
have cared about reunification especially strongly. As Genscher said in an 
interview with Welt am Sonntag:
iWirtschaftswoche, 16.9.88, Interview with H.D.Genscher; Mayall, Nationalism 
and International Society, p.30
2Genscher's speech at the FDP's Party Congress in Kiel, 6.-8.11.1977
^Tilford, p. 18
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"Certainly the experience I have had immediately after the war 
as young law student and junior lawyer in my middle-German 
native country has formed me. The big disappointment was that 
the attempt to build a democratic community was stifled by a 
Communist dictatorship even during the first months. When I 
came to the Federal Republic - at age 25 - the most important 
task to me seemed to help constructing the democratic state. 
Especially to keep the German question alive. To complete the 
unification of the Germans - according to the Basic Law's 
commission."4
For those FDP politicians who left the German Democratic Republic, 
their controversies with the East German regime have thus coloured their 
definitions of a state's domestic and external freedom and their desire to 
see the two German halves reunited.
The FDP has inherited the Liberals' heritage as the party of 
national unification, albeit in a slightly modified manner. On the one 
hand, restoration of Germany's unity has remained the main value of 
foreign policy-making for most Liberals, based on the traditional 
conviction that a nation could only be completely free if it were unified. 
Given the continued liberal belief in an inherent link between a people's 
internal and external right for self-determination, most Free Democrats 
were convinced that history had not yet spoken its last word on 
Germany's division and that the national values would assert themselves 
in the end. As Genscher said: "We cannot accept this division as history's 
last word on the German nation. This word will be spoken by the 
German people themselves."5
On the other hand, from the experience with Bismarck and during 
the Third Reich that a nation state without a democratic order was no 
value in itself, the Free Democrats have modified the previous liberal 
concept of the nation state. After 1949, the German Liberals have 
attached greater priority to the aspects of internal self-determination - 
domestic freedom, a democratic constitution and human rights - than to 
external self-determination at any price. The conviction that a nation was
4Welt am Sonntag, 14.4.74, Interview with H.D. Genscher
5B u ll.lll, 26.9.74, Genscher's speech before the 29th Assembly of the United 
Nations in New York on 23.9.74
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only of value if certain principles were realized in it has given the Free 
Democrats the patience to put up with Germany's division.6
What was more, while in this view, reunification without self- 
determination, a democratic constitution and human rights could not be 
imagined, the reverse order was very well conceivable. Most Free 
Democrats believed that the West Germans had already realized their 
right for internal and external self-determination which meant that, in 
case of reunification, the East Germans would most likely be the only 
ones still to exercise this right. While the CDU's left wing largely shared 
the concept of the nation and self-determination with the Liberals, the 
other parties in the Federal Republic took a different position.
The CSU and many right-wing Christian Democrats, for instance, 
believed that the whole German people was denied the right for self- 
determination which meant that German reunification could only be 
achieved if the Germans in both states exercised their right of self- 
determination. On the one hand, the Social Democrats agreed that the 
Germans had a right for self-determination and that the national question 
was still open. On the other hand, they believed that for the time being, 
self-determination must be subjected to the primary goal of securing 
peace.7
The Free Democrats also adhered to their conviction that German 
self-determination could theoretically happen without reunification of the 
two German states after the climate of East-West relations decisively 
improved in the late 1980s. In her speech at the FDP's 
BundeshauptausschuB in 1988, Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, the FDP's 
General Secretary, termed reunification of the human beings in the two 
Germanies "more important than reunification of the two German 
states."8 Similarly, the Free Democrats kept emphasizing after the fall of 
the wall that the West Germans must not expect the East Germans 
unconditionally to accept the Federal Republic's societal order. On the
6 "FDP's Perspectives of liberal German policy", decided at the FDP"s Party 
Congress in Mainz, 27.-29.10.1975, in Verheugen, Das Programm der Liberalen.
pp.222-228
7In a draft for its 1989 party platform, the SPD stated: "..The national question has 
not yet been solved, but it is subordinated to the requirements of peace..." Zimmer, 
pp.98, 123
8Schm alz-Jacobsen"s speech at the FDP"s BundeshauptausschuB in Berlin, 
19.11.1988
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contrary, the Liberals argued that the GDR citizens now had to exercise 
the right of self-determination and choose their future model of societal 
order themselves.
The Berlin factor
Another striking element of the FDP's Ostpolitik-making between 
1974 and 1990 was its concentration on the Berlin question. Historical 
reasons partly account for the importance the Liberals attached to Berlin: 
Berlin had been the capital of the German nation state when it was first 
created in 1871, and since 1949, the Free Democrats have always 
believed that it had to become the capital again if Germany were to be 
reunited. Since Berlin historically was so inseparably linked to the 
Liberals' desire and hope for reunification, the FDP cared about it just as 
'passionately' as about the national question. Genscher repeatedly stated 
that, while the FDP accepted Bonn as the Federal Republic's capital, the 
Liberals' hearts in reality beat in and for Berlin. Bonn was fine as long as 
Germany remained a divided country, but Germany's real capital in the 
long run would have to be Berlin: "Just as the English love their London, 
the French their Paris and the Russians their Moscow, we stand by our 
Berlin, its freedom and its vitality."9
Besides its importance for historical-emotional reasons, Berlin was 
at the very centre of the FDP's foreign policy thinking and hence of 
decisive importance. The FDP's plan to work towards a condition of 
peace in Europe in which the German people could regain its unification 
in free self-determination had to start from Berlin. Berlin thus played a 
relevant role both as reminder of Germany's division and as a national 
appeal to overcome this condition:
"The Berlin question is inseparably tied to the German 
question. Until its solution, Berlin remains the expression and 
symbol of the Germans' division resulting from WW II and a 
request to all political forces to overcome the division in a 
peaceful way."10
^Genscher cited in Berliner Morgenpost, 5.9.76
l°Bull.67, 21.6.78 This was a joint Berlin statement by all German parties, initiated 
by the FDP because it considered the Berlin issue too vital for Germany to allow for 
any domestic controversies about it.
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Just as well as Berlin symbolized the Germans' chances ever to overcome 
their division in a peaceful way, the FDP also attached great importance 
to the Berlin question because it regarded Berlin as a yardstick of detente. 
The Liberals believed that detente had to start and to prove itself in this 
city where the East-West contrasts were strongest. Genscher repeatedly 
cited Brandt who had said: "The bilateral relations between the Federal 
Republic and the Soviet Union cannot be better than the situation in 
Berlin." 11
The FDP's focus on Berlin can also partly be explained by its 
evaluation of the Soviet Union's and the German Democratic Republic's 
aims over Berlin, at least before Gorbachev assumed power in 1985. 
Genscher and most of the FDP believed that the Soviet Union in the long 
run wanted to isolate West Berlin from the West and to turn it into a 
separate entity. While the Christian Democrats largely concurred with 
this conviction, the SPD's view here differed from the Liberals: rather 
than evaluating Moscow's Berlin intentions as aggressively oriented 
towards extending its realm of influence, Social Democrats viewed the 
Eastern Berlin policy as defensive and explained this with the Soviet 
Union's and the GDR's deep insecurities.
From these different perceptions of Moscow's and East Berlin's 
motives flowed different strategies for dealing with the Berlin problem. 
Since the FDP regarded Berlin's status as immediately threatened, they 
tried to solve the Berlin problem by striving for more West German 
federal presence in Berlin in accordance with the existing law.12 In 
practice, this amounted to the Liberals' demonstration of their 
interpretation of the Four-Power agreement at every possible 
opportunity. Since the Social Democrats evaluated Soviet and East- 
German actions in Berlin more as defensive than as aggressive, they did 
not think it so important constantly to point out their Berlin 
interpretation or even to create situations where they could demonstrate 
their view. As Dietrich Stobbe (SPD), mayor of Berlin, said in 1976: 
"The Four-Power agreement is not made for harping on principles."13 
Much more than in demonstrations of firm legal positions, the SPD
HGenscher, DB, 115th session, 18.9.74, government declaration
l 2Hoppe, DB, 7th sess., 19.1.77, debate about the government declaration; 
Genscher, DB, 34th sess., 20.6.91, debate about the German capital
l 3Stobbe cited in Der Spiegel, 13.12,76; Die Zeit, 4.7.75
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believed in practical improvements for Berlin, for example by 
strengthening its economy.
Although the Free Democrats had strongly promoted Berlin as pan- 
German capital all throughout the Social-Liberal and Christian-Liberal 
coalitions, their support for Berlin as capital of a unified Germany was 
no longer so unanimous when the option actually arose in 1989/90. Some 
Free Democrats now argued that, given Berlin’s association with Reichs 
continuity and its former militarist connections, Bonn should remain the 
German capital since it symbolized forty years of German democracy 
since the war.14
However, most Free Democrats held that Berlin should become the 
pan-German capital, precisely because Germany had overcome its 
militarist history. In their view, Germany had thoroughly proved its 
democratic intentions since 1945 and now needed to move its capital to 
Berlin since this would symbolize the beginning of a new, yet more 
promising phase in German history: the replacement of the Cold War 
order by a European peace order and the end of both Germany's and 
Europe's division. After the centre of German politics had clearly shifted 
Eastwards with the opening of Eastern Europe, German politics must 
now pay tribute to this new development by being formulated in and 
executed from the centre of the new Europe.15 According to the Liberal 
supporters of Berlin, a 'yes' for Berlin was furthermore necessary to 
demonstrate solidarity with the new German states.
Human rights and the issue of non-intervention
Another area in which liberal foreign policy between 1974 and 
1990 has been characterized by clear priorities is that of humanitarian 
issues. Much more than the Social Democrats and the Union, Genscher 
and the FDP have emphasized the need for humanitarian measures to 
maximize individual freedom for people in all states in the world. 
Therefore, this chapter will next examine the question why the Liberals 
have cared so strongly about humanitarian questions.
14Adam-Schwaetzer, DB, 34th sess., 20.6.91, debate about the German capital
l^Luder, DB, 34th sess., 20.6.91, debate about the German capital
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To begin with, however difficult it may be to define the concept 
'liberalism' appropriately, most Liberals everywhere would probably 
agree that striving for greater individual freedom is one, if not the 
central element of liberal ideology. With the liberal striving for 
individual freedom comes the desire to maximize individual freedom for 
all human beings. Hence, Liberals have been guided by the conviction that 
detente must not remain something abstract for the human beings but that 
it must aim at increasing all human beings' individual freedom. The fact 
that the FDP, which liked to see itself as a party of 'rationally justifiable' 
progress, equated progress and human rights has also played a role in the 
Liberals' concentration on the human rights question: "...Progress can 
always only be evaluated by checking whether the individual human being 
gets more human rights."16
So much in terms of explaining the liberal efforts to maximize 
human rights for all human beings. How should the Liberals go about 
achieving this goal, however? The Free Democrats were bound to run 
into ideological conflicts here because their aspiration to maximize 
human rights worldwide was not very compatible with other liberal 
principles. The FDP faced the difficult question what to do with those 
states that did not want to maximize human rights for their citizens. The 
essential dilemma here was the contradiction between individual liberty 
and national self-determination since after all, it was also a liberal 
principle to request maximum internal and external freedom for all 
states. How the Liberals coped with this dilemma will be shown next.
In many ways, the Free Democrats initially made clear that they 
did not intend or expect a destabilization of the Communist regimes with 
their demand for greater realization of human rights. The Liberals 
repeatedly stated that it was not the purpose of their foreign policy to 
influence conditions in other countries in a missionary way. Apart from 
their aversion against exporting ideology, the Liberals further abstained 
from interference with the Communist regimes because they feared that 
detente would be impeded if the Federal Republic tried too hard to 
destabilize its negotiation partners. The FDP believed that in dealing with 
the Communist countries, West Germany had to respect the Warsaw 
Pact's basic interests just as much as their own:
16Die Welt, 28.9.74, Interview with H.D.Genscher
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"The Communists can only take on our concept of freedom for 
the price of self-defeat. We know that we cannot expect and 
achieve this, and we ought to adjust to it in our practical 
politics..."17
Since the principal differences between the two societal systems could not 
- and should not - be removed for the time being, the Free Democrats 
thought that they at least had to opt for the best cooperation presently 
possible. The Liberals were convinced that despite substantive ideological 
differences, the area where West Germany's interests could be made 
compatible with those of the Eastern states had not yet been examined and 
defined with the necessary thoroughness.
Despite this readiness for cooperation and for a power-political 
coexistence between the different systems, the FDP also always made 
very clear that detente must by no means be confused with Western 
domestic political adjustment to Communism and that any ideological 
cooperation was completely taboo. Genscher repeatedly stressed that any 
Communist attempts "to creep into power in felt slippers..." would 
immediately remove the basis for successful detente.18 Thus, for the time 
being, the Free Democrats neither thought it possible nor intended to 
change the Communist systems with their human rights policy. Instead, 
the Liberals pleaded for as much cooperation as possible in the interest of 
the human beings concerned.
A closer look at the party's statements shows, however, that the 
FDP's long-term expectations and goals concerning the human rights 
dilemma did not correspond to its short-term expectations and behaviour. 
Despite all their emphasis on peaceful coexistence of the two systems, 
most Liberals were convinced that in the end the liberal idea would assert 
itself over Communism for several reasons. For one thing, the Liberals 
believed that the Communist regimes had no future because they ignored 
fundamental human desires for self-determination, individual rights and 
national unity, in contrast represented by the FDP. Similarly, the Liberals 
also partly interpreted the East-West tensions as conflict between two 
concepts of legitimacy and believed that the Communist systems had little 
future because they entirely lacked any support by their population. As
^Hoppe, DB, 29th sess., 26.5.77, debate on German policy
i^ZDF, 25.1.76, Interview with H.D.Genscher
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the Liberals saw it, the Communist regimes, completely out of tune with 
the human beings' desires and entirely lacking any democratic legitimacy, 
were "....turning against the wheel of history which they c(ould) maybe 
retard for a while in their sphere of influence but which they c(ould) not 
stop...."19 In the long run, Communism, the reactionary force, thus 
plainly had no chance to survive against Liberalism, the progressive 
force. Genscher even went so far as to term Socialism "an historical 
error."20 The FDP thought that destabilization of the Eastern bloc would 
eventually be unavoidable because the liberal idea was morally superior 
and much more catching:
"The Liberal does not simply accept things the way they are 
now. He checks whether they can be improved, in the sense of 
more freedom for the individual, and then he goes ahead to 
improve them... There is a reason why Communists and Fascists 
have always seen their true enemy in Liberalism. They know: 
the liberal idea is infectious, it is attractive for human beings, it 
cannot be hushed up. The Liberal is always convincing where he 
makes his deep principles, his ideas also practically visible."21
The FDP's claim that it did not aim at the destabilization of the 
Communist regimes was thus modified by its principal conviction that the 
Western democratic systems would in the end assert themselves over any 
dictatorial regime.
The Free Democrats' approach to the rival claims of human rights 
and non-intervention was similarly ambiguous and showed strong traces 
of Immanuel Kant's legacy. On the one hand, the Liberals had inherited 
Kant's belief that the principle of non-intervention was a prerequisite for 
the achievement of peace among nations. Kant's fifth preliminary article 
for "Perpetual Peace" read that no state should interfere by force in the 
constitution or government of another state. On the other hand, Kant had 
been well aware that the rule of non-intervention was not fully 
compatible with the other articles in his pamphlet, particularly the first
19Bu11.123, 31.10.78, Genscher before the UNESCO in Paris on 30.10.78
^Esprit, August 1976, Interview with H.D.Genscher
2lGenscher's speech at the FDP's Party Congress in Hamburg, 30.9.-2.10.1974
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definitive article which read: "The civil constitution of every state shall 
be republican."22
As John Vincent has pointed out, the essential question in this 
context is which is the more pressing imperative: the rule of non­
intervention or an international society made up of republics? Kant had 
clearly regarded republicanism as prior to non-intervention. In other 
words, Kant's principle of non-intervention could only apply 
unconditionally in an international society made up of republican 
nations.23 As long as the world did not yet consist of democracies only, 
Kant had implied an exception to the principle of non-intervention if by 
intervention a democratic state could be established or a dictatorial 
regime destroyed. Faced with the Cold War situation, the German 
Liberals were neither able nor wanted to make direct use of Kant's 
exception to the principle of non-intervention during most of the 1970s 
and 1980s. However, as will be shown next, most Free Democrats have 
nevertheless been guided by Kant's legacy that the principle of non­
intervention could be modified if it served the liberal cause.
Let us now take a look at Liberal actions between 1974 and 1990 
which showed the FDP's special commitment to human rights. The Free 
Democrats demonstrated their commitment to human rights by fervently 
advocating the inclusion of Basket Three during the CSCE negotiations 
leading up to the signing of the Final Act of Helsinki in 1975. What were 
the results that the FDP expected from its active participation in the 
CSCE, then? The Free Democrats here essentially demonstrated the same 
clash between short-term and long-term expectations as overall in the 
human rights dilemma. In terms of short-term expectations, the Liberals 
made it clear that the CSCE was not out to change the political, economic 
or social system of any of the participating countries and that they would 
adhere to the principle of non-intervention which had also been anchored 
in the Final Act. As Genscher said: "The Final Act is not an instruction
22jCant, 'On Perpetual Peace,' in Reiss, p.99. Note that 'Perpetual Peace' essentially 
consisted of two sections: the first section contained six 'Preliminary articles' which are 
best understood as a set of rules that could and should be applied in the absence of 
perpetual peace. A full system of peace required realization of the three 'Definitive 
articles' which were discussed in the second section. The distinction between 
preliminary and definitive articles was based on Kant's reasoning that the absence of 
war was not yet the same as peace. Brown, pp.34-35
23Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, p.57
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for the export of societal systems..."24 Since Helsinki, the Foreign 
Minister had repeatedly warned of expecting spectacular results 
immediately, arguing that the CSCE was the best possible solution in the 
present situation since it provided a chance to bring at least step-by-step 
progress for the human beings.
Despite their repeated warning that the CSCE was but a chance and 
that it would be both unfair and unrealistic to expect dramatic results, the 
Free Democrats nevertheless had not given up hope that in the long run 
Basket III might possibly effect some liberalization of the East. In the 
FDP's view, the principle of non-intervention would in the end be 
subordinated to the principle of human rights for two reasons: firstly, 
since the Eastern European states had voluntarily signed the Final Act and 
had thereby committed themselves to humanitarian principles based on 
Western definitions, they could no longer justifiably complain about 
Western interference with their domestic affairs. Secondly, in line with 
Kant's legacy, the Free Democrats tended to view their influence in 
Eastern Europe not as interference with the Soviet Union's domestic 
affairs but as a way of saving the Eastern European people from the 
dictatorial interference of the Soviet government suppressing 
fundamental human rights.25 The FDP's assumption that any action less 
than dictatorial interference (which was happening in the Soviet Union) 
was not illegal was clearly coloured by Kant.
When the perspectives for a substantial improvement of the human 
rights situation in the Communist states - and hence for realizing the 
Liberals' long-term goals - greatly increased in face of the opening up of 
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, the Free Democrats became more 
outspoken in their approach to the human rights issue. While the FDP 
still warned against using Western economic and technological 
superiority for an attempt to destabilize the Eastern European states, the 
Free Democrats also signalled their active support for those states that 
were engaged in a process of realizing 'liberal' values, i.e. individual 
freedom, human rights and a democratic constitution. As Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher expressed it:
24Bull.38, 3.4.85, Genscher's speech before the demilitarization conference in 
Geneva on 2.4.85
^Genscher, DB, 78th sess., 10.3.78, SPD/FDP's inquiry about the FRG's role in 
the UN; Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, p.67
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" I have frequently stated that it is not our goal to destabilize 
our Eastern neighbours. That would be irresponsible and 
unreasonable. We are interested in the reform processes taking 
place without destabilizing effects... According to our concept 
of freedom, the introduction of more civil rights will 
contribute to a state's and a society's inner stability, whereas the 
means of repression will have a destabilizing effect in the long 
run."26
Although most Liberals admitted that they had not expected the 
developments of the late 1980s to happen so fast or even in their lifetime, 
they nevertheless viewed the breakdown of Eastern Europe as a triumph 
of liberalism.27 At the Liberals' party congress in Hanover in 1990, Otto 
Lambsdorff typically expressed this view:
"Today is a historical day for the Liberals and for 
Germany...We can be proud of our liberal ideals. It is our 
liberal values which have asserted themselves in the GDR's 
peaceful revolution and in the Central and Eastern European 
states' reform process."28
According to Genscher, the Free Democrats had never before felt so 
confirmed in their history. The Liberals' sense of triumph becomes 
somewhat more understandable if one considers the special characteristics 
of the Eastern European Revolution which, unlike other Revolutions, did 
not aim at overthrowing the existing world order but rather at replacing 
the Communist system with the Western democratic values.29 For a 
moment, the FDP's aims of global human rights and worldwide 
democracy indeed seemed within reach. The next section will look at this 
traditional liberal objective of a democratic world order based on 
international law in more detail.
26SZ, 21.6.89, Interview with H.D.Genscher
2^Note that in November 1987, Genscher had for instance still expressed his view
that Gorbachov "...absolutely certainly does not aim at doing away with Socialism and 
replacing it by a free-democratic order..." NDR II, 25.11.87, Interview with 
H.D.Genscher
^ L a m b s d o r f f ' s  speech at the FDP's Party Congress in Hanover, 11.-12.8.1990
29Halliday, p.2
145
United Nations/International law
As indicated above, another striking aspect of the FDP's foreign 
policy-making has been its concentration on international law. Therefore, 
this chapter will now examine to what degree the Liberals' commitment 
to the United Nations and to international law can be explained by their 
ideological heritage. To begin with, while the Free Democrats have 
inherited Kant's recognition that man is neither fundamentally good nor 
naturally peaceable, they have also shared Kant's view that the situation 
can be improved and power can be tamed by international law. 
Furthermore, the Liberals have proceeded from the assumption that the 
individual and not the state plays the key role in politics and in ideology. 
Hence, international relations are not about states but about the 
individuals of which these states are composed.
The combination of these two beliefs, in the room for improvement 
and in the priority of the individual over state autonomy, accounts for the 
FDP's attempt to secure peace by building a commonwealth of nations 
based on international law and international institutions. The Free 
Democrats have proceeded from the assumption that every individual has 
certain basic rights which the state must secure domestically and the 
United Nations internationally.30 According to liberal reasoning, the 
individual in the state thus needed to give up some of his personal 
freedom in order to have it secured by the state, just as the nation in the 
international scene out of voluntary self-interest needed to give up some 
of its national independence in order to guarantee its survival with the 
help of international law.
Furthermore, based on their conviction that the individual mattered 
more than the state, the Free Democrats have attempted to extend the 
framework of morality beyond the borders of the state, trying to develop 
an international morality that could be applied globally. Kant had already 
called for a "public law of mankind", making a "violation of law and 
right in one place felt in all others." The Free Democrats have inherited 
the belief that states have no right to autonomy when this autonomy could
30Bu11.122, 26.10.78, Genscher's speech before the German society of the United 
Nations on 24.10.78; See also Henry Shue's book "Basic Rights," in which he 
maintains that there is a set of economic rights that are as basic as civil and political 
rights. Shue argues that it is the primary duty of governments to secure the rights of all 
men. Shue, pp. 18-34
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involve the violation of universally applicable standards of human 
behaviour. As Genscher said in 1983:
"If the individual is not protected from unjustice and 
arbitrariness in a state, this affects the community of states as a 
whole. The effects of an absence of rights and disdain of human 
beings do not stop at the borders.”31
Notwithstanding the strong link between Free Democrats’ belief in 
international law and Kant's legacy, one other aspect seems noteworthy in 
this context. Although Genscher already stressed that the Liberals based 
their support for the United Nations on Kant's "Perpetual Peace" in his 
first speech before the UN in 1974, the Foreign Minister had left out an 
important detail. While Kant had indeed laid out the basic principles of 
international cooperation in his pamphlet, and while these principles have 
been anchored in the Charter of the United Nations, due to the different 
'Zeitgeist,' Kant had not considered an institutionalization of the 
principles of international peace necessary.32
Apart from Kant's influence, the Liberals have also considered the 
United Nations very important for reasons of historical experience. 
During his 1974 speech before the United Nations, Genscher explained 
that due to Germany's situation as a divided country, the Germans were 
especially aware that states were incomplete constructions. According to 
Genscher, Germans thus tended to have comparatively little confidence in 
their state's ability to cope with big international issues and were prone to 
believe that peace, freedom and human dignity could only be ensured by 
a reliable order of international relations.
Although the Liberals also had to acknowledge that claim and 
reality of the system of the United Nations were still far apart, they 
refuted any scepticism towards the United Nations, arguing that it after 
all was "...the only worldwide forum of an institutionalized dialogue we
3 1 Kant, 'On Perpetual Peace,' in Reiss, pp. 105-108; Bull.97, 27.9.83, Genscher's 
speech on occasion of the tenth anniversary of the FRG's membership in the United 
Nations
32B u ll.lll, 26.9.74, Genscher's speech before the 29th Assembly of the United 
Nations on 23.9.74; Brown, p.35
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have."33 Instead of criticizing the United Nations' lack of efficiency, the 
Liberals have attached much greater importance to extending its 
competences. The FDP was convinced that with growing recognition of 
global interdependence, the role of the United Nations also had to 
increase and that the structure of the organisation continually needed to 
be adjusted to the change of international circumstances and tasks.
The Liberals' enthusiasm for the United Nations can also partly be 
explained by their conviction that institutionalized international 
cooperation provided a good base for promoting specifically German 
interests. The FDP viewed the United Nations as the ideal forum to 
discuss all the principles and goals of German foreign policy-making 
before the whole world, which of course also included addressing the 
specific German problems and reminding the UN members that such a 
problem existed in the first place.34 However, the Liberals not only used 
the United Nations theoretically but also regarded it as an important 
means of achieving an active solution to the German problem. For 
example, part of the FDP's motive of requesting an increase in the United 
Nations' competences certainly was the Liberals' hope that this would 
allow for a solution of the German problems in the pan-European 
framework: "The stronger the United Nations are, the stronger is every 
member state in its right for self-determination and every human being in 
his human rights."35 However, the FDP also knew that it was not the 
United Nations' primary function to solve the German problems and thus 
made concerted efforts to avoid bringing German issues too much into 
the foreground.
Let us now take a look at specific FDP actions which demonstrate 
the Liberals' commitment to the United Nations and international law. In 
1976, Genscher suggested that a United Nations' Court of Human Rights 
be created. One of his motives here was the Liberals' fundamental 
conviction - as shown above - that they needed to try and proceed from 
the proclamation of human rights to their worldwide realization and
33B u ll.lll, 26.9.74, Genscher's speech before the 29th Assembly of the United 
Nations on 23.9.74; Bull.22, 20.2.79, Genscher's speech on "Security and detente" 
on 16.2.79 in Bonn
34DLF, 29.9.76, Interview with H.D.Genscher
35B u11.107, 28.9.78, Genscher's speech before the 33rd General Assembly of the 
United Nations on 26.9.78
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institutionalization. Furthermore, 1976 seemed the appropriate point of 
time to introduce such an initiative since the European Convention of 
Human Rights had finally entered into force the same year. As Genscher 
said: "...If we take the term freedom seriously,...then we have to make 
sure that these human rights pacts do not yellow in the United Nation's 
archives but that they become reality..."36 Precisely in order to 
implement these pacts, Genscher suggested the creation of a Human 
Rights Court of the United Nations. While so far, the organization could 
only morally appeal to its members to adhere to their human rights 
obligations, such a UN Court in contrast would be able to maintain action 
against human rights violations, thereby drastically increasing the chances 
for realizing human rights worldwide.
The FDP further argued for increasing the United Nations' 
competences on the grounds that the human rights issue by now had been 
removed from national sovereignty anyway. Hence, UN competences 
could no longer be rejected as interference with a state's internal affairs:
"The European Convention of Human Rights declared 
promotion of human rights to be one of the basic goals of the 
world organization. That way it withdrew the question of 
human rights from purely national control and turned it into an 
international question. It became legitimate to ask other states to 
realize human rights. No one can refute criticism of his 
behaviour in this area as interference with his internal 
affairs."37
Such Liberal statements of course also could not do away with the 
problem that the Western definition of human rights as individual rights 
clashed with many Eastern and Third World states' definition of human 
rights as collective rights. But, the Free Democrats argued, the creation 
of a UN Court of Human Rights would at least be a step in the right 
direction. Genscher refuted all accusations of being an idealist, arguing 
that he was very well aware of the fact that it would be a long time until 
this human rights court could be established. Nevertheless, according to
36Genscher cited in Deutsche Zeitung, 10.9.76
37bu11. 122, 26.10.78, Genscher's speech before the German society of the United 
Nations on 24.10.78
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Genscher, for a true liberal it was absolutely vital at least to attempt the 
creation of such a UN Human Rights Court:
"...I believe that in questions of principle, and the human rights 
court is a question of principle, a politician's efforts must not 
proceed by chance. For the liberal this is, if you like, a creed.."38
Detente or defence?
So far, this chapter has attempted to explain the Free Democrats' 
focus on a number of foreign policy issues - national unification, human 
rights and international law - which have all been characterized by then- 
underlying idealism. A look at the Liberals' approach to the issues of 
detente and defence manifests, however, that their foreign policy cannot 
merely be classified as 'idealist' since the FDP's position here was much 
more guarded. It will be shown next that in terms of the balance attached 
to detente and defence respectively, the Free Democrats assumed a middle 
position between the SPD and the CDU/CSU. This was largely based on 
the three parties' different perceptions of the Soviet Union's intentions 
and capacities, which in return led to different strategies for dealing with 
the balance between detente and defence. The first question consequently 
is how the German parties generally evaluated the Soviet Union's foreign 
policy intentions and which strategies flowed from these evaluations.
Apart from a small wing around Chancellor Schmidt, the majority 
of Social Democrats tended to see the Soviet Union and East Germany as 
insecure regimes, yearning for economic, technological and military 
recognition by the West. Hence, the SPD mostly interpreted Moscow's 
actions as defensive and refuted the assumption that the Soviet Union 
pursued principally expansionist goals.39 The Social Democrats' approach 
was largely based on Brandt's assumption that in an age of conflicting 
blocs, joint security could only be reached through cooperation with the 
potential opponent. Most Social Democrats believed that Bonn's primary
3^Der Spiegel, 6.9.76, Interview with H.D. Genscher
39Horst Ehmke, for instance, said in the Bundestag debate on security policy on 
8.3.79 (141st sess.): "It is not at all true...that the Soviet Union is generally 
expansionist in its foreign policy..."
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efforts should be geared towards detente with Eastern Europe instead of 
at increasing Germany's defence capacities.
In contrast to the SPD's fairly optimistic view of Moscow's 
intentions, most Union members shared an essentially pessimistic view of 
Soviet politics. The detente policy of the 1970s had not been able to 
remove the anti-Communist convictions in the Union, and most Christian 
Democrats still perceived the Kremlin as a substantial threat. The Union 
largely viewed Moscow's foreign policy as expansionist, aiming at 
hegemony and at a Communist world revolution. In the Union's view, the 
West could only conduct a policy of detente with Eastern Europe from a 
position of military strength since it believed the Soviet Union would 
abuse any sign of Western weakness.40
While the Social Democrats broadly represented an 'idealist' 
approach and the Christian Democrats represented 'realist' convictions, 
the Free Democrats assumed a middle position. On the one hand, the Free 
Democrats proved 'realists' in their approach towards the Soviet Union 
since for most of the 1970s and 1980s, they believed (1) that Moscow's 
armament could not be viewed as purely defensive, as it exceeded the 
level necessary for defence and (2) that the Soviet Union was prone to use 
its political and military potential above all where it considered the risk 
to be low. Consequently, there was no point in one-sided concessions in 
disarmament, as requested by a majority of the Social Democrats. In 
1974, Genscher had already said: "...we do not succumb to the illusion 
that detente by itself already would mean more security..."41 Similarly, 
the FDP was convinced that the Kremlin's possibly expansionist 
tendencies needed to be contained by a strong and united Atlantic alliance. 
The Free Democrats had always warned Germany of being pushed into 
choosing between the apparent alternatives "detente or transatlantic 
cooperation" and strongly disapproved of any SPD claims that there was 
equidistance between the Federal Republic and the superpowers 42
40Zimmer, p.l 17 Note that the more radical faction in the Union, the so-called 'Steel 
helmets,' aimed at deterring and containing Soviet military strength with the long-term 
objective of destroying Soviet hegemony. The less radical faction in the Union were 
called 'Genscherists' since their position on detente and defence greatly resembled that 
of the Free Democrats.
^iGenscher's speech at FDP Party Congress in Hamburg, 30.9.-2.10.1974; See 
also fdk 76,13.3.80; HR, 2.1.77, Interview with H.D.Genscher; WDR, 29.3.80, 
Interview with H.D.Genscher
42Genscher, DB, 203rd sess., 28.2.80, debate about the government declaration
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On the other hand, the FDP's approach to Eastern Europe was also 
somewhat coloured by 'idealist' convictions. This was for instance 
apparent in the Liberals' view that an arms race would not effect Soviet 
counterconcessions (as a majority of the Union argued), but would lead 
the Soviet Union to pour all its energy into armament. The Liberals 
shared the SPD's conviction that the Soviet Union's determination never 
to be militarily inferior again had been coined by the Second World War: 
"As Germans we are aware that the Soviet Union's frequently 
exaggerated security desire has also been influenced by the darkest 
Chapter of our own history."43 The Free Democrats also proved to be 
idealists in their defence policy because of their ongoing belief that the 
situation in the Soviet Union would eventually improve.
Overall, the Free Democrats differed from the two other parties 
because of their conviction that the issues of detente and defence were 
equally important and could not be treated separately. This clearly 
manifested itself during the debates about the NATO dual-track decision 
in the late 1970s, when - compared to the other parties, the Free 
Democrats found it least difficult to accept the duality of the NATO dual­
track decision. Most Social Democrats (apart from the wing around 
Chancellor Schmidt) faced a dilemma here because they regarded detente 
as prior to defence and consequently feared that NATO's rearmament 
would happen at the cost of detente. The Union, for which defence was 
the Federal Republic's highest priority, faced the opposite problem: many 
Christian Democrats feared that the arms control offers in the NATO 
dual track decision would get in the way of the necessary rearmament. 
Many Union members had only agreed to the dual-track decision on the 
assumption that there definitely needed to be some kind of modernization 
of NATO's Pershing missiles 44
For most Free Democrats, the concepts of detente and defence were 
completely interlinked, and hence their compatibility did not pose any 
serious problems. The FDP was principally ready for arms control, and 
certainly preferred it to modernization, but if Moscow did not cooperate, 
the West needed to rearm since otherwise the balance of military forces 
would be shifted in the Soviet Union's favour. Western failure to redress
4 3 B u11.119, 5.11.83, Genscher's speech on the principles and elements of a
European peace order on 2.11.83 in Helsinki
^■Zimmer, p. 113
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such a shifted military balance would result in less, not in more world 
security and would endanger world peace. Hence, the Free Democrats 
were more ’idealist' than the Union because they did not consider 
Moscow's containment more important than detente, and more 'realist' 
than the Social Democrats because they did not consider detente prior to 
defence.
The 'idealist' element in the Free Democrats' security policy 
manifested itself more strongly from the mid-1980s onwards when the 
climate of East-West relations greatly improved. When Genscher thought 
that Gorbachev was finally ready for true progress in arms control 
between East and West, he strongly appealed to both the Union 
domestically and to Germany's allies internationally to use this chance 
and to free themselves of their Cold War way of thinking:
"If there should be a chance today that, after 40 years of East- 
West confrontation, there could be a turning point in East-West 
relations, it would be a mistake of historical dimension for the 
West to let this chance slip just because it cannot escape from a 
way of thinking which invariably expects the worst from the 
Soviet Union."45
Just as the Foreign Minister had warned the Social Democrats of 
proceeding from Germany's equidistance between the two superpowers in 
the early 1980s, he now appealed to the Union to "adjust to the thought 
that responsible demilitarization creates more and not less security..."46 
After all, Genscher argued, Germany could not only trust the Americans 
when they were developing a new military programme and distrust them 
when they conducted demilitarization negotiations with the Soviet 
Union.47
So far, this chapter has sought to explain why certain issues became 
more highlighted than others in the FDP's Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik 
during the 1970s and 1980s by looking at the Liberals' history, ideology
45b u 11.13, 4.2.87, Genscher's speech before the World Economic Forum in Davos 
on 1.2.87
46welt am Sonntag, 17.1.88, Interview with H.D.Genscher
47Note that the FDP's ideological approach to the issues of detente and defence had 
the additional functional effect of reinforcing the party's strategic position in the middle 
of the German political spectrum.
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and past experience. However, the FDP's foreign policy between 1974 
and 1990 has also been decisively influenced by Foreign Minister 
Genscher, who for most of the period in question also held the functions 
of Party Chairman and Vice Chancellor. In fact, Hans Dietrich 
Genscher's impact on German foreign policy has been such that his 
politics has been labelled 'Genscherism,' and this chapter will next 
examine what lies between the term Genscherism.
Genscherism - merely a label of convenience?
This section will attempt to define Genscherism by addressing four 
questions: first, how far it is something distinctive from principal liberal 
values and ideology? Second, what has Genscherism meant for those who 
have created the term? Third, to what extent can Genscherism merely be 
seen as an expression of German public opinion, as some of his opponents 
have suggested? Fourth, how far has Genscher's foreign policy been 
influenced by developments in the international system?
The first question is to what degree Genscherism consists of a 
particular set of foreign policy aims and values. If examined under the 
aspect of continuity, it seems feasible to define Genscherism as a certain 
approach to foreign policy. After all, since he became Foreign Minister 
in 1974, Genscher consistently pursued the same three foreign policy 
objectives which were all interlinked. Firstly, Genscher always 
emphasized that the main pillar of West German foreign policy must be a 
firm commitment to the Atlantic alliance and to NATO. Secondly, the 
Federal Republic must strive for extending the European Communities 
and European cooperation in general. Thirdly, from the basis of such 
firm Western integration, West Germany must conduct a policy of 
detente towards Eastern Europe, aiming at the long-term replacement of 
bilateral relations with a multilateral framework based on joint efforts 
towards peace. Only within such a pan-European framework could - and 
did - German unification eventually become possible. Thus, a central 
element of Genscher's foreign policy approach was the Foreign 
Minister's belief that his search for common ground between East and 
West was thoroughly compatible with a strong Atlantic alliance and an 
increasingly coherent Western European community. Genscher's concept 
here was based on NATO's Harmel Report of 1967, which called for a
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dual policy of combining a credible deterrence policy with cooperative 
efforts towards the East.48
However, objections to defining Genscherism as a set of values 
seem justified on the basis of two considerations: for one thing, none of 
the goals Genscher advocated were new or creative. For another thing, 
none of these goals were seriously contested by the other Liberals, and 
most were not even questioned by the other democratic parties. The idea 
that West Germany needed to be firmly integrated into the Western 
community of states had dominated the Federal Republic’s foreign policy 
making since Adenauer. Nor was the concept that Germany should pursue 
a policy of rapprochement with Eastern Europe necessarily a novelty in 
German politics. This also addresses a more general 'liberal' problem 
since many of the values advocated by modern Liberalism - i.e. 
worldwide peace and more human rights - tend to be supported by all 
democratic forces. Hence, it is sometimes difficult to claim that 
Liberalism is the original or justified political representative.
The above factors rendering a clear attribution of Genscher's 
foreign political convictions to his person difficult were enhanced by 
Genscher's tendency towards diplomatically ambiguous, non-binding 
statements. As the magazine Der Stern once aptly commented, "...no 
word in his many speeches could ever be interpreted against Genscher."49 
Genscher's reticence to make strong statements only confirmed his 
opponents' conviction that Genscherism was more opportunism than 
substance and that the Foreign Minister was putting office before policy. 
Note that even the former Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt once 
called Genscher "a tactician without a concept."50
Returning to the question whether Genscherism can be defined as a 
set of foreign policy values, it seems that Genscher's foreign political 
beliefs represented not so much his own personal concepts as more 
generally 'liberal' principles, largely in line with FDP thinking. Many of 
Genscher's ideals were not his personal inventions but related to
48As shown above, Genscher's Ostpolitik was further characterized by the special 
importance he attached to the issues of national unification, supporting Berlin, 
promoting human rights and strengthening the United Nations.
49Stern, 4.11.76
50Schmidt cited in The Economist, 31.1.87
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international relations generally.51 In an interview with the magazine 
Bunte in 1991, the Foreign Minister answered the question 'what is 
Genscherism' as follows:
"Foreign policy based on the basic values of human rights, 
freedom and self-determination, and consequently...in 
accordance with our Basic Law. Genscherism rejects any power 
politics. We are no longer yearning for more power."52
This definition seems to confirm that Genscherism can hardly be seen as a 
distinct foreign policy ideology. Perhaps Genscherism should be more 
accurately rephrased as 'Genscher as representative of German 
Liberalism.'
Since it is not possible to define Genscherism as a set of personal 
foreign policy values, maybe a look at the origins of the term will 
provide an explanation for what lies behind Genscherism. The term 
'Genscherism' was first introduced by the Social Democrats in the 
autumn of 1982. It then disapprovingly referred to the FDP's continued 
support for the rearmament part of the NATO dual-track decision in face 
of the SPD's shift towards the left.53 It is important to note that although 
the SPD used the term Genscherism in the sense of the FDP's turn 
towards a 'pro-Atlanticist policy,' it was in fact not the Liberals who had 
changed their position but the Social Democrats. The NATO dual-track 
decision had provided for an approach combining arms control efforts 
with NATO's readiness for modernizing its Pershing missiles. Although 
Moscow had not reduced its level of intermediate-range nuclear missiles 
by 1982, most Social Democrats then no longer supported the 
rearmament part of the NATO dual-track decision and accused the FDP 
of succumbing to Washington's power politics.
From about 1986 onwards, Genscherism received a completely new 
meaning. This time, the emergence of the term was related to the 
democratization process in Eastern Europe and to Genscher's early plea 
for supporting Gorbachev's reform efforts. In the mid-eighties, 
Genscherism came to mean exactly the opposite from a pro-Atlanticist
51 Kirchner, Genscher and what lies behind Genscherism. p. 164
52Bunte, 21.3.91, Interview with H.D.Genscher
53Meiers/Tanner, p.2
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policy, namely a "...certain craven enthusiasm for Mikhail Gorbachev 
and for his arms control proposals..."54 This time, the term had been 
created in the United States and Great Britain and largely reflected 
Anglo-American irritation about Genscher's detentist policies and 
exasperation with his personality. For instance, in 1988, Jim Hoagland of 
the International Herald Tribune called Genscher a "master 
contortionist," even questioning the Foreign Minister's personal integrity, 
while the US ambassador in Bonn, Richard Burt, once called Genscher "a 
slippery man."55
Apart from their concern with what they considered Genscher's 
smug personality, Genscher's critics also fastened upon him as the 
personification of their concerns about the Germans in general. Some 
critics in Washington expressed their fear that Genscherism in reality was 
a German shift towards neutralism, while others were worried Genscher 
was aiming at reunification at any price, no matter how many concessions 
to the Eastern bloc might be required. Others argued that Genscher was 
continuing the bad German historical tradition of seeking to promote 
German interests by positioning the country as a makeweight between 
Western Europe and the Russians. As The Economist expressed it in 
1989, "The worry is that the Genscher push for a new Europe is really a 
push for a mightier Germany..."56 These fears were only enhanced when, 
convinced that East-West relations had reached a historical turning point, 
from 1986 onwards, Genscher started to insist on the need for further 
arms control with unusual German self-assertiveness. The Foreign 
Minister now not only nagged the US administration to continue talks that 
led to the INF treaty in 1987, but in 1989, Genscher also successfully 
opposed the modernization of NATO’s short-range nuclear missiles.
In terms of the question whether the term Genscherism can be 
defined by examining its evolution, three aspects deserve special 
attention. Firstly, the term appeared twice during Genscher's term in 
office, referring to exactly the opposite aspects of the Foreign Minister's 
foreign policy approach. Secondly, both times the reference to 
Genscher's foreign policy was critical. Thirdly, even though his
54IHT, 18.8.88
55IHT, 18.8.88; Capital, 1.2.89
56xhe Economist, 13.5.89
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opponents focused on certain aspects of Genscher's foreign policy, 
suggesting it had evolved in a dangerous direction, the fact was that the 
Foreign Minister's stance remained the same throughout his time in 
office. As the Europaische Zeitung commented in 1989, it was not 
Genscher who had changed but his political environment.57 In Emil 
Kirchner's words, Genscherism as created and applied by his opponents, 
should thus be seen more as a "label of convenience" than as an ideology 
or strategy.58
Since neither ideology nor terminology sufficiently define 
Genscherism, this section will now examine which other factors had an 
impact on Genscher's foreign policy. In particular, the question whether 
public opinion was a more important motive behind Bonn's foreign 
policy than Genscher's personality or ideology will be addressed next. In 
order to determine the role of public opinion in Genscher's foreign 
policy, this section will look at the three foreign policy events and 
developments that evoked the most intensive debates about Genscherism: 
the NATO dual-track decision of 1979, the Foreign Minister's early plea 
for supporting Gorbachev's reform efforts from 1986 onwards and 
Genscher's opposition to the modernization of short-range nuclear 
missiles in 1989. In line with their view of Genscher as opportunistic 
politician without a clear concept, many of his critics have accused 
Genscher of arbitrarily following public opinion trends and of abusing 
them to his advantage. A closer look at the Foreign Minister's most 
controversial foreign political decisions suggests, however, that public 
opinion could not have been the major determinant behind Genscherism.
As mentioned above, the term Genscherism first appeared in the 
context of the FDP's continued support for the rearmament part of the 
NATO dual-track decision in 1982. In the same year, the Free Democrats 
left the Social-Liberal coalition, whereby their determination to ensure 
the continuity of foreign policy played a significant role. If public 
opinion had been the main factor behind Genscher's foreign policy here, 
the question arises why the Free Democrats should have insisted on the 
application of both parts of the NATO dual track decision: after all, large 
sections of the German public violently protested against the deployment 
of US missiles on German soil. What was more, after the breakdown of
57Europaische Zeitung, 1.6.89
5^Kirchner, Genscher and what lies behind Genscherism. p. 172
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the coalition, the FDP's remaining time in power was immediately and 
severely threatened. Rather than following public opinion, the Foreign 
Minister had adhered to his principal conviction that cooperative efforts 
towards Eastern Europe needed to be combined with a credible 
deterrence policy, even though this had caused quite some domestic 
trouble for the FDP.59
From 1985 onwards, Genscher proved once more that he was 
determined to hold on to both parts of the Harmel Report. Given his firm 
belief in the chances arising from Gorbachev's readiness for reform and 
disarmament, Genscher now advocated substantial efforts at detente. 
Significantly, Genscher started calling for taking Gorbachev seriously 
before public opinion caught onto it. Much has been made of Genscher's 
1987 speech in Davos where he pleaded for taking Gorbachev at his 
word, but as a matter of fact, Genscher had already advocated the same in 
a speech in Vienna half a year earlier: "To me, it seems better to take 
Gorbachev at his word concerning his readiness for a new beginning and 
for new openness..."60 Initially ahead of both domestic and international 
opinion with his call for taking Gorbachev seriously, from about 1987 
onwards, the Foreign Minister's approach found increasing favour with 
the German public.
By 1989, when Genscher decisively influenced NATO's decision to 
postpone the modernization of its short-range nuclear missiles, public 
opinion was still very favourably predisposed towards Gorbachev and 
disarmament. In the latter case, it is thus possible to speak of some 
interaction between Genscher's decision and public opinion.61 On the 
whole, however, it has been shown above that at least during the 1980s, 
Genscher was much more a 'leader' than a 'follower' of public opinion
59Despite the temporary clash between public opinion and Liberal foreign policy, it 
should also be stressed that the FDP's change of coalition partner ensured the Free 
Democrats' remaining in power.
6°B ull.96, 29.8.86, Genscher's speech in Vienna on 27.8.86 before the 'Danube- 
European Institute'
61 In his article on "Genscher and what lies behind Genscherism". Emil Kirchner 
suggested that Genscher was capable of grasping control of German security making 
between 1987 and 1989 because of the favourable groundswell of public opinion for 
disarmament and Gorbachov. After the INF treaty and in face of Gorbachov's reforms, 
the Germans' perceived Eastern Europe as less threatening and hence dropped their 
support for a strong West German defence. Kirchner, p. 166
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which renders a definition of Genscherism as the expression of German 
public opinion implausible.
Given the fact that Genscherism can neither satisfactorily be 
explained with the help of ideology nor with the help of public opinion, 
we shall now lastly examine the question whether Genscherism was 
determined by the impact of international developments on German 
foreign policy. More specifically, the question is whether changes in the 
international system were more important than the positions taken by 
Genscher. While Genscher’s policies seem to have changed little, the 
international political environment changed considerably in the mid- 
1980s. Many have thus argued that the changes brought about by Ronald 
Reagan’s tough foreign policy course and Gorbachev’s glasnost and 
perestroika were much more relevant than Genscherism.
Without doubt, the breakdown of Communism in Eastern Europe 
in the late 1980s and German unification would not have been possible 
without Gorbachev and were probably triggered to some extent by 
Reagan's arms race. The main question here thus concerns the role of 
Genscherism within this larger given framework of international 
relations. The international developments in the late 1980s very 
favourably corresponded with Genscher's overall ideology which had two 
effects: firstly, the fact that the German Foreign Minister was 
predisposed towards the reform movements in Eastern Europe somewhat 
contributed to their success. For instance, it was Genscher who achieved 
the release of the East German citizens from the West German embassy 
in Prague in September 1989. Furthermore, during the unification 
process, the Foreign Minister's NATO plan and his quick embrace of the 
2+4 concept also contributed to the successful completion of German 
unity.
Secondly, the Eastern European and German revolutions 
corresponded exactly to the Liberals' aspirations in international 
relations. In 1989, Genscher expressed the positive correlation between 
his foreign policy aspirations and international developments by stating 
that nothing was more powerful than an idea whose time had come. The 
German Liberals greatly benefited from the fact that after the breakdown 
of Eastern Europe, the former Communist states were not looking for an 
alternative to the prevailing world order but rather wanted to be 
incorporated into the Western world as rapidly as possible. While the 
Liberals benefited from Gorbachev's reform efforts and the Eastern
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European states' readiness to take on the Liberal values of the West, it is 
still not possible to define Genscherism as the influence of international 
developments on Germany. As shown above, what mattered most was the 
favourable interaction between Genscher's foreign policy aspirations and 
international developments. Genscher nevertheless did not resist the 
temptation to point out that the critics of his 1987 speech in Davos had 
been proved wrong: "Many of those who then disapprovingly created the 
phrase 'Genscherism' have now become Genscherists themselves..."62
Overall, this section has tried to show why Genscherism cannot be 
defined as a set of foreign policy values attributable solely to Genscher. 
We have also seen why the term Genscherism, as invented and used by 
the Foreign Minister's opponents, is not very helpful for defining 
Genscherism. It has furthermore been discussed why, despite strong 
public support for Genscher from the mid-1980s onwards, Genscherism 
cannot merely be seen as an expression of German public opinion. 
Equally, although superpower relations have set the framework for 
German foreign policy making, this section has attempted to demonstrate 
why the claim that these international preconditions were much more 
dominant than Genscherism cannot be sustained.
In face of the difficulties encountered in defining Genscherism, the 
question arises whether the term is at all justified. Phrased alternatively, 
would German foreign policy between 1974 and 1990 have been different 
without Hans-Dietrich Genscher as Foreign Minister? Obviously, this 
counter-factual question cannot be answered fully but it helps in the 
attempt to define Genscherism. Emil Kirchner has argued that 
Genscherism must be seen as a reaction to both external changes 
(superpower rapprochement, Gorbachev's reform process) and to 
internal German developments (decreased perception of threat from 
Eastern Europe, greater search for national identity and unity, greater 
German self-awareness).63 This definition of Genscherism as reaction to 
long-term changes in Germany's internal and external framework has led 
Kirchner to conclude that Genscherism as phenomenon would not 
disappear even if the Foreign Minister left the political scene.
As shown above, Genscherism has clearly been favourably 
influenced by the international developments of the late 1980s, and
6^Die Welt, 17.10.89, Interview with H.D.Genscher
63Kirchner, Genscher and what lies behind Genscherism. p. 172
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Genscher has also occasionally relied on German public opinion to 
promote his cause. However, while Kirchner's argument certainly holds 
good for the particular case study around which his article is organized 
(Germany's opposition to the modernization of NATO's short-range 
nuclear missiles in 1989), it does not fully explain 'Genscherism' during 
the whole period from 1974 until 1990. Let's thus once again return to 
the central question at stake: what lies behind Genscherism?
This section will argue that Genscherism should be seen as a 
combination of Genscher's generally 'liberal' convictions with certain 
aspects of his personal style. More specifically, Genscherism can be 
defined as the combination of strict continuity in Genscher's foreign 
policy approach with his sense for the 'Zeitgeist' which led him to choose 
the 'right' policy priority at the 'right' point of time. As shown above, 
the central element in Genscher's foreign policy approach was his belief 
that Germany must and could combine a firm commitment to the West 
with detente efforts towards Eastern Europe. When he feared that 
Germany would move away from the appropriate support for NATO's 
deterrence measures in 1982, the Foreign Minister changed over to a 
Christian-Liberal coalition to restore the 'right' balance between detente 
and defence.
Likewise, when Genscher sensed that Gorbachev was seriously 
ready for reform in the mid-1980s, he did not hesitate to request Western 
support for this great chance. Thus, while most Liberals concurred with 
the Foreign Minister's general values, the special 'Genscherist' element 
lay in the varying priority Genscher attached to the aspects of detente and 
defence respectively, according to his vision. Genscherism can thus be 
defined as the combination of Genscher's adherence to his foreign 
political convictions with his capacity of sensing both the risks and 
chances inherent in change more quickly than others.64
Conclusion
In sum, this chapter has shown that a look at liberal history and 
ideology is essential for explaining why certain issues in the FDP's Ost- 
and Deutschlandpolitik between 1974 and 1990 became more highlighted
64For a further discussion of Genscherism, see Chapter Eight, pp.280-281
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than others. While the Liberals' historical experience helps to account for 
the FDP's focus on national issues, the Berlin question and international 
law, we have also seen the importance of great liberal thinkers of the 
past, most notably Immanuel Kant, as role models for the Free 
Democrats. Furthermore, although Genscher's approach to foreign policy 
reflected general liberal values and ideology, it has been shown that the 
special characteristics of 'Genscherism' also played a significant role in 
determining the FDP's foreign policy during the 1970s and 1980s.
In several ways, the FDP's special 'liberal' identity in foreign 
policy helped to increase the Free Democrats' room for manoeuvre in 
Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik. Firstly, the FDP's foreign policy principles 
had the additional functional effect of reinforcing the party's strong 
strategic position in the German party system. On the one hand, the Free 
Democrats' 'natural' concentration on certain issues allowed them to 
develop an independent profile, which in return helped the FDP to 
legitimize its existence in the German party system. On the other hand, 
the FDP's ideological stance on certain foreign policy issues, particularly 
the balance between detente and defence, consolidated the party's 
functional position as 'third force' between the Social Democrats and the 
Union.
Secondly, the FDP profited from its foreign policy convictions 
because to a certain extent, the various liberal values fit together rather 
well to form an ideology. The Free Democrats' belief that a state's 
internal and external freedom were inseparably linked led them to strive 
for German reunification, which was in return directly related to their 
focus on Berlin issues. Similarly, the fact that the FDP equated progress 
with more individual rights, while simultaneously seeking to contain 
individual or state abuse of power with the help of law, rendered the Free 
Democrats' striving for more human rights and improved international 
law rather congruous. Furthermore, the FDP's blend of 'idealism' and 
'realism' complemented well with the other liberal convictions. It should 
also be stressed that the Free Democrats successfully continued Gustav 
Stresemann's concept of linking Germany's national interest with their 
international foreign policy objectives: by striving for a pan-European 
peace order, the FDP hoped to overcome Germany's and Berlin's 
division, and the Free Democrats' request for more human rights 
worldwide and a UN Human Rights Court was clearly partly motivated
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by their desire to improve the situation for the Germans in Eastern 
Europe.
On the other hand, we have also seen that in various ways, the 
FDP's principles were not very compatible with each other, thus causing 
contradictions and ideological dilemmas. Generally speaking, there is 
little trace of a critical FDP examination of the compatibility of certain 
liberal objectives, i.e. the striving for worldwide democracy and a 
universal application of the principle of self-determination, with other 
international principles, such as territorial integrity and world peace. Nor 
is it wholly clear whether the Free Democrats perceived their foreign 
policy convictions as an ideology, and whether they had any reservations 
about their attempt to transfer liberal values to other parts of the world.
Despite such inconsistencies in liberal ideology, there has been a 
third way in which the Free Democrats have benefited from their foreign 
policy principles: unlike Germany's international framework and the 
domestic parameter, which were rather susceptible to change, ideology 
was the only resource on which the Liberals could rely relatively 
continuously between 1974 and 1990. Given the much higher volatility of 
the other two parameters, this study will next examine how the changes in 
the international system and in German domestic politics affected the 
FDP's room for manoeuvre in foreign policy after 1982.
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Chapter VI. The Christian-Liberal coalition 1982-90: 
the international framework
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This chapter will investigate the impact of international relations on 
German Ostpolitik after the Liberals' change of coalition partner in 1982. 
More specifically, it will examine the questions posed by Eastern, 
Western and German politicians respectively after the Christian 
Democrats' assumption of power in Bonn. Although Chancellor Kohl 
pledged to continue Ostpolitik in his first government declaration before 
the Bundestag, the Conservatives' long and fierce opposition to Social- 
Liberal Ostpolitik for most of the 1970s left Germany's international 
partners wondering whether the Free Democrats would be able to ensure 
the continuity of German Ostpolitik, even in a coalition with the Christian 
Democrats. It will also be examined whether the Liberals made any 
special contributions to German Ostpolitik after the 'Wende' in Bonn.
We shall furthermore investigate how the respective superpower 
climate affected the Federal Republic's room for manoeuvre in foreign 
policy between 1982 and 1990. How far was Bonn's pledge to continue 
Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik compatible with a US administration aiming 
at containing the Soviet Union and with the hardliner policy conducted by 
Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko in the Kremlin? Similarly, 
this chapter is concerned with the effects on the FDP's foreign policy of 
the marked change in the superpowers' foreign policy from the mid- 
1980s onwards. How did President Reagan's milder course towards 
Moscow and Mikhail Gorbachev's reform programme influence Bonn's 
Ostpolitik and inner-German relations? Lastly, the breakdown of Eastern 
Europe, the process of German unification and the question whether 
there were any specific FDP contributions to unification will be 
investigated.
The impact of US and Soviet leadership on the FDP’s 
Ostpolitik
Despite Chancellor Kohl's pledge in the Bundestag, the Free 
Democrats faced three strong potential obstacles to a smooth continuation 
of their Ostpolitik when the Christian-Liberal coalition took over the 
government in October 1982: (1), a US government that deliberately 
pursued a very tough course towards Moscow, (2), the Kremlin's firm 
opposition to the upcoming deployment of Western intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles, and (3), a new coalition partner, whose relations with
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Eastern Europe were traditionally more complicated than those of the 
Social Democrats. This section will consequently examine how far the 
FDP's commitment to continue Social-Liberal Ostpolitik was compatible 
with the above factors and how the Free Democrats reacted to Germany's 
external environment after 1982.
The incompatibility o f Washington's foreign policy and the FDP's 
objectives
However disunited the Reagan administration may have been, all 
members of the government agreed on the need to depart from the 'one­
way street' of detente which in their view had come only to serve Soviet 
interests. By putting rearmament before politics and reducing dialogue 
with Moscow to the arms race, the Reagan administration decisively 
differed from Carter's and Nixon's since both these Presidents had tried 
to deter the Soviet Union largely with economic and political means. 
Although Reagan's actual military policy towards the Soviet Union was 
much more cautious than his strong rhetoric, his approach harmed the 
prospects for East-West rapprochement in at least three ways and 
therefore clashed with the FDP's commitment to ensuring the continuity 
of Ostpolitik.1 To begin with, Reagan's introduction of the SDI (Strategic 
Defence Initiative) concept on 23 March 1983 was to harm any progress 
on arms control for a long time. The Western Europeans were struck not 
only by the President's blunt disinterest in any East-West cooperation, but 
also by the fact that Reagan had introduced the initiative without 
consulting his Western allies.
In 1983 and 1984, East-West relations furthermore suffered from 
Washington's serious doubts about several existing arms control measures 
and lack of enthusiasm for new ones. In fact, no arms control agreements 
were concluded during Reagan's first term in office, and the President 
clearly stated that he would not meet Andropov before the complete 
removal of all Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles worldwide. In 
addition, Washington's approach to economic relations with Moscow also
Un terms of the clash between Reagan's strong rhetoric and his actual military 
politics, Coral Bell has pointed out that compared to earlier US administrations, the rate 
of military expenditure during the early Reagan years was indeed initially very high. 
However, when Reagan's budgets are assessed as a whole against the general trends 
for the postwar period, the average for the Reagan years is somewhat below the 
average for the previous two decades (6.1%). Bell, p.63
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impeded the FDP's desire for a continuation of detente. By 1983, Reagan 
had imposed numerous trade restrictions on the Soviet Union, and by the 
end of the year, only seven US-Soviet agreements on scientific 
cooperation were still in force (a fifth of the volume of 1979).2 By the 
summer of 1983, there was thus a practical standstill in US-Soviet 
relations.
Even though the Christian-Liberal coalition could thus count on 
little US support for its desire to continue a policy of rapprochement with 
Eastern Europe, the Reagan administration for its part clearly favoured 
Kohl's assumption of power in Bonn. Except for Chancellor Schmidt's 
pro-Atlanticist stance, Reagan had never been in favour of the SPD's 
foreign policy and was pleased that with Kohl and Genscher, Bonn's 
commitment to the NATO dual-track decision would be assured. The 
President stated these views in a national press conference in January 
1983, and despite his subsequent efforts to express a more balanced view, 
this did not detract from what amounted to the most serious US 
intervention in a West German election since 1957, when J.F.Dulles had 
suggested that a Socialist government would be a catastrophe.3
For a number of reasons, the Kremlin's reaction to the Christian 
Democrats' assumption of power was much more cautious than 
Washington's. The Russians not only disapproved of the Union's support 
for the deployment of US Pershing missiles but also of the Kohl 
administration's closer ties with the expellee groups and stronger 
tendency to question the legitimacy of Poland's Western border. In the 
Kremlin's eyes, the attitudes of Chancellor Kohl and the Christian 
Democrats now raised for the first time since the 1960s the question 
whether revanchist sentiments were actively supported by the 
government's highest ranking officials.4
Before the Bundestag elections of March 1983, the Soviet Union 
signalled its interest in a Social Democratic government through TASS 
and Novosti. During the final days of the election campaign, the Soviets 
launched an even more intensive media effort to influence West German 
voters, albeit with little effect: for one thing, the Christian-Liberal
2Czempiel, p. 149 Reagan had not renewed the agreements that had expired since his 
assumption of the Presidency.
3Hanhardt, p.226
^Sodaro, p.288; The Times, 16.10.82
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coalition won the elections, and for another thing, Foreign Minister 
Genscher characterized as illusory any Soviet expectations that the 
election results would weaken the Western resolve to deploy US Pershing 
missiles if the Geneva talks failed. However, Moscow adjusted 
surprisingly quickly to the reality of West Germany's new government. 
Immediately after the elections, the Soviet Union extended an invitation 
to Kohl to come to Moscow, and Pravda concluded that Genscher's 
remaining in office was a smaller evil than a pure Union coalition with 
Franz-Josef StrauB as Foreign Minister.5
The FDP's efforts to ensure the continuation of detente
The question remains how the Christian-Liberal coalition reacted to 
its international environment which was not very favourable for the 
promotion of its declared foreign policy priorities. Given Moscow's 
opposition to the deployment of US Pershing missiles and Reagan's 
opposition to cooperation with the Kremlin, the Free Democrats tried to 
make the most use of their limited room for manoeuvre by attaching 
great importance to continued good relations with the Eastern bloc. The 
Christian-Liberal coalition tried to influence overall East-West relations 
via good contacts with Moscow's satellites, which for instance manifested 
itself in Genscher's visits to Prague and Bucharest in 1983.
Most importantly, however, the Free Democrats insisted that Bonn 
continue the Social-Liberal coalition's attempts to act as mediator in the 
face of superpower tensions. When the superpower talks were resumed in 
Geneva on 17 May 1983, Genscher expressed his hope that Moscow 
would now drop its demand for the inclusion of French and British 
nuclear forces in the Western total, thus providing the Geneva talks with 
a new impetus. However, the Soviet deputy Foreign Minister Georgi 
Kornienko quickly dismissed Genscher's suggestions as "what we call in 
Russian wishful thinking."6 During Kohl and Genscher's visit to Moscow 
from 4-7 July 1983, there was no rapprochement either. Although the 
meeting between Kohl and Andropov marked the latter's first encounter
5FAZ, 14.3.83; IHT, 4.2.83
^Genscher cited in IHT, 15.9.83 The Geneva negotiations were further burdened by 
the Soviet downing of a Korean airplane, especially since Moscow insisted that there 
was no connection between the missile talks and the airliner incident.
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with a Western leader and hence indicated West Germany's importance 
for Soviet policy at that time, neither government was prepared for any 
substantial concessions.
In addition to its - rather futile - attempts to mediate between the 
superpowers, the Christian-Liberal coalition (especially the Free 
Democrats) also strongly promoted European efforts to cooperate more 
closely on the issues of detente and demilitarization. During the second 
CSCE Follow-up conference in Madrid, the Federal Republic was the 
first country to suggest how the West could approach the upcoming 
European demilitarization conference in Stockholm, and the FDP 
strongly praised the CSCE's efforts to create additional fora for 
European discussion, apart from the superpower summits in Geneva.7 
Bonn's support for the revival of the Western European Union also 
corresponded to the Free Democrats' call for greater European security 
cooperation. On 12 June 1984, the Foreign Ministers of the Union met 
for the first time since 1973 and agreed on the need to revitalize the 
European section of NATO. Genscher tried to soothe potential American 
worries that Europe might go it alone by pointing out: "It is not a 
question of the US being too strong but of Europe being too weak."8
The FDP's call for joint European efforts to save detente also 
manifested itself in a series of theoretical articles about the future of 
East-West relations that Genscher launched through the Foreign Office 
after 1983. Apart from the Liberals' usual concern with image-building, 
Genscher's initiative should be viewed as a further attempt to contribute 
to improving the East-West climate in a difficult situation. All four 
articles which Genscher published between 1983 and 1984 essentially 
argued that the world was now on the threshold of a second phase of 
East-West relations, after the Ostpolitik treaties had been concluded and 
implemented during the first phase. According to Genscher, East-West 
relations now needed to undergo two major changes: firstly, the East- 
West dialogue must not be reduced to the military aspects but must aim at 
political, economic and social cooperation. Secondly, the Europeans must 
no longer leave the striving for a European peace order to the 
superpowers. Genscher also expressed these views in an interview with 
the Bayerischer Rundfunk:
7b u 11. 79, 21.7.83, MollemamTs speech on the CSCE process in Madrid
^Genscher cited in The Guardian, 13.6.84
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"It is our responsibility to make sure that East-West relations 
will not be reduced to demilitarization negotiations and to the 
relationship Washington/Moscow. We must also shape East- 
West relations from Europe to demonstrate that the Europeans 
accept their responsibility..."9
With the deadline for Bonn's decision about the stationing of US 
missiles in the Federal Republic coming dangerously close, the West 
German government made one last attempt to rescue the Geneva 
negotiations from failure when Genscher and Gromyko met in Vienna on 
15 October 1983. However, after eleven hours of talk, Genscher had to 
acknowledge that "there was nothing forthcoming on either side."10 In 
this situation, it was little surprise that the Kremlin broke off the arms 
control negotiations in Geneva on 23 November 1983 after the Bundestag 
had finally voted for the deployment of US Pershing missiles on German 
territory one day before. In addition, Moscow now interrupted the 
START negotiations about the reduction of strategic weapons. By 1984, 
all East-West military negotiations had been suspended, except for those 
conducted in Stockholm under the auspices of the CSCE. Foreign 
Minister Genscher was among the first and most vocal in pressing the 
Reagan administration to resume the dialogue with the Russians after the 
breakdown of the talks.
The impact of Chernenko's assumption of power on German Ostpolitik
It has been shown that until Yuri Andropov's death in February 
1984, the Christian-Liberal coalition had managed to shelter German- 
Soviet relations somewhat from the Second Cold War between the 
superpowers. Although Bonn's room for manoeuvre had been limited 
both by the Reagan administration's anti-Soviet course and by Moscow's 
objections to the deployment of US Pershing missiles, the Germans had at 
least maintained their role as the Kremlin's special partner in Western 
Europe. When Konstantin Chernenko became leader of the Soviet Union 
in 1984, this situation changed, and while the superpower relations now
9BR, 9.2.85, Interview with H.D.Genscher For Genscher's articles, see Bull. 133, 
6.12.83, fdk 282, 28.12.83, Bull.44, 14.4.84, Bull.92, 9.8.84
^Genscher cited in IHT, 17.10.83
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began to improve, German-Soviet relations deteriorated. It is to these 
adverse developments and the causes behind them that we shall turn next.
When Chernenko became the Soviet General Secretary on 13 
February, observers noted his espousal of detente and his reluctance to 
reiterate Andropov's conditions for resuming the Geneva arms talks. The 
Soviet Union by then had to acknowledge that its attempt to pursue a 
limited detente simultaneously with a strenuous arms build-up in the end 
had only resulted in driving the Western allies, particularly the 
Americans and the West Germans, closer together. Similarly, by 1984, 
President Reagan had begun to change his foreign policy course towards 
Moscow, and although Reagan held on to his long-term goal of defeating 
the Soviet Union, in 1984, the US administration dropped its former 
aversion to dialogue with Moscow. New Foreign Minister George Shultz 
embodied the conviction that if US-Soviet cooperation was in 
Washington's interest, there was no reason to sacrifice US interests solely 
to punish the Soviet Union.11
Even though Moscow cancelled its participation in the Olympic 
games in Los Angeles in 1984, Chernenko generally responded positively 
to Washington's greater openness. Reagan now for the first time in four 
years received Gromyko, and on 22 November 1984, Reagan and 
Chernenko announced that they were ready to resume arms control talks 
about nuclear missiles. This announcement was based on a compromise 
on both sides, as Washington had agreed to treat SDI as negotiable, and 
the Kremlin had renounced its requests that the United States completely 
withdraw its intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe and cancel 
the SDI project. As Genscher pointed out, the Western Europeans 
strongly approved of these signs of superpower rapprochement.12
Yet while Chernenko's assumption of power thus coincided with a 
renewed readiness for dialogue on the two superpowers' behalf, German- 
Soviet relations took off in the opposite direction. Five days before 
Genscher's visit to Moscow from 20-22 May 1984, Moscow started a 
massive campaign against the Federal Republic, accusing West Germany 
of "revanchist" tendencies, in other words of attempting to regain former 
German territories which had become Polish after the Second World 
War. This sudden reversal of the Kremlin's German policy can be
1 ICzempiel, p.245; Sodaro, p.315; The Times, 25.5.84
12DFS, 25.9.84, Interview with H.D.Genscher
172
explained by four reasons. Firstly, Moscow probably hoped that the 
revival of old German enemy images would help to justify Soviet 
hegemony over Eastern Europe and inhibit any attempts at an 
independent East-West dialogue in Central Europe.13 Secondly, Moscow's 
campaign also reflected an attempt to cope with a disintegrating 
leadership situation, as the aged Chernenko conveyed a fairly weak image 
to the outside world.
Thirdly, Soviet officials cited Bonn's security policies as the main 
factor preventing closer relations. The Kremlin still strongly disapproved 
of the Christian-Liberal coalition's 1983 decision to allow the deployment 
of US Pershing missiles on German territory. Fourthly, and most 
annoying from the FDP's point of view, the Soviet Union's campaign 
should be seen as a delayed reaction to the somewhat different emphasis 
placed on German policy and Ostpolitik by the Kohl government. 
Moscow was annoyed that the Christian Democrats asserted much more 
frequently than the Social-Liberal coalition their view that the German 
question and the issue of the Oder-Neisse border were still open. The 
Soviet media now harshly criticized the "militaristic and jingoistic 
tendencies" of the new West German government, and Genscher's attempt 
to convince the Soviets during his visit that Bonn nurtured no revanchist 
tendencies was not very successful.14
Although the substance of German-Soviet relations was not affected 
by Moscow's revanchism campaign, as for instance was evident in 
Genscher's frequent encounters with Gromyko and the continued 
development of economic and cultural relations, West Germany still lost 
its role as special partner of the Soviet Union which it had had since the 
Moscow Treaty in 1970. Despite Bonn's clear interest in further 
improving relations with Moscow, the Kremlin now made a point of 
keeping the Federal Republic at arms length and gave preference to 
relations with Britain and France.
Until the mid-1980s, the Free Democrats' objective of continuing 
German Ostpolitik despite their change of coalition partner was thus 
greatly constrained by (1) the incompatibility of this goal with the
l 3Pittman, p. 157; Sodaro, p.309 Moscow's desire for a reassertion of its hegemony
over the Communist bloc was linked to the fact that several Warsaw Pact states had
revolted against the Soviet Union's confrontational course after its walk-out of the INF
talks in Geneva.
^Frankfurter Neue Presse, 21.5.84; The Times, 22.5.84
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respective leadership's priorities in the White House and the Kremlin and 
(2) by the fact that the Eastern European countries still harboured much 
greater suspicion towards the Christian Democrats than towards the SPD, 
which was reinforced by the Union's greater tendency to question the 
finality of certain issues, i.e. the Oder-Neisse border. While in some 
cases, such as Moscow's revanchism campaign, the above two factors 
indeed rendered it difficult for the Free Democrats to guarantee the 
continuity of Ostpolitik, the FDP nevertheless attempted to save detente 
by continuing Bonn's mediating efforts between the superpowers, by 
promoting European efforts to cooperate more closely on the issue of 
detente, and by launching a series of articles about the future of East- 
West relations through the Foreign Office.
The FDP's room for manoeuvre in German policy
Just as the Free Democrats tried to shelter the Federal Republic's 
relations with the Soviet Union from the effects of the Second Cold War, 
the Christian-Liberal coalition also aimed at sustaining inner-German 
rapprochement after the 'Wende' in Bonn. This section will examine to 
what degree the new West German government was able to keep up a 
constructive dialogue with the GDR after 1982 despite the bad 
superpower climate. It will be shown that a number of factors favourably 
influenced the FDP's efforts for continued inner-German rapprochement 
until well into the mid-1980s.
To begin with, the Free Democrats benefited from both Moscow's 
and East Berlin's approval of keeping inner-German cooperation going 
after Kohl's election in 1983. Not only had the new Soviet leader 
Andropov signalled his support for a policy of dialogue between the two 
German states, but East Berlin also strongly welcomed Kohl's assurances 
that Deutschlandpolitik would be continued, although the GDR remained 
somewhat suspicious of the Conservatives' greater emphasis on the 
reunification imperative.15 By 1983, it had also become clear that 
Honecker was tilting towards peace politics and constructive inner- 
German relations, largely because East Germany did not want to lose the
15Zimmer, p. 144
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greater room for manoeuvre in foreign policy it had gained with the help 
of detente in the 1970s.
This shared West- and East German desire to shelter their relations 
from the superpower conflict soothed the potentially harmful effects of 
the stationing of US Pershing missiles in West Germany after 1983. 
Although East Berlin had employed massive propaganda to prevent such 
deployment before the Bundestag's final vote (i.e. by warning of a "new 
ice age" in inner-German relations), once the actual decision had been 
taken, East Germany's criticism focused much more on the United States 
than on Bonn. Even as the Soviets moved their short- and medium-range 
missiles into East Germany and Czechoslovakia to counter NATO 
deployment, Honecker called for limiting the damage as much as possible. 
Instead of causing an inner-German crisis, the Federal Republic's firm 
stance on deployment had driven a wedge between East Berlin and 
Moscow for the first time in thirty-five years.16 Similarly to its 
reluctance to let West Germany's 1983 deployment decision affect inner- 
German cooperation, East Berlin's reaction to Bonn's 1985 decision to 
support the research on SDI was also reticent, and the GDR above all 
emphasized its continued interest in detente.
Apart from Honecker's interest in maintaining inner-German 
dialogue, the Free Democrats also profited from the Union's readiness to 
continue the Social-Liberal coalition's practice of using positive economic 
leverage in return for East German political concessions. West 
Germany's DM 1 billion loan to the GDR of July 1983, for instance, 
underlined the new government's determination to continue its 
predecessor's German policy by the facts that (1) the credit been 
negotiated by Franz-Josef StrauB, traditionally one of the fiercest 
opponents to economic support for the GDR, and (2) the deal was 
announced without the specific concessions that the CSU had customarily 
demanded from East Germany. Although the GDR's counterconcessions 
on the whole stayed behind Bonn's expectations, East Germany did 
eventually ease conditions along the border by dismantling some obsolete 
security devices and by exempting youngsters under the age of fourteen 
from the minimum exchange rate.
When in July 1984, a group of West German banks concluded a 
second major credit agreement with the GDR, East Berlin reciprocated
l^Pond, Bevond The Wall, p.30
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with more significant concessions to Bonn. The German Democratic 
Republic now announced several measures designed to ease travel to East 
Germany and drastically increased the number of East German citizens 
permitted to emigrate to the Federal Republic. By the end of 1984, nearly 
35.000 East Germans had moved to West Germany legally, a substantial 
rise over the previous year's figure of little more than 7.700.17 Early in 
the year, East Germany had also granted the right to emigrate to a group 
of East German citizens who had camped at the Federal Republic's 
mission in East Berlin and the US embassy in Prague.
Although the second West German loan to East Berlin promoted 
inner-German relations, it was by no means perceived positively by the 
superpowers. The US administration criticized that Bonn's credits to the 
GDR equalled strategic support for the Soviet Union and might harm 
West Germany's commitment to the trans-Atlantic alliance.18 Similarly, 
Moscow now made East Germany into a side target in its revanchism 
campaign, for fear that East Berlin was growing too independent with 
West German help. Thus, by mid-1984, neither Genscher's remark that 
"constructive relations" between the two German states were "beneficial 
to all and burden(ed) no one," nor the GDR's insistence that all members 
of the Socialist community had the right to maintain "normal economic 
relations" with the OECD countries could hide the fact that the inner- 
German room for manoeuvre ultimately continued to be significantly 
restricted by the two superpowers.19 This was further highlighted when 
Honecker cancelled his proposed visit to Bonn in the autumn of 1984. 
Even though Honecker may have had reasons of his own for delaying the 
trip (i.e. some controversial Union rhetoric), in the last analysis it was 
the Kremlin leadership which blocked Honecker's trip to Bonn at this 
time.20
After Mikhail Gorbachev's assumption of power in the Kremlin in 
1985, however, the FDP's chances for progress in Deutschlandpolitik 
increased greatly. Inner-German cooperation was now again favourably
i^Sodaro, p.308
i^Moreton, p. 13
l^Genscher cited in The Guardian, 7.8.84; Plock, East-German-West-German 
Relations, p.47
20pond, Beyond the Wall, p.32
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influenced by the superpower climate, as Washington and Moscow had 
meanwhile returned to a course of global detente policy. This was most 
apparent in the realization of Erich Honecker's long-outstanding visit to 
the Federal Republic in September 1987. After the General Secretary's 
planned visits to Bonn had already failed twice in this decade, 1987 
seemed to be a good time, with both the inner-German and the 
superpower climate evolving in a positive direction. An Emnid opinion 
poll even showed that 54% of the German population explicitly welcomed 
Honecker's visit.21 Honecker's trip to West Germany was remarkable, 
since the playing of East Berlin's national anthem and the flying of the 
East German flag seemed to constitute the final step in Bonn's recognition 
of the smaller German state.
Such service made the customary West German protocol, i.e. the 
fact that the East German Foreign Minister was not received by Genscher 
but by the Inner-German Minister Dorothee Wilms seem like a 
diplomatic facade.22 Many observers interpreted the fact that Honecker 
was received like any other internationally respected statesman as the 
GDR's true 'coming of age' concerning its international recognition. In 
terms of concrete results, the Kohl-Honecker encounter brought the 
signing of a new science and technology agreement, an agreement on 
environmental cooperation and a commitment to accelerate collaboration 
in energy transfers and tourism.
The renewed stimulus in inner-German relations also manifested 
itself in Bonn's raise of the swing credit to East Germany from DM 600 
million to DM 850 million for the time period 1986-90, thereby 
reversing the lowering of the swing which had been effected by the 
Social-Liberal coalition in response to the GDR's increase of the 
minimum exchange rate in 1980. The German Democratic Republic 
reciprocated by relaxing its attitude on city partnerships between West 
and East German cities, abolishing the death penalty and greatly 
facilitating inner-German travel.23
2lDer Spiegel, 31.8.87
22piock, East-German-West-German Relations, p.84
23zimmer, p.213 Between 1985 and 1987, the number of pensionaries visiting West 
Germany increased from 1.6 million to 3.8 million, and the number of people travelling 
for "family affairs" rose from 66.000 in 1985 to 1.2 million in 1987.
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In assessing the success of the FDP's efforts for continued inner- 
German cooperation after the change of power in Bonn, it should thus be 
stressed that, on the one hand, the two German states' room for 
manoeuvre ultimately continued to be determined by the superpower 
climate. On the other hand, for much of the 1980s, the Free Democrats 
benefited from the GDR's continued readiness for constructive inner- 
German relations and from the Union's willingness to continue the 
Social-Liberal coalition's practice of utilizing positive economic leverage 
in inner-German relations.
Gorbachev’s assumption of power and progress in arms 
control
After Chernenko died on 10 March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev 
assumed power in the Soviet Union the next day. Although at age fifty- 
four, Gorbachev was the youngest head of the Kremlin in Soviet history, 
for approximately the first two years after his assumption of power, 
Soviet foreign policy was characterized primarily by its caution. While 
Gorbachev moved quickly to assume dialogue with the leaders of the 
Western community and had met Reagan, Thatcher and Mitterrand by 
1986, he refused to invite Kohl to Moscow. This section will examine (1) 
the effects on the FDP's room for manoeuvre in foreign policy both of 
Gorbachev's cautious foreign policy during his first two years in office 
and of the stunning progress in arms control from the mid-1980s 
onwards and (2) the FDP's reaction to the new Soviet leader.
The impact o f the new Soviet leadership on the FDP's Ostpolitik
Gorbachev's decision to continue Chernenko's policy of ignoring 
the Kohl/Genscher government can be attributed to essentially three 
reasons: firstly, the Soviet Union was then still trying to punish West 
Germany for its role in the INF crisis, and Gorbachev explicitly linked 
Moscow's future relations with Bonn to the Federal Republic's "good 
conduct" in matters of security policy. Secondly, the Kremlin's 
predominant concern with stopping SDI during Gorbachev's first two 
years in office further complicated its relations with Bonn, and thirdly, 
the Western debate over the sincerity of Gorbachev's reform efforts,
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which extended to the West German government, also strained German- 
Soviet relations.
Apart from Moscow's continued desire to punish the Federal 
Republic for its role in the INF controversy, German-Soviet relations 
after 1985 were burdened by the fact that Gorbachev's main security- 
political priority in 1985 and 1986 was stopping SDI, and that the 
Kremlin showed no readiness to compromise on the issue of 
intermediate-range missiles before Washington had renounced its SDI 
plans.24 Moscow's concern with stopping SDI also complicated its 
relations with Bonn, as the new Soviet administration spent much of 1985 
and 1986 trying to pressurize the West German government into 
rejecting any West German participation in the US project. Gorbachev 
mentioned the issue in his first letter to Kohl, and during Genscher's trip 
to Moscow in March 1985, Gromyko told him that, in the Kremlin's 
eyes, any West German support for US space weapons would make Bonn 
"an accomplice in torpedoing the whole process of limiting and reducing 
nuclear weapons..."25 The Soviets also actively promoted resistance to 
SDI within Germany by inviting leading Social Democrats (e.g. Willy 
Brandt, Egon Bahr and Oskar Lafontaine) to Moscow, while equally 
discouraging visits by Conservative members of the West German 
government.
Moscow's attempts to influence the Federal Republic's decision 
turned out to be rather ineffective, however. Bonn's final decision on SDI 
in December 1985 provided for a West German agreement with 
Washington that would permit German firms to take part in the SDI 
research. The main restriction to West German participation in SDI, 
namely the prevention of a governmental agreement between Washington 
and Bonn - which would have been much more binding - had been 
effected by the Free Democrats. The Foreign Ministry under Genscher 
had argued against governmental support for the research on SDI because 
it considered the potential damage to Ostpolitik to be higher than the 
possible risk of falling behind in technological innovation. Furthermore, 
in line with his earlier call for a revival of European efforts at foreign- 
political cooperation, Genscher had eagerly taken up France's suggestion 
to react to SDI by founding 'Eureka,' a programme geared towards
24sodaro, p.323
2^The Times, 5.4.85; Sodaro, pp.345-346
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promoting pan-European high technological activity, in an attempt to 
ensure that Europe would not leave the lead in high technology to the 
United States.26
The FDP's (Genscher's) reaction to the new Soviet leader
In addition to the SDI debate, German-Soviet relations in 1985 and 
1986 were affected by the Western debate about the sincerity of 
Gorbachev's proposals for substantial domestic and foreign-political 
reform. Gorbachev had already demonstrated during the SDI debate that 
under his leadership, the Kremlin's former striving for military 
superiority would be replaced by the objectives of economic, social and 
political reform at home. The Western reactions to the Soviet Union's 
new foreign policy differed widely. While many members of the Western 
community found it difficult to believe in Moscow's new foreign policy, 
others, most notably Hans-Dietrich Genscher, pleaded for taking 
Gorbachev seriously as early as 1986.
Those Western statesmen who found it difficult to believe in 
Moscow's peaceful intentions argued that Gorbachev's call for reform, 
arms control and cooperation with the West was mere propaganda. In 
their view, Gorbachev was only taking a break to let the Soviet economy 
recover and then wanted to return to the Soviet Union's old hegemonial 
efforts. The best way to counter the Communist threat remained a policy 
of strength. In contrast with such Western views of Gorbachev's politics 
as bluff, held by a majority of the US and British administrations and 
many German Christian Democrats, Genscher signalled early on that he 
believed in the sincerity of Gorbachev's proposals. According to the 
Foreign Minister, Gorbachev had truly recognized that the Soviet Union 
could only survive by undertaking substantial reforms:
"Gorbachev has recognized: modernization of the economy is 
not possible without modernizing and opening up society as 
well, both internally and externally."27
26iHT, 13.12.85; Der Spiegel, 4.11.85 "Eureka" was founded on 17 July 1985 at a 
conference in Paris.
27b u 11.13, 4.2.87, Genscher's speech before the World Economic Forum in Davos 
on 1.2.87
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Just as the two views differed in their trust of Gorbachev's 
intentions, their suggestions for dealing with the new Soviet leader also 
diverged. Those Western statesmen who were suspicious of Gorbachev 
maintained that Western economic aid to the Soviet Union would only 
make sense after the Kremlin had undertaken the necessary domestic 
restructuring. Genscher and his supporters, in contrast, argued, that the 
West should support Moscow's reform efforts now since it could only 
benefit from Soviet aspirations at reform and cooperation. The West 
German Foreign Minister pleaded: "Let us not sit back idly and wait for 
Mr. Gorbachev to deliver...Let us rather try to influence, expedite and 
shape developments from our end."28 Similarly, the Free Democrats tried 
to refute Western complaints that Germany's efforts to form a bridge 
between East and West were incompatible with a full commitment to 
NATO, by pointing out that it was the Soviet Union, and not Germany, 
which had started the process of substantial rapprochement29
The fact that the Western debate about Gorbachev's sincerity 
extended to the West German government did not aid Soviet-German 
relations. As a reaction to some Christian Democrats' open doubts about 
Moscow's intentions, the Kremlin started to distinguish between its 
behaviour towards Genscher and that towards Kohl. Chancellor Kohl's 
interview with Newsweek in October 1986, in which he compared 
Gorbachev's public relations abilities to those of Nazi propaganda 
minister Josef Goebbels, further strained the Union's relations with 
Moscow. As a result, the Kremlin cancelled any German-Soviet 
encounters before the West German elections of 1987, and Kohl was not 
invited to Moscow before October 1988, two years after the interview. In 
contrast, Pravda reacted favourably to Genscher's speech in Davos and 
praised the German Foreign Minister as a "pioneer of detente" the next 
day.30
28b u 11.13, 4.2.87, Genscher's speech before the World Economic Forum in Davos 
on 1.2.87; IHT, 13.6.88
20Adam-Schwaetzer cited in Die Welt, 31.3.89
30Newsweek, 27.10.86; Pittman, p. 158; FAZ, 2.2.87
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The positive interaction between the progress in arms control and the 
FDP's foreign policy
Given Western doubts about Moscow's leadership and the 
Kremlin's chilled relations with parts of the West German government, 
on the surface, the chances for rapprochement between the superpowers 
did not seem great when they resumed their arms control negotiations on 
12 March 1985 in Geneva. Nevertheless, both superpowers had 
meanwhile begun a major process of rethinking, which was to show its 
full effect by December 1987 when the INF treaty, the biggest 
disarmament agreement in post-World War II history, was signed. As 
previously mentioned, the Reagan administration had demonstrated a 
much greater readiness for constructive dialogue with the 'evil empire' 
from 1984 onwards and continued this approach after the Geneva 
summit.31
Concerning the Kremlin's readiness for superpower cooperation, 
Gorbachev's new approach manifested itself in a series of concrete Soviet 
arms control proposals, which was for instance apparent during the US- 
Soviet summit in Reykjavik from 11-12 October 1986. Although no 
political facts were created in Reykjavik, the superpowers factually 
agreed on the deconstruction of medium-range missiles in Europe as well 
as on the division of strategic offensive missiles in Europe by half. 
Gorbachev described the encounter as a "breakthrough," although he did 
not hide his disappointment about Reagan's obduracy on SDI.32 Despite 
the pressure most West Europeans had put on Washington to move ahead 
with arms control, the reports from Reykjavik left the NATO 
establishment quite ruffled in the end. If taken seriously, the agreements 
in Reykjavik would require remaking NATO's strategy of flexible 
response, on which the alliance had operated for forty years.33 In 
agreement with its West European partners, the Federal Republic now 
argued against the decoupling of nuclear and conventional arms control.
Those Western observers who had been surprised by Gorbachev's 
concessions in Reykjavik, were to be even more astounded when the
31 The UK government had also taken a pro-active approach towards Eastern Europe 
from 1983 onwards, to some extent preparing the ground for the United States.
32Sodaro, p.327
33Bell, p.68
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Soviet leader gradually dropped any remaining preconditions in the way 
of an INF agreement. In February 1987, Moscow announced that 
Washington's renunciation of SDI was no longer a prerequisite for the 
INF accord, and a few months later, the Kremlin also dropped its initial 
opposition to the inclusion of the shorter-range missiles in the 
negotiations.34 Since the Kremlin's concessions had removed the last 
obstacles in the way of an INF agreement, Reagan and Gorbachev 
actually signed the treaty on 8 December 1987.
Although the East-West climate generally benefited from the INF 
accord, the effect of Gorbachev's 1987 suggestions on the West German 
government was much more ambiguous. Both for domestic and alliance- 
political reasons, Chancellor Kohl now faced a substantial dilemma. 
While many Christian Democrats feared that the complete scrapping of 
INF missiles would leave Germany too vulnerable to a potential 
conventional Soviet attack, the Free Democrats and public opinion 
strongly favoured a zero solution. Genscher argued that it would be 
"downright absurd" if the West did not use this "historical" chance for 
progress.35 In addition to such domestic opposition, Kohl also faced 
pressure from his Western allies who urged the Federal Republic to 
support the INF treaty.
After the signing of the INF accord in December 1987, the Free 
Democrats continued to benefit from the positive development of East- 
West relations, which now turned to the issue of conventional 
disarmament at the CSCE conference in Vienna. In 1988, it was agreed 
that the futile MBFR talks would henceforth be replaced by negotiations 
between representatives of the two alliances in Vienna. By the summer of 
1988, the West German government, and Foreign Minister Genscher in 
particular, had also embarked on a diplomatic initiative, seeking to ensure 
that East-West negotiations on conventional forces in Europe would be 
launched as soon as possible.36 Consequently, the FDP was very pleased 
when the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) talks not only started in
34sodaro, pp.328-329 Note that there was some substantial opposition in the Soviet 
Union to INF on the grounds that the treaty would require the Soviets to destroy twice
as many missiles as the United States.
35ZDF, 8.3.87, Interview with H.D.Genscher; Bull.94, 26.9.87, Genscher's 
speech before the 42nd General Assembly of the United Nations in New York on 
24.9.87
36The Guardian, 29.7.88
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March 1989 in Vienna but also made rapid progress, largely due to 
Moscow's continued readiness for cooperation and due to the pressure on 
Washington to reciprocate the Soviet concessions.37
In addition to Genscher's initiative regarding conventional 
disarmament, the Free Democrats attempted to contribute to further arms 
control by assuming a firm position on the issue of NATO's 
modernization of short-range nuclear forces. In contrast to most 
Christian Democrats and the US and British governments, which firmly 
backed the modernizing of NATO's short-range nuclear forces, the Free 
Democrats actively supported Gorbachev's offer to dismantle all nuclear 
missiles and openly doubted the wisdom of supporting US plans to 
introduce a new generation of short-range nuclear missiles in the mid- 
1990s.38 Under considerable domestic pressure from his coalition partner 
and public opinion, Chancellor Kohl announced in February 1989 that his 
government would postpone a decision about modernization until 1991 or 
1992. Kohl's statement caused substantial apprehension in the United 
States and Britain, as the Bush and Thatcher governments feared Bonn's 
abandonment of a common NATO position on nuclear modernization. 
The United States was annoyed that the same West German government 
which had called for close cooperation with Washington in 1982, now 
refused to cooperate on the modernization of short-range nuclear 
missiles.
Finally, during the NATO summit in Brussels from 29-30 May 
1989, American and West German negotiators resolved their differences. 
By then, Bush was under strong pressure to counter perceptions that 
Gorbachev was more interested in arms control than the US President, a 
view which was even reflected in West German public opinion polls. In 
Brussels, President Bush agreed to postpone the decision about the 
modernization of NATO's Lance missiles until 1992, when the issue 
should be reexamined "in the light of the overall security-political 
developments."39 Meanwhile, Washington skilfully linked the talks about
37Mastny, The Helsinki process and reintegration of Europe, p.20
3^Sodaro, p.358 Note (1) that the Social Democrats largely agreed with the FDP's 
view and (2) that even some conservative elements in the CDU/CSU were backing 
away from modernizing nuclear weapons, in part because their limited range would 
confine a nuclear engagement to areas populated by Germans.
39Staack, p.281; Der Spiegel, 5.6.89
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reducing short-range nuclear missiles to the success of the Vienna talks. 
While Bonn would have preferred immediate negotiations, the Federal 
Republic agreed to wait until after an accord on conventional arms 
reduction had been worked out in the CFE framework.
Overall, this section has demonstrated that despite Gorbachev's 
cautious approach towards Bonn during his first two years in office, the 
Free Democrats, and Foreign Minister Genscher in particular, quickly 
signalled their support for the new Soviet leader. It has also been shown
(1) that the FDP greatly profited from the major reversal in the 
superpowers' foreign policy from about 1986 onwards and from the 
resulting revolutionary arms control agreements, and (2) that the Free 
Democrats somewhat contributed to the progress in arms control 
themselves, for instance with their firm opposition to the modernization 
of NATO's short-range nuclear missiles in 1989. While this section has 
focused on the security-political aspects of East-West relations, the next 
will examine the impact of Gorbachev's arrival in power on German- 
Soviet economic cooperation, Berlin's status, progress in humanitarian 
issues and on inner-German relations.
The implications of glasnost and perestroika for the FDP’s 
Ostpolitik
Economic and technological cooperation
In line with the generally reticent character of German-Soviet 
relations during 1985 and 1986, economic ties between the two countries 
initially also languished. While West German imports from the USSR had 
reached a peak of DM 14.4 billion in 1984, they had fallen to 9.3 billion 
in 1986. German exports to the Soviet Union also dropped by about DM 
1.4 billion during these two years.40 Significantly, however, the Kremlin 
never contemplated a more serious rupture of its economic relations with 
West Germany, most likely because Moscow was aware of Bonn's central 
role for good Soviet relations with Western Europe. Given this awareness 
and the growing likelihood of the Christian-Liberal coalition's re-election
40Sodaro, p.344
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in the 1987 Bundestag elections, Moscow started to readjust its politics 
towards the Federal Republic from 1986 onwards.
As a first step of German-Soviet rapprochement, the Kremlin 
invited Foreign Minister Genscher to Moscow from 20-22 July 1986. 
Concerning this visit, Bonn attached much greater importance to 
Moscow's readiness to receive Genscher than to the actual substance of 
the talks conducted. Although Genscher and Gorbachev signed an 
agreement of scientific and technological cooperation during Genscher's 
stay, in Bonn's view, the most important outcome of the visit was the two 
statesmen's agreement that they had opened "a new page of East-West 
re la tions."41 This optimistic spirit was confirmed when during 
Shevardnadze's visit to Bonn in January 1988, the two Foreign Ministers 
extended the German-Soviet agreement on economic and industrial 
cooperation of May 1978 by another five years.
According to Gorbachev, the ice between the Federal Republic and 
Moscow was finally broken during Kohl's long-expected visit to the 
Soviet Union in October 1988. Apart from a number of 
intergovernmental agreements on issues such as agricultural and cultural 
cooperation, German-Soviet economic relations now again got a major 
boost, as more than seventy German businessmen accompanied Kohl to 
Moscow. Even on the first day, sixteen agreements were signed, and a 
consortium of West German banks also agreed to extend a DM 3 billion 
credit to the Soviet Union.42 The improved climate between Moscow and 
Bonn was again apparent about a year later, when, in June 1989, 
Gorbachev visited West Germany - the first Soviet leader to do so since 
Brezhnev's visit in 1981. During Gorbachev's stay, the two sides issued a 
six-page joint declaration which covered a wide range of areas such as 
economic and environmental cooperation, human rights and 
disarmament.
Apart from such concrete progress in German-Soviet cooperation, 
Foreign Minister Genscher now also started to appeal for generally 
greater economic cooperation between East and West. In line with his 
conviction that Gorbachev's reform efforts ought to be supported by the 
West, Genscher called for Western economic aid to the Communist bloc 
during the World Economic summit in Paris in July 1989. Two months
4 lStaack, p.277; Pittman, p. 158
42sodaro, p.356
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later, the German Foreign Minister introduced the so-called 'Europa- 
plan,' based on the idea of providing planned international aid for the 
emerging democracies in the Soviet bloc.43 Since Gorbachev was also 
aware that without greater Eastern European integration into the world 
economy, there could be no economic reform at home, Moscow formally 
established relations with the European Economic Community in June 
1988 and even urged its Communist partners to open their own 
economies to greater cooperation with the Common Market.
While both Bonn and Moscow were generally pleased about the 
degree of economic and technological cooperation they had achieved in 
the middle- to late 1980s, many members of the US administration were 
by far less enthusiastic about such close Soviet-German cooperation. 
During Genscher's visit to Washington in January 1988, much of the 
debate centered on the question of whether concluding economic and 
technological deals with Moscow gave Western Europe greater security 
or whether it enabled the Russians to move closer to their long-term aim 
of dominating the continent. In contrast to Bonn, which called for a 
conference on East-West economic and technological cooperation, the 
Reagan administration was conducting a major campaign against what it 
perceived as the uncontrolled transfer of Western technological secrets to 
the armed forces of the Soviet Union 44
Similarly, the United States also called for generally stricter 
control over exports to Moscow, whereas Genscher argued for a 
liberalization of the Cocom regulations. Acting as spokesman for the 
West German government, the Foreign Minister argued that the export 
controls were a product of the Cold War and needed to be adapted to the 
new spirit of cooperation:
"These restrictions need to be rethought and reduced to what is 
really necessary...It is, after all, in the European and the 
Western interest to overcome the economic and technological 
division in Europe as a whole..."45
4^DLF, 17.7.89, Interview with H.D.Genscher
44The Times, 25.1.88; Wirtschaftswoche, 29.1.88
45Genscher cited in The Guardian, 21.1.88
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Eventually, Bonn and Washington achieved a solution that allowed both 
sides to save face. Along Bonn's lines, the export restrictions would 
henceforth only apply to technology used for arms production, and along 
Washington's lines, those remaining export restrictions would be very 
strictly enforced.
Berlin
Despite the international and bilateral problems in German-Soviet 
relations after 1982, one area that remained relatively unaffected by these 
problems was the Berlin question. However, there was also no progress 
either until July 1986 when, during Genscher's visit to Moscow, the 
German-Soviet agreement on scientific and technological cooperation was 
finally signed. As mentioned in Chapter Three, this agreement had 
existed since 1978, but had not been signed previously because of the 
Soviet Union's refusal to guarantee West-Berlin's inclusion. Given the 
FDP's traditional efforts to improve West Berlin's status, the Free 
Democrats highly approved of such progress. In the autumn of 1987, 
expert talks were held with the aim of enabling West Berlin to be 
included in further agreements. One month before Chancellor Kohl's 
visit to Moscow in 1988, Genscher and Shevardnadze signed an 
agreement on environmental protection and cultural cooperation, which 
fully included West Berlin.46
Humanitarian issues
East-West communication on humanitarian issues after Gorbachev's 
assumption of power greatly resembled the East-West dialogue on all 
other questions. Initially, there was little progress, either at the CSCE 
expert meeting about human rights in May 1985 in Ottawa, or concerning 
the figures of ethnic Germans allowed to emigrate from the Soviet 
Union, whose number dropped by about half between 1983 and 1986. 
However, from about 1986 onwards, Gorbachev's concessions in the 
humanitarian field, which directly related to his overall programme for 
political and economic reform, led to significant progress in
46pittman, p. 154; SR, 28.7.88, Interview with H.D.Genscher Note, however, that 
the Berlin agreement was accompanied by a Soviet rebuff to a US request to expand 
airline traffic to Berlin.
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humanitarian issues. Even if the Western debate about Gorbachev's 
sincerity also extended to 'glasnost,' the Soviet concessions put pressure 
on the Western doubters, if not to reciprocate, at least to acknowledge the 
Soviet efforts. The Free Democrats, for their part, greatly appreciated 
Moscow's humanitarian concessions, not only for reasons of principle, 
but also because Gorbachev's actions favourably reinforced Foreign 
Minister Genscher's early support for the Soviet leader.
Gorbachev's sincerity concerning greater East-West cooperation 
was for instance apparent during the Communist party congress in 1986, 
when the General Secretary declared his wish to break down the military 
blocs and to create a Common European Home. Two years later, in his 
December 1988 speech before the UN General assembly, Gorbachev 
announced Moscow's departure from the Brezhnev doctrine, which had 
postulated the Kremlin's right to interfere in the other Eastern European 
countries for the sake of "restoring" their domestic stability. From now 
on, the Soviet Union would respect the principle of free elections "...to 
which there shall be no exceptions."47 By the end of the CSCE conference 
in Vienna from November 1986 until January 1989, the Soviet Union had 
also terminated all jamming of Western broadcasts in Eastern Europe. 
This was the largest opening of the closed Eastern European societies to 
date, and the chances for a convergence between East and West improved 
even further when Washington in return agreed to the Kremlin's earlier 
controversial suggestion of holding a human rights conference in Moscow 
in 1991 48
German-Soviet cooperation on humanitarian issues was also in line 
with the general East-West dialogue. While the number of ethnic 
emigrants from the Soviet Union had continuously declined until 1986, in 
1987, the situation improved greatly. For one thing, from January 1987 
onwards, applications by ethnic Germans were subject to a new 
regulation, and for another thing, President von Weizsacker's visit to 
Moscow in July 1987 (as the first Bundesprasident to go for thirteen 
years) also resulted in improving the emigration numbers. During von 
Weizsacker's visit, Gorbachev also addressed the touchy issue of the
47Hacker, p.22
48Mastny, The Helsinki process and reintegration of Europe, pp. 16-22 Moscow 
continued to stick to its course of neutrality during the 1989 CSCE human rights 
conferences in in London and Paris, during which the clashes among the Eastern 
European states came to the fore even more strongly.
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Union's position on German reunification, telling the Bundesprasident 
that statements suggesting the German question was still open raised 
doubts about the Federal Republic's adherence to the Soviet-West German 
treaty of 1970. Despite his request for proceeding from the existing 
realities, Gorbachev also made the much more encouraging statement: 
"...Today two German states are a reality...May history decide what will 
happen in a hundred years."49 This leads to the question which will be 
addressed next, namely how the improved superpower climate and 
Gorbachev's reforms affected the FDP's desire for continued progress in 
inner-German relations in the later half of the 1980s.
Inner-German relations in the later half of the 1980s
As shown earlier, Honecker's 1987 visit to Bonn had been the 
highlight of the two German states' close cooperation since the early 
1980s. However, for the time being, Honecker's visit marked the end of 
the two Germanies' joint striving for rapprochement since afterwards, 
the SED's resistance to continued reform no longer permitted such inner- 
German cooperation. Much to Bonn's dismay, Honecker rejected the idea 
of following Gorbachev's policy of perestroika, denying any need for 
reform and reconstruction in East Germany and attributing Soviet 
attempts at perestroika to the Soviet Union's less advanced state of 
development. Due to its bordering on West Germany and its identity 
problem, East Germany also resisted the implementation of glasnost, as 
the German Democratic Republic feared that any questioning of the past 
and more openness would pose a vital threat to its existence.50 Bonn's 
policy towards East Germany after 1987, in contrast, remained 
characterized by the attempt gradually to improve inner-German 
relations with small steps. From the Free Democrats' point of view, both 
the fact that a solution to the German question presently seemed out of 
reach and the hope that Honecker's successor would allow for greater
^Gorbachev cited in Die Zeit, 11.9.87; Pittman, p. 153 German-Soviet relations 
further benefited from the Kremlin' release of Matthias Rust after Genscher's trip to 
Moscow in the autumn of 1988 and from Moscow's suggestion to establish a special
German-Soviet trade zone in Kaliningrad, which was, however, prevented by the 
opposition of the Russian population in the Volga area.
50Pittman, p. 155
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inner-German progress, called for the continuation of a policy of small 
steps.51
From 1987 onwards, the futility of West Germany's hopes for 
further progress became apparent through East Berlin's rigorous 
procedure against dissidents. On occasion of the 69th anniversary of Rosa 
Luxemburg's assassination on 15 January 1989, more than a hundred 
people who demonstrated for peace and human rights were either 
imprisoned or expelled. Furthermore, inner-German relations were now 
strained by the limitations on Western journalistic access to East 
Germany. In December 1987, East Berlin officially protested against the 
'interference' by Western politicians with its internal affairs, because 
these politicians had criticized the GDR's refusal to let certain SPD and 
Green politicians enter into East Germany. East Berlin's more restricted 
approach also manifested itself with regard to a much more dogmatic 
approach to the past. In 1988, the German Democratic Republic forbade 
the import of the Soviet magazine Sputnik because the East German 
leadership feared that Sputnik's critical evaluation of the Stalinist past 
would undermine its legitimacy.52
A look at German-Soviet cooperation after Gorbachev's assumption 
of power has shown (1) that, after an initial adjustment period, 
Gorbachev's readiness for reform favourably corresponded with the 
FDP's efforts for progress in East-West relations in general and German- 
Soviet relations in particular, (2) that the Free Democrats sought to 
support the changes in the Soviet Union themselves, especially through 
their calls for Western economic aid to Eastern Europe, and (3) that 
from about 1987 onwards, the superpower rapprochement had the 
opposite effect on inner-German cooperation, namely stopping it 
completely. Fearing its survival, East Germany blocked any economic or 
social reform of the type that was being implemented in the other 
Communist states and widely supported by the West. The result of these 
adverse developments in East Germany and the rest of Eastern Europe 
will be examined next.
5 lSee Lambsdorff's speech at the FDP's Party Congress in Hanover, 11.-
12.8.1990; Zimmer, p.223
52GlaeBner, p.264
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The opening of Eastern Europe and the origins of the 2+4 
process
From mid-1989 onwards, it became increasingly difficult for East 
Germany to block the reform process, as events in Eastern Europe 
developed their own momentum. Gorbachev's departure from the 
Brezhnev doctrine, his concessions in the final CSCE document in 
Vienna, and the Kremlin's neutralist reaction to the growing gap between 
the reform-minded and reform-hostile regimes in Eastern Europe, 
seemed to signal that Moscow was increasingly reluctant to interfere with 
its satellites' politics in a "stabilizing manner."
By June 1989, this impression was confirmed (and the potential 
threat to East German stability increased), when Gorbachev and 
Chancellor Kohl signed a joint German-Soviet declaration during the 
General Secretary's visit to Bonn. The declaration stressed the concept of 
a 'common European house,' based on the principles of self- 
determination, international law and human rights, and thereby pointed 
the path for the reforming states on how to maintain their own power by 
turning away from Stalinism. This section will firstly investigate the Free 
Democrats' reaction to the actual process of liberalization in Eastern 
Europe in 1989 and secondly look at the FDP's role in the preparations 
for German unification.
The FDP's reaction to the unravelling of Eastern Europe
Arguably, Hungary's decision to open its border with Austria in 
May 1989 triggered off the unravelling of Eastern Europe, since vast 
numbers of East Germans now began to cross illegally into the West via 
Hungary. Even after the German Democratic Republic had restricted this 
possibility by September 1989, growing numbers of East German 
refugees sheltered in Bonn's Prague and Warsaw embassies. With its 
forty-year anniversary approaching on 7 October 1989, the German 
Democratic Republic was under growing pressure to do something about 
this situation because it did not want to be confronted with pictures of 
escaping citizens on that day. Furthermore, as ever more East Germans 
arrived in the West German embassy in Prague, Czechoslovakia put 
increasing pressure on Honecker to stop the influx.
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During their September 1989 encounter at the United Nations, the 
Foreign Ministers concerned consequently discussed the matter. East 
Berlin's request that the refugees must first return to East Germany 
where they would be given exit visas in due course was causing a 
deadlock, as most refugees did not trust this procedure and preferred to 
stay in Prague. The negotiations only progressed when Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher came up with the compromise formula that the refugees would 
return to the GDR by passing through East Germany in a special train on 
their way to the Federal Republic. This procedure would allow East 
Berlin to save its face, as SED officials could take away the refugees' 
passports en route and then claim that the East German government itself 
had decided to expel the dissidents. Eventually, Honecker gave in, and on 
30 September, Genscher flew to Prague, where he told the refugees in 
what he later termed "the most moving hour of my political work" that 
they would be allowed to emigrate.53
However, neither Genscher's compromise formula which had 
allowed East Berlin to avoid a refugee crisis, nor Gorbachev's assurances 
of Soviet support during the GDR's fortieth anniversary celebrations 
could hide East Germany's growing problems.54 During the summer 
months, reform groups had sprung up in almost all small East German 
cities, and after the anniversary celebrations, mass protests broke out in 
the German Democratic Republic, leading to Honecker's resignation on 
18 October. The new East German government, headed by Egon Krenz, 
lasted for less than a month, on 9 November 1989, Krenz's successor 
Hans Modrow declared that all East Germans could leave the GDR for 
visiting purposes. Although in retrospect, this measure most likely was an 
SED gamble taken to stem the mass exodus and restore stability, de facto, 
it meant the opening of the Wall, since East Berlin allowed the East 
Germans to leave the country through all crossing points with West 
Germany.55
53DFS, 2.10.89, Interview with H.D.Genscher
54Kaiser, p. 184; Neckermann, p. 12 During the celebrations, Gorbachev had also 
reminded Honecker that "He who is too late will be punished by life," but it is very 
unlikely that at this point of time, Gorbachev wanted to take initiatives that would result 
in German unity.
55Pittman, p. 160 While hard-line elements in the Soviet Union had urged Gorbachev 
to use force to save East Germany, Gorbachev in the end listened to those advisers, 
including Shevardnadze, who advised against such interference in the GDR. Note that 
on 4 November 1989, Czechoslovakia had also opened its borders.
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The FDP's role in preparing the process o f German unification
From Bonn's and the FDP's perspective, the fall of the wall had 
transformed the long-term option of unity into a strategic opportunity to 
be grasped. The West German government seized the initiative quickly 
when on 28 November 1989, Kohl announced his 10-Point Plan, 
suggesting that the two German states should now increase their 
cooperation at all levels, form a 'contractual community,' move towards 
confederated structures and ultimately reunify. Due to the federal 
government's awareness of Western and Soviet reservations about the 
prospect of increased German power, the 10-Point-Plan also stressed the 
need to place the process of German reunification in the context of 
multilateral cooperation, i.e. the CSCE, East-West disarmament and the 
European Community. Only one day after the fall of the wall, Foreign 
Minister Genscher had expressed a similar view:
"No people in the world, no people in Europe must be afraid if 
the doors between East and West are now opening 
up...Germans living in freedom, in a democracy have never 
posed a threat for other peoples...We will stick to our 
commitment to the Western democracies..."56
However, to the Federal Republic's disappointment, although the 
10-Point Plan satisfied the impatient East Germans, it most certainly did 
not satisfy the other Europeans. Given twentieth century German history, 
the Western reaction to the prospect of German reunification was 
cautious, and the Chancellor's suggestions were widely seen abroad as a 
deliberate attempt to accelerate events.57 The Free Democrats, slightly 
concerned about the Chancellor's sudden assumption of control over 
Deutschlandpolitik, quickly pointed out that the Western criticism of the 
10-Point Plan was identical with their own: (1) that the Western allies had 
not been consulted prior to the plan's publication and (2) that there was 
no concrete reference to the controversial issue of Germany's post-war 
borders.58
56d FS, 10.11.89, Genscher xs speech at the Schoneberger Townhall after the fall of 
the wall
^Pond, Beyond the Wall, p. 138
5&SR, 30.11.89, Interview with O. Lambsdorff; Handelsblatt, 30.11.89
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Nevertheless, on the whole, the FDP backed the 10-Point Plan and 
was dissatisfied when at the superpower summit in Malta in December 
1989, the Four Powers unanimously argued that for the time being, the 
existence of two German states was the best option. In Malta, the Western 
powers expressively warned of precipitating the unification process, and 
on 20 December, Francois Mitterrand even went to East Berlin, where he 
publicly assured the new East German president of French support for 
the future existence of East Germany. Similarly to the Western powers, 
Moscow's immediate reaction was to insist that German reunification was 
not up for discussion and that the German Democratic Republic must 
remain in the Warsaw Pact.59
Given the strong reservations about the prospect of German 
reunification both in East and West, we shall now turn to the question 
which factors enabled the unification process to take off eventually, and 
whether there were any specific contributions on the Free Democratic 
Party's behalf. The first and most pressing factor for reunification was 
the German Democratic Republic's complete collapse by the end of 1989. 
From Bonn's and the FDP's perspective, this was followed by a second 
favourable development, namely East Berlin's, Moscow's and 
Washington's realization that it was counterproductive to oppose what 
had already begun to look like an inevitable process towards 
unification.60
Realizing that the Soviets would not act to save the GDR from any 
credible political alternative, by January 1990, Modrow had not only 
brought forward the first free East German elections from 6 May to 18 
March 1990 but had also travelled to Moscow to discuss his country's 
future with Gorbachev. Significantly, during this visit, the Soviet 
leadership in principle agreed to the option of German unity. The 
"Declaration on the Way to German Unity," elaborated by Modrow and 
Gorbachev during the visit, proposed several steps towards a German 
federation, although it was based on the prerequisite that a united 
Germany be neutral. Bonn rejected any neutral status for a unified 
Germany, but Kohl and Genscher greatly welcomed Modrow's and
59pittm an, p. 160
^ K a ise r ,  p-191
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Gorbachev's acceptance of a single German state and the fact that the 
option for reunification was now really there for the first time.61
By the end of January 1990, the Bush administration had also 
concluded that East Germany was collapsing and that German unity was 
now a certainty and should be accelerated. The main aim in this situation 
was to fit Germany into the "new European security structure" in a 
manner acceptable to all key participants in the process. London, Paris 
and Moscow were tempted to organize the negotiations on German 
unification as "4+0" procedure, in which the Four Powers would agree 
on an approach without Germany. However, the negative German and 
European public response to the 11 December 1989 meeting of the Allied 
Control Council in Berlin, convened at the Soviet request, had 
demonstrated that any impression of excluding the Germans from the 
process of unification, in reminiscence of the anti-Hitler coalition of half 
a century earlier, would endanger a new European system at its very 
outset.62
Consequently, two members of the White House administration, 
Robert Zoellick and Dennis Ross, now came up with a plan widely 
referred to as "2+4," which postulated that the Four Powers and the two 
Germanies should jointly negotiate the process of unification. The 
advantages of the 2+4 plan were (1) that the Germans would not feel 
excluded, as under the 4+0 option, (2) that the negotiations would not 
need to be held within either the NATO or the CSCE framework, both of 
which were too big and therefore unwieldy. In order to avoid German 
opposition to 2+4 on the grounds that it would be an intervention in 
German affairs, Ross and Zoellick made it a precondition for the 2+4 
negotiations that their explicit objective must be a unified Germany - 
everyone involved had to sign up to this. In order to shelter internal 
unification from the external process, the plan would not go into
hlDFS, 11.2.90, Interview with H.D.Genscher; The Guardian, 1.2.90 After 
Modrow's "Declaration on the Way to German unity," the actual inner-German 
negotiations about unification took off very quickly, and in the first week of February
1990, the discussion about an Economic and Currency Union began on the basis of 
introducing the Deutsche Mark into East Germany. Genscher pointed out to Moscow 
that the chances for East Germany to fulfil its delivery obligations to the Soviet Union 
would increase dramatically if the GDR formed an economic union with the Federal 
Republic.
62Kaiser, p. 189; Szabo, p.59
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operation until after the 18 March election in the GDR and after the start 
of inner-German negotiations for unity.63
Just as Baker's assistants were designing the 2+4 formula, Foreign 
Minister Genscher came up with a potential solution to another difficult 
question, namely the alliance-political future of a united Germany. The 
problem was that although departure from NATO was no option for the 
Federal Republic, by January 1990, Bonn's chances of achieving 
reunification without paying the price of leaving NATO seemed rather 
slim. Considering the reunification euphoria in both Germanies and the 
fragile public support for NATO, most analysts believed that a Soviet 
veto on NATO membership for a united Germany might well succeed.64 
Furthermore, it would clearly be difficult to ensure continued German 
membership in NATO without making the Soviets appear as the losers of 
the Cold War.
In this situation, Genscher developed his NATO plan as a means of 
both selling unification to the Soviets and ensuring Germany's remaining 
in NATO. The Foreign Minister first proposed his plan on 31 January 
1990 at the Tutzing Protestant Academy near Munich. The core idea of 
Genscher's concept, namely that a united Germany should belong to 
NATO, but that no allied forces would advance into the territory of what 
would be the former GDR, had been circulating among diverse sources in 
Germany, but Genscher had now seized upon these ideas.65 According to 
this scenario, Soviet troops would remain in the Eastern parts of an 
emerging new German state during a transition period. Genscher's plan 
also suggested much greater cooperation between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact - the two alliances should form the nucleus of a world peace force, 
perhaps under the United Nations which would guarantee global, and 
therefore European, security.
Thus, by the time the West German Foreign Minister travelled to 
Washington on 2 February 1990, two plausible suggestions for the kind 
of international framework that might accompany the domestic process of 
German unification - the "2+4" concept and Genscher's NATO plan -, 
had already been proposed. During Genscher's stay in Washington, the
63Szabo, pp.59-60
64Pond, Beyond The Wall, p. 173
^Genscher's speech at the Tutzing Protestant Academy on 31.1.90, in Auswartiges 
Amt - Pressemitteilung, 31.1.90; Szabo, pp.56-57; The Times, 1.2.90
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US and German delegation agreed on the 2+4 formula, and Genscher 
even got an assurance from Baker that the "formula" would be "two-plus- 
four" and not "four-plus-two," as the British Foreign Minister Douglas 
Hurd had requested. At the conclusion of their conversation, Baker and 
Genscher had furthermore agreed on Genscher's NATO plan as outlined 
in Tutzing. Even though Washington expressed some reluctance about 
making East Germany into a completely demilitarized zone, overall, the 
Bush administration concurred with Genscher's plan on the grounds that 
Moscow ultimately had a strong interest in seeing a new Germany as part 
of the Western alliance and not as a neutral state that might ignite 
nationalist conflicts with its neighbours.66
The remaining task of convincing France, Great Britain, and above 
all the Soviet Union of this international framework for unification was 
completed in three steps throughout the month of February. Firstly, 
James Baker succeeded in selling the 2+4 idea to Shevardnadze and 
achieved a least a neutral Soviet reaction to Genscher's NATO plan 
during his visit to Moscow on 8 February. The US Foreign Minister now 
also for the first time presented what came to be known as the Nine 
Assurances: a package of cooperative measures concerned with what the 
West would offer to the Soviet Union in return for acceptance of German 
unification.
Secondly, during their trip to Moscow on 10 February, Kohl and 
Genscher obtained, as the Chancellor put it, "the key to German unity."67 
While Gorbachev insisted that the external aspects of German unification 
were by no means an exclusively German affair and could only occur 
with Four-Power approval, the Soviet General Secretary now also agreed 
that the Germans themselves must determine the process of internal 
unification without outside interference. Thirdly, full international 
acceptance of German unification was eventually achieved during the 
Open Skies' conference in Ottawa on 12 February 1990. All Four Powers 
and the two Germanies now concurred that a two-plus-four conference 
would be set up to regulate the external aspects of German unification. 
According to Foreign Minister Genscher, the decisive outcome of the
66IHT, 7.2.90; Neckermann, p.36
67Kohl cited in Szabo, p.63
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Ottawa conference was all participants' agreement that they wanted to 
achieve German unification.68
Despite the FDP's dependence on Moscow's and the Western 
Powers' approval of Bonn's push for reunification, it has also been shown 
that Genscher's NATO Plan and the Foreign Minister's quick embrace of 
the 2+4 concept contributed to getting the process of German unification 
started. The next and last section of this chapter will examine the FDP's 
role during the actual negotiations about unification.
The negotiations on German unification in 1990
Once the external framework for German unification had been 
successfully established, the remaining precondition for the 2+4 talks to 
begin was the formation of a government in East Germany. This duly 
happened after the first free elections in the GDR on 18 March 1990, 
when the Christian Democrats, the SPD and the Liberals formed a grand 
coalition with Lothar de Maiziere as Prime Minister. However, compared 
to its crucial role in paving the way for the start of the 2+4 talks and to 
the central role played by its West German counterpart, East Germany's 
contribution to the actual negotiations about German unification was 
much more marginal, largely due to the novelty of its arrival in the 
Western diplomatic scene. From Bonn's and its Western allies' 
perspective, the three main tasks of the 2+4 talks were (1) to elicit from 
the Germans a binding agreement on the permanence of their borders,
(2) to ensure united Germany's full integration into Europe in 
combination with Soviet economic stability and (3) to convince the 
Soviets to accept a sovereign Germany within NATO.
The first main 2+4 talks, held in Bonn on 5 May 1990, tackled the 
controversial issue of Germany's post-war border with Poland, as 
Chancellor Kohl's hesitance to make a firm final commitment on the 
Polish border had meanwhile caused substantial irritation, not only at 
home (with the FDP) but also abroad.69 Since Kohl's encounter with
68d LF, 15.2.90, Interview with H.D.Genscher
69on 14 March 1990, a first 2+4 encounter at the ambassadorial level had already 
taken place in Bonn, during which the multilateral and bilateral fora for discussion had 
been defined.
199
President Bush in Camp David in February 1990, Washington had urged 
for a final solution to the Oder-Neisse issue, and Margaret Thatcher had 
also declared in an interview with Der Spiegel that the signing of a 
German-Polish border treaty was a necessary precondition for German 
unity.70 During the meeting in Bonn, it was decided that the Polish 
delegation should participate in the July session of the 2+4 negotiations, 
an idea which Washington and Moscow advocated in particular. 
Approximately two months later, during the 2+4 talks in Paris on 17 
July, final agreement on the Polish border was reached.
Apart from the Oder-Neisse issue, the Free Democrats and their 
fellow architects of German unification faced the tasks (1) of ensuring 
united Germany's full integration into the EC and (2) of handling the 
Soviet Union's economic and domestic-political difficulties. The 
Strafibourg summit of December 1989 had already provided a European 
context for German unification when Chancellor Kohl, well aware of the 
Europeans' concern about Germany's growing power, had established a 
link between German and European unification by increasing Bonn's 
support for Economic and Monetary Union and by calling for greater 
political cooperation within the EC. The Dublin summit held at the end of 
April 1990 developed a concrete framework for East Germany's 
inclusion into the EC, and at the second Dublin summit, held at the end of 
June, a deadline of 1 January 1993 was set for the ratification of an 
agreement of European economic, monetary and political union.71
Furthermore, as the negotiations on German unification evolved, it 
became clear that a final settlement would require economic support for 
an increasingly unstable Soviet Union. During Horst Teltschik's 
confidential talks with Moscow about the Soviet economic crisis on 14 
May 1990, the Soviet leaders had already expressed their interest in a 
long-term agreement for Soviet-German economic and political 
cooperation, indicating that such an agreement might be more important 
than a 2+4 treaty. During the EC summit meeting in Dublin and the G-7 
summit in Houston in July 1990, Chancellor Kohl also advocated a 
European aid programme for the Soviet economy.
On the whole, however, the Germans were careful to avoid the 
impression that they were buying East Germany and the Soviet Union,
7°Der Spiegel, 26.3.90, Interview with M. Thatcher
7lHandelsblatt, 18.7.90
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since their Western partners disagreed with the notion of German 
economic help in exchange for unification. Nevertheless, the Germans' 
readiness to assist the Soviet Union economically and to cover East 
Germany's debts with Moscow entailed the use of 'positive economic 
leverage', since it laid the groundwork for solving the last remaining 
problem in the way of unification by July 1990, namely the issue of 
united Germany's membership in NATO.72
Agreement on the restoration of full German sovereignty and a 
united Germany's membership in NATO proved difficult to reach, both 
in terms of finding an international compromise with the Soviet Union, 
and on the national level, since Foreign Minister Genscher proved 
consistently more lenient towards Moscow’s position than Chancellor 
Kohl and most of the US administration. Disagreement over Germany's 
future status first erupted during the May 2+4 encounter in Bonn, when 
the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze suggested separating 
the internal and the external aspects of German unification from each 
other. While the Federal Republic was attracted to Shevardnadze's 
proposal because it would allow Germany to unite without the delays that 
waiting for the solution of the international questions might cause, 
opinions in Bonn were divided about the second aspect of Shevardnadze's 
suggestion: the prolongation of Four Power competence and, as a result, 
the continuation of limitations of Germany's sovereignty.73 Initially, 
Genscher and Lambsdorff seemed open to Shevardnadze's suggestion, but 
when Chancellor Kohl argued that unification and the restoration of 
Germany's full sovereignty had to occur together, Genscher quickly 
retreated to Kohl's view.74
Before final agreement on Germany's future alliance commitments 
and on full German sovereignty could be reached, a number of steps had 
to be completed, each of which increased Moscow's readiness to 
compromise on the matter. Firstly, during Gorbachev's visit to 
Washington from 31 May until 3 June 1990, Bush and Gorbachev
72szabo, p.84, p.93; Plock, East-German-West-German Relations, p. 191 On 13 
September, one day after the final 2+4 agreement on German unification in Moscow, 
the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on Good 
Neighbourliness, Partnership and Cooperation, according to which Germany would 
provide generous support for the reconstruction of the Soviet economy.
73FAZ, 8.5.90
24Der Spiegel, 14.5.90, Interview with H.D.Genscher
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reached agreement on the issue of conventional forces and the 
institutionalization of the CSCE. Secondly, during its London summit on 
6 July, the Atlantic alliance changed its message, and the London 
Declaration stressed that NATO henceforth aimed at building a European 
peace order based on freedom, law and democracy, and offered to extend 
"the hand of friendship and cooperation" to the Soviet Union and all 
other European countries.75 The third and last obstacle to agreement on 
Germany's future was removed during the Communist Party congress on 
3 July 1990, when the unexpectedly mild reaction to Shevardnadze's 
speech, stressing pan-European cooperation over military confrontation, 
paved the way towards final agreement on the controversial issues of 
Germany's future military and political status.
The first indication of a final German-Soviet deal came when the 
Chancellor received an invitation from Gorbachev to visit him in the 
Caucasus from 13-15 July 1990. The visit marked a sensational 
breakthrough on all outstanding issues and also brought to the fore once 
again Genscher's greater tendency to accommodate the Soviet Union. 
Gorbachev now agreed that reunified Germany would remain in NATO 
and overall accepted the Genscher plan, if in a slightly modified version. 
Genscher's original NATO plan had stipulated that no units of the 
Western alliance be stationed on GDR territory, including "armed forces 
of the Bundeswehr, whether assigned to NATO or not."76
The treaty concluded in the Caucasus corresponded with this 
provision insofar as until the completion of the Soviet withdrawal from 
East Germany, only German territorial defence units not integrated 
under NATO command could be stationed on the territory of the former 
GDR. However, in contrast to the more conciliatory Genscher plan, after 
this transitional period, the special status of East Germany would end 
with regard to the German forces, which could then be deployed under 
NATO command, while the stationing of foreign troops or nuclear 
weapons would remain permanently prohibited.
Gorbachev offered yet another concession in the Caucasus: that he 
would not demand a transitional period during which the Four-Power 
rights would remain. With the signing of the 2+4 agreement, Germany 
would be granted full sovereignty, and there would be no more Four
75Kaiser, p. 197
76Bull.28, 28.2.90; Kaiser, p. 196
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Power authorities and no peace treaty. Last but not least, the encounter in 
the Caucasus brought German-Soviet agreement on the future ceilings of 
the German armed forces. In return for Gorbachev's concessions, 
Chancellor Kohl pledged to limit the German armed forces to 370.000 
(Genscher and the FDP had pleaded for a ceiling of 350.000), pay DM 13 
billion to facilitate the withdrawal of the Red Army within four years, 
provide wide-ranging economic and technical assistance to the Soviet 
Union and sign a friendship treaty.77
After the breakthrough in the Caucasus, German unification was 
completed on 12 September 1990 in Moscow when all 2+4 participants 
signed the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany." On 
1 October 1990, the treaty was presented to the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe in New York. Even though the treaty could 
not be ratified by all Four-Power governments in time for Germany's 
unification on 3 October 1990, in a well-received gesture, the four 
victorious allies signed a document clearly stating that they would no 
longer exercise their occupation rights. This idea of suspending the Four 
Power rights had been invented by the British embassy in Bonn and 
cleared the way for Germany to unite in full sovereignty, which actually 
happened on 3 October 1990.
Conclusion
Two main and related conclusions emerge from this chapter. First, 
that from the mid-1980s onwards, the impact of the respective 
superpower leadership on the FDP's room for manoeuvre in Ostpolitik 
was much more favourable than during most of the 1970s and early 
1980s. Second, that the positive interaction between the various changes 
in the international system during the Christian-Liberal coalition and the 
FDP's foreign policy priorities allowed the Free Democrats, and most 
notably Foreign Minister Genscher, to exert a much stronger influence
77on the evening before the treaty was to be signed, one last obstacle arose when the 
British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd informed Genscher that he could not sign the 
treaty because his government insisted on the right of NATO troops to manoeuvre on 
former East German territory after the Soviet withdrawal. These last-minute British 
demands were not well received by either Genscher or Baker, but a compromise was 
eventually reached when the British agreed to an appendix to the treaty drafted during 
the night by the Political Director of the Foreign Office, Dieter Kastrup. Szabo, p. 111
203
on international developments than ever before. It should also be stressed, 
however, that the international developments in the mid-1980s 
highlighted the constraints on the FDP's room for manoeuvre in foreign 
policy, as the Free Democrats who had pushed for the continuation of 
detente all throughout the early 1980s (i.e. Genscher's series of articles in 
1983 and 1984), had not been very successful until the US President and 
the Soviet General Secretary embarked on a similar course.
Nevertheless, concerning US foreign policy between 1982 and 
1990, the Free Democrats greatly benefited firstly from the Reagan 
administration's switch from a highly confrontational policy towards 
Moscow to a much more lenient approach by the mid-1980s, culminating 
in the biggest arms control agreements since World War II. Secondly, the 
FDP profited from President Reagan's particular style of leadership. In 
many cases, Reagan's rhetoric was much louder than his actual politics, 
which not only precluded much need for crisis management, but also 
complemented well with the Free Democrats' desire for continued good 
relations with Eastern Europe.78 Examples of Reagan's rhetoric being 
shriller than his actual performance are (1) the fact that the almost 
universally held picture of an unprecedently large transfer of US national 
sources to military purposes was never entirely accurate in the first place, 
(2) that as of 1988, SDI could hardly be regarded as anything more than 
an ambitious research programme and that (3) despite Reagan's fierce 
rhetoric, US land forces during his Administration were only used 
against Grenada.
This positive effect of the United States' return to detente on the 
FDP's Ostpolitik coincided favourably with the changes in the Kremlin 
after Gorbachev's assumption of power. The Free Democrats gained both 
from Gorbachev's determination to reform the Soviet Union's economic 
and political system, and from the new Soviet leader's personal 
convictions. Gorbachev's attempt to reconcile socialism in some way with 
the Western concepts of democracy and his push for greater international 
cooperation corresponded with many Western statesmen's values, but 
importantly, it was Hans-Dietrich Genscher who first voiced his belief in 
Gorbachev's sincerity, thereby providing the Kremlin's efforts with some 
of the necessary Western support.
78Bell, p.22
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The superpower rapprochement and the stunning progress in arms 
control from 1986 onwards also increased the Federal Republic's room 
for manoeuvre in the Atlantic alliance and reduced Washington's chances 
for utilizing 'linkage', in other words, for putting pressure on Bonn to 
demonstrate its loyalty towards NATO in return for the American 
security guarantee. From the mid-1980s, West Germany increasingly 
united with its European allies in their push for more arms control, and 
the FDP's controversial (yet successful) refusal to accede to the 
modernization of US Lance missiles in early 1989 also signalled a new 
German self-confidence.
Apart from the favourable interaction between the progress in 
arms control and the FDP's capacities for action in foreign policy, the 
Free Democrats benefited from the renewed EC impetus towards 
integration in the mid-1980s. The revival of the Western European 
Union, the founding of "Eureka" and the progress towards European 
economic, monetary and political union all not only closely corresponded 
to the FDP's foreign political aims, but were also actively promoted by 
the Free Democratic Party.
Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated that in at least two 
ways, the Free Democrats profited from their coalition with the Union 
between 1982 and 1990: on the one hand, the Conservatives' greater 
tendency to question the finality of Germany's division and of Poland's 
Western border allowed the Liberals to portray themselves as the true 
guarantors of Ostpolitik towards both West and East. On the other hand, 
the Free Democrats approved of the fact that by the early 1980s, the 
Union had dropped its opposition to Bonn's use of positive economic 
leverage for improving its relations with Eastern Europe. West 
Germany's credits to the GDR in 1983 and 1984, for instance, helped to 
shield inner-German relations from the Second Cold War at least 
temporarily, and the Federal Republic's grants to Moscow in 1990 
provided a strong incentive for the Soviet Union to remove its troops 
from East Germany and to approve of reunification.
Given the favourable military and economic developments in 
international relations throughout the 1980s, combined with the unusually 
positive constellation of leading personalities, with the benefit of 
hindsight, the breakdown of Eastern Europe and the negotiations on 
German unification may appear as a very smooth process. However, it 
should be stressed that there were many moments when things could
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easily have gone wrong. There is Gorbachev’s decision not to use force to 
stop the East German revolution in 1989 even though strong voices in the 
Soviet Union urged him to do so, there is the continuity of Gorbachev 
and Shevardnadze as leaders of the Soviet Union in 1990, and the fact that 
Washington quickly and constructively supported the process of German 
unification, in contrast to France's and Great Britain's initial reaction.79
Most important in the context of this chapter, however, is the fact 
that Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher cooperated much 
better throughout the process of unification than ever before. Kohl, for 
his part, not only seized the initiative with his 10-Point-Plan, but also 
corrected Genscher's occasional tendency to concede more to the Soviets 
than necessary. Genscher seemed more ready than Kohl to accept 
Shevardnadze's proposal at the May 2+4 meeting in Bonn to decouple the 
internal and external aspects of unification, and he was also willing to 
settle for a somewhat smaller Bundeswehr than required by the Soviets. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that Genscher's initial postulation that no 
Bundeswehr forces would be deployed on the territory of the former 
GDR was in the end modified.
We have also seen, however, that the FDP (and most notably 
Foreign Minister Genscher) was to a degree able to contribute to the 
process of German unification. In part, Genscher's contribution to 
unification went back further than the years 1989 and 1990, and his merit 
in recognizing Gorbachev's sincerity early on has already been 
mentioned. The Foreign Minister also indirectly contributed to creating 
the option of reunification with his compromise formula concerning the 
East German refugees at the Prague embassy in 1989. Once the process 
of German unification was on the agenda, Genscher helped to keep the 
Polish border issue from harming international support for unification 
and did much to gain Soviet trust and eventual acceptance of a united 
Germany, for instance with his NATO plan.
79Szabo, p.ll4ff.
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Chapter VII. The Christian-Liberal coalition 1982-90: 
the domestic context
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After examining the impact of liberal ideology and international 
developments on the FDP's Ostpolitik during the Christian-Liberal 
coalition, a comprehensive analysis of the Free Democrats' room for 
manoeuvre in foreign policy between 1982 and 1990 lastly requires a 
look at domestic politics. This chapter will investigate how the Free 
Democrats coped with their volatile electoral situation after leaving the 
Social-Liberal coalition and how the reversal of power among the two 
big parties affected the FDP's foreign policy. More specifically, how did 
the Social Democrats adjust to their new role as parliamentary 
opposition, and what was the impact of the CDU's control over the 
Chancellor's Office on the FDP? We shall also examine the Free 
Democrats' reaction to the arrival of a second junior coalition partner 
(the CSU), and whether the Union stuck to its pledge that Social-Liberal 
Ostpolitik would be continued even under a Conservative government.
This chapter will also look at the impact of public opinion on the 
Federal Republic's foreign policy-making after 1982. In particular, the 
question will be how the German public's strong anti-nuclear sentiments 
in the 1980s affected the Free Democrats' approach to the issues of 
detente and defence. Lastly, we shall attempt to trace the FDP's role in 
the process of German unification. What was the Liberals' reaction to 
Chancellor Kohl's sudden assumption of control over German policy, and 
how did they try to maintain their special profile in Ostpolitik and 
German policy throughout the unification process? Since the first pan- 
German elections in December 1990 are a good indicator of the FDP's 
impact on the process of German unification, the last section of this 
chapter will be devoted to their examination.
The FDP's struggle for survival - the Bundestag elections of 
1983
The first question to be addressed is how the Liberals coped with 
the substantial pressure they faced during the months after their change 
of coalition partner. As already pointed out in Chapter Four, the Free 
Democrats had an unusually bad press in the latter half of 1982, being 
charged with betrayal and opportunism. As in the months before, 
Genscher defended himself and his party by insisting that it had been the 
SPD and not the Free Democrats who had deserted from previous Social-
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Liberal positions: "...The SPD has deserted Schmidt - not we the former 
Federal Chancellor. That's the truth, and it will assert itself..."1
With the membership losses being far greater than the party would 
publicly admit, the Free Democrats faced the additional problem of a 
very bleak electoral situation. Critics converted the party's name from 
Free Democratic Party to 'Fast Drei Prozent' ('almost three percent'), 
thereby not only hinting at the 5% hurdle but also reducing the FDP's 
function to an electoral one - the new name paid no tribute the FDP's role 
as representative of political Liberalism in Germany. Genscher was 
painfully aware of this attempt to reduce his party's impact to a 
functional position. In addition, although Genscher was re-elected as 
Party Chairman at the FDP's party congress in November 1982, the left- 
wing parliamentary deputies and most of the youth wing still strongly 
opposed the change of government on the grounds that the Liberals had 
deserted their principles: "Better a party of one percent that is true to its 
principles than a party of three percent that has lost its credibility."2 At 
this party congress, the FDP decided that if there were to be another 
coalition change at the federal level, next time, the party would have to 
ask the party congress for permission - a decision which clearly reflected 
the grassroot's suspicion towards the party leadership.
However, as critics either left the party or adjusted to the political 
change, the controversy within the FDP over the realignment generally 
ebbed. By the beginning of the new year, the polls began to indicate an 
improvement of the FDP's position in the electorate, and the Liberals' 
pre-election convention in January 1983 was a harmonious event, with 
most delegates eager to display party unity. By this point of time, even 
though two thirds of the Liberals were still uneasy about the manner in 
which the coalition change had taken place, more than ninety-nine percent 
approved of a resolution to continue the coalition with the CDU/CSU 
after the March 1983 elections.3
The Free Democrats' only opportunity for re-election seemed to lie 
in running the campaign on the FDP's importance as guarantor of 
continuity in West German foreign policy. Not surprisingly, the Liberals
iGenscher's speech at the FDP's 33rd Party Congress in Berlin, 5.-7.11.1982
2The Times, 8.11.82
3Soe, The Free Democratic Partv: Two Victories and a Political Realignment. 
pp. 130-133
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readily seized this chance. The FDP's motto was 'Germany needs the 
Liberals,' and Genscher even spoke of 1983 as the "most important 
elections in West Germany's history."4 The Free Democrats elaborated 
greatly on the fact that they had switched coalition partners because 
Germany's current problems called for a reconfirmation of two 
principles of German post-war politics that had both been introduced 
during the first Christian-Liberal coalition under Adenauer: Germany's 
commitment to a market economy and the Federal Republic's strong ties 
with the West. As Genscher put it: "The purpose of the Wende was to 
change the approach to economics and to make sure that nothing would 
be changed in foreign policy..."5 According to the Free Democrats, the 
new Christian-Liberal coalition would act as necessary buffer against the 
SPD's neutralist tendencies and as the only reliable guarantor for 
Germany's remaining in NATO.
While the FDP emphasized the need to create a Christian-Liberal 
counterweight against the Social Democrats, the Liberals of course also 
stressed their importance for ensuring that Bonn's detente policy towards 
Eastern Europe would be continued. Even though the FDP this time did 
not campaign directly against Franz-Josef StrauB, the CSU leader still 
played an important role in the FDP's self-promotion, as when the party 
stressed that Genscher would guarantee continuity in foreign policy. 
Based on their experience in the 1980 election campaign, the Free 
Democrats faced their competition with StrauB quite confidently, being 
well aware that they could benefit from contrasting their foreign policy 
with the CSU's conservative approach:
"The CSU has made an interesting contribution to foreign 
policy with its remark that they have not fought Ostpolitik for 
thirteen years now to ignore it. That's certainly an additional 
motive for many voters to support the FDP."6
With 6.9%, the FDP's election result on 6 March 1983 was fairly 
satisfactory, considering the party's problems since their change of 
coalition partner in 1982. After the elections, Genscher's popularity
4Bildzeitung, 11.2.83, Interview with H.D.Genscher
^ZDF, 19.6.86, Interview with H.D.Genscher
6WAZ, 17.2.83, Interview with H.D.Genscher
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increased again, and on a scale from plus 5 to minus 5, Genscher reached 
the first positive result (0.1) since the events in October 1982.7 The 
coalition negotiations presented quite a change from Social-Liberal times, 
however, as the Free Democrats now had to defend their ministerial 
claims against two parties instead of just one. Naturally, competition with 
the CSU was especially tough, with both the Liberals and StrauB aiming 
at the second most influential posts in government, those of Foreign 
Minister and Minister of Economics. The coalition haggle soon escalated 
so much that Otto Lambsdorff, Minister of Economic Affairs, felt called 
upon to make the following clarifying statement:
"We want to continue the coalition with the Union. But we will 
not allow it to suppress us... The Free Democrats are not the 
CDU's or CSU's sister party. We contribute our own concepts 
to the coalition negotiations... In coalitions, there is no such 
thing as the right of the stronger partner. Who treats the junior 
coalition party as majority enabler instead of as equal partner, 
destroys the basis for future cooperation. I am sure that the 
Federal Chancellor understands this. Some politicians from 
Bavaria... still need to learn it."8
In an attempt to improve the tense relations between the CSU and 
the FDP, Genscher and StrauB met in Munich on 11 March 1983. As a 
result, StrauB agreed to stay in Bavaria but requested more influence for 
his party in Bonn. In the end, the Free Democrats secured three 
ministries (including the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of 
Economics) for themselves but lost their previously fourth occupied 
Ministry of Agriculture to the CSU (which in total occupied four 
Ministries).
Consensus and dissensus in Parliament
Apart from the need to adjust to a second junior coalition partner, 
the Free Democrats now also faced their former governing partner's 
departure into opposition. The main question at stake was whether the
7Bonner Rundschau, 4.5.83
8fdk 87, 9.3.83
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Social Democrats would use their function as parliamentary opposition in 
the same manner as the Union had done previously. After all, the 
CDU/CSU had vehemently opposed any Social-Liberal attempts to 
advance Ostpolitik for most of the 1970s, although Chapter Four has also 
shown that the Union's growing acceptance of Social-Liberal Ostpolitik 
from about 1978 onwards had finally put an end to the inner-German 
dissensus over Ostpolitik.
Since this section is concerned with the impact of the interaction 
between government and opposition on West German foreign policy 
during the Christian-Liberal coalition, it will first concentrate on the last 
phase of cycle two - pan-German support for Ostpolitik - which still 
determined Bonn's politics after 1982. In an attempt officially to 
demonstrate that Social-Liberal Ostpolitik would be continued even after 
the government's shift towards the right, all three German parties (FDP, 
Union and SPD) approved of a joint resolution on German policy on 9 
February 1984 in the Bundestag.9 Apart from all three parties' 
declaration on a joint Berlin policy in June 1978, there had not been such 
publicly demonstrated unity between government and opposition since the 
early 1970s. Most importantly, the Bundestag resolution of 1984 
demonstrated that the Social Democrats would continue to support the 
Kohl/Genscher government's foreign policy instead of contesting it in 
their new function as parliamentary opposition.
At a later stage of the Christian-Liberal coalition, in March 1989, 
the Bundestag once more approved of a joint resolution on foreign 
policy. This time, the statement had been formulated in face of the clash 
between Gorbachev's reform process and the lack of humanitarian 
improvements in East Germany. The 1989 Bundestag Resolution was 
meant to be a political signal to East Berlin that all parties in the German 
Bundestag agreed on the importance of more human rights in the German 
Democratic Republic.10
Although government and opposition had thus achieved far- 
reaching agreement on Deutschland- and Ostpolitik, such parliamentary 
consensus could not be maintained all throughout the Christian-Liberal 
coalition. As indicated above, the Christian Social Union's return to
9Note that the Greens had not participated in the work towards this resolution and
had voted against it.
l°Zimmer, p. 129
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government and the party's feeling that it was not given appropriate 
influence in foreign policy-making tempted the CSU on a number of 
occasions to block the government's foreign policy efforts. Matthias 
Zimmer has consequently argued that the main resistance to Christian- 
Liberal Ostpolitik after 1982 did not come from the Social Democrats in 
opposition but from the right wingers within the Union. For instance, 
when the Bundestag considered another joint foreign policy resolution in 
the mid-1980s, the Union's conservative wing refused to support it on the 
grounds that they could not tolerate the intended acknowledgement of the 
Polish Western border in the event of German reunification.11 The CSU's 
opposition blocked any further progress on the proposed resolution.
In addition to the shift in the debate about Ostpolitik, foreign policy 
during the Christian-Liberal coalition was also greatly affected by the 
impact of cycle three, relating to the evolution of inner-German 
consensus and dissensus about security policy. As shown in Chapter Four, 
until the late 1970s, all German parties had agreed on the Federal 
Republic's need strictly to follow NATO's security policy, based on the 
joint effort to combine a credible defence with arms control offers. It has 
also been demonstrated that from the late 1970s onwards, cycle three had 
entered into its second phase of strong polarization over security policy 
in face of the emergence of the peace movement and the SPD's growing 
opposition against the stationing of NATO's Pershing missiles on German 
soil.
After the March 1983 elections, the battle lines on the issue of 
deployment of US intermediate-range nuclear missiles were sharply 
drawn between the coalition government and the parliamentary 
opposition. Before the decision about the stationing of Pershing II 
missiles in the Federal Republic was finally taken, the Social Democrats 
requested a renewed vote in the Bundestag. While Genscher and the 
Union refused this request on the grounds that the Bundestag had already 
approved of the stationing of INF forces in May 1981, the government 
did agree to another security-political debate about the issue.
Not surprisingly, many Social Democrats argued during this 
Bundestag debate that the existing level of nuclear arms should be frozen 
without requesting prior agreement on demilitarization. Equally 
predictably, the governing coalition rejected this idea as dangerous.
1 Izimmer, pp.H I, 134
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Genscher accused the Social Democrats of "...answering tomorrow's 
problems with yesterday's answers" and reluctantly acknowledged the 
widening gap between government and opposition on the matter.12 While 
in the end, the decision to deploy the missiles in the autumn of 1983 
proved to be far less disruptive to society at large than had originally 
been feared, it nevertheless did result in the final breakdown of the 
consensus that had emerged between the major parties on major security 
issues since the early 1960s.13
Despite such strong polarization over security policy in the early- 
and mid-1980s, the Christian-Liberal coalition was to live and see the 
emergence of phase three of cycle three, that is inner-German 
realignment over security policy. For a discussion of this process of 
realignment, the reader is referred to section five of this chapter which 
covers the Christian-Liberal coalition's security policy in more detail. 
For the moment, we shall turn to another factor which influenced the 
Free Democrats' foreign policy after 1982 apart from the Social 
Democrats' departure into opposition - the CDU's take-over of the 
Chancellor's Office.
Cooperation between the Chancellor's Office and the Foreign 
Office
For a number of reasons, Genscher's relationship with Chancellor 
Schmidt differed from that with Helmut Kohl which in return greatly 
affected the process of foreign policy-making during the Christian- 
Liberal coalition. To begin with, Genscher had not known Helmut 
Schmidt very well before entering the Social-Liberal coalition in 1974 
and had never intensively collaborated with him. Kohl and Genscher, in 
contrast, had been both neighbours and friends for years when they 
formed a coalition in 1982 and had frequently discussed foreign policy 
issues during the Social-Liberal coalition. In fact, Kohl and Genscher 
were close enough friends to use the familiar way of addressing each
12SDR, 3.7.84, Interview with H.D.Genscher At the FDP's party congress from
18-19 November 1983 in Karlsruhe, a majority of the Free Democrats had approved of 
the deployment of US Pershing missiles on German soil from 1983 onwards (286 
"yes" votes; 226 "no" votes; 1 abstention).
13Cerny, p.211
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other, if only in private. Genscher himself once characterized the 
different nature of his relationship with the two Chancellors as follows: 
"Schmidt and I respected each other. Kohl and I have been good friends 
for years... That makes it easier to solve problems..."14
The relationship between Kohl and Genscher further benefited 
from the fact that, in contrast to Schmidt, Kohl was neither an expert in 
foreign policy nor an Economist. During the Social-Liberal coalition, 
Schmidt had devoted much time to thinking about new foreign-political 
strategies, and Genscher had in return taken on a lot of the daily work, 
developing his profile in areas where he would not disturb the 
Chancellor. As shown in Chapter Four, the Foreign Minister's room for 
distinguishing himself had further been limited by the high level of 
foreign-political agreement between Schmidt and himself. The situation 
in the Christian-Liberal coalition was very different, for one thing 
because Kohl was not as interested in foreign policy as Schmidt, and for 
another thing because Genscher had by now gained enough foreign policy 
expertise to be highly respected. After the change of government, the 
Union initially even somewhat depended on Genscher's experience for 
continuity of German foreign policy. On the whole, Kohl's abstinence 
from foreign policy gave Genscher a chance to shine, and he seized it 
with both hands.
Cooperation between the Chancellor's Office and the Foreign 
Office was also favourably influenced by two other factors. Firstly, 
although Kohl did not have a major impact on foreign policy, German 
Ostpolitik during the Christian-Liberal coalition profited from the 
Chancellor's skilful reconciliation of controversies both within his own 
party and within the coalition. As Smith has pointed out, the fact that 
Kohl was so "adept both in party management and in the coordination of 
the government and the coalition" significantly contributed to his holding 
on to power. Secondly, Kohl signalled his readiness to continue Social- 
Liberal Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik after 1982 by charging the Union's 
most reform-oriented politicians with German policy.15 This policy
l^Bildzeitung, 17.3.84, Interview with H.D.Genscher; Bunte, 22.3.84 Note that 
even though Kohl and Genscher used the familiar way of addressing each other in 
private, in the Cabinet, they stuck to the formal 'Sie.'
15Smith, Developments in German Politics, p.50; Zimmer, pp. 110-111 For 
instance, Rainer Barzel and Alois Mertes, who had both tried to soften the Union's 
positions on detente already during the 1970s, became the first Minister of Inner- 
German Affairs and Junior Minister in the Foreign Office respectively.
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greatly facilitated cooperation between the Chancellor's Office and the 
Auswartiges Amt.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher in particular gained from the fact that 
Ostpolitik, East-West issues and demilitarization had by now been 
acknowledged as his 'special field' in the Foreign Office. Not even the 
junior ministers in the Foreign Office, Irmgard Schwaetzer and Helmut 
Schafer, dared touch these issue areas. Here, Genscher formulated the 
foreign policy and had it executed by the state secretaries. Genscher's 
impact on foreign policy was further aided by Federal President Richard 
von Weizsacker's new approach to his office. Unlike previous Presidents, 
von Weizsacker spoke out on many domestic and foreign policy issues 
and acted simultaneously as a pace-setter and integrator in public opinion 
formation.16 Genscher benefited from von Weizsacker's approach to the 
Presidency since the two leaders shared a far-reaching agreement on 
foreign policy. Both emphasized detente as the main element of German 
foreign policy, and Genscher sometimes used the strategy of commending 
von Weizsacker's foreign policy approach in order to reinforce the 
FDP's position against Union hardliners.
Despite the good personal relations between Chancellor, Federal 
President and Foreign Minister, and notwithstanding the Union's initial 
reliance on Genscher's expertise in foreign policy, it would be wrong to 
assume that the Chancellor's Office completely left the field of foreign 
policy to the Free Democrats after 1983. Soon after his assumption of 
power, Kohl went ahead and appointed Horst Teltschik, a Christian 
Democrat, as foreign policy adviser in the Chancellor's office. By 
choosing a personal aide of his, Kohl set a precedent since this position 
had traditionally been occupied by somebody from the Foreign Office to 
ensure maximum exchange of information between the two offices. 
Kohl's choice introduced a good deal of suspicion and rivalry between the 
Chancellor's and the Foreign Office, as is often found between the State 
Department in Washington and the National Security Adviser in the 
White House.17
Teltschik prepared all trips for Kohl and exerted more influence 
over the practical formulation of German foreign policy than any official
IbKirchner, Genscher and what lies behind Genscherism. p. 167; FAZ, 12.8.89; Die
Welt, 12.6.85
l 7Donhoff in Schulze/Kiessler, p. 8
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in the German Chancellor's office ever had. Jealousies between the 
Foreign Office and Teltschik could consequently not be avoided, and the 
Foreign Office retaliated against what it perceived as Teltschik's 
exaggerated influence by complaining to Kohl or by releasing more or 
less subtle criticism of the Chancellor's aide. Concerning Genscher's 
attitude towards Teltschik, their rivalry was probably more personal than 
political since Teltschik largely agreed with the Foreign Minister's ideas, 
except for his slightly stronger emphasis on Bonn's loyalty towards 
Washington.18
The FDP's stronghold in foreign policy after 1982 was 
furthermore challenged by the arrival of the Christian Social Union in 
government. The CSU's traditional aspirations to the Foreign Office were 
intensified by the fact that StrauB considered foreign policy to be his field 
of special expertise and by the CSU leader's well-known aversion to the 
FDP generally and to Genscher in particular. From the beginning of the 
Christian-Liberal coalition, the CSU and several members of the CDU 
thus signalled clearly that they considered themselves underrepresented in 
foreign policy and were not willing to put up with an eternal Free 
Democratic monopoly in this important field. The Bayernkurier, the 
CSU's official press organ, for instance wrote that German foreign policy 
was not Genscher's private affair, and Volker Riihe, vice-president of the 
CDU's parliamentary fraction, stated along similar lines:
"...It is not written down anywhere that the FDP always has to 
provide the Foreign Minister. The Union has been very 
successful in foreign policy after the war. Nobody has decided 
that this post must be occupied by our coalition partner 
forever..."19
Riihe's statement reflected the view held by many Conservatives in the 
Christian-Liberal coalition who, beneath the surface of German-political 
continuity, felt that their views had been ignored. The effects of such 
intra-governmental rivalry on Christian-Liberal foreign policy will be 
addressed in the next section.
18FAZ, 9.11.85
19SZ, 26.9.85; Der Spiegel, 5.8.85, Interview with V. Riihe
217
Continuity or discontinuity of Ostpolitik? - The FDP’s use of 
intra-coalition disagreement over Ostpolitik for se lf­
promotion
This section in concerned with the question to what degree the 
government actually adhered to its pledge that the Union's assumption of 
power would not bring any changes in German foreign policy, especially 
in Ostpolitik and German policy. It will attempt to show that several 
hardliners in the CDU/CSU had by no means accepted the principles of 
Social-Liberal Ostpolitik and still sometimes tried to interfere with the 
coalition's policy towards Eastern Europe. Most importantly, the impact 
on the Free Democrats of such continued Conservative reservations 
against Ostpolitik will be examined.
Straufl' attempts to run German Ostpolitik in 1983
With StrauB, the Free Democrats faced a competitor who in several 
ways actually attempted to conduct foreign policy on his own. Besides his 
desire to make an impact in this field that clearly mattered so much to 
him, StrauB probably also wanted to demonstrate that he was fitter to run 
West Germany's foreign policy than the present incumbent of the Foreign 
Office. Although the Bavarian Minister President had always been one of 
the staunchest opponents of Social-Liberal Ostpolitik, during the early 
years of the Christian-Liberal coalition, he suddenly tried to portray 
himself as a capable 'Ostpolitiker' by assuming a more lenient position 
towards Eastern Europe than the Free Democrats and most of the Union 
on a number of occasions.
StrauB first attempted to prove his foreign-political expertise in 
1983 when Rumania wanted to restrict the emigration of its citizens to 
those who returned their education fees of about DM 10.000. While 
Foreign Minister Genscher immediately stated that such Rumanian 
requests offended against the principles of Helsinki and that he would 
only travel to Bucharest to discuss the situation after Rumania had 
reversed its decision, StrauB embarked on a much milder course and 
agreed to travel to Bucharest without attaching any preconditions.20
20FAZ, 21.5.83; WAZ, 1.6.83 Note that in 1983, StrauB also travelled to Poland 
and Czechoslovakia where he confirmed his support for continued good West German 
relations with Eastern Europe.
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StrauB's trip had no immediate impact on the Federal Republic's relations 
with Rumania, but since the CSU Chairman had consciously ignored 
Genscher's position on the matter, the Foreign Office viewed it as 
interference with its politics towards Eastern Europe.
Even though the Foreign Office did not officially react to StrauB' 
trip, it now attached even greater importance to Genscher's role as the 
actual negotiator with Rumania. On 31 May 1983, the Foreign Minister 
travelled to Bucharest himself. As a result of this trip, the previous 
conditions for emigration from Rumania were restored, and the ethnic 
Germans who wanted to emigrate no longer needed to pay back the 
expenses for their education.21 The Auswartiges Amt had thus 
successfully demonstrated to StrauB who was really running German 
Ostpolitik.
When it became known in July 1983 that StrauB had been involved 
in the successful negotiations about a DM 1 billion credit to East 
Germany by a consortium of West German private banks, much of the 
Foreign Office was again both surprised and annoyed. For one thing, 
StrauB had always fiercely opposed an Ostpolitik based on trading West 
German economic concessions for humanitarian improvements in Eastern 
Europe. For another thing, the negotiated credit was not without 
economic risk for the Federal Republic since the government had 
assumed formal guarantee for it. Although the negotiators claimed that if 
East Berlin did not meet the interest payments, the West Germans would 
be able to put pressure on the defaulters by cutting payments to East 
Germany, such claims were fairly unconvincing. StrauB' conciliatory 
approach towards the GDR could not even be explained by substantial 
East German counter-concessions, since the latter stayed far below the 
federal government's expectations. The Foreign Office thus found it hard 
to see the credit as anything other than a demonstration by StrauB that he 
was not necessarily the ultimate hardliner he was usually held to be and 
that he was really more suitable to run West Germany's foreign policy 
than was the Free Democratic Party.22
2lFAZ, 1.6.83 As a counterconcession, Bonn would continue to pay a lump-sum for 
ethnic Germans who were allowed to emigrate from Rumania.
22The Times, 25.10.83; fdk 53, 8.3.84
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Public relations
Controversies within the new government were not limited to 
disagreement and competition between the two smaller coalition partners, 
however. The Union and the Free Democrats also had frequent run-ins 
over the issue of public relations conduct. Even though the Union had 
largely accepted Ostpolitik by 1982, in terms of their official statements, 
some of its members continued to pursue a tougher course towards 
Eastern Europe than the Liberals. Shortly before Honecker’s planned 
visit to Germany in 1984, Alfred Dregger, CDU Bundestag deputy, for 
example said in an interview with Die Welt: "Our future does not depend 
on whether Honecker pays us the honour of a visit."23 The federal 
government, and especially the FDP, carefully distanced itself from 
Dregger's statements by confirming its invitation to Honecker. When 
Honecker postponed his visit to West Germany, Genscher clearly 
expressed that he did not approve of the spectacular manner in which the 
intended visit had been discussed:
"Certainly, there has been and is too much staggering. 
Especially our politics towards the GDR calls for utmost 
restraint. Brazen comments are not a sign of strength, nor are 
they particularly helpful..."24
Similarly, when a West German citizen had died during a trial in 
the East German city of Drewitz in April 1983, StrauB and Edmund 
Stoiber, the CSU's General Secretary, immediately spoke of murder and 
requested a reorientation of German policy. Again, the FDP called for 
more moderation in the CSU’s treatment of the German Democratic 
Republic. Genscher claimed that although the incident was utterly 
regrettable, the government must continue to promote good relations 
with East Germany, precisely to work on a policy enabling to prevent 
such instances in the future.25
By far the worst impact on East-West relations had Kohl's 1986 
Newsweek interview in which the Chancellor compared Gorbachev's
23Dregger cited in Die Welt, 25.8.84
24Bildzeitung, 7.9.84, Interview with H.D.Genscher
25>fdk 109, 22.4.83; HR, 24.4.83, Interview with H.D.Genscher
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public relations abilities with those of Josef Goebbels, who had been 
Hitler's propaganda official during the Third Reich. Disapprovingly, 
Genscher cited the Soviet newspaper Pravda's accusations of the West 
German "nationalist and revanchist" tendencies in his speech at the FDP's
1986 party congress in Mainz. The Foreign Minister also appealed to the 
Union to "...keep in mind the twenty million casualties that Hitler's attack 
caused in this country..."26
Disputes over the Oder-Neisse border
Even though it had been agreed in the coalition negotiations that 
relations with the Communist states would be conducted on the basis of 
the Ostpolitik treaties, concerning the issue of Poland's Western border, 
controversies between the CDU/CSU and the Free Democrats continued 
to persist after 1982. The main difference between the FDP's and the 
Union's approach was one of emphasis: while the FDP tended to 
emphasize the inviolability of the Polish border, the CDU/CSU focused 
on the Constitutional Court's verdict of 1973 that a final decision about 
the border could only be taken in a peace treaty for a reunified Germany. 
All throughout the Christian-Liberal coalition, right-wing Union 
members were straining the coalition by their insistence that the former 
German areas on the other side of Oder and Neisse still had to be treated 
as part of the government's operative German policy and needed to be 
returned to Germany in the long run. When the CSU again claimed in
1987 that the Ostpolitik treaties were not politically binding for the 
federal government, Genscher replied firmly: "There can be no 
withdrawal ...from detente, as Herr StrauB wants it... Ostpolitik is not an 
adventure playground..."27
More generally, Genscher would react to such Union statements by 
citing Helmut Kohl to prove that the FDP could fully rely on the 
Chancellor's support for their position. In an interview with the Hessian 
broadcast, the Foreign Minister said, for instance:
"I agree with the Federal Chancellor on foreign policy, which 
is very important, otherwise there could not be any progress. I
26Genscher's speech at the FDP's Party Congress in Mainz, 21.-22.11.1986
27Genscher cited in The Times, 21.1.87; FAZ, 22.1.87
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regret, however, that there are certain voices which try to 
water down the clear course that the Chancellor and I are 
embarking on... But they will not succeed, I guarantee it..."28
The Free Democrats agreed with Kohl’s frequent declarations that the 
Federal Republic did not have any claims to Polish territory. In fact, the 
group around Kohl did not even believe that the Polish border would be 
disputed in any future negotiations over a final peace treaty. The 
Chancellor differed from the Free Democrats, however, since for legal 
and strategic reasons, he would not commit himself publicly to the 
finality of the Polish border in case of reunification. In addition to Kohl's 
support, the Liberals could rely on substantial public approval of the 
FDP’s position on the Polish border. In 1985, 76% of the West German 
population thought that recognition of the Oder-Neisse border was 
acceptable, and even 66% of the Union’s voters thought so 29
Intra-coalition controversies about the Polish border reemerged 
with new intensity in 1989, the year that marked the 50th anniversary of 
Hitler's invasion in Poland. For one thing, Chancellor Kohl now made it 
quite clear that he was not willing to leave the field of German-Polish 
relations to the FDP alone. Early in 1989, Kohl had appointed his foreign 
policy adviser Teltschik as the top negotiator in Bonn's new drive to 
improve ties with Poland. The Teltschik delegation was meant to prepare 
Kohl's trip to Warsaw in the summer of 1989 and to negotiate possible 
German credits to Poland. While most of the Union members agreed that 
Bonn should once again link credits to Poland to Warsaw's permission 
for the emigration of ethnic Germans, Genscher warned of reducing 
Polish-German relations to the economic aspect and pointed to the 
historical importance of the year 1989. Naturally, Genscher was not 
enthusiastic about Kohl's nomination of Teltschik as his personal 
representative to Poland in 1989. Since the Foreign Office was not 
consulted about Teltschik’s preparations, it feared that his appointment 
was meant to give the Chancellor more control in a field where Genscher 
had so far made the running.30
28h R, 14.7.85, Interview with H.D.Genscher
29Die Welt, 30.1.85 (Emnid poll)
30DFS, 7.4.89, Interview with H.D.Genscher; The Economist, 11.2.89; IHT, 
21.7.90 Later on, Genscher blocked the Chancellor from giving Teltschik the same 
assignment to Czechoslovakia.
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The intra-coalition discussions in 1989 also demonstrated, however, 
how strongly Chancellor Kohl tried to appease both his Liberal coalition 
partner and the Union's right-wing. In the end, Kohl postponed his trip to 
Poland which had been planned for 1 September 1989, officially because 
the issue of West German credits to Poland had not yet been solved. It 
was no secret, however, that Kohl's decision was also linked to Christian 
Democratic fears about the recent rise of the extreme right-wing 
Republican party. The CSU and parts of the CDU wanted to avoid losing 
the support of their right-wing voters to the Republikaner and hence 
opposed any spectacular visits to Poland in 1989.31
Soon after the postponement was announced, the leader of the CSU, 
Theo Waigel, further soured relations by repeating the controversial 
view that the German Reich had not ended in 1945 and that it continued 
to exist "within the borders of 1937."32 Foreign Minister Genscher 
warned that responsible treatment of the question of the German-Polish 
border was the basis for any government in which the FDP participated 
and that uninhibited right-wing remarks about Germany's pre-war 
borders could jeopardize the future of the Christian-Liberal coalition. 
Chancellor Kohl here once again clearly sided with the Free Democrats 
by stating that concerning the Polish border, mere insistence on legal 
points was not of much use for practical politics.
Genscher's early call for cooperation with Gorbachev
Concerning Christian-Liberal reactions to Gorbachev's aspirations 
at perestroika and glasnost, the Union also proved less ready than the 
Free Democrats to give up their traditional suspicion towards the 
Communist states. Genscher explained his early support for Gorbachev 
with his firm conviction that the new Soviet leadership was seriously 
interested in reforming the country and in conducting a politics of 
opening up both at home and abroad. In his famous speech in Davos, 
Genscher had already pleaded for taking Gorbachev seriously, and in the 
1987 Bundestag elections, the FDP greatly benefited from such early 
Liberal support for the new Soviet leader. The German voters apparently
3 lln contrast to 1985, by the summer of 1989, only 65% of the German population 
thought the Oder-Neisse border was acceptable. Der Spiegel, 28.8.89
3 ^ The Guardian, 11.7.89
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trusted the Foreign Minister’s belief in Gorbachev and voted for the FDP 
accordingly.
With 9.1% of the vote, the FDP was quite content with the outcome 
of the elections, in contrast to the Union, which at 44.3%, had scored its 
worst result since the first Bundestag elections of 1949. In addition to the 
positive public reaction to the FDP's approach towards Gorbachev, the 
Free Democrats had also benefited from public support by leading 
German scientists and authors throughout the 1987 election campaign for 
Genscher's remaining in office as Foreign Minister. Turning against the 
CSU's requests for departure from detente policy, these promoters had 
asked the Germans to give their second vote to Genscher in order to 
"save detente policy."33
Genscher again demonstrated his trust in Gorbachev's intentions 
when he requested in September 1989 that Western Europe develop a 
'Marshall Plan' for Eastern Europe. According to the Foreign Minister, 
the aim of such a plan was to help stabilize the reform countries both 
internally and externally. Apart from financial aid and food deliveries, 
Genscher suggested that the West should be ready to offer training and 
expertise, particularly in management. To some degree, Genscher's 
initiative was supported by German public opinion since even in 1988, 
Gorbachev had enjoyed a positive ranking of more than 70% among the 
West Germans.34
Generally speaking, the Union parties were much more reluctant to 
believe in Gorbachev's sincerity and initially viewed Genscher's 
enthusiasm with suspicion. In 1986, Horst Teltschik typically criticized 
the fact that Gorbachev's public commitment to demilitarization and a 
new phase of detente had not yet concretely manifested itself in the 
demilitarization negotiations in Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna. 
Furthermore, in 1988, Chancellor Kohl took the surprise decision of 
transfering his close colleague Rupert Scholz to the Ministry of Defence. 
By giving the post of Defence Minister to a man whose attitude towards 
the Russians was notoriously tough, Kohl clearly hoped to provide a 
counterweight to Genscher's keen support for Gorbachev. In face of the
33fdk, 13.1.87 Among Genscher's supporters were Marion Countess Donhoff, 
Arnulf Baring, peace researcher Wolf Count Baudissin, political scientist Theodor 
Eschenburg, publicist Wolfgang Leonhard and author Rolf Hochhuth. Bark/Gress, 
p.475; Cemy, p. 190
3^Time, 15.8.88; The Times, 20.9.89
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open intra-coalition disagreement over the appropriate response to 
Gorbachev, German newspaper articles about the alleged lost mutual trust 
between Chancellor and Foreign Minister abounded.35
Similarly, in 1989, Gerhard Stoltenberg, the new Minister of 
Defence, was very sceptical when Genscher announced his idea of a 
Marshall plan for Eastern Europe. While signalling the CDU/CSU's 
readiness in principle to help Eastern Europe, Stoltenberg put the accent 
on the risks inherent in such aid and on the Federal Republic's negative 
credit experiences in the 1970s. Stoltenberg thus warned of confusing 
hope with reality in dealing with the Soviet bloc and requested that the 
Eastern European states must create reliable economic framework 
conditions before they could expect any aid from West Germany.36
In line with his overall strategy of dealing with reluctant Unionists 
throughout the Christian-Liberal coalition, Genscher lost no time over 
harping on the differences between the FDP and the CDU/CSU but rather 
devoted his energy to citing Chancellor Kohl whenever the latter's 
statements seemed to support the Free Democrats' positive attitude 
towards Gorbachev. For instance, when Genscher's 1985 argument for a 
"new phase of detente policy" met with harsh criticism from StrauB, the 
Foreign Minister duly pointed to Kohl's call for a "new phase of East- 
West relations" after the Chancellor's encounter with Honecker in March 
1985. Similarly, after his trip to Moscow in July 1988, Genscher 
emphasized that Kohl had fully approved of the journey, calling it 
"unusually successful."37 Towards the end of the decade, such references 
to the Chancellor's support for the FDP's position no longer proved 
necessary since by then, most German politicians had joined the 
Gorbachev fan club. By the end of 1988, even StrauB had converted to 
Genscher's belief that West Germany stood to gain a lot from 
Gorbachev's revolution, if it worked.
35See, for instance, Die Welt, 17.2.89; The Economist, 11.2.89 Scholz only held 
the post of Minister of Defence until April 1989 when he passed it over to Gerhard 
Stoltenberg.
36Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 20.7.86; SZ, 19.9.89
37FAZ, 3.8.88; Der Spiegel, 17.11.86, Interview with H.D.Genscher; Die Welt, 
13.7.85
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The compatibility of detente and defence 1985-89 - the 
interaction between public opinion and Liberal foreign policy
The previous section has demonstrated that, in terms of foreign 
policy impact and self-promotion, the Free Democrats generally profited 
from their coalition with the Christian Democrats although the Union did 
not always unanimously support the continuation of Social-Liberal 
Ostpolitik. This section will attempt to show how the FDP could come to 
gain disproportionally large influence over yet another area of Bonn's 
foreign policy between 1982 and 1989, namely security matters. In order 
to answer this question for the later half of the 1980s, it will be necessary 
to look at the interaction between German public opinion and the Federal 
Republic's security policy. During the first major security-political 
debate after 1983, however, it was not so much public opinion but the 
FDP's readiness to cooperate with its coalition partner that allowed the 
Liberals a major say in the final decision, as will be shown next.
1985 SDI debate
By 1985, the Free Democrats were facing two substantial 
problems related to security policy, both of which strongly coloured their 
response to Reagan's SDI project. To begin with, by the mid-eighties, 
there was a growing gap between Genscher's emphasis on the need to 
safeguard European and German interests and the Chancellery's 
increasingly pro-American stance, reflected most clearly in its almost 
total takeover of German-American relations. By 1985, nobody doubted 
any longer that Teltschik had succeeded in creating a direct connection 
with the Reagan administration bypassing the Foreign Office. The 
Americans had, for instance, promised to provide Teltschik with special 
information about the talks in Geneva that no other ally would get.38 
Kohl closely followed Teltschik's advice of absolute loyalty towards the 
United States.
Second, in line with its strongly pro-American stance, the Union 
had quickly signalled its approval when President Reagan had proposed 
his plan for a Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in 1983. In June 1985, 
Kohl's national security adviser Teltschik travelled to the USA to check
38SZ, 7.2.85
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whether West German support for SDI would be useful. As a result of 
the trip, Teltschik called for a governmental agreement with the United 
States to coordinate the participation of West German industry in the SDI 
project. According to Teltschik, it was of "vital interest" for West 
Germany to take part in the US research effort since sooner or later the 
superpowers would agree to stationing a certain level of space missiles 
anyway, maybe without consulting the Western allies.39 Teltschik 
furthermore praised the US programme for having prompted the latest 
Soviet proposals for a reduction in offensive missile systems. The 
Chancellor's Office even suggested that if the other Europeans did not 
want to follow suit in joining SDI, the Germans might possibly support 
the project in a solo attempt.
This endorsement of West German participation in SDI was the 
Kohl government's first public statement on the issue after Teltschik’s 
fact-finding mission and caused substantial problems for the Free 
Democrats whose support for Reagan's initiative was much less 
unconditional, for both functional and factual reasons. The FDP was 
worried that Teltschik's influence on the Chancellor would increase even 
more after his trip to Washington, depriving the Foreign Office of a 
major say in the decision-making process on SDI. With many prominent 
members of the FDP's parliamentary fraction, including Hildegard 
Hamm-Briicher, Olaf Feldmann, Gerhart Baum and Helmut Schafer, 
vehemently voicing their opposition against SDI as catalyst for a new 
arms race, Genscher also faced the immediate threat of a polarization on 
the issue within his own party. Furthermore, in contrast to the Union 
who saw one of the main advantages of the project in pressurizing the 
Soviet Union into arms control concessions, the Liberals feared SDI 
would have exactly the opposite effect. The Free Democrats were 
worried that overt West German participation in SDI might burden 
Soviet-US arms talks in Geneva and hamper Bonn's attempts to broaden 
discussion with Eastern Europe.40
In face of the Union's decidedly strong support of the US project, 
Genscher feared, however, that the FDP would risk a major coalition 
conflict on the matter if it insisted on its security-political reservations. 
After all, Chancellor Kohl had already so openly advocated some kind of
39Teltschik cited in Die Welt, 6.11.85
40IHT, 2.10.85; SZ, 4.4.85
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German support for SDI that the Union was under pressure from 
Washington to make a positive decision. The Liberals thus decided to aim 
at a compromise on Germany’s participation in SDI by raising substantial 
preconditions for their assent to the project.
This decision to cooperate instead of to block had four advantages: 
firstly, the FDP could avoid a serious coalition conflict over the issue. 
Secondly, by attaching substantial prerequisites to the FDP's consent to 
SDI, Genscher succeeded in uniting most members of his party behind 
him. The majority of the FDP's thirty-five parliamentary deputies 
supported the Foreign Minister's efforts to act as a brake on the 
government’s commitment to SDI. Thirdly, by actively participating in 
the decision-making process, the Free Democrats could make better use 
of the SPD's arguments against SDI than if they embarked on a course of 
mere opposition. Fourthly, as will be shown, the Liberals' readiness to 
compromise provided them with disproportionate influence over the 
government's final decision since the Union was extremely interested in 
some kind of SDI agreement, yet could not act without its coalition 
partner.
What was the FDP's position on Germany's participation in the 
American project, then? While the Free Democrats were more suspicious 
than other members of the coalition about SDI's military-strategic 
aspects, they much more strongly favoured the project's technological 
aspects. The Liberals' overall strategy thus was to aim at limiting  
Germany's support for the SDI programme to participation in the 
research and at extending the SDI debate to the European level. In line 
with their aim of reducing strategic cooperation on SDI, the Liberals 
opposed the Union's call for a governmental agreement with Washington, 
arguing that "..the state's participation, even in relatively harmless 
treaties, of course has a political dimension..."41 Similarly, the Free 
Democrats strongly warned against unilateral German support of SDI, as 
considered by some Union members, and instead requested the Europeans 
to embark on a joint research project called 'Eureka' in face of this 
challenge. Genscher pointed out that, after all, the Europeans had not left
41SR, 12.10.85, Interview with G.Baum The FDP gave its consent to negotiations 
about the involvement of private West German companies in the project, however.
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the development of the steam engine, the railway and the car to the 
Americans.42
Facing both his own party's strong advocation of SDI and his 
coalition partner's opposition to it, Kohl found himself between two 
stools by the autumn of 1985. The Chancellor had agreed to the FDP's 
argument to delay Bonn's decision about SDI until after the US-Russian 
summit in Geneva in November 1985. However, when Washington 
remained determined to embark on the project after the Geneva 
encounter, the West German government finally had to make a decision 
about its desired level of involvement in the US initiative.
Much to the Union's dismay, most FDP criteria for supporting 
West German participation in SDI were included in the cabinet decision 
of 18 December 1985. The FDP's one concession to the Union was the 
fact that the government's resolution assured Washington of Bonn's 
political support for SDI. However, the resolution also included the 
FDP's requests that there would be no governmental participation in SDI 
and that Bonn would place priority on the arms-control political and 
technological consequences of the SDI research.43 The Free Democrats 
also benefited from the fact that their Party Chairman and Minister of 
Economics, Martin Bangemann, had been nominated as German 
negotiator in Washington. The FDP hoped that Bangemann would assert 
himself against the CDU/CSU in the negotiations with the USA.
The INF Treaty of 1987
The next major intra-coalition controversy over defence policy 
arose when Gorbachev offered the so-called 'double zero option' in 1986, 
providing for the complete removal of all long- and short range 
intermediate nuclear missiles from Europe. In 1982, the CDU/CSU and 
FDP had still advocated precisely this zero option as the 'ideal' solution to 
arms control, as it would have rendered the deployment of US Pershing 
missiles on German territory from 1983 onwards superfluous. As shown 
earlier in this chapter, the two governing parties had also unequivocally
42FDP's decrees at its Bundeshauptausschuss in Neuss, 1.6.1986; The Free 
Democrats also profited from the SPD's support for Germany's participation in Eureka 
and from the Social Democrats' objections to SDI's military-strategic aspects. Benien, 
p.159
43Bu11.146, 20.12.85
229
supported NATO’s policy of actually deploying such US intermediate- 
range nuclear forces in Europe after 1983, when the INF negotiations in 
Geneva had failed to result in the desired reduction of Moscow’s 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles.
By 1986, such intra-coalition consensus on defence-political 
questions could no longer be taken for granted. As the INF treaty evolved 
on the basis of the 'double zero option,' leading West German 
Conservatives began to voice their criticism at the emerging treaty and 
suggested a dual strategy, neither element of which the Free Democrats 
agreed with. On the one hand, the Union requested that Germany at least 
hold on to its shorter-range intermediate nuclear forces, fearing that a 
fully denuclearized Europe would weaken the West in general and West 
Germany in particular. Volker Riihe came up with the famous phrase: 
"The shorter the range, the deader the Germans."44
In contrast to the Christian Democrats, Foreign Minister Genscher 
made it clear, well before his cabinet colleagues fell into line, that he 
regarded West Germany's Pershing missiles as dispensable and that they 
should not stand in the way of a treaty between the superpowers. 
Genscher and most of the FDP also reckoned that even after the double­
zero option, the Western alliance would still have enough nuclear punch 
to deter a Russian attack. The Foreign Minister kept emphasizing that, 
given Gorbachev's serious readiness for demilitarization, any removal of 
INF forces could only be of advantage for the Federal Republic and 
criticized the Union for setting the wrong tone in foreign policy:
"We can very well imagine a world with fewer nuclear 
missiles...We Liberals must not permit the attempt suddenly to 
portray demilitarization and not the arms race as the real 
danger..."45
The Free Democrats approved just as little of the Union's second 
precondition for agreeing to the INF treaty: that the double zero option 
be linked to far-reaching reductions of Moscow's short-range nuclear
44Rtihe cited in US News, 1.6.87 The CDU/CSU also insisted that Germany keep 
open the possibility for modernization of its Pershing 1A missiles in case the agreement 
with Moscow failed.
45Genscher cited in Die Welt, 24.11.86; Genscher's speech at the FDP's 38th Party 
Congress in Kiel, 5.-6.9.1987
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weapons and conventional arms to avoid Soviet military superiority. In 
May 1987, Chancellor Kohl even requested not only the reduction but the 
complete removal of all short-range nuclear weapons ('third zero 
option'). This declaration, announced without prior consultation of 
Foreign Minister Genscher, further increased the confusion regarding 
Bonn's position. While the FDP agreed that the intention to discuss the 
reduction of short-range nuclear missiles should be included in the INF 
treaty, it warned against drawing up artificial borders between the 
individual areas of demilitarization.
Overall, the INF debate had led to a complete reversal of political 
fronts in West Germany which aided the FDP's position and made it 
much more difficult for the Union to assert its views. For one thing, the 
Free Democrats could now count on support from the parliamentary 
opposition - the peace movements, the Greens and the Social Democrats - 
for their stance on the double zero option. The function of the opposition 
had been assumed by those parts of the CDU/CSU's parliamentary 
fraction who were opposed to Moscow's proposals. In addition, the FDP's 
position was strengthened domestically as public support for the INF 
treaty grew. Surveys revealed that 90% of the population - including the 
overwhelming majority of CDU/CSU voters - were in favour of the zero 
option. Two-thirds of the West Germans did not believe that the loss of 
the Pershing missiles would lead to a less credible American nuclear 
guarantee for Europe.46
Gorbachev's suggestions had thus resulted in the sharpest split 
between the two coalition partners on a major national issue since Kohl's 
assumption of office. Even Genscher called the INF controversy the 
"most difficult situation for the government" since its formation in 
1982.47 Overall, Kohl's vague approach to the double-zero option had led 
to an outpouring of public support for Genscher. When asked in 1987 
which German politician truly wanted peace, 76% of the German 
population expressed their highest trust in Foreign Minister Genscher, 
whereas only 62% believed the same of the Federal Chancellor. All 
throughout 1987, the CDU/CSU suffered heavy losses to the Free
^^Meiers/Tanner, p.9
^Genscher cited in FAZ, 28.4.87
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Democrats in the state elections, a fact which the Christian Democrats 
blamed exclusively on the missiles debate.48
In face of its isolation both at home and abroad, the Union began to 
retreat from its opposition against the double zero option. After intense 
intra-coalition debates, the Free Democrats' position was almost 
unconditionally accepted in the government's June 1987 resolution on the 
double zero option. The coalition decided that both the longer- and the 
shorter range intermediate nuclear missiles would be removed, with the 
exception of seventy-two shorter-range Pershing 1A missiles under joint 
US-West German command. The remaining of these Pershing missiles in 
Germany was the only FDP concession to the Union. The government's 
resolution also followed the Liberals' suggestion that there was no need to 
commit Moscow to further reduction of its short-range nuclear missiles 
at this point of time - the resolution merely provided for negotiations 
about such additional demilitarization efforts 49
Overall, the INF debate had shown that the international and 
domestic changes in the late 1980s helped to reinforce the FDP's foreign 
political position. All throughout the negotiations about the double zero 
option, the Free Democrats had benefited from Gorbachev's serious 
readiness for disarmament, from the German public's strong anti-nuclear 
sentiments and from the new alliance between the parliamentary 
opposition and the Liberals.
The 1989 decision to postpone the modernization of short-range nuclear 
missiles
In face of the vacuum that the withdrawal of all intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles left in Europe, the inner-German debate about the 
modernization of short-range nuclear forces started with renewed 
intensity in 1989. For similar reasons as in the 1987 debate about the INF 
treaty, the FDP under Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was once 
more going to play a decisive role in the outcome of the 1989 decision.
48Stern, 27.5.87, 'Infratest' opinion poll; Risse-Kappen, p. 138
49In the end, the Union even dropped its request for modernizing the Pershing 1A 
missiles. To the CSU's utter dismay, Chancellor made this decision without prior 
consultation of the Christian Socialist Union. Risse-Kappen, p. 142
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Firstly, Genscher again benefited from strong public support 
against modernization which had arisen from a number of interconnected 
factors, most of which have already been addressed in this chapter. Both 
the debates about the NATO dual-track decision and about the INF treaty 
had set in motion a growing anti-nuclear sentiment among the German 
public. The actual removal of all intermediate-range nuclear missiles 
from Europe after 1987 had left the two Germanies even more concerned 
that their countries would be the future nuclear battleground. Such anti- 
nuclear feelings accounted for the result of an Allensbach poll of June 
1988 which showed that 68% of the West Germans were against the 
modernization of short-range nuclear missiles. Significantly, more than 
half of the German population (57%) did not think a West Germany 
without nuclear weapons would be more vulnerable to Soviet threats.50
Secondly, it has also been shown that the German public strongly 
sympathized with Gorbachev’s reform efforts and firmly believed in the 
Soviet leader's true readiness for peace. This trust in Moscow's peace 
efforts was counterbalanced by a growing suspicion of the United States, 
both because of Washington's lack of reaction to Gorbachev’s reforms 
and because of Reagan's SDI initiative earlier in the decade. At the end of 
1988, 83% of West Germans tmsted Gorbachev more than Reagan, and 
more people trusted Russian rather than American peace and 
disarmament policy. The concrete achievements of the 1980s, such as 
Honecker’s visit to Germany in 1987, visits by leading German statesmen 
to Moscow in 1988, the INF agreement, Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, and Soviet permission to let ethnic Germans emigrate from 
the Soviet Union all acted as further catalyst for a new broad consensus 
among West German policymakers on the necessity of detente.51
With his opposition against the modernization of short-range 
nuclear missiles, Genscher thus personified the 'new' security policy 
consensus which had emerged in Germany in the wake of the INF treaty. 
While many Union members advocated the replacement of the ageing 
Lance missiles in the mid-1990s, pointing to the continued threat from 
the Soviet Union, Genscher believed this would send the wrong signal to
50FAZ, 22.7.88
SiKirchner, Genscher and what lies behind Genscherism. p. 166; The Independent, 
27.4.89
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Gorbachev just as talks on cutting non-nuclear forces had begun in 
Vienna:
“The momentum which now has been achieved in the 
disarmament process in Europe, in particular by the unilateral 
steps taken by Gorbachev, should not be stopped by a false 
signal that could be interpreted as rearmament instead of 
disarmament.”52
Genscher also referred to NATO's 1987 agreement that the Lance 
missiles did not need to be modernized before 1995 and that the Alliance 
was ready to negotiate about their reduction. According to the Foreign 
Minister, Germany was consequently in no hurry to make a 
modernization decision. While Genscher could not expect the Union's 
backing for his party's resistance to modernization, he could be sure of 
support from the Social Democrats and the Greens.
Given the German public's opposition to modernization and the 
near consensus among all West German parties on the need to reduce 
short-range nuclear missiles, the Free Democrats enjoyed strong backing 
for their views. At their party congress preceding the government's 
decision, the Free Democrats linked the coalition's survival to the 
controversy about modernization, and Genscher even threatened 
indirectly that he might resign if the CDU/CSU did not fully back his 
position on short-range nuclear missiles.53 Not surprisingly, the federal 
government's decision of May 1989 was very much along the Free 
Democrats' lines.
The coalition decided that modernization of the Lance missiles be 
delayed until 1992 and would be made contingent on the progress of 
conventional arms reduction talks in Vienna. Furthermore, the 
government called for early talks on the reduction of short-range nuclear 
missiles with the aim of reducing them to the lowest level possible. 
Genscher strongly favoured the coalition's position because it was "a 
concept for arms control and disarmament and not for armament."54
^Genscher cited in IHT, 15.2.89; Welt am Sonntag, 5.3.89
53Die Welt, 29.5.89; Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 2.6.89
54d B, Genscher, 140th sess., 27.4.89, debate about the modernization of short- 
range nuclear missiles
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After the NATO summit in Brussels in May 1989, Kohl and Genscher 
were very content since the summit had confirmed the West German 
approach.
Overall, by the late 1980s, Genscher's enthusiasm for Gorbachev 
and his distaste for NATO's plans to modernize its short-range nuclear 
missiles in Europe had helped to make him the country's most popular 
politician, while Kohl's fortunes had started to sag more and more in the 
opinion polls. It was little wonder then that the Chancellor readily took 
up his chance to improve his image significantly when the option arose in 
late 1989.
The process of German unification - Internal issues
Kohl and Teltschik seize initiative with the Ten Point Plan
All Germans in East and West, inclusive of their respective 
governments, were shocked by the pace at which Eastern Europe had 
been unravelling from the autumn of 1989 onwards. Hence, Chancellor 
Kohl was not the only German whose initial reaction to the opening of 
the wall on 9 November 1989 was characterized both by surprise and a 
certain passivity. Nevertheless, only two weeks after the fall of the wall, 
Kohl decided to seize the initiative regarding German unification, partly 
in order to improve his own and his party's image. As shown in the 
previous section, the CDU/CSU's general situation in the late 1980s was 
quite unfavourable, since the Union had a low standing in the polls and in 
addition faced a strong and unexpected challenge from the new 
Republikaner party. Furthermore, as Federal Chancellor, Kohl faced the 
growing problem of massive emigration from the GDR which had 
accelerated after the wall's breach, and the need to stabilize the 
situation.55
Kohl and his aides thus seized the initiative in the Chancellor's 
office, beginning with the announcement of the Ten Point Plan for 
reunification on 28 November, 1989. The Ten Point Plan was in part a 
reaction to the new GDR leader Hans Modrow's statement eleven days 
earlier in which he had introduced the idea of a contractual union
55Szabo, p.21
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(Vertragsgemeinschaft) between the two Germanies. While Kohl 
signalled readiness in principle to take up Modrow's suggestion, the 
central element of the Ten Point Plan was Point 5 where he suggested the 
setting up of "confederative structures between the two states with the 
goal of creating a federation, a federal state order in Germany."56
According to the Chancellor, the Federal Republic was ready to 
form a joint governing committee for permanent consultation and a joint 
parliamentary committee with the GDR. Kohl also offered continued 
economic, humanitarian and cultural cooperation to East Berlin. Bonn's 
prerequisite, both for any West German support and for the formation of 
a confederate structure between the two Germanies, was that the reform 
process in the GDR should continue. In political terms, the SED's 
monopoly of power would have to be replaced by democratic laws and 
there would need to be free elections. In economic terms, East Germany 
should open up for Western investment and move towards a market 
economy.57
In being the first person in Germany who suggested a way in which 
reunification could be achieved, Kohl gained an impetus that set him 
apart from other politicians and parties in Germany. The central question 
consequently is how the Free Democrats reacted to this new activism on 
the Chancellor's behalf, given the fact that they were traditionally strong 
promoters of national unity and had become used to Kohl's style of 
largely leaving the field of German- and Ostpolitik to Foreign Minister 
Genscher. With the Ten Point Plan, the Christian Democrats had clearly 
used the rights of the Chancellor's Office to deal with German policy, as 
opposed to the Foreign Office. Before Kohl's Ten Point Declaration in 
the Bundestag, the Kanzleramt had not even consulted the Foreign Office, 
and the leading Free Democratic politicians were only informed about the 
Ten Point Plan very shortly before it was announced in the Bundestag. 
Kohl's independent initiative, along with the generally competitive 
relationship between the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, set the 
tone for a strained relationship between the two main German actors and
56DB, Kohl, 177th sess., 28.11.89, debate about domestic issues; Smith, 
Developments in German Politics, p.24
57DB, Kohl, 177th sess., 28.11.89, debate about domestic issues Kohl's Ten 
Point Plan also reassured the outside world that Germany would retain its alliance 
commitments after unification and strive for an extension of the EC and the CSCE 
process.
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their respective bureaucracies that was going to last throughout the whole 
unification process.58
For the time being, the Free Democrats had little choice but to 
approve of the Ten Point Plan, however. For one thing, the FDP was 
well aware that it might manoeuvre itself into political isolation if it did 
not approve of its coalition partner's efforts to achieve German 
unification. For another thing, as Genscher and Lambsdorff pointed out, 
the FDP agreed so much with the content of the plan that it would have 
been ridiculous to block it solely for reasons of formality, that is the 
Union's failure to inform the Free Democrats beforehand. Even though 
the FDP signalled general approval of the Ten Point Plan, it also 
reminded the Union of its presence by criticizing some aspects of the 
Chancellor's initiative. The Free Democrats did not approve of the fact 
that, just as the Union had barely informed its coalition partner, it had 
not consulted with the Western powers and the Soviet Union before 
announcing the Ten Point Plan. According to Lambsdorff, Genscher now 
had to soothe the effects of the Union's failure to inform its Allies by 
travelling to all Four Power states.59
The FDP furthermore disapproved of the fact that the Ten Point 
Plan failed to address the issue of Poland's Western border. The Liberals 
feared that the chances for German unification would be severely limited 
if the Union now started a new debate about the Oder-Neisse border. As 
Lambsdorff expressed it:
"Who represents the view - and it is legally possible to 
represent such a view - that we can only make a decision about 
the Polish Western border after Germany has been reunified, 
makes sure that Germany will never be reunified."60
In addition to their substantive criticism of the Ten Point Plan, the 
Free Democrats also signalled to the Union that they were not willing to 
let a party that had opposed the Ostpolitik treaties for so long claim all 
the credit for Germany's foreign policy achievements since 1969. The 
Liberals clearly threatened that if the Union did not split the "harvest" of
S^Szabo, p.26
59Handelsblatt, 30.11.89; SR, 30.11.89, Interview with O.Lambsdorff
b^SR, 30.11.89, Interview with O. Lambsdorff
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German policy with the FDP in a fair manner, the Free Democrats would 
publicly remind the Germans of the Union's earlier reluctance in 
supporting Social-Liberal Ostpolitik and the Final Act of Helsinki. As 
Foreign Minister Genscher put it in unusually blunt language: "We will 
not allow the CDU/CSU to scratch the butter off our bread."61
Intra-coalition debate about the procedure of unification - via Article 23 
or 146?
One of the major intra-coalition controversies about the right path 
towards reunification broke out before the first free elections were held 
in East Germany on 18 March 1990. Originally planned for the month of 
May 1990, the East German elections had been advanced to March in face 
of the worsening economic and political situation and the continued flight 
to West Germany. As the election date moved closer, so did the prospect 
of German unity, which fuelled the discussion about the legal and 
constitutional means to bring it about.
Opinions in West Germany about the constitutional problem of 
joining the FRG and the GDR were divided, however. The Basic Law 
provided two mechanisms for reunification: the first possibility, via 
Article 23, left the door open for "other parts of Germany" to accede to 
the Federal Republic. In this case, the GDR states would simply declare at 
some point of time that they were henceforth part of the Federal 
Republic, and the Basic Law would fully remain in force. The best 
historical example for the working of Article 23 was the association of 
the Saarland in 1956. However, the Basic Law provided a second 
mechanism for reunification, via Article 146. In this case, the GDR 
would not simply accede to the FRG and accept the Basic Law as it was, 
but the two German states would jointly decide which constitution the 
new unified German state should follow: "The Basic Law shall cease to be 
in force on the day on which a constitution adopted by a free decision of 
the German people comes into force."62
Initially, it seemed that Article 146 would provide the obvious 
option of joining the two Germanies. For one thing, it had been included 
in the Basic Law precisely for the possibility of German reunification
blGenscher cited in SZ, 8.1.90; Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 9.1.90
62Karpen, p.306
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becoming possible one day. What was more, East Germany favoured 
Article 146 because it might provide the possibility to secure some social 
rights in the form of a "social charter." For the same reason, the West 
German SPD and some members of the FDP's left wing also argued for 
the route of a new, all-German constitution. Most Free Democrats and 
the Union, in contrast, were not in favour of reunification via Article 
146. In the Liberals' view, most East Germans clearly wanted 
reunification rather sooner than later, and in face of such strong support 
for rapid reunification, the creation of a new constitution would be too 
lengthy and too complicated.63 What was more, the Basic Law was after 
all the most democratic constitution Germany had ever had, so there 
seemed little reason to replace it.
While the Free Democrats concurred with the Union in their 
support of proceeding according to Article 23, they differed from their 
coalition partner in their stronger emphasis on the aspect of self- 
determination. The Liberals stressed that East Germany was entirely free 
to choose whether it wanted to join or not and that the West Germans had 
no right simply to swallow the GDR and impose their legal system. 
Generally, the reunification debate revealed that the Christian Democrats, 
and above all the CSU, were somewhat less inclined than the Free 
Democrats to treat the GDR as equal partner. The Union had a stronger 
tendency to, as The International Herald Tribune put it, "gobble up East 
Germany without even saying grace," which manifested itself throughout 
the whole unification process.64
Overall, by the time of the East German elections, the mechanisms 
for creating political and economic unity were already operating. The 
outcome of the elections was a decisive victory for the pro-unification 
parties and provided the unification process with yet a new stimulus. The 
Christian Democrats had won 48.2% of the vote, and Lothar de Maiziere, 
the new Prime Minister, now formed a grand coalition of CDU, Liberals 
(5.3%) and SPD (21.8%) 65 This gave the new government the necessary 
two-thirds majority to push through the constitutional and legal changes 
needed quickly to accede to the Federal Republic. In April 1990, the East
63fdk 130, 16.5.90; fdk 132, 17.5.90
64iHT, 12.3.90; NDR, 6.3.90, Interview with O.Lambsdorff In May 1990, Georg
Tandler of the CSU, for instance, accused the GDR of a "lack of thankfulness."
6^Bark/Gress, p.730
239
German government agreed to pursue political unification under Article 
23 of the Basic Law and immediately turned to negotiating the terms of 
unity with the Christian-Liberal coalition in Bonn.
The State Treaty - Economic and Monetary Union
The two German states' increased sense of urgency concerning 
reunification after the East German elections on 18 March not only 
manifested itself with regard to the constitutional questions but also 
concerning the introduction of a market economy in East Germany. As 
Otto Lambsdorff expressed it: "The process of German unification will 
only become more complicated, both at home and abroad, if we lose 
time."66 Exactly two months after the East German elections, the two 
Germanies thus signed a State Treaty, which provided for economic, 
monetary and social union to take effect on 1 July 1990. In February, 
Kohl had already urged Modrow to take steps leading towards such a 
currency union. The State Treaty provided for the East German mark to 
be converted at a 1:1 exchange rate, which was more a political than an 
economic decision, however, taken by Kohl despite the Bundesbank's 
opposition.67
After the two Germanies had formed an economic and monetary 
union, the main concern was to settle the form and timing of complete 
reunification. Once again, the CSU and FDP disagreed, this time about 
the procedure of the first pan-German elections. The Christian Social 
Union suggested that the GDR deputies for a pan-German Parliament 
should be determined in separate elections after the West German 
elections had taken place. This suggestion reflected the CSU's fears of 
losing influence in a Germany that consisted of sixteen instead of eleven 
states. The Free Democrats vehemently opposed this idea on the grounds 
that there must not be deputies of a different quality in the first pan- 
German Parliament. In order to avoid simply "replacing Eastern 
patronizing by Western patronizing," free general secret elections should 
be held in both Germanies on the same day 68
66fdk 97, 13.4.90, Interview with O. Lambsdorff (SR)
b^Bark/Gress, p.724; Smith, Developments in German Politics, p.26
b^Lambsdorfrs speech at the FDP's Party Congress in Hanover, 11.-12.8.1990; 
SZ, 30.3.90, Interview with H.D.Genscher Note that the coalition in the GDR was
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Finally, an agreement was reached that pan-German elections 
would be held in December 1990. Once this procedure was agreed, and 
after the two-plus-four talks had been successfully concluded, a second 
State Treaty, concerned with the aspects of political unification, could be 
ratified by the three German Parliaments (Volkskammer, Bundestag, 
Bundesrat). This Unification Treaty regulated the ways in which the laws 
and the administration of the Federal Republic should be applied to the 
five newly constituted East German Lander. With its accession on 3 
October 1990, the German Democratic Republic ceased to exist, and 
Germany had become economically and politically reunified.
The process of German unification - External aspects
The 2+4 process
While the previous section has examined the Free Democrats' 
reaction to Kohl's sudden advances into the field of Deutschlandpolitik 
and their attempt to maintain some influence over the internal process of 
German unification, this section is concerned with the Liberals' impact on 
the external aspects of German unification. Since German policy was 
assigned to the Chancellor's Office, Genscher and the Foreign Office 
could only hope to influence the unification process by bringing in the 
foreign policy aspects, especially the relationship with the Soviet Union 
and the Polish border issue. It is to these issues that this chapter will turn 
next.
Just as with regard to the domestic issues, the external process of 
unification was characterized by competition between the Chancellor's 
Office and the Auswartiges Amt. On a number of occasions, this resulted 
in a failure of communication between Kohl, Genscher and their 
respective bureaucracies, which in return created substantial problems 
for their international partners. For instance, during the first two-plus- 
four talks in Ottawa in February 1990, Teltschik called the White House, 
leaving the impression that Kohl did not support Genscher's concept of 
such international negotiations over German unity. Most likely, 
Teltschik's motive was his fear that the two-plus-four process would
also divided over the timing of unification and the first pan-German elections. Here, the 
dispute even led to the break-up of the coalition.
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allow the Foreign Office to gain bureaucratic control over the question of 
German unity.69 Genscher reacted by calling Kohl and asking him to 
clarify his position with President Bush, which the Chancellor did.
Similarly, when Teltschik travelled to Moscow in May 1990 with 
the purpose of conducting negotiations about the GDR's economic 
obligations towards the Soviet Union, the Foreign Office was not 
informed about this trip. It only found out when Lufthansa had a question 
about Teltschik's flight and turned to the Auswartiges Amt. Competition 
between the two offices was further increased by the fact that Teltschik 
acted as Kohl's main interlocuteur with Gorbachev during the crucial 
year of 1990, meeting with the Soviet President six times during the year 
and laying the groundwork for the July agreement in the Caucasus.70
While on the one hand, the competition between the Chancellor's 
and the Foreign Office resulted in a certain degree of miscommunication 
between the two offices, on the other hand, it sparked the FDP's efforts 
to influence the external process of German unification. The Free 
Democrats for instance benefited from the fact that Kohl and Genscher 
diverged on the question of the size of the future Bundeswehr and its 
structure in Eastern Germany. Even though NATO-related issues tended 
to be assigned to the Ministry of Defence, occupied by the CDU, 
Genscher was able to make an impact by introducing his NATO plan in 
February 1990. Taking Soviet sensitivities into account, Genscher's plan 
suggested that Germany should be politically integrated into NATO, but 
that its military structures should be confined to the territory of the 
former Federal Republic. Lambsdorff explained the rationale behind the 
Foreign Minister's plan:
"We cannot achieve full membership of a reunified Germany 
in NATO if we want to achieve reunification in agreement 
with our European neighbours, including the Soviet Union."71
69Szabo, p,64
70Abendzeitung (Munchen), 21.5.90; Szabo, p. 84
71DLF, 31.1.90, Interview with O. Lambsdorff
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During the July 1990 negotiations in the Caucasus, Genscher's plan (if in 
a slightly modified version), formed the basis of the German-Soviet 
agreement that reunified Germany would remain in NATO.72
Recognition of the Oder-Neisse border
On the eve of German unification, the conflict within the German 
government over the finality of the Polish Western border also arose 
with renewed intensity. The debate centered on the question whether the 
Parliament of a unified Germany should finally and legally renounce any 
claims to revise the Oder-Neisse border or whether this should be done 
by West Germany prior to reunification. While the FDP wanted to settle 
the issue immediately, Kohl hesitated, and in contrast to other issues, 
demonstrated no readiness for compromise.
The question arises, of course, why the Federal Chancellor was so 
hesitant about a final commitment to the Western border, considering 
both the FDP's and the Western Powers' vehement call for a speedy 
solution. To begin with, as shown earlier in the chapter, while the Free 
Democrats as well as all the governments involved in the two-plus-four 
process believed that the Oder-Neisse border should be finally 
acknowledged, the Union argued that only an all-German government 
could formally renounce any change in the postwar German border. The 
Chancellor also avoided a final statement on the Oder-Neisse border for 
fear of alienating a big faction in the Union, namely the expellees from 
the former German territories that were now Polish. Certainly, Kohl's 
hesitance was also related to the Union's fear of losing even more votes to 
the Republikaner who had gained in votes when the process of German 
unification started and who argued that the Western Polish territories 
must be returned to Germany. Lastly, as Stephen Szabo has suggested, 
Kohl probably wanted to keep the issue of the Polish border as a reserve 
for bargaining.73
72Note that after some controversies between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry 
of Defence over the Genscher plan (with Stoltenberg postulating the possibility to
station Bundeswehr soldiers on East German territory after unification), on 19 
February 1990, the Foreign Ministry had scored an initial victory over the Ministry of 
Defence when the federal government officially accepted Genscher's plan. In the end, 
however, the Foreign Minister's plan was somewhat modified, since Gorbachev did 
agree to the deployment of German forces under NATO command on the territory of 
the former GDR, after the Soviet Union had withdrawn from East Germany.
73Szabo, pp.72-73; Die Welt, 28.2.90
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However, Kohl was also aware of the issue of reparations when he 
dealt with the Polish border resolution. After returning from his talks 
with President Bush in Camp David in February 1990, Kohl proposed a 
guarantee of the Polish border if Poland once more renounced all 
reparation claims from the Second World War and guaranteed the rights 
of the German minority remaining in Poland. This linkage between the 
Polish Western border and the reparation issue reflected Kohl's desire to 
achieve a quick, comprehensive agreement rather than settling the 
question in prolonged negotiations that would result in ever expanding 
reparation claims from all kinds of countries.74 By early 1990, both 
Yugoslavia and Rumania had approached the Federal Republic with 
requests to discuss reparations.
Typically, given the competition between the Chancellor's and the 
Foreign Office that characterized the whole unification process, Kohl did 
not discuss this controversial linkage between the border issue and 
reparations with Genscher who had not accompanied Kohl to Camp 
David. While the FDP agreed that national requests for reparation had to 
be rejected, it did not agree with the linkage between the reparation and 
border issues. After all, as both Genscher and Lambsdorff pointed out, 
the Polish government had already declared in August 1953 in a binding 
manner that it renounced any reparation claims towards the two 
Germanies. Why, argued the FDP, should Bonn doubt the sincerity of 
Poland's statement and risk a renewed discussion about the topic?75
As the domestic debate about the Oder-Neisse border and the two- 
plus-four talks evolved, it became increasingly clear that the Chancellor 
would have to drop his position if unification were to be achieved. For 
one thing, the Free Democrats had already enjoyed Parliament's official 
backing for their position since November 1989 when the Bundestag had 
passed a resolution affirming that the West German government would 
not try to revise Poland's Western border. For another thing, by early 
1990, Kohl was not only facing opposition from his coalition partner but 
also from the Four Powers. The British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher complained that Germany's commitments to the Oder-Neisse 
border were not binding enough, and after Kohl's encounter with 
President Bush in February 1990, the US President also insisted that the
?4szabo, p.73
?5ZDF, 4.3.90, Interview with H.D.Genscher; SZ, 5.3.90
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Germans commit themselves to the Polish border sooner rather than 
later. The Free Democrats expressed their disapproval of Kohl's 
ambiguity as follows:
"It is generally regretted that the federal government and 
especially the Federal Chancellor are not creating the clarity 
which is necessary in the Americans' view."76
During the first week of March 1990, the Liberals raised the issue 
to the level of a crisis, suggesting that the coalition might break up over 
it. The crisis was resolved when the cabinet decided to accept the FDP's 
position and agreed that both German parliaments would declare the 
inviolability of the Polish border "as soon as possible" after the East 
German elections in March 1990. The cabinet also agreed to Poland's 
representation at the two-plus-four talks when Poland was affected. 
Indeed, three months after the East German elections, both German 
Parliaments passed with large majorities resolutions recognizing Poland's 
Western border as inviolable. It was also arranged that a final German- 
Polish treaty on the Oder-Neisse border should be signed after German 
unification, which duly happened on 17 July 1991.
Overall, Kohl's tactics on the Polish border had exaggerated the 
importance of the border issue within Germany itself, since neither any 
of the major parties nor much of the German public really wanted to 
revise the Oder-Neisse line. The main beneficiaries from the Chancellor's 
ambiguity were the Liberals who had used the domestic and international 
support for a swift recognition of the Polish Western border for 
advancing their own position and for distinguishing themselves as an 
indispensable corrective in the coalition with the Christian Democrats.
Despite the Free Democrats' impact on the Polish border issue, the 
fact remained that the Union under Kohl had played a very prominent 
role in the process of German unification and that the FDP's image as the 
party of national issues and detente had been challenged more strongly in 
the late 1980s than ever before during the Christian-Liberal coalition. 
The last section of this chapter will consequently address the question of 
how the Free Democrats coped with this new situation during the first 
pan-German election campaign, which was very strongly dominated by 
the theme of German unification.
76DLF, 27.2.90, Interview with O. Lambsdorff; Die Welt, 28.2.90
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The first pan-German elections of 1990 - Genscher’s 
importance for the Liberal campaign
The election campaign
In many ways, the Liberals actually benefited from the linkage 
between the elections and the issue of unification, for instance because of 
the general positive public mood associated with unification. It is 
noteworthy, however, that throughout the year 1990, it had not always 
been so clear that a positive attitude towards unification would aid the 
governing coalition in the 1990 election campaign. Quite on the contrary, 
in the spring of 1990, many Germans had still thought that the 
government's unification politics was too hasty and identified with 
Lafontaine's warnings that unification would cost too much. At this stage, 
Lafontaine had been leading in the polls compared with Chancellor Kohl, 
and the race between the governing and the opposition parties was still 
wide open.
The introduction of the Economic and Currency Union on 1 July 
1990 had marked a turning point in public opinion, however. Largely 
due to the government's ability to take action and put forward initiatives, 
there was a growing sense by the summer of 1990 that Genscher's and 
Kohl's reunification policy was the better course and that the coalition 
was more capable of managing reunification and economic reconstruction 
in the East.77 This growing support for the governing parties and the 
declining support for Lafontaine and the SPD expressed itself in terms of 
public opinion figures as follows: while at the beginning of 1990, "only" 
around 70% of the West German and 80% of the East German population 
had been in favour of a unified German state, by September 1990, 
support for unification had risen to around 90% in both parts of the 
country. What was more, by August 1990, 90% of the Germans expected 
a victory for the present government which meant that the election race 
was nearly over.78
The governing coalition furthermore benefited from the SPD's 
failure to take up the issue of unification in its actual election campaign. 
The Social Democrats' promise to modernize Germany by leading it onto
77yeen, p.68
78yeen, p.50
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a socially and ecologically responsible road ("The New Road") might 
have worked under different national circumstances, but in face of 
unification simply failed to address the issue that most moved the 
electorate. The Union and the Free Democrats in contrast nearly 
exclusively concentrated on unification in their election campaign. The 
Christian Democrats, for instance, portrayed Kohl as the undisputed 
architect of German unity. Similarly, Genscher contrasted the Liberals' 
positive approach to unification with Lafontaine's continued warnings 
about its likely negative consequences by stressing: "Germany unification 
does not create a problem - it solves it."79
The Free Democrats' manifesto for the 1990 elections also 
illustrated the priority the Liberals gave to the issues of German 
unification and peace. The manifesto's first section, called "Peace," dealt 
with foreign policy issues and occupied fourteen pages out of a total of 
ninety. The party finally agreed to the manifesto at its party congress 
from 29-30 September 1990 in Niimberg, at which a majority of the 
Free Democrats also approved of the decision to continue the existing 
coalition with the Christian Democrats, provided (much to the CSU's 
dismay) that Genscher would remain Foreign Minister. Overall, the 
Union's and the Free Democrats' election campaigns were in harmony 
with the climate of public opinion and simultaneously reinforced it.80
In addition to support from the German public, the Free Democrats 
also benefited from unusual internal harmony during the run-up to the 
1990 elections, partly stemming from the unification of the East and West 
German Liberal parties earlier in the year. Just as the proximity of the 
first Bundestag elections in 1949 had put pressure on the Westem-zone 
Liberal parties to form the FDP in 1948, so the increased likelihood of 
unification and pan-German elections had given renewed impetus to the 
idea of creating a single all-German Liberal party in 1990. The East- and 
West German Liberal parties actually unified at a pre-election party 
convention from 11-12 August in Hanover, expanding the party executive 
to give the East German Liberals an adequate representation. As
79fdk 113, 29.4.90
SORadunski, p .45
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Lambsdorff pointed out proudly, both in 1861 and in 1990, the Liberals 
had been the first to found a pan-German party.81
The Free Democrats were well aware, however, that in addition to 
the advantages of unusual party unity and strong public support for 
unification, they also needed to develop an independent profile. As it 
became obvious that the opposition had no real chance of winning the 
election, the FDP increasingly employed its traditional strategy of 
pointing out that anybody who wanted to avoid an absolute Union 
majority and who cared about Hans-Dietrich Genscher's remaining in 
office needed to vote for the Liberals. Furthermore, much to the Union's 
dismay, the Free Democrats ran the election campaign on the promise 
that there would be no tax raises associated with unification because of 
the likely immense strain on the German economy from such a 
measure.82
Most importantly, however, the Liberals decided to focus their 
campaign on their leading personalities rather than on the whole Free 
Democratic Party. Given Hans-Dietrich Genscher's close association with 
unification and his continued polling as Germany's most popular 
politician, and given Otto Lambsdorff s reputation as "the Pope of the 
market economy," the Liberal election campaign focused on Genscher 
and Lambsdorff, especially in terms of speeches at major rallies, 
television and radio broadcasts, and press advertising.83 Concerning the 
Foreign Minister, the emphasis was on his achievements in global 
diplomacy, as Lambsdorff expressed it at the FDP's pre-election 
convention in August 1990:
"I do not know whether you, Hans-Dietrich, would win the first 
prize in a beauty contest, but you guarantee that the image of the 
ugly German will not reappear in the world."84
81 Roberts, The Free Democratic Party and the New Germany, p. 156; Lambsdorff s 
speech at the FDP's Party Congress in Hanover, 11.-12.8.1990 Lambsdorff was 
elected chairman of the enlarged party.
82fdk 363, 30.11.90, Interview with O. Lambsdorff (SAT 1); fdk 326, 8.11.90
^Roberts, The Free Democratic Party and the New Germany, p. 159; Die Zeit,
16.11.90
84stuttgarter Nachrichten, 30.11.90; Lambsdorff's speech at the FDP's Party 
Congress in Hanover, 11.-12.8.1990
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Aware of the Union's substantial contributions to unification, the 
Liberals ran the campaign by attempting clearly to split the bonus 
between themselves and the CDU/CSU. In concrete terms, this meant that 
the FDP publicly acknowledged Kohl's contribution to unification by 
introducing the Ten Point Plan and by removing Moscow's objections to 
unified Germany's remaining in NATO during the German-Soviet 
encounter in the Caucasus in July 1990. For the most part, however, the 
Liberals focused on Hans-Dietrich Genscher's merits during the process 
of German unification.
To begin with, the FDP emphasized that Genscher had shown 
visionary traits by being the first Western statesman publicly to 
acknowledge the chances inherent in Gorbachev's reform process. The 
Free Democrats furthermore pointed to Genscher's key role in the 
release of the East German citizens from West Germany's embassy in 
Prague in September 1989. In terms of the external process of German 
unification, the three central Liberal triumphs were Genscher's quick 
embrace of the two-plus-four talks, the Foreign Minister's imaginative 
proposals concerning Germany's future commitment to NATO and his 
insistence on a rapid solution to the question of the Oder-Neisse border.85
In addition, the Liberals benefited in this election campaign from a 
generally favourable evaluation of Genscher's role in the process of 
unification by much of the national and international press. While for 
some time, Kohl had been more popular with the Western powers than 
Genscher, by the time of unification, this was no longer the case. The 
Chancellor's reluctance to acknowledge Poland's Oder-Neisse border for 
so long had raised doubts among his allies about Kohl's qualifications as 
Statesman. The International Herald Tribune, for instance, commented:
"(Kohl) is a loyal ally and a good European, as he keeps 
repeating in honest surprise that anyone might doubt it. He just 
does not see very far...Mr. Genscher...has a broader sense of the 
need to work with his allies and neighbours in reorganizing 
Europe, with Germany at its heart instead of at the front 
line..."86
85Roberts, The Free Democratic Party and the New Germany, p. 147
86IHT, 12.3.90 See also IHT, 21.7.90; Die Weltwoche (Zurich), 26.7.90; Time,
30.7.90
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Despite the Union's strong profile as 'Wiedervereinigungspartei,' the 
Free Democrats had thus managed quite well to stress their contribution 
to unification.
One last bonus the FDP was able to exploit in the election 
campaign, given the predominance of the issue of unification, were the 
East German roots of leading Liberal politicians, such as Genscher's 
origins in Halle and Wolfgang Mischick's roots in Dresden. In November 
1990, Genscher and Lambsdorff travelled through the five new German 
states, campaigning for the East Germans to vote for the Liberals on 2 
December 1990. Many East Germans celebrated Genscher as the 
"architect of German unity," and Genscher skilfully pursued the "we" 
approach: "we who have been bom in the Eastern part of Germany must 
know that we are just as industrious, intelligent and creative as the West 
Germans."87 Genscher furthermore exploited his East German heritage 
by inviting the French, English, US and Soviet Foreign Ministers to his 
hometown Halle. Roland Dumas was the first to take up Genscher's 
invitation, followed by Douglas Hurd in October 1990. When Eduard 
Shevardnadze came on 12 November 1990, he even assured his "great 
friend Hans-Dietrich Genscher that I will contribute to his election 
campaign from today onwards."88
The outcome of the elections
The striking focus on unification during the 1990 election 
campaign was directly reflected in its outcome, since all those who had 
taken a positive approach towards German unification were rewarded and 
those who had not were punished. The Free Democrats' election result of 
11% (10.6% in West Germany and 12.9% in East Germany) delighted 
even the most optimistic Liberal campaigners. Reaching nearly thirteen 
percent in the Eastern regions meant that the FDP had more than doubled 
its share of the vote in East Germany. In Halle Altstadt, the FDP had even 
won a seat outright with 34.5 % of the first ballot. Overall, the Liberals 
had taken votes from the Social Democrats and the Greens but had made
87Genscher cited in Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 22.11.90
^ S h e v a r d n a d z e  cited in SZ, 12.11.90 Note that James Baker was the last Foreign 
Minister of the Four Powers to visit Halle on 19 June 1991.
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their greatest gains from CDU voters.89 Nevertheless, the Christian 
Democrats were also pleased with their result of 43.8%, especially in 
contrast to the Social Democrats who had only gained 33.5% of the votes. 
The Greens and the Republikaner had not even won enough votes to make 
it into Parliament.
Generally, the coalition negotiations in 1990-91 were not 
particularly dramatic even though the FDP's result had increased the 
relative strength of the party within the coalition, both in relation to the 
CDU and the CSU. Genscher contentedly remarked that the results 
reflected the FDP's contribution to German politics since the last 
elections, which according to the Foreign Minister had been far greater 
than the party's arithmetical representation.90 The policy negotiations 
were carried out partly by working groups, and there were few really 
serious issues of contention among the three parties involved. The main 
problem was the FDP's announcement that there would be no election of 
a Chancellor without previous agreement on providing a "low-tax area" 
status for former East Germany. Theodor Waigel, Minister of Finance, 
and the rest of the CSU were opposed to such concessions, but a face- 
saving formula was eventually found, and the Christian-Liberal coalition 
could start into the new decade.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that, in contrast with the Social-Liberal 
coalition under Schmidt, the Free Democrats benefited much more 
strongly from the constellations of domestic politics between 1982 and 
1990. This is not to say, however, that the Liberals did not face a number 
of new challenges in the Christian-Liberal coalition, such as Horst 
Teltschik's appointment as foreign policy adviser in the Chancellor's 
office, the CSU's claims as junior coalition partner, the Union's ongoing 
reticence towards Ostpolitik and Kohl's sudden advance into the field of 
German policy with his Ten-Point Plan. But it has also been attempted to 
show how and why the Free Democrats were nevertheless able to make
89Veen, p.64
90Der Spiegel, 3.12.90, Interview with H.D.Genscher
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use of the domestic situation after 1982 for exerting disproportionate 
influence over Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik during this decade.
First, in contrast to its coalition with Schmidt, the FDP's grip on 
foreign policy was now much stronger, (1) because of the good personal 
relations between Kohl and Genscher, and (2) because Kohl's limited 
interest and experience in the field of foreign policy complemented 
perfectly with Foreign Minister Genscher's growing recognition and 
expertise.
Second, even though the CSU's participation in the government 
could easily have posed a threat to the FDP's influence, the Free 
Democrats were able to avoid any serious damage with the help of Kohl's 
style of leadership and their special function in the German party system. 
On the one hand, the fact that the Christian Social Union and the Free 
Democratic Party shared their relatively small size and their aspiration 
to the posts of Minister of Economics and Foreign Minister, could have 
had a harmful effect on the FDP's role. Given the Union's dependence on 
the Liberals for forming and continuing the Christian-Liberal coalition, 
and considering Genscher's growing reputation as guarantor of continuity 
in German foreign policy, the post of Foreign Minister was safely 
occupied by the Liberals, however.
On the other hand, the Free Democrats could have suffered from 
the many differences with the CSU - such as the parties' contrasting 
foreign policy rationale and the personality clash between their respective 
leaders Straub and Genscher. However, in the many controversies with 
the Union's right wing and the CSU over the government's Ostpolitik, the 
FDP again benefited from Kohl's style of leadership since the 
Chancellor's strategy was to avoid any commitments towards either side 
for as long as possible before endorsing the Liberals' position in the end. 
Even though the group around Kohl largely agreed with Genscher's 
German- and Ostpolitik, this strategy made the Liberals appear as the 
victors in many coalition haggles. The FDP furthermore made clever use 
of the CSU's right-wing positions by portraying itself as necessary 
moderating influence on the coalition.
The fact that the parliamentary opposition was now made up of 
Social Democrats was also of advantage for the FDP. The traditional 
Social-Liberal agreement on Ostpolitik and German policy continued, and 
since the Union by now had also embarked on a course of detente with 
Eastern Europe, parliamentary consensus on German policy was
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unusually high between 1982 and 1989. The Social Democrats clearly 
acknowledged the Free Democrats' role as guarantor for continuity of 
Ostpolitik in the new government. We have also seen that, concerning 
matters of defence, where for much of the 1980s parliamentary consensus 
could not be achieved, the Free Democrats were nevertheless able to 
exploit two bonuses: on the one hand, despite inner-German debates, the 
Liberals' views tended to be closer to the Social Democrats than the 
Union's which allowed them to act as mediator between government and 
opposition. On the other hand, the Free Democrats benefited from strong 
public support for their positions on SDI, the INF treaty and the 
modernization of short-range nuclear missiles in 1989.
Generally, the German public's anti-nuclear sentiments during the 
1980s and the FDP's argument for avoiding a renewed arms race 
interacted favourably with each other, making it difficult to classify the 
Free Democrats as either 'followers' or 'leaders' of public opinion. 
However, public support for the FDP also manifested itself with regard 
to Genscher's early call to take Gorbachev seriously and to initiate a new 
phase of detente with Eastern Europe. Concerning their early trust in 
Gorbachev, the Liberals had proved to be 'leaders' of public opinion 
after 1986.
Lastly, the personal importance of Hans-Dietrich Genscher for the 
Free Democratic Party during the Christian-Liberal coalition should be 
addressed. Apart from Genscher's growing expertise and reputation, the 
Foreign Minister represented nearly all aspects that aided the Free 
Democrats' survival in the German party system: the FDP used his 
function as Foreign Minister as bargaining chip in all coalition 
negotiations and ran every election campaign between 1983 and 1990 at 
least partly on Genscher's personality. Genscher furthermore embodied 
the FDP's functions as moderating force, corrective and guarantor of 
continuity in German foreign policy. When the Liberals' profile as the 
party of Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik was strongly challenged by the 
Union at the end of the decade, it was once again the Foreign Minister's 
contribution that allowed the Free Democrats to retain an important role 
in the process of unification, which in return positively influenced the 
outcome of the first pan-German elections in December 1990.
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This study has attempted first to answer the question how the FDP 
under Hans-Dietrich Genscher could come to have a disproportionally 
strong effect on German Ostpolitik and second to define the constraints 
on the FDP's freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy between 1974 and 
1990. The answer to these questions can best be found by examining the 
findings pertaining to the three parameters that were introduced at the 
beginning of the thesis - international relations, domestic politics and 
liberal ideology.
The following steps will be taken in the course of this chapter. 
First, an examination will be made of the interaction between 
international relations and the FDP's foreign policy in the 1970s and 
1980s. Given the intense external constraints on the Federal Republic's 
foreign policy for more than forty years, the investigation will also focus 
on how the Free Democrats have reacted to the new international system 
since the end of the Cold War. Second, we shall look at the impact of 
domestic politics on the FDP's Ostpolitik between 1974 and 1990 and 
address the question of whether the relationship between the domestic 
context and Liberal foreign policy, as analysed in this dissertation, is a 
specific characteristic of German politics, or whether it exists in a similar 
version in other Western European countries. Third, the link between 
liberal values and foreign policy will be considered, both by attempting 
to determine the special characteristics of German liberal foreign policy 
through international comparison and by assessing the overall 
compatibility of the FDP's various principles and some of the dilemmas 
inherent in liberal ideology.
International relations and German foreign policy
Two main and related conclusions emerge from investigating the 
interaction between international relations and German foreign policy 
between 1974 and 1990. Firstly, that during the 1970s, the international 
constraints on the Free Democrats' room for manoeuvre were much 
stronger than during the 1980s, as the goals of Liberal Ostpolitik were 
more 'incompatible' with the structures and opportunities of the 
international system. Secondly, that while Germany's external framework 
set a tight framework for the Free Democrats' foreign policy, it 
simultaneously allowed for a number of specific FDP (Genscher)
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initiatives to have some impact on East-West relations. In line with the 
generally improved international climate during the Christian-Liberal 
coalition, the FDP's ability to contribute to international relations was 
much greater during the 1980s than during the 1970s.
Before turning to the findings of Chapters Three and Six in more 
detail, it should be stressed again that - concerning the impact of 
international constraints on the FDP's Ostpolitik, Germany's external 
environment usually affected West Germany as a whole and not only 
individual parties. Nevertheless, this study has found that occasionally, 
international factors did specifically affect the Free Democratic Party, 
and that an analysis of Germany's external constraints has been essential 
for defining and explaining the FDP's room for manoeuvre in foreign 
policy.
International constraints on the FDP's Ostpolitik, 1974-1990
This study has shown (1) that the FDP's room for manoeuvre in 
Ostpolitik between 1974 and 1990 was to a high degree determined by the 
compatibility of its foreign policy goals with the aspirations of the 
respective superpower leadership in the White House and the Kremlin, 
and (2) that the impact of superpower leadership on the Free Democrats 
was much more favourable during the Christian-Liberal than during the 
Social-Liberal coalition. For most of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the 
FDP's efforts for constructive relations with Eastern Europe were 
constrained by the Nixon/Ford administrations' lack of enthusiasm for the 
CSCE negotiations in Helsinki, by the Soviet Union's build-up of 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles and Jimmy Carter's human rights 
campaign after 1977, and by President Reagan's determination to contain 
the Soviet aggressor with the help of US military strength during the 
early years of his Administration.
After the Christian-Liberal coalition's assumption of power in 
1982, however, several changes in the US and Soviet leadership greatly 
increased the FDP's capacities for action in Ostpolitik. Concerning 
Washington's foreign policy, the Free Democrats' policy of detente 
towards Eastern Europe was aided both by the Reagan administration's 
switch from a confrontational policy towards Moscow to a much more 
lenient approach and by the growing realization that President Reagan's 
rhetoric was much more fierce than his actual politics. In addition to the
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changes in US foreign policy, the Free Democrats also benefited from 
Gorbachev's economic and social reforms after his assumption of power 
in the Kremlin, and from the fact that Hans-Dietrich Genscher was the 
first Western statesman to voice his belief in the new Soviet leader's 
sincerity.
This study has also shown that the FDP's desire for progress in 
inner-German relations between 1974 and 1989 greatly depended on the 
overall superpower climate, although inner-German relations tended to 
be affected by the international developments somewhat belatedly. After 
the onset of the Second Cold War in the late 1970s, for instance, Bonn 
and East Berlin succeeded in shielding inner-German cooperation from 
the superpower crisis for some time, but by 1984, Washington's and 
Moscow's objections to such close inner-German cooperation effectively 
blocked further progress. Similarly, in the mid- and late 1980s, inner- 
German relations were again out of tune with the (by then improving) 
superpower climate for a while, since for fear of survival, East Germany 
now prevented any further contact with the Federal Republic. However, 
the German Democratic Republic eventually caught up with the 
developments in the East-West climate, this time to Bonn's and the FDP's 
advantage, because precisely the lack of economic and social reform in 
the GDR made the changes more drastic when they happened in 1989.
In addition to the international constraints on inner-German 
relations, the FDP's freedom of manoeuvre in Ostpolitik between 1974 
and 1990 was limited by the politics of 'linkage' in the Atlantic alliance. 
The concept of linkage greatly influenced the FDP because the Free 
Democrats directly depended on Western backing for securing West 
Berlin's status and for progress on the national question, which was 
apparent both during the negotiations in Helsinki and during the process 
of German unification. Equally, the Free Democrats were aware that 
NATO's military and political support for the Federal Republic was 
directly linked with Bonn's loyalty towards the alliance and the West. By 
switching coalition partners in 1982, the FDP played an important role in 
backing the 1983 deployment of US Pershing missiles in West Germany.
The issue of the 'linkage' between Bonn's support for NATO and 
its freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy also leads to another 
conclusion of this thesis, namely that although Germany's international 
environment set a tight framework for the Free Democrats' foreign 
policy between 1974 and 1990, it nevertheless allowed for a number of
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specific FDP contributions to have some impact on East-West relations, 
much more so during the 1980s than during the 1970s.
The FDP's contributions to international relations
Despite the Federal Republic's dependence on NATO, this study has 
also shown that membership in the Western alliances was an important 
instrument in Bonn's foreign policy-making. Precisely via its firm 
commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and to the EC, the Federal Republic 
successfully reduced international fears of a renewed strong German role 
in world affairs, and thereby increased its capacities for action in foreign 
policy. We have also seen that Germany's membership in NATO became 
of particular importance for the FDP's foreign policy in the later half of 
the 1980s. By asserting their opposition to the modernization of NATO's 
short-range nuclear missiles in 1989 first against the Christian Democrats 
and then against their NATO partners, the Free Democrats utilized the 
Atlantic Alliance for fostering the pro-Gorbachev course on which they 
had embarked since the mid-1980s. Similarly, as Jeffrey Anderson and 
John Goodman have pointed out, Germany heavily relied on its link with 
international institutions during the process of German unification, using 
German support for NATO to reassure the United States, German 
membership in the EC to reassure Great Britain and France and German 
support for a strengthened CSCE to soothe the worst Soviet fears.1
Even more significantly than NATO, European Political 
Cooperation has been an important instrument of foreign policy-making 
for Bonn, and in particular for the Free Democratic Party. Apart from 
enhancing the Federal Republic's international legitimacy via the 
'European label,' EPC has allowed Germany to achieve a balance between 
its commitment to the United States and to detente. As Reinhardt Rummel 
and Wolfgang Wessels have pointed out, EPC has provided Bonn with an 
'alibi function' in a number of foreign policy controversies with 
Washington:
"EPC was and is a highly useful framework for diverting
conflicting pressure away from Bonn and transferring it to an
1 Anderson/Goodman cited in Keohane/Nye, p. 10
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anonymous body where the respective blame can be put on the 
'group' or on other partners."2
For instance during the conflict over Afghanistan in 1980 and during the 
debate over European participation in Reagan's SDI project, EPC has 
allowed the Federal Republic to pursue the continuation of detente 
without risking an open conflict with the White House. The higher the 
intensity of the East-West conflict was, the more useful the EPC 
mechanism has been for Bonn.
Bonn's call for a more regular exchange of views on security 
matters within the EPC was certainly also partly motivated by Germany's 
national interest to gain a greater say in European security policy.3 The 
Free Democrats also efficiently utilized EPC to strenghten Bonn's 
influence in international organizations, such as the UN General 
Assembly, and in international negotiations, especially during the various 
phases of the CSCE. Lastly, as Rummel and Wessels have pointed out, 
EPC has provided great opportunities for certain political actors, 
"...especially the FDP Foreign Ministers" to exercise personal influence 
in foreign policy.4 Through the intensive and confidential personal 
contacts within the EPC framework, Genscher has been able to formulate 
and initiate his foreign policy, which has in return strengthened his 
personal position at home.
In addition to the Federal Republic's use of its membership in the 
various Western alliances for foreign policy-making, Bonn also relied on 
'positive' economic leverage for fostering its relations with Eastern 
Europe. Although economic leverage was not exclusively employed by 
the Free Democrats, it was a central aspect of German Ostpolitik and will 
be considered here for the following three reasons. Firstly, the Federal 
Republic's economic and financial power substantially contributed to the 
achievement of its goals in Ostpolitik, i.e. improving the travel facilities 
for East German citizens, effecting permission for large numbers of 
ethnic Germans to emigrate from Eastern Europe, and increasing 
France's and the European Commission's support for German unification
2Rummel/Wessels, p.40
3The Genscher/Colombo initiative of 1981, for instance, called for a legal EPC
framework for security questions.
4Rummel/Wessels, p.50
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by announcing Germany's unwavering support for European Monetary 
Union in 1990.
Secondly, it is noteworthy that over time, the use of positive 
economic leverage became such an important and successful element of 
the Federal Republic's foreign policy that Bonn increasingly refused to 
succumb to outside pressure in this realm. This was for instance apparent 
in 1982 when Bonn united with its EC partners in resisting Washington's 
embargo on high technology exports to Moscow. Thirdly, in line with the 
FDP's much greater involvement in international relations in the 1980s 
and with Genscher's early support for Gorbachev, the Free Democrats 
took the initiative in positive economic leverage in 1989 by requesting 
that Western Europe develop a 'Marshall Plan' for Eastern Europe 
immediately. This suggestion contrasted with the view, held by many 
Western statesmen and the majority of Christian Democrats, that 
economic aid to Eastern Europe should only be granted after the reforms 
had safely been implemented.
Lastly, the Free Democrats were able to contribute to international 
relations during the 1970s and 1980s through their concentration on the 
issue of human rights. A central achievement in this area was the 
inclusion of Basket III in the Final Act of Helsinki, which is interesting 
for a number of reasons. Although the German approach to the CSCE 
had of course been modified by the attitudes of its negotiating partners, 
the West German Foreign Ministry (under the guidance of Free 
Democrat Guido Brunner) nevertheless phrased the first draft of all EC 
members in the humanitarian area, carried the main burden of the 
negotiations and overall put a distinctive emphasis on the theme of human 
contacts. Given the international and geopolitical constraints on West 
Germany's ability openly to advocate freedom and human rights in 
Eastern Europe, the fact that Basket III had made the issue of human 
rights into an international agenda was also very much in Bonn's and the 
FDP's interest.
Furthermore, although dissidents in Eastern Europe had always 
fought for human rights, the effect of Basket III on the internal stability 
of the Communist regimes was much stronger than either the East or the 
West had expected. The two years after the Final Act saw the rise of a 
number of dissident movements in Eastern Europe, and even though such 
liberalizing effects were increasingly stifled by the Communist regimes 
from about 1977 onwards, arguably, Basket III had initiated some more
260
long-term changes. After all, all participating states had voluntarily 
committed themselves to the humanitarian principles in the Final Act, 
thereby removing the taboo from issues like greater freedom of ideas and 
movement. Overall, with its strategy of small steps, the Helsinki of 
human contacts, and its efforts for extending travel between East and 
West, the Free Democratic Party contributed to increasing the Eastern 
European people's awareness of the attractions in the West.
The FDP's foreign policy since the end of the Cold War
Looked at overall, the question arises how the Free Democrats, 
whose foreign policy actions have been so strongly determined by the 
external framework for more than forty years, have reacted to the end of 
the Cold War and the resulting changes in the international system. Given 
the expiration of the Soviet threat and the survival of just one 
superpower, the Federal Republic's room for manoeuvre has no longer 
been constrained by the superpower climate, and similarly, the problems 
and dependencies resulting from Germany's national division have ended 
with unification. Only Bonn's network of alliances has provided an 
element of continuity, and united Germany has taken on the same 
institutional commitments which the Federal Republic has held since 
1949. Given the discontinuity in Germany's external framework after 
1989, it seems necessary to take a look at the FDP's foreign policy since 
unification. Have the Free Democrats attempted to steer a more 
independent course, if necessary at the cost of Germany's institutional 
commitments, or has the Federal Republic relied on the one factor of 
continuity, its network of alliances?
A problematic issue since the end of the Cold War has been the 
FDP's ambiguity concerning Germany's status in the new Europe. Along 
with many other German politicians, the Free Democrats have found it 
difficult openly to express that through unification, the Federal Republic 
has gained more power and typically stated at their party congress in 
1991: "Liberals do not want more power for Germany, but more 
responsibility."5 In terms of concrete politics, this ambivalent attitude 
towards power was clearly apparent during the Gulf War, when Bonn's
5FDP's 'Liberal foreign policy for united Germany,' decided at the FDP's 
BundeshauptausschuB in Hamburg, 25.5.1991
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reluctance to take on greater international responsibilities other than 
financial ones and Genscher's vague position on the question of self- 
determination for Kuwait (after the Liberals had so strongly promoted 
self-determination in the context of German unification) caused negative 
reactions from the international community.6
On the other hand, the FDP's reluctance to acknowledge Germany's 
greater responsibility has contrasted markedly with certain independent 
foreign political initiatives, which have also caused some international 
irritation. Firstly, there is Bonn's unilateral initiative (strongly backed by 
Foreign Minister Genscher) in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, 
only two days after agreeing on a collective EC procedure for 
occupation. Secondly, the Free Democrats have continued to pursue an 
active Ostpolitik, which has manifested itself in the conclusion of bilateral 
treaties with several former Communist states and in Germany's pressing 
for multilateral aid to the USSR and the new democracies in Eastern 
Europe.7 This German push for an extension of economic and political 
relations with Eastern Europe has not necessarily been equally shared by 
the Federal Republic's various alliance partners and has consequently 
encountered resistance from the United States, Britain and Japan.
In this context, a third - though only potentially - problematic 
aspect of German foreign policy since unification should be addressed. 
On the one hand, since 1990, Bonn's and the FDP's various foreign 
policy concerns - military and economic security, good relations with 
both West and  East - have been compatible in a way that was 
inconceivable during the Cold War. On the other hand, the Free 
Democrats seem to have given little thought to the fact that the post - 
Cold War integrationist effort may ultimately render some of Germany's 
various memberships in the European Community, the Western European 
Union and NATO incompatible with each other.
Apart from the Federal Republic's ambiguity about its new 
international role after the end of the Cold War, it should also be stressed 
that in several ways, German foreign policy has not changed since 1990: 
(1), Bonn has conducted nearly all foreign policy actions within its 
institutional framework and (2), the Free Democrats have continued to 
assume a middle position between the Union and the SPD on a number of
6Gutjahr, p.89
7SAT 1, 16.7.91, Interview with H.D.Genscher
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foreign policy issues. With regard to NATO, however, there has been 
remarkable consensus between the German government and opposition 
that although reforms were needed, there was no substitute to a continued 
(if scaled-down) presence of US military forces in Germany. Similar, 
though somewhat less concrete domestic consensus has existed over the 
indispensability and complementarity of the WEU and the CSCE.
In the debate whether German troops should be able to participate 
in military actions under the United Nations and/or other collective 
auspices, the Free Democrats have assumed a middle position: while the 
FDP shared the Union's view that Germany should be committed to more 
than peacekeeping missions, the Free Democrats agreed with the SPD that 
the issue required constitutional clarification, and that Germany could 
only participate in UN-sanctioned out-of area missions.8 Despite the 
Federal Republic's strong continued commitment to NATO, WEU and 
CSCE, there was little evidence of German leadership in the reform 
efforts under way in these three institutions, a situation that contrasted 
markedly with Bonn's role in the European Community.
Concerning the Federal Republic's leading role in the drive for 
European political and monetary union, it seems noteworthy that even 
Germany's continued economic interest in the European Community 
cannot fully account for the strong integrationist initiative in Bonn. After 
all, many of the reform proposals -such as the FDP's call for a European 
Parliament directly accountable to the European peoples and elected by 
proportional representation - aim at strengthening the EC at the expense 
of national sovereignty, including Germany itself.9 As Anderson and 
Goodman have pointed out, Bonn's and the FDP's pacesetter role in the 
push for European economic and political union can probably best be 
explained by the fact that over the last forty years, Germany's reliance on 
a web of international institutions to achieve its foreign policy goals has 
become so complete that Bonn's institutional commitments have become 
an integral part of the Federal Republic's foreign policy.10
In general, this dissertation has shown that Germany's external 
environment is of essential importance for assessing the main question at
8Anderson/Goodman, pp.47-48
9Gutjahr, p.87
l°Anderson/Goodman, p.60
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stake in this study, namely how the FDP's capacities for action in 
Ostpolitik between 1974 and 1990 can be both explained and defined. The 
next section will consider another parameter which has proved vital in 
answering the research questions posed in this thesis.
Domestic context
Concerning the impact of domestic politics on the FDP's foreign 
policy under Hans-Dietrich Genscher between 1974 and 1990, two main 
points will be considered. Firstly, Chapters Four and Seven have shown 
that the domestic context had nearly the opposite effect on Liberal 
foreign policy before and after 1982: during their coalition with the 
Social Democrats, the domestic factors frequently constrained the Free 
Democrats' room for manoeuvre, while during the Christian-Liberal 
coalition, the FDP was able to exploit most of the domestic-political 
constellations to its advantage. The second point which will be addressed 
here is the question of how the generally favourable link between 
German domestic politics and the FDP's Ostpolitik holds up by 
international comparison. More specifically, the question is whether - 
compared to other Western European liberal parties - the relationship 
between the domestic context and Liberal foreign policy as analysed in 
this dissertation, is a specific characteristic of German politics, or 
whether it exists in a similar version in other Western European 
countries.
The domestic context and Liberal Ostpolitik, 1974-1990
Regarding the first point, that is the impact of domestic politics on 
Liberal Ostpolitik before and after 1982, this thesis has found that in 
terms of the distribution of power between the Chancellor's and the 
Foreign Office, the Free Democrats enjoyed far greater room for 
manoeuvre during the Christian-Liberal coalition than under Chancellor 
Schmidt: (1), Kohl and Genscher had been both neighbours and friends 
for years when they formed a coalition in 1982, (2) in contrast to 
Schmidt, Kohl was neither an expert in foreign policy nor an Economist, 
which complemented perfectly with the Foreign Minister's growing 
recognition and expertise, and (3) after 1982, Genscher further benefited
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from his far-reaching foreign political agreement with the new Federal 
President von Weizsacker.
Despite the favourable division of labour between Kohl and 
Genscher, it would be wrong to assume that the Chancellor's Office 
completely left the field of foreign policy to the Free Democrats after 
1983. On the one hand, Kohl's appointment of fellow-Christian Democrat 
Horst Teltschik as foreign policy adviser in the Kanzleramt introduced a 
good deal of rivalry between the Chancellor's Office and the Foreign 
Office, and also markedly contrasted with the FDP's successful resistance 
against Schmidt's 1976 attempt to unite the competences for Ost- and 
Deutschlandpolitik in the hands of one new state secretary, Hans-Jiirgen 
Wischnewski. On the other hand, while for most of the time period since 
1974, the Free Democrats had successfully ignored the fact that German 
policy was theoretically assigned to the Chancellor's Office, from late 
1989 onwards, the situation became more problematic for the FDP: Kohl 
and Teltschik now seized the initiative in Deutschlandpolitik with the Ten 
Point Plan and retained it throughout the unification process.
Nevertheless, regarding the issue of parliamentary opposition in the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat, we have also seen that the domestic situation 
improved for the Free Democrats after 1982. For much of the 1970s, the 
Union's fierce opposition against Social-Liberal Ostpolitik caused heated 
parliamentary debates and complicated the passage of several agreements, 
such as the 1976 Polish Accords. During the Christian-Liberal coalition, 
however, parliamentary consensus was unusually high, as the Union had 
by then come to endorse detente, and the SPD continued to support it. 
The FDP's main advantage stemmed from the fact that, in contrast to the 
Union, it had been the co-architect of Social-Liberal Ostpolitik, and, in 
contrast to the SPD, was still in power.
Concerning the impact of domestic factors on the Liberals' foreign 
policy, the role of the Basic Law should also be addressed. As shown in 
Chapters Four and Seven, before 1989, the Basic Law mostly affected 
German politicians by providing the constitutional anchoring of certain 
foreign policy principles. By 1990, however, when the prospect of 
German unification - and with it the inner-German debate about the 
constitutional procedure of joining the two Germanies - had arisen, the 
Free Democrats were once again able to seize the matter for themselves. 
While most Liberals concurred with the Union in their support of 
proceeding according to Article 23, their greater emphasis on East
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Germany's right of self-determination effectively shielded the FDP from 
both domestic and international criticism about the government's 
tendency to "gobble up East Germany."
Two other important factors of domestic politics - coalition 
consensus and public opinion - also had a much more favourable effect on 
the FDP's foreign policy during the 1980s than during the 1970s. As 
shown in Chapter Four, the Social-Liberal coalition's high level of 
agreement on Ostpolitik had made for a very promising start, but the 
failure to maintain such consensus resulted in the coalition's breakdown 
by 1982. On the surface, the chances for intra-coalition consensus seemed 
even smaller during the Christian-Liberal coalition, given the strategic 
and ideological competition between the FDP and the CSU. In practice, 
however, Chancellor Kohl's style of leadership - that is avoiding any 
commitments towards either side for as long as possible before endorsing 
the Liberals' position in the end - ensured a much stronger coalition 
consensus than during the Social-Liberal era.
Similarly, between 1974 and 1982, the Free Democrats had not 
been very successful in claiming public opinion for themselves, (1) 
because of the high level of agreement in Social-Liberal foreign policy 
for most of the 1970s, and (2) because the FDP's pro-Atlanticist course 
was out of line with the growing German peace movement in the 1980s. 
During the Christian-Liberal coalition, in contrast, the FDP's call for 
avoiding a renewed arms race interacted favourably with the German 
public's anti-nuclear sentiments. Furthermore, Genscher's running ahead 
of his NATO colleagues in promoting Gorbachev not only consistently 
made him the first or second most popular politician in West German 
public opinion polls, but also made the FDP into an occasional 'leader' of 
public opinion in the 1980s.
With regard to the FDP's functional position in the German party 
system, the domestic situation was also much more favourable during the 
Christian-Liberal coalition than before. Given the CSU's right-wing 
positions, during the 1980s, it was easier for the FDP to prove its 
indispensability as 'third force' in the German party system by acting as a 
moderating and stabilizing force in German foreign policy. What is 
more, in face of Genscher's growing reputation, the Liberals were better 
able to exploit the 'personalization effect' between 1982 and 1990. 
During the Christian-Liberal coalition, the FDP not only used Genscher's 
function as Foreign Minister as bargaining chip in all coalition
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negotiations, but also ran all election campaigns at least partly on 
Genscher's personality.
In sum, the analysis of the FDP's domestic context between 1974 
and 1990 in Chapters Four and Seven has helped to highlight both how 
unfavourable domestic constellations have occasionally constrained the 
Free Democrats' room for manoeuvre in foreign policy, and how 
domestic politics helps to account for the FDP's disproportionally large 
role in foreign policy. The contrast between the FDP's small size and its 
frequently disproportionate impact on foreign policy raises the question 
whether this relationship between domestic politics and Liberal foreign 
policy is a unique characteristic of German politics or whether it exists in 
a similar version in other Western European countries.
The interaction between domestic politics and liberal foreign policy in 
Western Europe
A comparison with other Western European liberal parties shows 
that by several criteria, the Free Democratic Party has a relatively weak 
starting position, at least on the surface: firstly, although most liberal 
parties are unable to boast strong organizational resources, the FDP ranks 
especially low in terms of organized membership, alongside the French 
UDF (Union pour la Democratic Frangaise) and the Dutch D'66 
(Democraten 66). Secondly, while empirical studies show that the 
electorate of many liberal parties in Western Europe is heavily made up 
of transient voters (ranging from 40 to 65 percent), the FDP's lack of 
close ties with a large segment of voters makes it particularly dependent 
on so-called 'fickle' votes.11 Thirdly, compared to the liberal parties in 
Belgium, France and Luxemburg, whose percentage of the votes 
resembles the other major parties in their respective systems, the Free 
Democrats' electoral showing has been very modest.
Despite the FDP's comparatively weak organizational and electoral 
strength, an international comparison also reveals that the German 
Liberals have benefited much more from their domestic environment 
than have the other liberal parties in Western Europe. In other words, the 
FDP's ability to make use of the domestic context for exerting a 
disproportionally large influence over foreign policy is fairly unique,
1 iKirchner, Liberal Parties in Western Europe, p.482
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both by domestic comparison with the SPD and the CDU/CSU and by 
comparison with most other Western European liberal parties. Why this 
is so and most importantly, what it says about the FDP's relationship with 
foreign policy, will be examined next.
To begin with, the Free Democrats have profited from being 
among those Western European liberal parties whose comparatively poor 
electoral results have been inversely linked with high levels of 
government participation.12 Apart from the FDP, the Finnish SFP 
(People's Party of Finland), the Dutch VVD (People's Party for Freedom 
and Democracy) and the Italian PRI (Republican Party) have also 
participated in government far more than their electoral performance 
would imply, partly due to their country's favourable electoral system. 
The extent of the FDP's advantages due to the electoral system becomes 
perhaps most marked by comparison with the British Liberal Party, 
which would almost certainly participate in government, if it were not 
for the operation of the single-member plurality system in Great Britain.
Furthermore, a comparison with other Western European liberal 
parties shows (1) that the German domestic context has strongly favoured 
the FDP in the process of coalition formation and in the subsequent 
allocation of ministries, and (2) that foreign policy has played an 
important role in both processes. The combination of the German 
people's aversion against majority government and the unlikelihood of a 
'grand coalition' between the Social- and Christian Democrats has 
assigned a pivotal role to the Free Democratic Party in the process of 
coalition formation. As Kirchner has pointed out, in principle, the liberal 
parties in Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg could play a similarly 
advantageous role, but in practice have not because 'grand coalitions' 
involving the two major parties have been much more common in those 
countries.13
Importantly, foreign policy has played a central role in the Free 
Democratic Party's coalition formation and has hence reinforced the 
FDP's favourable domestic position. This thesis has shown that all 
throughout the Social-Liberal coalition, the FDP's decision to continue 
the alliance with the Social Democrats was to an extent motivated by its
12Of the forty-five years of the Federal Republic's existence, the FDP has been in 
government for thirty-eight.
l 3Kirchner, Liberal Parties in Western Europe, p.483
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desire to guarantee the continuity of Ostpolitik. Similarly, the FDP's 
1982 decision to enter a coalition with the Union was partly linked to 
security-political issues, and foreign policy has also played an important 
role in the Free Democrats' decision to renew their commitment to the 
Christian-Liberal coalition in all elections since the 'Wende'.
In addition, the FDP's central role in coalition formation has 
allowed it to gain disproportionate pay-offs in terms of the allocation of 
ministries, which has for instance been apparent in its long-term 
occupation of the German Foreign Ministry. A comparison with other 
Western European liberal parties reveals that even very small liberal 
parties in general have had their claims for leading ministries fulfilled, 
usually either in the field of protecting individual rights (Interior, 
Justice) or in the realm of free market principles (Economics, Finance, 
Trade). However, the FDP's position is once again unique, firstly because 
the Free Democrats' pivotal role in the formation of German coalitions 
has led to a disproportionate pay-off regarding both the quantity and the 
quality of cabinet posts, and secondly because the FDP has monopolized 
the German Foreign Ministry since 1969. Compared with the other 
Western European liberal parties, only the Liberal Party in Luxemburg 
can boast a similarly high extent of holding the Foreign Ministry in the 
post-Second World War period.14
The FDP's long-term control over the Foreign Ministry has in 
return produced a number of additional advantages, for instance the fact 
that by its very nature, the Foreign Ministry has conferred media 
prominence on the party. Furthermore, the Free Democrats have had the 
opportunity to influence the Foreign Office with liberal principles and 
values, which in return has enhanced their credibility for further office- 
holding. Lastly, the significance of the Foreign Ministry has often been 
heightened by political developments, for instance crises in the EC and 
detente and the process of German unification, which has allowed the 
FDP to claim much credit for the foreign policy achievements of the 
governments in which it has participated.15
In addition to the Federal Republic's electoral system and 
favourable domestic context, the Free Democrats have succeeded
l^Kirchner, Liberal Parties in Western Europe, p.479 Note that the FDP has also 
occupied the post of Minister of Economics since 1972.
l 5Roberts, The Free Democratic Party and the New Germany, p. 151
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comparatively well in projecting themselves into the limelight with the 
help of leading liberal personalities. A comparison with other liberal 
parties in Western Europe shows that such a reliance on the 
'personalization effect' it is not an uncommon practice, considering for 
instance the Luxemburgian Liberal Party's heavy concentration on its 
leader Gaston Thorn and the Italian PRI's focus on the two Prime 
Ministers from its ranks.16 However, once again, the case of the FDP's 
reliance on Hans-Dietrich Genscher has been particularly marked. On the 
one hand, his eighteen years in office have made Genscher the longest- 
serving Foreign Minister in the Western world, and on the other hand, no 
previous West German Foreign Minister has succeeded in mobilizing the 
press for himself to such an extent. Thus, while during his early years in 
office, Genscher was aware of his dependence on the Liberals' electoral 
success, over the years, this situation slowly reversed, and the FDP 
increasingly relied on Genscher's growing reputation at home and 
abroad.
Lastly, the FDP has greatly profited from the fact that since 1949, 
it has overcome the Liberals' historical problem of being divided into 
two strands. This is remarkable, for while the Liberals in Austria, 
Luxemburg, Sweden and the United Kingdom are also united in one 
party, in the majority of Western European countries, there continue to 
exist two or even more liberal parties. The benefit of overcoming the 
German Liberals' historical division for instance becomes apparent by 
comparison with the situation in Italy, where the two liberal parties PRI 
and PLI have only managed to be together in government for very short 
periods of time, which has been at the cost of their influence over Italian 
policy-making. What is more, the FDP's regular incumbency of 
government office has helped the German Liberals to conceal an inherent 
ambivalence between their left- and right-wings, as coalition agreements 
have often required one or the other wing to compromise.
In this context, it should also be pointed out (1) that within the 
FDP, there has been remarkably little disagreement over foreign policy 
and Ostpolitik, and (2) that in the few debates about foreign policy which 
have taken place, the FDP has not differed greatly from most other 
liberal parties in Western Europe. For instance, concerning the Free 
Democrats' internal disagreement over the stationing of US Pershing
16Note that the PRI 'merely' has an electoral means of 2.74%.
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missiles in the Federal Republic after 1983, the left-wing's strict 
opposition to deployment was reflected in the Dutch D'66 and in the 
British Liberal Party. Similarly, along with the FDP's right wing, the 
Dutch VVD staunchly supported the deployment of US Pershing missiles 
on their country's territory. On the whole, it seems noteworthy that, 
apart from some left-wing liberals' stronger anti-nuclear stance, most 
liberal parties in Western Europe have been united in their firm support 
for NATO, and that, although many Western European liberal parties 
have continued to be divided over socio-economic issues, their views of 
foreign policy have tended to be nearly identical.17
Overall, a comparison with other Western European liberal parties 
has demonstrated that the Federal Republic's electoral system, the process 
of coalition- and government formation in Germany, and the FDP's 
situation as a unified party with strong leadership has positioned the FDP 
particularly well to capitalize on the favourable interaction between 
domestic politics and liberal foreign policy. In face of the FDP's 
comparatively advantageous position in the Federal Republic, many 
authors besides this study have raised the question as to what degree the 
FDP has used its strategic advantages in the German system to hold on to 
power at the cost of a loss of programmatic distinctiveness. Rudiger 
Zulch, Jurgen Dittbemer and Christian Soe, for instance, have all argued 
that the FDP's functional role has led it to sacrifice policy and ideology at 
the cost of government participation.18
To some degree, this thesis has tended to confirm these hypotheses, 
and this has been most apparent in relation to Hans-Dietrich Genscher's 
particular style of leadership. With his strategy of committing the FDP to 
a coalition partner before the elections and with his consequent and 
exclusive emphasis on the Free Democrats' positive aspects, Genscher 
succeeded in covering up the party's lack of clearly liberal policies and 
therefore contributed to the FDP's regular re-election, but only at the 
price of renewed suspicion about their opportunistic character. Arguably, 
precisely Genscher's strong leadership accounts for some of the FDP's 
problems today: (1) just as Genscher found it difficult to follow in Walter
17For a further discussion of the FDP's foreign policy values in international 
comparison, see pp. 274-278
l 8Ziilch, pp. 12-18; Dittberner, pp. 142-154; Soe, The Free Democratic Party.
pp. 112-120
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Scheel's footsteps during the early years of his office, his successor Klaus 
Kinkel now faces an unfavourable comparison with his predecessor, (2) 
since the Free Democrats can no longer hide behind Genscher's 
personality, their lack of clear programmatic positions has become much 
more obvious, which is (3) aggravated by the fact that with unification 
and the break-up of Eastern Europe, the Free Democrats have lost 
Ostpolitik as their field of special expertise.
Nevertheless, the question remains whether the combination of the 
Federal Republic's external environment and the FDP's favourable 
domestic position can fully account for its foreign policy actions or 
whether, as Chapters Two and Five have attempted to answer, the Free 
Democrats have also been guided by liberal principles and ideology. This 
is precisely the question which will be addressed in the next and last 
section of this Conclusion.
Liberal ideology
There are three main aspects of the impact of liberal ideology on 
the FDP's Ostpolitik between 1974 and 1990 to consider. Firstly, this 
section will attempt to determine the special characteristics of German 
liberal foreign policy by domestic and international comparison. 
Secondly, we shall assess the overall compatibility of the FDP's various 
principles (as shown in Chapters Two and Five), and thirdly look at some 
of the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in liberal foreign policy 
ideology.
Special characteristics of the FDP's ideology in domestic and international 
comparison
Clearly, the attempt to define the special characteristics of the 
FDP's foreign policy values by domestic comparison poses a number 
problems. To begin with, none of the goals which the Liberals supported 
were seriously contested by the SPD or the Union, which made it difficult 
for the FDP to claim that its objectives were specifically 'liberal.' There 
was a remarkable domestic consensus in Germany both about the need 
firmly to integrate the Federal Republic into the Western community of 
states and about a policy of rapprochement with Eastern Europe.
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Similarly, the Free Democrats could hardly claim credit for advocating 
worldwide peace and more human rights, since these values tend to be 
supported by all democratic forces. Furthermore, as Garton Ash has 
pointed out, after the end of the Cold War, all German parties naturally 
tried to claim the credit for unification, with the Christian Democrats 
drawing a straight line from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Kohl, the Social 
Democrats pointing to Willy Brandt's influential role in the 1970s and in 
1990, and the Free Democrats celebrating the triumph of Genscherism.19
However, Chapters Two and Five have shown that in some ways, 
the FDP's foreign policy values did differ from those of the Social 
Democrats and the Union, for instance regarding the Liberals' view of 
the Soviet Union's intentions and their resulting policy towards Eastern 
Europe. Along with the Union, the Free Democrats evaluated Moscow's 
intentions as expansionist, but contrary to many Christian Democrats, the 
Liberals did not think that an arms race or a confrontational policy would 
lead to Soviet counter-concessions. While the FDP shared this latter view 
with the SPD, the Liberals did not agree with most Social Democrats' 
(apart from a small wing around Chancellor Schmidt) evaluation of the 
Communist states as insecure regimes which called for recognition and 
one-sided concessions. Overall, regarding their assessment of the 
Kremlin's intentions and their resulting policies, the Free Democrats 
assumed an ideological middle position between the two major parties.
In terms of concrete politics, this for instance manifested itself in 
the three parties' approach to human rights. In line with their view of the 
Eastern European states as insecure, most Social Democrats opposed a 
human rights campaign against the Communist bloc, whereas the 
Christian Democrats were more prone to believe that moral pressure on 
the Soviet Union would force the Kremlin into counterconcessions. As 
shown above, the Free Democrats preferred to elicit humanitarian 
concessions via a policy of small steps or through Eastern Europe's 
voluntary commitment to more human rights in a process of 'do ut des.' 
In addition, it has been demonstrated that the FDP assumed an ideological 
middle position between the SPD and the CDU/CSU on the issues of 
detente and defence.
Chapter Five has also shown that the Free Democrats have differed 
from the other German parties in their unremitting efforts for extending
i^Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, p.363
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the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, right up to the 
1991 debate in the Bundestag about united Germany's future capital. The 
FDP's striving for extending the competences of the United Nations, e.g. 
Genscher's 1976 call for a UN Court of Human Rights, also distinguished 
the Free Democrats from the other West German parties, if making the 
Liberals prone to attacks about their 'idealism.'
Lastly, the FDP was the only West German party which 
continuously supported the two main pillars of West German foreign 
policy after World War II, that is both West- and Ostpolitik. While the 
Christian Democrats steadily supported the Federal Republic's firm 
commitment to the West, the Union's long and fierce opposition to 
Ostpolitik and its initial vote against the Final Act of Helsinki calls for 
some modification of the argument about a straight line from Adenauer 
to Kohl. Similarly, the SPD had not officially accepted Westpolitik before 
1959 and, during their time in opposition from 1982 until 1990, came to 
embrace the concept of 'liberalization through stabilization' so fully that 
many Social Democrats opposed German unification in 1990.
The question remains whether the Free Democrats' foreign policy 
values were a special characteristic of German liberalism, or whether the 
FDP's principles are shared by most other liberal parties in Western 
Europe. In assessing this question, this section will rely on Derek Hearl's 
analysis of the party platforms of fourteen Western European liberal 
parties (see Table pp.276-277). In order to determine whether the 
policies advocated by these parties can justifiably be labeled 'liberal,' 
Hearl has compared their programmes since World War II to those of all 
other parties in Western Europe. While on the one hand, Hearl's analysis 
has revealed the striking similarities between the policies of all 
democratic parties in Western Europe, on the other hand, it has also 
demonstrated that liberal parties tend to attach greater importance than 
most other parties to the values of democracy, individual freedom, 
human rights, European unification and foreign special relations.20
Are there any special characteristics of German liberalism, then? A 
comparison of the ten most salient issues in the Western European liberal 
parties' platforms over the post-war period, again based on Hearl's
2^Hearl, pp.438-444 and 451-452 Hearl has also analysed that some of the issues 
which liberals focus on today would qualify as 'new' as opposed to 'old' liberalism - 
in other words, peace, internationalism, democracy and foreign special relations 
represent the issues of the 1970s and 1980s rather than those of the 1940s and 1950s.
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model, leads to three interesting observations: firstly, in the FDP's party 
programmes, foreign policy has played a more important role than in any 
other of the thirteen Western European liberal parties. Out of the FDP's 
ten most prominent policy priorities, three have been related to foreign 
policy, while the other Western European liberal parties have on average 
merely listed 1.5 foreign policy issues as most urgent objective.21
Secondly, each of the FDP's three foreign policy priorities - human 
rights, European Community and special foreign relations - is 
noteworthy by itself. To begin with, although most Western European 
liberal parties attach great importance to the issue of human rights, in 
terms of relative importance, human rights rank highest with the FDP 
(second most important priority). In contrast, the FDP's concern with the 
European Community is only shared by the Italian PLI, and no other 
Western European liberal party shares the FDP's preoccupation with 
special foreign relations.
Thirdly, regarding the question why the German Liberals have 
attached such comparatively great importance to foreign policy in the 
first place and to the issues of human rights, European/national 
unification and special foreign relations in particular, the answer most 
likely lies in a combination of two factors: the German Liberals' 
historical tradition and the Federal Republic's special post-war situation 
as a non-sovereign state. While Hearl's analysis has demonstrated that all 
Western European parties strive for more human rights, for the FDP, a 
policy of small steps geared at humanitarian improvements in Eastern 
Europe has been especially important, considering the great number of 
ethnic Germans in the Communist states, Germany's division into two 
halves and the Federal Republic's geographic proximity to Eastern 
Europe.
Similarly, the combination of the German Liberals' historical 
heritage and Germany's unsatisfied demands after World War II also 
helps to explain the FDP's concentration on (1) special foreign relations 
(with the Eastern European states) and (2) on the European Community, 
as the Free Democrats have firmly believed that national unification 
could only be achieved within a pan-European peace order. This is not to 
say that the Free Democrats have solely been motivated by national
21 If one includes democracy in the analysis, given the inherent link between 
democratic values and liberal foreign policy, the FDP names four out of ten main 
values in the realm of foreign policy, while the other parties on average list 2.2.
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Liberal Party Policy 'profiles’
Source: Derek Hearl, 'Ambivalence revisited: an analysis of liberal party manifestos since 1945,' in Emil 
Kirchner, 'Liberal Parties in Western Europe.' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)
"N'= Number of manifestos since World War II in each case
% = Average proportion of each manifesto devoted to the various issues named in the party programmes
Austria Belgium
FPO____________ (N=9)_________ %_ P R L / P V V  (N = 131______ %
Democracy 13.56 Free enterprise 10.56
Internationalism 7.49 Non-economic groups 7.94
Social justice 5.92 Middle-class groups 6.85
Freedom and human rights 5.25 Economic orthodoxy 3.99
Social services 5.17 Agriculture/farmers 3.69
Free enterprise 4.38 Decentralisation 3.54
National effort 4.22 Government efficiency 3.47
Agriculture/farmers 4.20 National effort/social harmony 3.27
National way of life 4.10 Freedom and human rights 3.21
Non-economic groups 3.93 Technology and infrastructure 2.97
Denmark Denmark
Radikale Venstre fN=16) % Venstre (N = 161 %
Productivity 5.95 Economic orthodoxy 8.78
Social justice 5.06 Productivity 4.77
Military: negative 4.88 Incentives 4.27
National effort/social harmony 4.69 Free enterprise 3.86
Non-economic groups 4.34 Social justice 3.44
Specific economic goals 3.23 Specific economic goals 2.53
Incentives 2.97 Education 2.25
Internationalism 2.41 Decentralisation 1.88
Social services 2.31 Freedom and human rights 1.83
Education 2.22 Agriculture/farmers 1.83
Regulation of capitalism 2.22
Germany Italy
F D P  fN = 8) % PLI (N = 8) %
Social justice 6.54 Free enterprise 7.58
Freedom and human rights 4.20 Social justice 4.51
Technology and infrastructure 4.15 Freedom and human rights 4.39
Non-economic groups 3.77 Democracy 3.46
Agriculture/farmers 3.68 Regulation of capitalism 3.01
Education 3.41 Economic orthodoxy 3.00
Social services 3.18 European Community 2.51
Foreign special relations 3.00 Government efficiency 1.88
Democracy 2.55 Labour groups 1.78
European Community 2.54 Non-economic groups 1.77
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Italy
P R I  (N = 6) %
Luxemburg
D P  CN=7) %
Government efficiency 6.68 Middle-class groups 12.40
Democracy 4.67 Social services 8.97
Social justice 4.18 Agriculture/farmers 6.70
Freedom and human rights 3.71 Social justice 6.67
Economic planning 2.37 Non-economic groups 5.88
Decentralisation 2.20 Freedom and human rights 4.42
Non-economic groups 2.10 Democracy 4.26
Specific economic goals 1.60 Education 4.02
Productivity 1.49 Technology/Infrastructure 3.72
Traditional morality (negative) 1.33 Art, sport, leisure, media 3.72
Netherlands
V VD (N = l  1) %
Free enterprise 10.75
Social justice 5.88
Economic orthodoxy 5.65
Social services 4.28
Non-economic groups 3.89
Education 3.83
Freedom and human rights 3.67
Incentives 3.46
Internationalism 3.04
Netherlands 
D ’ 66 CN=4) %
Social servies 9.40
Democracy 9.19
Environment 7.79
Social justice 6.39
Internationalism 4.97
Freedom and human rights 4.86
Technology/infrastructure 4.72
Education 4.31
Government efficiency 3.40
Norway
Norges Venstrelag ( N = 1 11 %
Norway
Det Nve Folkepartiet f N s l l %
Social services 7.96 Technology/inffastructire 7.68
Education 7.40 Environment 7.68
Technology/infrastructure 6.81 Internationalism 7.09
Agriculture/farmers 6.46 Non-economic groups 6.30
Social justice 6.10 Agriculture/farmers 6.10
Productivity 5.19 Democracy 5.41
Art, sport, leisure, media 4.87 Decentralisation 5.41
Environment 4.77 Social services 5.41
Middle-class groups 4.50 Education 4.82
Decentralisation 4.44 Social justice 4.43
Sweden
Folkpart iet  fN=131 %
United Kingdom 
Liberal Partv (N = l l ) %
Social services 13.48 Democracy 5.10
Social justice 5.59 Internationalism 4.77
Freedom and human rights 5.39 Social services 4.48
Democracy 5.13 Decentralisation 4.15
Internationalism 4.97 Social justice 3.56
Education 4.40 Full employment 3.43
Free enterprise 4.37 National effort/social harmony 3.24
Incentives 4.12 Agriculture/farmers 3.19
Economic orthodoxy 3.95 Non-economic groups 3.08
Environment 3.68 Freedom and human rights 3.08
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considerations in foreign policy, but it is an attempt to explain the FDP's 
slightly different accents in foreign policy, although this chapter has 
shown that overall, the Free Democrats' foreign policy principles are 
quite representative of Western European liberalism in general. Next, we 
shall consider the link between liberal values and foreign policy in more 
detail, both by assessing the overall compatibility of the FDP's various 
principles and by looking at some of the dilemmas inherent in liberal 
ideology.
The impact o f liberal ideology on the FDP's Ostpolitik
An examination of the FDP's history and ideology in Chapters 
Two and Five has shown firstly that the Liberals have been significantly 
influenced by their predecessors' legacy and secondly that the Free 
Democrats have benefited from the relative compatibility of their various 
foreign policy values with each other. In other words, the Liberals' 
fairly balanced approach to the issues of domestic politics and foreign 
policy, German nationalism and European integration, realism and 
idealism, human rights and intervention aided them in the pursuit of their 
objectives and also increased their room for manoeuvre in Ost- and 
Deutschlandpolitik.
To begin with, after World War II, the Free Democrats continued 
to adhere to the traditional liberal conviction that "...free foreign policy 
and free domestic policy depend upon each other," that is to say only a 
country with a democratic constitution could conduct a 'liberal' foreign 
policy.22 However, for a number of reasons, the Free Democrats' attempt 
to balance domestic and foreign policy has been more successful than 
their predecessors', (1) because their negative past experience has led the 
Liberals to attach greater priority to domestic freedom than to national 
freedom and (2), since the Free Democrats have overcome the Liberals' 
historical division into two wings, which greatly contributed to domestic 
stability. (3), given the Federal Republic's limited room of manoeuvre in 
international relations after 1949, many Free Democrats have considered 
it especially important to make "a sensible domestic politics" into an 
"element of foreign policy," and (4) were greatly aided in this attempt by 
Germany's much more democratic domestic stucture since World War
22Maier cited in Reinhold-Maier-Stiftung (II), p.26
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II, apparent in the democratic party system, the Basic Law, the social 
market economy, public opinion, and the attitudes of the elite.23
Furthermore, the Free Democrats' Ostpolitik profited from their 
concept of embedding Germany's national problems in the wider 
European framework. From the 1960s onwards, the Free Democrats 
increasingly relied on Gustav Stresemann's conviction "that precisely via 
international relations one can and must pursue national goals."24 First 
the FDP, and then most other German politicians, concluded that the way 
for Bonn to achieve reunification was to work towards a European peace 
order, in which the Germans could achieve unity in free self- 
determination. In Hans Dietrich Genscher's words, the new maxim was: 
"The more European German politics is, the more national it is..."25 By 
renouncing some of their sovereignty, the Germans ultimately hoped to 
regain it, and by calling for self-determination and human rights 
everywhere, the Free Democrats hoped to achieve these objectives for 
the Germans, too. Timothy Garton Ash has assessed this link between the 
German question and European integration as follows: "...As with 
Stresemann, there was the mixture, so difficult to analyse, of genuine 
Europeanism and genuine nationalism..."26
With the concept of embedding national interest in international 
relations, the Free Democrats have also inherited a certain blend of 
'realist' and 'idealist' elements from Gustav Stresemann. On the one 
hand, both Stresemann and the Free Democrats have proved 'realists' by 
pursuing the national goal of restoring German sovereignty (and after 
1949, German reunification). On the other hand, the means employed 
both by Stresemann and the FDP to achieve their objectives have been 
'idealist,' i.e. the readiness for cooperation with Germany's Allies and 
the FDP's emphasis on the new elements in post-1945 international 
relations, such as economic, technological and scientific interdependence 
and the need for multilateral cooperation.
Chapter Five has also shown that the Free Democrats tried to 
resolve the dilemma over the principle of non-intervention and their
23Heuss cited in HeB, p.91; Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, p.359
24Stresemann cited in Thimme, p. 126
25Wirtschaftswoche, 16.9.88, Interview with H.D.Genscher
26Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, p.358
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striving for more human rights by distinguishing between their short- 
and long-term objectives. In the short run, the FDP regarded the 
principle of non-intervention prior to a human rights campaign, as the 
latter would be dangerously destabilizing. For the time being, the 
Liberals thus put peace above democracy and focused on a pragmatic 
policy of detente, small steps, and coexistence. In the long run, however, 
the Free Democrats' order of priorities was reverse for three reasons: 
(1), in the FDP's view, the Liberals' efforts to get the Communist states 
voluntarily to sign human rights obligations, such as in the Final Act of 
Helsinki, no longer allowed the Eastern European states to complain 
about Western interference with their internal affairs, (2) the Free 
Democrats firmly believed that the liberal idea was superior to 
Communism and would eventually assert itself, and (3), in line with 
Kant's legacy, the Free Democrats tended to view any action less than 
dictatorial interference as principally legitimate if it served the cause of 
democracy, such as their attempt to save the Eastern European people 
from Soviet dictatorship.
This study has also shown that in many ways, Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher has epitomized the search for compromise, balance and 
compatibility that has characterized the FDP's foreign policy making 
since the end of World War II. Firstly, there is Genscher's aversion to 
strong words and plain speaking, which he once expressed by stating that 
in foreign policy, "speech is silver but silence is golden."27 Timothy 
Garton Ash, who has called Genscher "...the archetypal Bonn waffler" 
and described his speeches as "...endless coats of many shades of grey, 
...layered wedding-cakes of blancmange, ...monuments of sowohl-als- 
auch." has also pointed out that Genscher's vague, harmonising use of 
language served Germany's purposes well in this period, as the Federal 
Republic mainly aimed at bridging the gaps between East and West.28
Secondly, Genscher was particularly representative of the FDP's 
search for compromise in foreign policy. Long before his appointment as 
Foreign Minister, during the FDP's 1967 party congress in Hanover, 
Genscher already suggested a compromise formula concerning
27DFS, 13.9.84, Interview with H.D.Genscher
2^Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, p.375 Garton Ash has argued that "It was this 
getting on with all sides, not the specific advocacy of taking Gorbachev at his word, 
that was the real essence of Genscherism."
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Germany's acceptance of the Oder-Neisse border (over the telephone 
because he had turned ill), which a majority of the Free Democrats 
eventually supported.29 Similarly, during the 1976 debate about the 
ratification of the Polish Treaties in Parliament, Genscher's successful 
plea for a minor change in the Polish text eventually won over the 
Union's assent. During the East German refugees' occupation of Bonn's 
embassy in Prague in 1989, it was Genscher who came up with the face- 
saving formula which resulted in East Germany's permission to let the 
refugees emigrate to the Federal Republic, and in 1990, Genscher's 
NATO plan contributed to the process of German unification by taking 
Soviet sensitivities about the future military structure of Germany into 
account.
Thirdly, Genscher has personified the FDP's harmonising effect on 
foreign policy through the balance which he attached to the various 
liberal priorities according to the 'Zeitgeist.' When he feared that 
Germany would depart from the appropriate support for NATO's 
deterrence measures in 1982, the Foreign Minister changed over to a 
Christian-Liberal coalition to maintain the 'right' balance between 
detente and defence. Likewise, when Genscher sensed that Gorbachev 
was seriously ready for reform in the mid-1980s, he unambiguously 
announced his support for the Soviet leader. Thus, while Genscher's 
approach to foreign policy was generally representative of German 
Liberalism, the special 'Genscherist' element lay in certain aspects of his 
personal style, which rendered him the epitome of German Liberalism in 
this period: his vague, harmonising use of language, his talent at devising 
compromise formulas, his efforts to get along with all sides (both at 
home and abroad) and his capacity of sensing both the risks and chances 
inherent in change more quickly than others.
An assessment of liberal foreign policy ideology
So far, it has been shown that the FDP's concentration on certain 
foreign policy issues can to a high degree be explained by historical 
liberal values and by Kant's legacy, and that the Liberals have profited
2 9 T h e  formula ran; "...while the final decision about the Eastern borders can only be 
taken after a peace treaty, the possible unification of the two parts of Germany must not 
fail due to territorial question..." Kaack, Die FDP. Grundrifi und Materialien zur 
Geschichte. p. 104
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from the relative compatibility of their various foreign policy values with 
each other. Yet, despite their historical and philosophical heritage, the 
Free Democrats' preoccupation with daily politics and the need to adjust 
their concepts to the reality of world politics has caused a number of 
contradictions and dilemmas in liberal foreign policy, both at the 
theoretical level and at that of praxis. It is to these incompatibilities and 
dilemmas in liberal ideology that we shall turn next.
To begin with, while Kant in his pamphlet on 'Perpetual Peace' 
very deliberately discussed the philosophical heritage of the 
Enlightenment, the Free Democrats were much more ambiguous about 
acknowledging their foreign policy convictions as some form of 
ideology. On the one hand, the Liberals occasionally openly admitted that 
they aimed at transferring their values to the other parts of the world in 
the long run. Wolfgang Mischnick, for instance, said in 1980:
"We are aware how difficult it is to transfer the politics which 
was undeniably successful in Europe to other parts of the 
world. That's a principal aim of our foreign policy, an old 
free-democratic goal..."30
In line with this view, most Liberals regarded the breakdown of Eastern 
Europe as a triumph of Liberalism.
On the other hand, the Liberals refuted the view that their support 
for the democratization process in Eastern Europe was an attempt to 
assert liberal ideology. Based on the FDP's assumption that the Soviet 
Union was a full member of Europe, and that Europe's joint liberal 
ideological heritage had always continued to exist and had only been 
covered up by the Cold War for some time, the Free Democrats regarded 
the process of liberalization in Eastern Europe as a return to the joint 
European values and as a process of "de-ideologization."31 Taken 
literally, the term 'de-ideologization' seems to imply that the breakdown 
of Communism would leave an ideological vacuum in Eastern Europe. 
There is no trace of an assessment within the FDP how far the ideals of 
the French Revolution also made up for an ideology, and whether the 'de-
3^Mischnick, DB, 196th sess., 17.1.80, debate about the government declaration
31fdk 11, 11.1.90, Lambsdorff's speech in Tel Aviv on 11.1.90 on 'Europe and 
Germany at the beginning of the 1990s'
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ideologization' of Eastern Europe was not rather a replacement of one 
ideology with another. Similarly, in talking about the return to Europe's 
joint heritage, the Liberals clearly referred to the values of the 
Enlightenment and did not pay much attention to the question whether 
Europe might have shared some values before the Enlightenment.
Apart from the FDP's ambiguous position on its views as an 
ideology, several liberal foreign policy objectives also proved 
incompatible with each other, thus causing dilemmas both on the 
theoretical and on the practical level. Despite the Free Democrats' 
frequent references to the prominent role of the principle of self- 
determination in the liberal value system, there is little trace of a critical 
examination of the concept as such. For instance, the FDP never openly 
acknowledged the difficulty or even futility of the attempt to identify 
those criteria which a national group should fulfil in order to be entitled 
to self-determination. Nor did the German Liberals ever address the 
question of how far the principle of self-determination was compatible 
with other international principles, i.e. territorial integrity and world 
peace. As Harald Johnson has pointed out:
"It would be highly explosive to allow an unrestricted claim for 
any group, minority, population of foreign origin...or 
irredentist faction which felt that it had a grievance."32
Recently, the impossibility of a universal application of the principle of 
self-determination has become obvious in terms of the Balkanization we 
see today.
Furthermore, concerning the Free Democrats's conviction that only 
a state with a democratic constitution could conduct liberal foreign 
policy, in terms of the resulting question as to whether this meant that all 
states had to become democracies before liberal foreign policy goals 
could be achieved worldwide, Kant produced much the clearer concept. 
While Kant was aiming at the emergence of a system of perpetual peace 
in the long run, the philosopher also emphasized that, for the time being, 
he did not want to replace the existing world system by republican states 
only "since this is not the will of nations, according to their present 
conception of international right."33 There is little trace of an FDP
32Johnson, p.86
33Kant 'On Perpetual Peace' in Reiss, p. 105
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attempt to analyse the compatibility or incompatibility of simultaneously 
aiming at democracy for all states and worldwide peace.
Lastly, Liberal politics and philosophy have also hardly been 
compatible regarding the liberal aim of a worldwide peace order based 
on international law. The Free Democrats never openly acknowledged the 
dilemma that while Liberalism has finally been very successful in 
creating a zone of peace among the liberal democracies, it has equally 
strikingly failed to guide foreign policy outside the liberal world. 
Michael Doyle has partly explained this failure with the fact that outside 
the democratic world, the liberal regimes are caught in the international 
state of war as the Realists see it, with conflicts being a natural result of 
the struggle for resources, prestige and security among sovereign, 
independent states.34
The Free Democrats have thus had to contend with the mismatch 
between the egalitarian order of law as they promoted it and the 
hierarchical order of power in international relations. While in law, all 
states are equal, in reality, they are not. As a matter of fact, states are far 
more unequal than the individuals in a state, and any attempts to create 
moral standards of behaviour in international relations have proved very 
difficult. As Fred Halliday has pointed out:
"International affairs are, notoriously, the area where moral 
considerations apply least, and we have come to accept different 
moral criteria for states than for individuals."35
Even the Free Democrats' hope that the great powers would do their best 
to sort out the moral problems in the world has not proved realistic since 
such hopes have overstated the willingness of the great powers to assume 
their global responsibilities.
Overall, the Free Democrats have demonstrated a certain blend of 
'idealism' and 'realism' on many foreign policy issues. The Liberals' 
position on the question of man's fundamental nature and on the balance 
between detente and defence can, for instance, be viewed as 'realist.' 
However, in general terms, their foreign policy approach should be 
classified as idealistic, a fact which has manifested itself in two ways.
34Doyle, p.325
33Halliday, p. 12
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First, the Free Democrats have been true idealists according to Charles 
Beitz's definition that idealists do not claim that the realization of their 
goals will be easy or that they can foresee the dynamics by which they 
may be realized. Ideal theory only requires that its realization in practical 
terms is theoretically possible.36 The Free Democrats have not claimed 
that the achievement of national unification, worldwide human rights, 
international law and global peace could be guaranteed by a certain point 
of time or by a certain approach. Equally, they have not abandoned these 
goals as too difficult.
Instead, the Liberals have viewed the absence of such a world 
community of liberal-democratic states as a challenge to construct one. In 
fact, the FDP's belief that their ideals would most likely have some 
bearing on present world politics even if it was not possible to realize 
them immediately has been the second idealist element in their foreign 
policy making. Kant had expressed similarly optimistic convictions in 
'Perpetual Peace" by stating that if his preliminary articles were adhered 
to, they would at least push the system in the right direction - towards 
perpetual peace.37 Hans-Dietrich Genscher was a major representative of 
this liberal aspiration to turn theory into practice. Even though one must 
keep in mind that German unification had just been completed when 
looking at the following statement of his, it is nevertheless indicative of 
the close link he saw between theory and practice: "For me, wanting 
something and making it come true is always identical."38
Despite their awareness of the evil in man's nature and despite their 
reservations about the feasibility of achieving their goals, both Kant and 
the modem German Liberals have ultimately been optimists. Thus, in 
contrast to the international and domestic parameters, whose impact on 
the FDP's room for manoeuvre in Ostpolitik changed substantially 
between 1974 and 1990, liberal ideology and personalities have provided 
a crucial element of continuity, independence and indeed identity for the 
party.
36Beitz, Political Theory, pp. 156, 160
37Brown, p.34
3^Genscher cited in Die Zeit, 3.10.91
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Chronology
1974
6 May 
16 May
20 June 
9 August
30 September-2 October 
28- 31 October
1975
1 August 
9-10 October 
19 December
1976
19 February
3 October
2 November
1977
13-15 June
4 October
28 October
Willy Brandt resigns as Chancellor after the discovery of an East 
German spy in his office
Helmut Schmidt becomes Federal Chancellor and head of the 
Social-Liberal coalition. Hans-Dietrich Genscher succeeds 
Walter Scheel as Foreign Minister
Bundestag ratifies Prague Treaty
President Nixon resigns; Gerald Ford becomes President of the 
United States
FDP Party Congress in Hamburg. Genscher replaces Scheel as 
Party Chairman
Schmidt and Genscher visit the Soviet Union. Third German- 
Soviet natural gas pipeline agreement signed
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe concluded in 
Helsinki with the signing of the 'Helsinki Final Act'
Genscher visits Poland. Agreements on credit, pensions and 
emigration of ethnic Germans signed
Inner-German agreement on transit arrangements between West 
Berlin and the rest of the Federal Republic signed
Bundestag ratifies Polish Treaties
Bundestag elections - Social-Liberal coalition re-elected
Jimmy Carter elected President of the United States
Genscher visits the Soviet Union
First CSCE follow-up conference begins in Belgrade (closes 9 
March 1978)
Schmidt's speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(ESS) in London, pointing to the West's security gap in the area of 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles
287
1978
7 April
4-7 May
16 November
1979
5-6 January 
18 June
21-24 November 
12 December
27 December
1980
15 May
22-23 June 
30 June-1 July 
5 October
17 October
4 November
12 November
1981
I-2 April 
22-25 November 
30 November
II-13 December
13 December
President Carter indefinitely delays the decision about producing 
the neutron bomb
Brezhnev visits the Federal Republic. German-Soviet agreement 
on long-term economic and industrial cooperation signed
Inner-German negotiations about traffic and payment transactions 
concluded
Presidents Carter, d'Estaing, Callaghan and Chancellor Schmidt 
meet in Guadeloupe
Carter and Brezhnev sign SALT II agreement in Vienna 
Andrei Gromyko visits Bonn 
NATO dual-track decision taken 
Soviet Union invades Afghanistan
West Germany joins US boycott of Moscow Olympic Games
G7 summit in Venice
Schmidt and Genscher visit Moscow
Bundestag elections - Social-Liberal coalition re-elected
Beginning of Geneva talks between the USA and the Soviet Union 
on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)
Ronald Reagan elected President of the United States
Second CSCE follow-up conference begins in Madrid (closes 15 
July 1983)
Genscher meets Gromyko in Moscow 
Brezhnev visits Bonn
USA and Soviet Union resume INF talks in Geneva
Schmidt visits the GDR. Summit meeting with Honecker at the 
Werbellinsee
Martial Law declared in Poland
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1982
17 September 
1 October
10-12 November
Four FDP ministers resign. Social-Liberal coalition ends
Schmidt loses his office as Chancellor through a constructive vote 
of no confidence. Succeeded by Helmut Kohl
Brezhnev dies. Yuri Andropov becomes leader of the Soviet Union
1983
6 March
23 March 
4-7 July
22 December
23 December
Bundestag elections. Helmut Kohl becomes Federal Chancellor 
and head of the Christian-Liberal coalition. Genscher remains 
Foreign Minister
President Reagan announces SDI programme 
Kohl and Genscher visit Moscow
Bundestag votes for deployment of US Pershing and cruise 
missiles in West Germany
Soviet Union breaks off INF negotiations in Geneva
1984
13 February 
May
20-22 May
Konstantin Chernenko succeeds Andropov as leader of the Soviet 
Union
Soviet Union begins 'revanchism campaign'
Genscher visits Moscow
1985
23-25 February
11 March
March 
2 July
FDP Party Congress in Saarbriicken. Genscher resigns from the 
post of Party Chairman. Succeeded by Martin Bangemann
Michail Gorbachev succeeds Chernenko as leader of the Soviet 
Union
US-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva resumed
Eduard Shevardnadze succeeds Gromyko as Soviet Foreign 
Minister
29 November-5 December First Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting in Geneva
1986
20-22 July
11-12 October
Genscher visits Moscow. Both sides agree to 'open a new page' in 
German-Soviet relations
Second Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting in Reykjavik
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4 November Third CSCE Follow-up conference opens in Vienna (closes 15 
January 1989)
1987
25 January
6-11 July
7-11 September
8 December
1988
17-19 January
29 May - 1 June 
24-27 October
1989
20 January 
2 February 
19 March 
2 May 
12-15 June 
10 September
30 September
7 October 
18 October 
4 November 
7 November
9 November 
28 November
Bundestag elections. Christian-Liberal coalition re-elected
President von Weizsacker and Foreign Minister Genscher visit 
Moscow
Honecker visits the Federal Republic
Third Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting in Washington. USA 
and Soviet Union sign the INF Treaty
Shevardnadze visits the Federal Republic
Fourth Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting in Moscow
Kohl visits Moscow
George Bush succeeds Reagan as President of the United States
MBFR talks ended in Vienna (after sixteen years)
Conventional Force Reduction talks (CFE) begin in Vienna
Hungary begins to dismantle its border with Austria
Gorbachev visits the Federal Republic. 'Bonn Declaration1 signed
Hungary opens its border with Austria
East German refugees at West German embassy in Prague are 
permitted to leave for the West in special trains
GDR celebrates its fortieth anniversary
Honecker resigns. Succeeded by Egon Krenz
Czechoslovakia opens its borders with the Federal Republic
East German government resigns
Opening of the Berlin Wall
Kohl announces his 10-Point Plan for overcoming Germany's and 
Europe's division
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1990
10-11 February
12-14 February
18 March
5 May 
21 June
1 July 
14-16 July
31 August 
3 October 
9 November
2 December
Kohl and Genscher visit Moscow. Gorbachev signals readiness to 
cooperate on German reunification
2+4 formula for negotiating the external aspects of German 
unification announced at the Ottawa 'open skies' meeting
Free Volkskammer elections in the GDR. Grand coalition of 
Christian and Social Democrats formed
First 2+4 meeting in Bonn
Oder-Neisse border formally recognized
German Monetary, Economic and Social Union comes into force
Kohl and Genscher in Moscow and the Caucasus. Gorbachev 
agrees to united Germany's membership in NATO
Federal Republic and GDR sign the Unification Treaty
Day of German Unity. Germany is reunified
German-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed
First pan-German elections to the Bundestag. Christian-Liberal 
coalition re-elected
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